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Abstract
Four studies were conducted with the following samples a): people with frequent nightmares; b) people 
with sleep apnoea; c) fire-fighters and d) people with traumatic brain injury. Nightmare frequency was 
significantly elevated in these groups compared to the normal population. Correlations between nightmare 
frequency and various measures of psychopathology and individual differences were similar in size to those 
found in student samples. However, partialling out nightmare distress did not render nightmare frequency -  
psychopathology correlations negligible. Indeed, in the fire-fighters study, only one fire-fighter reported 
having a problem with nightmares. Nightmare frequency is thus not an artifact o f nightmare distress in 
these samples. Defining nightmares as having to wake up the sleeper made no difference to between 
subjects correlations with the individual difference and psychopathology variables, and to within subjects 
correlations with state mood. However, requiring the dream to be very unpleasant as opposed to just 
moderately unpleasant to be classed as a nightmare did result in increased sizes o f correlations. Within 
subjects correlations of pre-sleep mood with the presence/absence of a nightmare that night were small in 
comparison to between subjects analyses. Nightmares are thus more likely to be caused by general trait or 
long-term poor well being than by acute poor well-being. None of the individual difference variables 
assessed in this study predispose individuals to have nightmares under conditions of high anxiety or high 
depression. This was despite the individual difference variables in many cases having significant between 
subjects correlations with nightmare frequency. Ratings of PTSD correlated with nightmare frequency in 
individuals who had undergone repeated exposure to trauma (emergency service workers), and in 
individuals who had had one severe trauma (individuals with traumatic head injury). Despite sleep 
fragmentation there was no indication of cessation of dreaming in the patients with apnoea, but 
approximately one third of the participants with brain injury had complete cessation of dreaming. These 
results are discussed in terms of theories o f nightmare formation, and of the continuity o f  waking and 
sleeping cognition.
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1Chapter 1 
General Introduction
This thesis reports investigations of the aetiology of nightmares, and the 
correlates of nightmare frequency and of the distress caused by nightmares.
Definition of nightmares
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders defines a 
nightmare as an ‘extremely frightening dream’ from which a person wakes up 
directly. The nightmare is remembered in detail and is said to ‘usually involve threats 
to survival, security or self esteem’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Nightmares are thought to occur predominantly in the REM sleep stage in the latter 
part of the sleep cycle (Fisher et al, 1970; Hartmann, 1984), however, they can occur 
in NREM sleep (Hefez et al. 1987; van der Kolk et al. 1984). They are said to be 
accompanied by little if any autonomic arousal (Fischer, Byrne, Edwards and Kahn, 
1970). However, night terrors, also referred to as ‘pavor noctumus’, ‘incubus attacks’ 
or ‘stage 4 nightmares’ are quite rare and said to occur usually early in the night 
during slow wave NREM sleep. They are often accompanied by marked increases in 
autonomic arousal, marked fear, screaming and little or no recollection of a dream 
(Kales et al. 1980b). Night terrors have been viewed as a ‘disorder of arousal’ rather 
than one of sleep (Broughton, 1968).
2Prevalence of nightmares.
Prevalence estimates of nightmare frequency in the general population have 
not been consistent. Hartmann (1984) reported that the average number of nightmares 
experienced by adults is estimated to be one or two per year. The American Sleep 
Disorders Association (1990) estimated that 5% of the adult population experience at 
least one nightmare per month. Klink and Quan (1987) found a prevalence of 8.1% 
for nightmares; however, Bixler et al (1979) found an estimate of 5.3% when using a 
similar definition of nightmares. Nielsen and Zadra (2000) estimated that 4-8% of the 
general population had a ‘current problem with nightmares’. For instance, in a twin 
study, Hublin et al (1999) found that 3% had nightmares weekly, whereas 10% had 
nightmares monthly. In Spoormaker et al (in press) 2.2% of the general Dutch 
population suffered ‘much’ or ‘very much’ from nightmares and 7% suffered ‘a little’ 
from nightmares. It is likely that the inconsistency of these prevalence rates can be 
attributable to different criterion for defining a nightmare and the time scales used.
Research has also suggested that women tend to report more nightmares than 
men (Ohayon et al. 1996). DSM-IV describes the ratio as between 2-4: 1 (American 
Psychiatric association, 1994). It has also been reported that women have a higher 
dream recall frequency in comparison to men (Schredl and Palmer, 1998) which may 
lead to a higher recall of nightmares. However, Klink and Quan (1987) found an equal 
prevalence of nightmares among elderly males and females. This suggests along with 
other research that nightmare frequency may decrease with age (Salvio et al, 1992).
Inconsistency in how nightmares are defined
Much of the inconsistency in prevalence rates of nightmares is attributable to 
how various authors have defined and measured a ‘nightmare’. The use of
inconsistent definitions of what it is that constitutes a nightmare has lead to problems 
in interpreting the nightmare literature. Some researchers have argued that a 
nightmare can be and should be distinguished from other disturbing dreams because it 
causes the sleeper to awaken. However, others have not included this waking criterion 
in their definitions. For example, Hartmann (1984) defined a nightmare as a long 
frightening dream that awakens the sleeper. Many others have utilised similar 
definitions, which encompass this waking criterion (Coalson, 1995; Feldman & 
Hersen, 1967; Hersen, 1971; Levin, 1994; Levin & Hurvich, 1995; Miller & DiPilato,
1983). However, many researchers have not used this waking criterion (Belicki,
1992a; Bixler et al., 1979; Blagrove et al, 2004; Chivers & Blagrove, 1999; Kales et 
al., 1980a; Klink & Quan, 1987; Salvio et al., 1992; Wood & Bootzin, 1990). For 
instance, Wood et al (1992) defined nightmares as ‘frightening dreams with visual 
content and an elaborate story’. Some researchers provided no definition of a 
nightmare to subjects (Belicki & Belicki, 1986; Cemovsky, 1983; Dunn & Barrett, 
1988; Haynes & Mooney, 1975; Heame, 1991; Stepansky et al., 1988).
Use of the waking criterion in the definition of a nightmare
The waking criterion is used as it is assumed by many that waking from an 
unpleasant dream is an indirect measure of nightmare intensity. Although Zadra and 
Donderi (1993) found that 45% of bad dreams are found to have emotional intensities 
equal to or exceeding those of the average nightmare. Furthermore, Krakow, Kellner, 
Pathak & Lambert (1995) found that less that one forth of chronic nightmare sufferers 
report always awakening from their nightmares. Zadra and Donderi (1993) assessed 
the use of the waking criterion. They defined nightmares as disturbing dreams that 
awaken the sleeper and bad dreams as disturbing dreams that do not awaken the
sleeper. They demonstrated that nightmare frequency had more significant 
correlations than bad dream frequency with measures of well-being. This suggests 
that people who experience bad dreams are low on measures of well being, but not to 
the extent demonstrated by those with nightmares. Therefore, this study seems to 
support the use of the waking criterion. They highlight that group studies which 
define nightmares using the waking criterion would classify bad dream only 
participants as control participants; hence, this may lead to an increase in the control 
group’s mean scores on measures of psychopathology. However, those studies that do 
not use a waking criterion place may place bad dream only participants in the 
experimental nightmare group, thus decreasing the mean psychopathology scores of 
the experimental group. The authors argue that this may account for some of the 
inconsistent findings reported on the relationship between nightmare frequency and 
measures of psychopathology. Schreuder et al (2000) found that direct awakening 
from a bad dream resulted in higher total scores on the Symptom checklist-90 and 
higher scores on several posttraumatic complaints. However, subjects in this study 
had posttraumatic stress disorder and the majority experienced both types of dreams. 
In contrast, Kellner et al (1992) found no relationship between direct awakenings 
from a frightening dream and associated distress. Blagrove et al (2004) found that the 
frequency of unpleasant dreams (a combined measure of disturbing dreams that wake 
the sleeper and those that do not) is a better index of low well being than nightmares 
alone (with the waking criterion).
Validity of the waking criterion
Blagrove and Haywood (2006) assessed whether people believe they are able 
to judge whether the imagery or emotion of a dream caused them to wake up. It is
possible that some individuals may be inaccurate in the judgements they make about 
their sleep and that this may be a problem when expecting people to judge whether a 
nightmare woke them up or not. It is suggested that there may be a halo effect when 
people are deciding whether a nightmare woke them up, with awakening being 
erroneously attributed to a dream that had particularly unpleasant events or emotions. 
The authors investigated how certain people were in deciding that a nightmare woke 
them. In order to reduce the halo effect and attributions participants were asked to 
make awakening decisions about all dreams (whether pleasant or unpleasant). They 
found that judgements of being woken by a dream were made with high certainty 
particularly for very unpleasant dreams. Furthermore, judgements that dreams did not 
cause awakenings were made with moderate to high certainty. In a sub sample it was 
found that participants were significantly more certain in judgements that dreams had 
woken them than in judgements that dreams had not woken them. It was also found 
that dreams in general that were judged to cause awakening were significantly more 
unpleasant than dreams judged not to cause awakening. Thus, the authors conclude 
that if certainty can be used as evidence that people are accurate in attributing 
awakening to their dreams then it may be valid to include the waking criterion in the 
definition of a nightmare. Importantly, level of certainty was not related to state or 
trait anxiety or nightmare distress suggesting that these judgements are valid.
Blagrove and Haywood (2006) also highlight other possible advantages of 
using the waking criterion. One possibility is that the waking criterion provides a 
more exact and clear definition of what constitutes a nightmare. They argue that this 
may be important when using retrospective measures to measure nightmare frequency 
as these two categories of nightmares differ in the accuracy of retrospective frequency 
estimations. This could be the result of the difference in ease of making instances of
6these two categories of nightmares available to memory (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). It could also be the case that waking criterion nightmares produce more 
distress than non-waking nightmares (inclusive nightmares). Separate studies have 
assessed state distress resulting from waking criterion nightmares (Levin and 
Fireman, 2002b; Ohayon et al 1997) and resulting from inclusive definition 
nightmares (Kothe and Pietrowski, 2001; Krakow et al 2002), but no study has 
directly compared the two. However, trait nightmare distress has been found to 
correlate more strongly with prospective frequency of waking criterion nightmares 
than with prospective frequency of inclusive definition nightmares (Blagrove and 
Haywood, 2006; Blagrove et al. 2004). A further point of interest raised by these 
authors is whether waking criterion nightmares and inclusive definition nightmares 
respond differently to treatment. However, there has been no research on treatments in 
inclusive definition nightmares.
Problems with using the waking criterion
Blagrove et al (2006) caution that a possible confound in using the waking 
definition of nightmares is that frequent awakenings from sleep have been reported in 
people suffering from nightmares compared to controls in studies using inpatients 
(Hersen, 1971), participants, of which some had suffered trauma (Krakow et al. 1995) 
and insomniacs (Ohayon et al 1997). Furthermore, Germain and Nielsen (2003) found 
poorer general sleep in people with trauma related nightmares. Thus, while it may be 
the case that individuals in such clinical populations may be able to correctly judge 
when they have been awakened from a nightmare, the frequent awakening and 
nightmares may at times occur simultaneously leading to the erroneous judgement 
that the nightmare caused the awakening. Blagrove and Haywood (2006) state that
although subjective reports of frequent awakenings are increased in non-clinical 
populations with nightmares (Levin, 19094; Schredl, 2003) this has not been found 
polysomnographically for idiopathic nightmares (Germain and Neilsen, 2003).
Clearly it would be productive if all studies made the distinction between 
waking criterion and inclusive definition nightmares. This would allow for 
consistency across studies but also enable the exploration of the different correlates of 
these two types of dreams. Furthermore, Blagrove et al (2006) suggest that data from 
studies using both these definitions can be combined in order to make comparisons 
with studies that have not used the waking criterion as a necessity in their definition 
of a nightmare. It may then be possible to explain the inconsistencies surrounding the 
prevalence of nightmares in the general population as well as offering insight into the 
differences between nightmares that wake the sleeper and bad dreams that do not.
The role of emotion in the definition of a nightmare
A further problem with the defining of nightmares is that the majority of 
researchers have defined nightmares as frightening dreams (e.g. Bixler et al., 1979; 
Feldman & Hersen, 1967; Hartmann, 1984; Hersen, 1971; Kales et al., 1980a; Levin, 
1998; Levin & Hurvich, 1995; Miller & DiPilato, 1983; Salvio et al., 1992; Wood & 
Bootzin, 1990). However, Zadra and Donderi (1993) found that 17% to 30% of the 
nightmares reported contained emotions other than fear such as anger and grief. Zadra 
et al (2004) conducted a content analysis of nightmares and found incidences of 
61.1% for fear/ anxiety and 38.4% for other negative emotions (e.g. anger, grief) in 
nightmares.
Other studies have shown that nightmare sufferers also report many other 
negative emotions besides fear, such as anxiety (Perlis, Warbasse & Bootzin, 1990).
8A similar conclusion was reached by Belicki et al. (1985). This research suggests that 
the criterion defining a nightmare should be broadened from a ‘frightening dream’ to 
include dreams that contain other distressing negative emotions. However, an agreed 
definition should be reached so that studies can be meaningfully compared.
Inconsistencies due to sampling differences
Another source of variability within the literature is that different studies have 
focused on different populations. The majority of studies have used undergraduates 
(Cellucci & Lawrence, 1978; Dunn & Barrett, 1988; Feldman & Hersen, 1967; 
Haynes & Mooney, 1975; Lester, 1968, 1969; Levin, 1989, 1998; Levin & Hurvich, 
1995; Wood & Bootzin, 1990), others have used non clinical adults (Heame, 1991; 
Kales et al., 1980a; Miller & DiPilato, 1983) or adults with a lifelong history of 
nightmares (Berquier & Ashton, 1992; Hartmann & Russ, 1979; Hartmann et al., 
1981) or psychiatric inpatients (Hersen, 1971). Hence, it is possible, if not probable 
that the nature and strength of the relationship between nightmare frequency and 
measures of psychopathology will vary across some of these populations. Thus, it 
may be less meaningful to make comparison between studies conducted on very 
different populations.
The definition of frequent nightmares
Researchers often talk about people who suffer from ‘frequent’ nightmares, 
however, there is often a different consensus of what is meant by ‘frequent’. Some 
classify participants into a frequent nightmare group if they report at least one 
nightmare a week (Dunn & Barrett, 1988; Feldman & Hersen, 1967; Hartmann et al., 
1981; Levin, 1998), whereas, others classify participants into a frequent nightmare
group if they report at least one nightmare a month (Belicki & Belicki, 1986; Berquier 
& Ashton, 1992; Hersen, 1971; Kales et al., 1980a; Levin, 1989). Levin and Fireman 
(2002a) found in their study that participants reporting three or more nightmares (i.e. 
one or more a week) reported significantly higher levels of psychological disturbance 
than those reporting two nightmares or less. Hence, they argue that this highlights the 
validity of a once per week diagnostic criterion rather than once a month, as it is a 
more meaningful indicator of dysfunctional nightmare behaviour. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that there any many inconsistencies within the nightmare literature when 
there is no agreed consensus as to what is meant by the term ‘frequent nightmares’.
Retrospective verses prospective measures of nightmare frequency.
A further problem adding to the inconsistency within the nightmare literature 
is the use of differing methodologies. A major issue here is that until fairly recently 
the majority of studies only used retrospective self-report in order to assess nightmare 
frequency. The retrospective method has been shown to produce considerably lower 
estimates of nightmare frequency compared to retrospective reports. For instance, 
Wood and Bootzin (1990) used both retrospective measures of nightmare frequency 
and contemporaneous logs of the incidence of nightmares. Undergraduates were 
asked to estimate the number of nightmares they had experienced in the past month 
and the past year and also to record the number of nightmares they experienced over a 
period of 2 weeks. It was found that the retrospective self-reports produced a lower 
estimate of nightmare frequency by a factor of 2.5. They found that participants 
reported a 150% higher mean nightmare frequency using a prorated 2-week log than 
they reported on a 12-month retrospective estimate and a 91% increase over the 
prorated mean 1-month estimates. Blagrove et al. (2001) also found that dream logs
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produced a mean estimate of nightmare frequency (using waking criterion) that was 
25% higher than the retrospective questionnaires. Similarly, Salvio et al. (1992) 
demonstrated that nightmares in the elderly were 10 times more prevalent, when 
assessed by dream logs, than had previously been estimated using retrospective self- 
reports.
Zadra and Donderi (2000) confirmed and extended such findings. They argued 
that there were various methodological shortcomings of Wood and Bootzin’s study, 
firstly that their reporting period was only 2 weeks which was then prorated to 52 
weeks for comparison to the 12 month retrospective reports. Hence, small variations 
in these two weeks would magnify the variability of a prorated 52-week estimate. 
Furthermore, Wood and Bootzin instructed their participants to record only 
nightmares and hence, this focus might have influenced participants’ reports. Zadra 
and Donderi, therefore, used a 1-month dream log (in which all remembered dreams 
were recorded) also retrospective estimates of pleasant dreams (eg. flying dreams) 
were also measured together with disturbing ones. In this study nightmares were 
defined as very disturbing dreams that awaken the sleeper, whereas, bad dreams were 
defined as very disturbing dreams that do not awaken the sleeper. Hence, the authors 
were able to examine whether retrospective reports and daily logs produced different 
estimations of nightmares and bad dreams. It was found that the retrospective 
measures produced markedly lower estimations of both nightmare and bad dream 
frequency. Their results also suggested that bad dreams were even more prevalent 
than nightmares. When the 1 month log data were prorated over 52 weeks, it was 
found to give an annual frequency 162% higher than the mean 12 month retrospective 
estimate and 92% higher than the prorated mean 1 month retrospective estimates. The
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prorated annual bad-dream frequency estimated from the logs was 69% and 53% 
higher than the 12-month and the prorated 1-month estimated respectively. Hence, 
they found that the frequency of both nightmares and bad dreams were lower when 
retrospective measures were used; however, retrospectively measured nightmare 
frequency was lower than for bad dreams. The authors attempted to explain this latter 
finding by suggesting that fewer nightmares were recalled retrospectively as a result 
of the stronger negative dream content, as retrospective estimates of flying and lucid 
dreams were closer to dream log frequency data than were retrospective estimates of 
nightmares and bad dreams. However, Blagrove et al. (2004) argued that lucid and 
flying dreams are also rarer than nightmares and, hence, this may be a simpler 
explanation for the smaller difference between their retrospective and prospective 
estimates of frequency. However, in order to investigate the motivated forgetting 
hypothesis suggested by Zadra and Donderi, Blagrove et al. (2004) investigated 
whether the lower estimate of nightmare frequency obtained retrospectively (which 
they also found in their study) was related to the mean emotional tone of the 
participants’ dreams. However, they concluded that the underestimation appeared to 
be due to. a simple function of forgetting over time rather than a motivated forgetting 
explanation. Alternatively, it may be the case that keeping a log increases the 
frequency of the experiencing or reporting of unpleasant dreams.
A similar concern occurs with retrospective and log assessments of dream 
recall frequency. Zadra and Donderi (2000) found that a larger number of dreams 
were reported in the dream logs than were reported in retrospective estimates of 
dream recall frequency. When asked the number of dreams they recalled a week on 
the retrospective questionnaire the mean dream recall frequency was 5.82 (SD= 3.06). 
The mean number of dreams reported in the 4-week logs was 27.13 (SD14.24) or 6.78
12
dreams per week. Hence, they suggested that either retrospective reports 
underestimates the total number of dreams or that keeping a dream log increases 
dream recall, or both. Hence, prospective estimates can not necessarily be considered 
to produce the ‘true frequency’ compared to retrospective measures but rather it is 
more helpful to consider them as two different estimates.
Idiopathic and PTSD nightmares
It is important to distinguish between idiopathic (or ordinary) nightmares and 
posttraumatic nightmares. Posttraumatic nightmares can occur following exposure to 
a traumatic event. Nightmares can occur as part of the PTSD syndrome or as part of a 
posttraumatic stress reaction. Posttraumatic nightmares typically re-enact the 
traumatic event and occur repetitively. Kilpatrick et al (1998) found that 
approximately 60% of patients with PTSD experienced nightmares. A similar 
prevalence rate of 56% was reported by Schreuder et al. (2000) for PTSD nightmares 
in a sample of war veterans who continued to re experience their combat trauma from 
more than 40 years previously. However, idiopathic nightmares are those which are 
long standing and emerge in the absence of an identifiable external trigger. Hartmann 
(1996) compared posttraumatic and idiopathic nightmares and found that post 
traumatic nightmares usually occurred earlier in the night, whereas, idiopathic 
nightmares occurred in the last hours of sleep. Kales (1980a) found that average time 
of occurrence for idiopathic nightmares was 212 minutes after sleep onset. Hartmann 
also noted that posttraumatic nightmares were associated with more limb movements 
than idiopathic nightmares. However, Germain and Nielsen (2003) found that both 
idiopathic and posttraumatic nightmares were associated with an elevated number of 
periodic limb movements, in comparison to a healthy control group. This study also 
found that individuals with posttraumatic nightmares experienced a lower sleep
efficiency (longer and more frequent awakenings). PTSD nightmares will be 
examined in more detail later in this chapter as they are investigated in the third and 
fourth studies of this thesis.
Nightmare Distress
Nightmare distress refers to the impact that nightmares have on daily 
functioning, including fear of going to sleep and of meeting people who have been in 
one’s nightmares. Belicki (1992) found that nightmare frequency and nightmare 
distress were only moderately correlated (r = 0.26). Thus, it seems that some people 
can have lots of nightmares and not be bothered by them, whereas others may 
experience relatively few nightmares but become very distressed by them.
Spoormaker et al (2006) claim that nightmare distress seems to be almost like a trait 
variable with correlations to trait but not state anxiety (Belicki, 1992) and neuroticism 
(Levin and Fireman, 2002a). The variable has also been correlated with physical 
complaints (Kothe and Pietrowsky, 2001) and stress related symptoms (Zadra and 
Donderi 2000). Belicki (1992) found that only nightmare distress, and not nightmare 
frequency, was associated with heightened psychopathology. Wood and Bootzin 
(1990) reported a similar association between nightmare frequency and distress. Levin 
and Fireman (2002a) also found that prospective ratings of nightmare prevalence and 
trait nightmare distress were not significantly associated (r =0.21). Blagrove et al 
(2004) also demonstrated that nightmare distress was a mediating variable for the 
relationships of nightmare frequency and measures of psychopathology. Furthermore, 
when nightmare distress was controlled for nightmare frequency (retrospective and 
prospective measures) was no longer related to any of the psychopathology or
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personality variables. However, interestingly when nightmare distress was controlled 
for, weak but significant relationships between bad dream frequency and anxiety, 
depression and neuroticism all remained. Therefore, this latter finding supports the 
proposition that it is useful for investigators to distinguish between nightmares 
(waking criterion) and bad dreams (inclusive definition). However, this study used the 
Belicki (1992) Nightmare Distress Scale, which contains a response format based on 
frequencies and, thus, it has been argued that the format is likely to be confounded by 
nightmare frequency (Schredl et al. 2003). Therefore, the correlation between 
nightmare frequency and nightmare distress may be too high when this scale is used. 
However, a lower correlation was found with nightmare frequency when a nightmare 
distress scale was used with an intensity scale.
This research suggests that nightmare distress could be a confounding factor in 
many previous studies and may have stronger relationships with measures of 
psychopathology than nightmare frequency. However, the concept of nightmare 
distress is still vague. It remains to be evaluated as to whether nightmare distress is a 
mental complaint or personality trait. Furthermore, imagery treatments for nightmares 
work on the principle of reducing the frequency of nightmares, thus, it is unclear how 
nightmare distress would be affected by treatment. The latter studies reviewed suggest 
that it would be more effective to treat the distress associated with the nightmares 
rather than the frequency. However, it can reasonably assumed that imagery therapy 
and changing the ending of nightmares may decrease distress by empowering and 
increasing the a person’s sense of control over their nightmares.
Individual difference correlates of nightmare frequency and nightmare distress
It has been suggested that nightmares may be indicative of an underlying 
psychopathology. However, there have been many conflicting results on whether the 
frequency of nightmares is correlated to waking psychopathology. This is because not 
only has there been a failure to replicate some findings, but that there has recently 
been raised the possibility that relationships between nightmare frequency and 
psychopathology are confounded by trait nightmare distress (Blagrove et al, 2004). 
The individual difference variables that have been investigated will now be reviewed.
Proneness to psychosis.
There is some evidence to suggest that frequent nightmares may have a 
specific association with schizophrenic spectrum disorders and in particular 
schizotypy (Hartmann, 1984; Kales et al. 1980a; Hartmann et al., 1981; Hartmann et 
al., 1987; Claridge et al., 1997; Levin, 1998; Levin & Raulin, 1991; Levin, 1990; 
Levin, Galin & Zywiak, 1991; Herz & Melville, 1980; Fennig et al., 1992).
Van der Kolk and Goldberg (1983) stated that most schizophrenics have at 
least one nightmare per month during periods of remission. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated that pre-psychotic patients often report nightmares (Stone, 1979). 
Kestenbaum (cited in Hartmann, 1984), in a longitudinal study found that nightmares 
were a frequent'symptom in children that later went on to develop schizophrenia. 
Hartmann (1984) found that a significantly high proportion of persons who 
experienced one nightmare per week throughout their lifetime reported that a first or 
second degree relative suffered from schizophrenia. Such observations lead Hartmann 
to conclude that the nightmare group were genetically vulnerable to schizophrenia.
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Hartmann also found that 25% of his nightmare sufferers had at least one relative who 
had attempted or committed suicide.
Many investigators have proposed that nightmares and schizophrenia may 
share a common biology (Doty, 1989; West, 1962). Evidence to support this assertion 
is the observation that parkinsonian patients administered with L-dopa often have a 
intermittent phase of frequent nightmares, thus, suggesting that nightmares and 
schizophrenia are bio-chemically if not etiologically related (Hartmann, Skoff, Russ, 
& Oldfield, 1978).
Hartmann et al (1984) compared nightmare sufferers with two matched 
controls groups all recruited via newspaper advertisements. There were 12 subjects in 
each group (6 male and 6 female) all between 20 and 35 years of age. Inclusion in the 
nightmare group required a lifelong history of nightmares and a frequency of one 
nightmare per week. The first control group consisted of vivid dreamers and the 
second of those who had neither nightmares nor vivid dreams. It was found that the 
nightmare subjects demonstrated elevated scores on the psychosis scales of the MMPI 
but not on the neuroticism scales. The authors concluded that there was more 
pathology in the nightmare group, which took the direction of schizophrenia. Out of 
the 12 nightmare sufferers; two were diagnosed with schizophrenia, three with 
schizotypal personality and one with borderline personality. Hartmann concluded that 
his nightmare subjects ‘very strikingly did not have the characteristics of 
neurotics’(p.73) and none could be diagnosed as having anxiety states, phobic states, 
or obsessive-compulsive disorder. Thus, this study clearly advocates that the types of 
psychopathologies specifically heightened in chronic nightmare sufferers are the
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schizophrenia spectrum disorders and not neurotic disorders. Kales et al (1980a) also 
reached a similar conclusion. They found that the nightmare group had especially 
elevated scores on the paranoid and schizophrenia scales; however, they also found 
that all the clinical scales of the MMPI, including neurotic scale, were elevated.
Hartmann (1984) argues that there may be several reasons for these 
differences; firstly, Kales et al. (1980a) selected participants who reported ‘twelve or 
more nightmares within the previous year but not necessarily with a lifelong history 
of nightmares, however, Hartmann et al. included only people who reported at least 
one nightmare per week and they had to be lifelong nightmare sufferers. Also, in 
contrast to Hartmann et al (1984), Kales et al. noted that 43% of their group reported a 
current or past insomnia. Hartmann pointed out that the MMPI profiles of insomniac 
patients ‘almost always have elevated scores on the many MMPI scales, especially the 
neurotic scales’. Hence, the greater incidence of insomnia in Kales et al’s study may 
have contributed to the increased score on the neurotic scales. A further difference 
between Kales et al’s and Hartmann et al’s study, is that in contrast to Hartmann et 
al’s study, 60% of the nightmares sufferers in the Kales et al. study reported the 
occurrence of a major life event preceding the onset of the nightmare disorder. Thus, 
Hartmann (1984) argues that Kales et al’s sample are more similar to the veterans 
with post traumatic nightmares reported in the Van der Kolk et al. (1980) study.
A large-scale study by Levin and Raulin (1991) assessed the relationship 
between frequent nightmares and schizotypal symptomatolgy. They used a sample of 
669 undergraduate students (446 females and 223 males) who were administered 4 
measures of schizotypy (Chapman, Chapman & Raulin, 1976; Raulin, 1984; Raulin,
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Chapman & Chapman, 1978; Chapman, Chapman & Raulin, 1978). A nightmare was 
defined as ‘a scary dream that awakens the dreamer from sleep’. They found that 
perceptual aberration, intense ambivalence and somatic symptoms were all 
significantly positively correlated to nightmare frequency, however, the fourth scale 
physical anhedonia was negatively correlated to nightmare frequency. Hence, these 
findings support the proposed link in aetiology between frequent nightmares and 
schizotypal traits and furthermore, point to specific disorders of thought. The authors 
interpreted their findings in terms of a disturbance of ego boundaries. They suggest 
that even in a non-clinical population, nightmare sufferers ‘may lack the capacity to 
maintain a consistent, firm boundary around the mental representation of the self and 
to differentiate separate internal representations of different external objects’ (pp 12). 
When the data were analysed separately according to sex, Levin and Raulin (1991) 
found that the female’s data contributed primarily to the overall significance of the 
findings. It was suggested that this was because the females were more disturbed by 
their nightmares than the males and that these effects are readily generalised to their 
waking experiences. Hence, this is consistent with the assertion that nightmare 
distress may be a mediating factor in the relationship between nightmare frequency 
and measures of psychopathology (Belicki & Parry, 1987) and, hence, may be a 
confound in the relationship between schizotypy and nightmare frequency. In fact, 
research has suggested that there is a significant relationship between schizotypy and 
nightmare distress. Claridge et al. (1997) gave a non-clinical adult sample of 204 (117 
females and 87 males) four measures of psychosis proneness, these were; the 
Schizotypal Personality (STA) and the Borderline Personality (STB) (STQ; Claridge 
and Broks, 1984) and the Physical Anhedonia (PhA) and Social Anhedonia (SoA) 
(Chapman et al. 1976). They found that the STA was the only psychosis proneness
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measure positively related to nightmare distress and it was the biggest single 
predictor. They found this was still the case even after controlling for neuroticism 
which otherwise had a strong influence throughout the data (this will be discussed in 
more detail later). Claridge et al. also found that overall women reported more 
nightmare distress, but in addition they found that irrespective of gender, nightmare 
distress increased as a function of self-evaluated feminine traits, as measured on the 
BEM Sex Role Inventory (BEM, 1973). Hence, this finding may offer some insight as 
to why Raulin and Levin found that females contributed disproportionately to the 
overall significance of the relationship between schizotypy and nightmare frequency. 
However, Claridge et al. (1997) did not include any measure of nightmare frequency. 
Hence, these studies appear to support the notion that nightmares are associated with 
the schizophrenic spectrum disorders, although, it is less clear to what extent these 
associations are due to increased nightmare frequency or to the emotional distress 
caused by the nightmares.
Schizotypy
Levin and Fireman (2002a) examined the role of nightmare frequency, state 
nightmare distress and various measures of psychopathology including schizotypy.
116 undergraduates (31 males and 85 females) completed a 21 day dream log. A 
nightmare was defined as a ‘scary dream that awakens the dreamer from sleep’. The 
authors, hypothesised that the relationship between nightmare frequency and 
psychological disturbance would be largely attributable to the level of state nightmare 
distress with one exception: schizotypy. They argued that for individuals scoring 
highly on this measure, that nightmares would occur more frequently and be 
experienced as more ‘egosyntonic’ and, hence, be experienced with less distress.
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Therefore, they hypothesised that for schizotypy nightmare frequency would 
contribute unique predictive variance, irrespective of the level of subjective distress. 
They found that individuals reporting nightmares on a weekly basis reported more 
psychiatric disturbances on most scales of the SCL-90-R as well as greater levels of 
dissociation and schizotypy than individuals reporting 2 or less nightmares over the 
21 day logs. Both nightmare frequency and state nightmare distress were significantly 
related to most measures of psychological disturbance, it was found that these 
relationships were often stronger for the distress dimension. With the exception of the 
SCL-90-R phobia subscales, the state distress dimension was related to all measures 
of psychopathology, whereas, nightmare prevalence was not related to either measure 
of depression (SCL-90-R or BDI) nor to state or trait anxiety or pathological 
dissociation. Furthermore, when the shared variance was removed state nightmare 
distress was found to consistently account for more unique variance to the prediction 
of higher psychological disturbance than nightmare frequency. Both state nightmare 
distress and frequency were significantly associated with schizotypy (as measured by 
perceptual aberration, Magical Ideation and PER-MAG) although the correlations 
were stronger with nightmare distress. Nightmare frequency was not significantly 
related to the psychoticism scale on the SCL-90-R, however, the distress dimension 
was. The authors reported that nightmare frequency was not uniquely predictive of 
schizotypy and failed to contribute any significant variance to the Psychoticism scale 
of the SCL-90-R. Hence, the authors conclude that there is no evidence to suggest a 
specific relationship between nightmare frequency and psychosis proneness.
Berquier and Ashton (1992) also concluded that frequent nightmares were 
reflective of a ‘global maladjustment rather than specific psychotic symptomology’
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(pp249). They used a sample of 30 non-clinical adults who experienced one 
nightmare or more per month since childhood. The mean age was 34.7 yrs (ranging 
from 19-63). They were compared with 30 low nightmare frequency control subjects 
with a mean age of 35.9 years. Selection criteria for the control group were the 
presence of less than two nightmares per year on average. Participants completed a 
dream dairy for 1 month. Subjects also completed the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (Hathoway and McKinley, 1940) and the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975) and a drug use questionnaire. The 
findings demonstrated that the nightmare subjects scored significantly higher on the 
EPQ Neuroticism scale and on 8 of the MMPI clinical scales than did the control 
group. However, the nightmare sufferers were not shown to be significantly higher on 
the EPQ Psychoticism scale.
Hence, there seems to be some inconsistency in the findings from different 
studies. Hartmann et al’s (1984) data reveal some important gender differences, which 
may in part explain these inconsistencies. The MMPI profiles demonstrate that male 
nightmare sufferers tended to have higher scores than the females on the psychotic 
scales (paranoia, psychasthenia and schizophrenia). The Rorschach tests also 
suggested more thought disorders and psychotic thinking among the males. Hence, 
Hartmann, concluded that the ‘males could be considered slightly more disturbed on 
average than the females’ (p.99). It may be if the sample is predominantly female then 
averaging may reduce the mean scores on these psychotic scales given the indication 
of a ‘global psychopathology’ (Berquier and Ashton, 1992).
Furthermore, Hartmann et al (1984) and Kales et al (1980a) relied on 
retrospective estimates of nightmare frequency, whereas, Berquier and Ashton used
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daily logs to measure nightmare frequency, and as mentioned previously nightmare 
frequency tends to be underestimated on retrospective reports.
Creativity and Fantasy Proneness
Evidence suggests that creativity is a heterogeneous concept compromised of a 
multiplicity of factors (Belcher, Rubovits and DiMeo, 1981; Richards, 1981) which 
has caused considerable debate in the literature regarding its definition and 
measurement (Treffinger, Renzulli and Feldhusen, 1971). The problem is made more 
difficult still by the need to distinguish the creative process from the creative product 
and convergent from divergent creativity. Levin, Gallin and Zywiak (1991) concluded 
that there does not appear to be overwhelming evidence that subjects who self-report 
frequent nightmares are significantly more creative than those that do not.
Hartmann et al (1981) found that lifelong nightmare sufferers have a potential 
for artistic achievement. Using a student sample and a self-rating scale of creativity 
Chivers & Blagrove (1999) did not find this. Levin and Fireman (2001-2002) found 
that nightmare frequency and nightmare distress were associated with higher levels of 
fantasy proneness, psychological absorption, and a guilty-dysphoric daydreaming 
style. These results were not due to higher levels of overall dream recall.
Thin and thick intransvchic boundaries
Hartmann (1989) noted that frequent nightmare sufferers have striking 
personality characteristics that could be called "thin boundaries" in several senses. To 
measure thin and thick boundaries, a 145-item questionnaire, the Boundary
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Questionnaire, was developed. Nightmare sufferers and art students usually scored 
thin, while a group of naval officers usually had thick boundaries. Schredl et al (1999) 
found that persons with thin boundaries report dreams that are more negative (r=.31) 
and emotionally intense (r=.27). For adolescents Cowen & Levin (1995) found that 
boundary thinness was related to dream recall (r=.16), nightmare recall (r=.16) and 
distress due to nightmares.
Cognitive arousal
Hicks et al (2002) finds that cognitive arousability, as measured by the self- 
report Arousal Predisposition Scale, is not related to dream recall frequency, but is 
positively related to dream unpleasantness and to frequency of night-terrors and 
fantastic or posttraumatic nightmares.
Neuroticism
Chivers and Blagrove (1999) reported no significant relationship between 
nightmare frequency and neuroticism. However, Zadra and Donderi (2000) found that 
both retrospective and prospective measures of nightmare frequency were correlated 
to neuroticism. Lang and O’Connor (1984) found significant correlations between the 
EPQ-N and both nightmare frequency and nightmare intensity. Furthermore, Berquier 
and Ashton (1992) also found neuroticism was significantly higher in the nightmare 
group compared to controls. Blagrove et al. (2001) also found that neuroticism (EPQ- 
N) was significantly correlated with nightmare frequency as measured both 
retrospectively and prospectively. However, such correlations become smaller when 
nightmare distress was partialled out.
Claridge et al. (1996) noted that neuroticism was highly correlated to several 
measures of proneness to psychosis and furthermore, they pointed out that when 
included alongside measures of psychosis proneness in factor analysis, N helped to 
define at least one of the major components of schizotypy. Thus, they stressed the 
importance of detangling these correlated influences of psychosis proneness and 
neuroticism in order to establish whether the relation between neuroticism and 
nightmares is significant in its own right or whether its effect is secondary to that of 
more primary psychotic traits. Thus, they looked at the extent to which any of the 
relations found with nightmare distress were due to general neuroticism rather than 
specifically the influence of schizotypy. They demonstrated, however, that the STA 
(Claridge and Broks, 1984) a measure of schizotypal personality was the only 
psychosis proneness measure that was positively related to nightmare distress and was 
its single biggest predictor, and this was the case even after controlling for N. Thus, 
they conclude that neuroticism may be considered as a ‘very broad dimension that 
correlates with, but subsumes, a range of more specific, clinically relevant personality 
features’.
Borderline Personality
Claridge et al (1997) demonstrated a significant relationship between the 
distress engendered by nightmares and schizotypal personality traits (as reviewed 
above), however, in unpublished data from this study they also revealed a smaller but 
significantly positive correlation with the associated dimension of borderline 
personality (r = 0.39, N = 179; p <0.001). Claridge, Davies, Bellhouse and Kaptein
(1998) aimed to establish the existence of a three-way relationship between reported 
adverse life events, borderline personality traits and susceptibility to nightmares.
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They assessed 60 undergraduate females (mean age 20.4 years, range 18-30). 
Participants completed the nightmare distress scale (Belicki, 1992), a scale of 
borderline personality traits (STB; Claridge and Broks, 1984) and the Child abuse and 
Trauma (CAT) scale (which includes subscales covering three areas of life events: 
sexual abuse, punishment, and neglect/negative home environment). They found that 
these relationships were all positive and mostly very significant, with the exception of 
the punishment scale of the CAT, which generally wasn’t related to the other 
variables. Stepwise regression analysis revealed that nightmare distress was predicted 
by a combination of borderline personality and the sexual abuse and neglect trauma 
scales. In a large sample of 203 women, a regression analysis revealed that borderline 
personality (again measured by the STB) continued to be a strong predictor of 
nightmare distress but this time only the abuse trauma scale remained in the equation 
(R was 0.27). Thus, these authors conclude that borderline personality traits were 
strongly associated with the tendency to report early sexual and neglectful abuse, as 
well as distressing nightmares (the last two domains also being significantly 
correlated). However, these authors did not measure the frequency of nightmares so it 
is not clear if this variable is related to borderline personality. It was hypothesised in 
the current study that borderline personality would be significantly related to both 
distress and frequency dimensions.
Depression . -
Having nightmares on a weekly basis was strongly associated with depressed 
mood (Miro and Martinez 2005), and an association between nightmare frequency 
and non-clinical depression is seen in Blagrove et al (2004) and Zadra and Donderi 
(2000). However, for clinical depression the situation becomes complicated, as
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Armitage et al (1995) shows that dream recall rates were extremely low in depressed 
patients (<20%) and decreased further when antidepressants were used. Also, most 
dreams were short and bland.
Nightmares as a predictor of suicide
Agargun and Kara (1998) reported in a case-control study that patients with 
major depression who experience at least two nightmares a week had higher suicide 
scores than depressed patients who never report having nightmares. There is also 
evidence to suggest an association between REM sleep abnormalities and suicidal 
behaviour in patients with major depression (Sabo et al. 1991) and in patients with 
psychosis (Keshavan et al. 1994).
Tanskanen et al (2001) examined the risk between the frequency of 
nightmares and the risk of suicide in a large, prospective population based study 
(N=36,211). The study began in 1972 and subjects were followed until 1995 or death. 
Information or deaths caused by suicide or other self-inflicted injury was obtained 
from the National Death Register. They found that the frequency of nightmare was 
directly related to the risk of suicide. They reported that for subjects reporting 
nightmares occasionally the adjusted relative risk of suicide was 57% higher than 
those without nightmares and that subjects reporting frequent nightmares the risk was 
105% times higher compared with subjects reporting no nightmares at all. They also 
found that the frequency of reporting a nightmare was directly associated with more 
frequent symptoms of mental health problems such as insomnia, depression, life stress 
and anxiety. However, one limitation of this study is that the frequency of nightmares 
was investigated using only one question. This study clearly has important clinical 
implications as frequent nightmares may alert clinicians that a patient may be at risk
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of suicide (obviously the presence of frequent nightmares will be considered in the 
wider clinical profile of the patient along with other risk factors). Also the authors 
found that the prevalence of insomnia in those reporting frequent nightmares was 
significantly greater than those not reporting nightmares.
Nightmares, sleep disturbances and suicidal ideation
The relationship between depression and sleep problems is well established. 
For example, Breslau et al (1996) found that even after controlling for a history of 
depressive symptoms, previous insomnia is a significant predictor of subsequent 
depressive episodes. Perlis et al (1997) have demonstrated that patients who suffer 
from recurrent depressive symptoms have increased insomnia prior to the recurrence 
of Major Depressive Disorder. However, there has been little research assessing the 
impact of sleep problems on suicidal ideation. Insomnia, hypersomnia and subjective 
sleep quality have also been reported to be related to suicidal behaviour in patients 
with major depression (Agargun, Kara and Solmaz 1997; Agargun, Kara and Solmaz 
1997) and panic disorder (Agargun and Kara, 1998). Research has demonstrated 
differences in sleep between depressed patients who are suicidal compared to those 
who are not. Depressed patients with suicidal ideation often display increased REM 
activity and longer waking periods when compared to depressed patients without 
suicidal ideation (Keshaven et al 1994; Yu et al. 2003).
Cukrowicz, Krakow and Joiner (2006) assessed nightmare frequency, 
insomnia, suicidality and depression in 222 university students. They found that 
insomnia and nightmares were significant predictors of depression, however, only 
nightmares significantly predicted suicidal ideation. This indicates that disruptions in 
sleep associated with disturbing dreams and nightmares play an important role in the
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development and maintenance of suicidal ideation. This was even found to be the case 
after controlling for the effects of depression on suicidality. This suggests that 
distressing cognitions and waking experiences may be re-experienced during sleep 
possibly leading to lower mood the following day and increased preoccupation with 
the nightmare. Also disturbing dreams may play a role in depression by reducing 
sleep quality. However, one limitation of these studies assessing suicidal behaviour is 
that they did not control for PTSD, although PTSD has been associated with suicidal 
behaviour and suicide attempts (Davidson, Hughes and Blazer, 1991). Furthermore, 
the role of nightmare distress has not be examined.
Anxiety
The empirical data regarding the relationship between nightmare frequency 
and anxiety is also inconsistent. Hersen (1971) found a significant relationship 
between nightmare frequency and anxiety together with heightened concerns about 
death in a clinical sample of 160 male inpatients. However, their diagnoses included 
primarily psychotic disorders.
Non-clinical populations with frequent nightmares were correlated with the 
presence of neurotic symptoms such as guilt and anxiety. Nightmare frequency has 
been correlated with anxiety-distraction, guilt-dysphoria and guilt-fear of failure in 
day dream patterns (Starker, 1974, 1984; Starker and Hasenfeld, 1976). Berquier and 
Ashton (1992) found that people who report frequent nightmares have higher levels of 
anxiety than people with few nightmares. In two different samples of college students 
(N=210 and 76 respectively) Haynes and Mooney (1975) using the Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (TMAS; Taylor, 1953) found low but statistically significant 
correlations (r = 0.17 and 0.23) with a measure of retrospective nightmare frequency.
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Nielsen et al (2000) assessed the association between anxiety and disturbing 
dreams in a sample of adolescents. 610 boys and girls rated their recall of both 
disturbing and normal dreams at both 13 and 16 years of age. The authors found 
elevated anxiety levels for 13 and 16 year olds who reported frequent disturbing 
dreams. Furthermore, at the age of 16 they demonstrated that the recall of disturbing 
dreams was associated with clinically symptomatic anxiety indicators taken from 
DSM-IIIR. Schredl et al. (1996) reported a significant relationship between the level 
of generalised trait anxiety and the frequency of bad dreams in 10-16 year olds.
Mindell and Barrett (2002) examined the relationship between nightmares and 
trait anxiety in elementary aged children. Children and their parents completed 
questionnaires assessing nightmare occurrence and anxiety. From both the parental 
reports and the children’s reports, it was found that the children whose nightmares 
were rated as most frightening had significantly higher levels of trait anxiety than 
those whose nightmares were rated as less frightening. However, the relationship 
between nightmare prevalence and anxiety differed depending on whether the reports 
were made by the children themselves or by their parents. Based on the children’s 
reports there was no significant difference between the anxiety scores of those who 
reported experiencing nightmares and those who did not experience nightmares. 
However, based on parental reports there was a relationship between nightmare 
prevalence and anxiety scores. The authors claim that the limited relationship 
especially for the children may have been affected by a ceiling effect as there was a 
75% nightmare prevalence estimate based on the children’s reports, however, this 
decreased to 49% when rated by the children’s parents. Thus, the authors argue that 
given the high base rate of nightmare prevalence a relation with anxiety was difficult 
to obtain.
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Anxiety and nightmares: negative findings.
Some studies have not found a relationship between anxiety and nightmares. 
Wood and Bootzin (1990) found no relationship between nightmare frequency and 
self reported anxiety as measured by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS; 
Taylor, 1953). Using a retrospective measure of nightmare frequency (12 month 
reports) the correlation with anxiety was 0.13, when prospective logs were used this 
decreased to 0.04. They concluded that ‘a genuine, though very low, association may 
exist between anxiety and nightmare frequency when retrospective reports are used’. 
Wood and Bootzin suggested that anxious individuals may not actually have more 
nightmares but they may be more likely to remember them and report them 
retrospectively. This assertion is supported by Clark and Teasdale (1982), who 
suggest that anxious individuals might have greater access to memories of anxiety- 
related events, such as nightmares. In addition Wood and Bootzin also found that 
nightmare distress was not significantly correlated with scores on the TMAS.
Belicki (1992) also found no relationship between anxiety and nightmares. 
Fisher and Wilson (1987) assessed a sample of children in grades 1-12 and found a 
positive relationship between frightening TV content and overexcitement but not 
anxiety.
Zadra et al (1995) investigated the relationship between trait anxiety and both 
nightmare frequency and bad dream frequency in an attempt to offer some clarity to 
how different definitions may affect the correlations reported. This study used a 
sample of 46 women (mean age 36.9 yrs) who completed a daily log of all their 
dreams for 14 consecutive days. Over this period 46 nightmares were reported and 
113 bad dreams. The authors reported that there was no significant correlation
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between levels of self- reported anxiety and nightmare frequency (r = 0.23) only a 
modest correlation was found between trait anxiety and bad dream frequency (r =
0.31, p<0.05). The authors concluded that the relation between trait anxiety, 
nightmares and bad dreams is at best weak. However, they found that trait anxiety 
correlated negatively with the ratio of positive to negative dream affect, this suggests 
that the emotional tone of dreams is related to low well being. Hence, in this study it 
seems that emotional tone of the dream may be a better predictor of low well being 
than nightmare frequency.
State anxiety
Levin (1998) found that his subjects, who reported at least one nightmare per 
week, had significantly greater trait anxiety than controls, although only trends were 
found for depression and state anxiety. However, other authors have found that state 
anxiety was related to heightened mood (Cook, Caplan and Wolowitz, 1990; 
Stepansky et al. 1998; Zadra and Donderi, 2000; Zadra et al 2000; Levin and Fireman,
2000). Thus, current findings on the relationship between anxiety and nightmares are 
inconsistent. The heterogeneity may be explained by the findings of Kothe and 
Pietrowsky (2001). They assessed a sample of 41 non clinical adults who reported 
having the ‘occasional nightmare’. Anxiety was measured by the ‘State-Trait- 
Anxiety-Inventory’ (STAI; Laux et al.,1981). They found that STAI scores after a 
night with a nightmare were significantly higher compared to those after a night 
without a nightmare. This suggests that state anxiety may be a mediating factor in the 
relationship between trait anxiety and nightmare frequency.
It has been suggested by various authors that the reasons for these 
inconsistencies concerning psychopathology and nightmare frequency may be a result
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of the different methodologies used. Blagrove and Haywood (2006) suggested that 
there is no systematic difference between correlations of anxiety with frequencies of 
waking criterion nightmares and non-waking criterion nightmares. They present the 
following table of all between subject’s correlational studies involving nightmare 
frequency and anxiety.
Comparison of Pearson and Spearman correlations of nightmare frequency 
and anxiety, categorised according to whether study used waking criterion, and 
according to retrospective or log measure of nightmare frequency. Original table 
reproduced from Blagrove et al (2006).
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Furthermore, inspection of this table suggests that there is no systematic 
difference between correlations with anxiety and frequency of nightmares whether 
measured retrospectively or prospectively. The average correlation for all the above 
studies between anxiety and nightmares measured retrospectively (excluding the 
Starker et al 1976 study) is r =0.22 and the average correlation for the studies 
measuring nightmare frequency using logs is r = 0.23. However, these average 
correlations include studies using different criteria for nightmares (i.e. waking and 
non waking and all inclusive definitions). The average correlation with anxiety for the 
two studies using retrospective measures and waking criterion nightmares measured 
retrospectively is 0.26 and for the four studies using logs and the waking definition of 
nightmares is 0.21. Although the correlation is slightly higher for retrospective 
measures the difference is small and both average correlations are weak. The average 
correlation for the seven studies using an inclusive definition of nightmare and a 
retrospective measure of nightmare frequency is 0.22, whereas, when the inclusive 
definition is used with logs the average correlation with anxiety in the above 5 studies 
is 0.27. This suggests that the correlation with anxiety is slightly higher when logs are 
used, however, the correlations again are small. Thus, inconsistencies in the literature 
concerning the relationship with anxiety may be due to the different measures of 
anxiety utilised as well as the different samples used (e.g. the number of chronic 
nightmare sufferers). However, in general the literature suggests that the relationship 
between trait anxiety and nightmare frequency is at best weak. However, evidence 
suggests that this relationship is mediated by state factors (Koth and Pietrowsky,
2001).
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Within subjects analysis with anxiety
Cellucci and Lawrence (1978) examined the relationship between daily 
fluctuations in anxiety and the occurrence of nightmares over an 8 week period 
among 29 undergraduates. They found no simple relationship between anxiety and the 
occurrence of nightmares. However, within subjects correlations revealed that a 
relationship does exist between these variables for a small subset of the sample. 
However, Cellucci and Lawrence did not use frequent nightmare sufferers in their 
study and it is possible that with such a population stronger within subjects 
correlations would exist.
Thus, study one aims to assess within subjects correlations of anxiety and 
depression in a population of frequent nightmare sufferers and to compare the 
magnitude of these correlations with between subjects correlations. It may be the case 
that only weak relationships are found with trait and state anxiety and nightmare 
frequency using between subjects correlations, whereas, within subjects correlations 
may reveal a strong association with anxiety and indeed other measures of general 
psychopathology for a subgroup of individuals. It may be that state anxiety and 
depression are correlated within subjects with unpleasant dreams only in those 
individuals with heightened psychopathology. Thus, in this way, psychopathology 
may modulate the relationship between state factors and the occurrence of nightmares.
A possible confound here, however, is that dream recall, and not just 
nightmare recall, may be increased under conditions of state anxiety. Cohen (1974a) 
found a small within-subjects effect of waking mood on dream emotional quality. He 
suggests that individuals with negative waking mood can mobilize defensive 
capacities during sleep. Dream recall was more likely following negative presleep 
mood, with this effect being greater for infrequent dream recallers. He suggests that
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this effect is mediated by dream salience, which is increased by negative presleep 
mood. Within subjects correlations for the presence or absence of a dream each night, 
therefore, will have to conducted to investigate this confound.
Effects of trait and state factors on nightmare frequency
Schredl (2003) proposes that the inconsistencies in the literature may be due to 
the fact that previous studies have not taken into account the intercorrelations between 
state and trait measures and that the magnitude of the correlation coefficients to 
nightmare frequency have not been directly compared.
Schredl argues that on the basis of the continuity hypothesis that one would 
expect state factors to play a more important role in explaining the variability in 
nightmare frequency than trait factors. Schredl (2003) tested the hypothesis that state 
factors explain the relationship between trait factors and nightmare frequency. 
Retrospective and prospective measures of nightmare frequency were used (the 
intercorrelation between these scales was r = 0.662; p<0.0001). The German version 
of the NEO-PI-R (Ostendorf and Angleitner, 1994) was used, measuring the Big Five 
personality measures (neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness). Three stress measures were used; the ATE-36 
(Schmidt-Atzert, 1989), which assessed the occurrence of 19 negative events, which 
are part of daily hassles, the EBF-72/3 (Kallus, 1995) which comprises of 42 seven 
point items measuring the stress present in a number of areas such as social 
interactions, emotional stress etc and the SCL-90 R (Derogaties, 1986) with a 
retrospective interval of 7 days. A regression analysis found that 10% of the variance 
in nightmare frequency was explained by gender and neuroticism, a further regression
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showed that 6% of the variance was accounted for by boundary thinness, openness to 
experience and absorption (as well as gender). Gender and the three stress variables 
accounted for 17.5% of the total variance in a further regression and it was found that 
including the trait measures did not increase this variance. Thus, the proportions of 
the variance explained by the stress measures were considerably higher than that 
explained by the trait measures. This finding supports the hypothesis that the effects 
of trait factors are mediated by state factors. In this way persons who scores high on 
neuroticism experience stress more frequency and hence, have more nightmares. This 
study provides support for the continuity hypothesis of dreaming in that nightmares 
reflect negative waking experiences.
Summary of individual difference variables
The majority of the research reviewed above assessing the relationship 
between nightmares and psychopathology has used samples of students, healthy 
adults or people reporting frequent nightmares. These studies (reviewed below) have 
found only small to moderately sized relationships between nightmares and anxiety 
(Zadra and Donderi, 2000; Nielsen et al, 2000; Haynes and Mooney, 1975; Levin, 
1998; Tanskanen et 2001) depression (Levin, 1998; Tanskanen et 2001) and 
symptoms of psychosis (Kales et al, 1980a; Levin, 1998). Other studies have found no 
relationship between psychological complaints and nightmares or bad dreams (Wood 
and Bootzin, 1990; Belicki, 1992; Spoormaker and van den Bout, 2005). Between 
subjects correlations in studies that have identified positive relationships between 
nightmares and psychopathology have generally been around about 0.3 suggesting 
relatively weak relationships. Furthermore, Cellucci and Lawrence (1978) found 
significant within subjects correlations with nightmare occurrence and anxiety in their
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longitudinal study. However, there have been no other studies that have addressed 
within subjects correlations of nightmares or bad dreams with any other measure of 
well-being.
Stress, dreaming and nightmares 
Experimentally induced stress and dreaming
In laboratory experiments typically subjects are divided into two groups. One 
group are put in a high stress situation (e.g. given a sham intelligence test which is 
very difficult and can not be completed in the time limit) and the remaining 
participants are assigned to a low-stress condition (e.g. given an easy test to do). De 
Koninck and Koulack (1975) and Koulack et al (1985) have demonstrated that 
participants in the high stress condition reported an increased amount of incorporation 
of the stressor compared to participants in the low stress condition. Goodenough et al 
(1974,1975) found an increase in dream anxiety and an alteration of dream content 
following stressful presleep films. These studies suggest that waking life stressors can 
affect dream content. However, Koulack (1991) and Schredl (2003) state that real life 
stressor are more likely to be incorporated into dream than experimentally induced 
stressors and, furthermore, individual differences are evident when determining what 
is stressful and what is not.
 Waking life stress and dreaming
Berger, Hunter and Lane (1971) awakened hospital patients during REM sleep 
and collected dream reports for several nights while they were awaiting surgery as 
well as during the recovery period. They found that a large percentage of their dream 
content was related to the awaited surgery. Furthermore, the postoperative dream
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report showed a marked decrease in surgery-related content. Cartwright et al (1998) 
found that patient’s level of depression was correlated with the subjective experience 
of negative emotion in early night REM sleep periods. Negative toned films presented 
prior to sleep also correlates with subject experience of negative toned dreams.
Cartwright (1991) studied volunteers who were going through a divorce at the 
time of their break up and again a year later. 31 of these were diagnosed with 
depression at the initial testing period and 18 were not depressed. She found that 
those who were depressed dreamt of their ex-partner more frequently and with 
stronger affect than those who were not depressed. Of the participants that were 
initially depressed she found that on follow up those who had incorporated the ex 
spouse into their dreams a year previously had significantly lower depression scores 
and were judged as doing well in getting over the divorce. Furthermore, those who 
showed recovery at follow up were found to have more highly developed dreams and 
fewer reports without recall than those who remained depressed as well as a shift 
towards more positive affect in dreams that directly incorporated divorce related 
elements. Cartwright (1991) concludes that there are clear differences in dream 
content and affect between those who do and those that do not get over their 
depression. It suggests that those who suffer depression in response to a stressful life 
event and whose dreams contain strong affect and incorporations of the stressor 
appear to remit more successfully from their depression. This study suggests that a 
direct incorporation of a stressor into one’s dream may serve as a mechanism for 
coping with that stressor.
In general these data suggest that events, particularly those of a usual or 
stressful nature do affect the content of dreams. However, the influence of presleep
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stimuli can take a number of forms from direct incorporation of a stimulus, changes in 
dream activity or types of interactions or changes in the emotionality of dreams.
Stress and nightmares
The previous research suggests that negative life events can affect dream 
content and that waking stress will be associated with an increased frequency of 
nightmares. Schredl’s (2003) study, described above, has demonstrated that waking 
stress is an important factor in explaining nightmare frequency. Chivers and Blagrove
(1999) found that that nightmare frequency was significantly correlated with stress as 
measured by the General Health Questionnaire (which examines current life events 
rather than stable traits). Koulack and Nesca (1992) found that type A individuals 
have more nightmares than type B individuals, although there was no difference in 
dream recall frequency between the two groups. Type A behaviour patterns are seen 
as an indicator for experiencing high amounts of stress and are more likely to 
experience stress-related health problems such as coronary disease, compared to type 
B individuals (Glass, 1977). Hartmann (1984) reported periods of stress were a 
precipitating factor for increased nightmares in his nightmare sufferers.
These included many different stressors such as adolescence, relationship 
break ups, geographical moves etc. Cemovsky (1984) found correlations between life 
events and sleep disturbances especially the occurrence of nightmares. Krakow et al. 
(1993) reported that 12 out of 20 nightmare sufferers had reported a traumatic 
incident or stressful period prior to the nightmare. These included job loss, pregnancy, 
death of a loved one, divorce, physical abuse, burglary, rape, starting college or a new 
job. In line with this research Kales et al. (1980a) showed that 60% of their sample 
reported the occurrence of a major life event preceded the onset of their nightmares.
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Kothe & Pietrowsky’s (2001) reported that 31.6% of the nightmares were 
considered to be associated with a previous stressful occurrence and 75.5% of the 
nightmares were thought to reflect something within the participants’ life. However, 
using the ‘Social Readjustment Rating Scale’ (SRRS; Holmes & Rahe, 1967) Kothe 
& Pietrowsky found no relationship between life events and frequency of nightmares. 
Such a negative finding was also reported by Belicki (1987). Belicki (1992a) and 
Cemovsky (1984b) also found no relationship between nightmare frequency and 
recent life stress. Picchioni et al (2002) examined the relationship between stress and 
nightmares as well as assessing the possibility that nightmares can serve a beneficial 
function in this relationship. 412 psychology students were separated into low, 
medium and high nightmare frequency groups as well as a low, medium and high 
nightmare intensity groups. Nightmare intensity was measured using the Nightmare 
Distress Questionnaire (Belicki, 1992). Comparisons were then conducted for daily 
stressors, life stressors, social support and coping. The authors found a significant 
relationship between nightmares (intensity and frequency) and daily stressors (using 
the Hassles and Uplifts Scale; Delongis et al, 1988). This suggests that even daily 
hassles can be associated with nightmares (as well as the more severe trauma 
reported, for example, by Wood and Bootzin, 1992). Furthermore, they found that the 
relationship between life stressors and nightmares (frequency and intensity) was also 
significant (using the college student version of the Social Readjustment Rating Scale; 
Holmes and Rahe, 1967). Therefore, this suggests that nightmares are associated with 
stress regardless of its severity. Interestingly, these authors also found that high levels 
of social support were associated with low levels of nightmare frequency and 
nightmare intensity. This is meaningful in light of the well-known finding that social 
support buffers the effects of stress, and thus it would be logical to expect that high
levels of social support would attenuate the relationship between stress and 
nightmares. However, their findings also suggest that this relationship between social 
support and stress could be mediated by nightmare distress as a high amount of social 
support could have produced a reduction in nightmare intensity.
Sexual trauma and nightmare frequency
In the life events domain, accessing information about some forms of personal 
trauma by explicit enquiry is problematic and there is growing interest in the 
complementary use of more indirect method; among these is the examination of 
individual sleep disturbances. This methodology is based on the considerable 
evidence that nightmares represent one way in which traumatised persons find an 
outlet for their distress. Although this method have considerable interpretative 
difficulties (Renneis, 1994) dreams and nightmare analysis if properly systemised 
could have some advantages for exploring particularly sensitive areas of life 
experience, such as child sexual abuse.
There is agreement within the literature that adults who have experienced 
childhood sexual trauma frequently report impaired sleep and frequent nightmares. 
Studies by Garfield (1987) and Ellenson (1985) found that there was more explicit 
violence in the nightmares of those who had been sexually abused. Some case reports 
have reported more sexual content (Burgess and Holmstrom, 1978; Kavaler, 1987). 
The presence of shadowy figures has been reported (Robinson, 1982), as have snakes 
and worms (Weiss et al, 1955; Barry and Johnson, 1958). Belicki and Cuddy (1996) 
argue that nightmares and unpleasant dreams are expected in survivors of sexual 
trauma given that the ‘elements of a dream are derived from self-concept, world-view 
and emotional response’.
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Cuddy and Belicki (1992) assessed 539 women, 124 reporting prior sexual 
trauma (63 of these reporting physical as well as sexual abuse), 71 women reporting 
only physical abuse and 344 reporting no abuse. They found that the sexual abuse 
group reported more nightmares, more repetitive nightmares; more sleep terrors and 
greater difficulty falling asleep after a nightmare than did the no abuse group. The 
sexual and physical abuse group reported a mean of 13 and 9.7 nightmares in the prior 
year respectively; the no abuse group reported a mean of 6.8 nightmares in the prior 
year. The sexual and physical abuse groups reported a mean of 4.2 and 3.3 repetitive 
nightmares in the prior year compared to the no abuse group who reported a mean of 
1.9 repetitive nightmares. Furthermore, these figures were derived from retrospective 
estimates which has been shown to produce lower estimates of nightmare frequency 
compared to logs (Wood and Bootzin, 1990). However, this study demonstrates that 
there are relative differences in these distressing experiences.
Sexual trauma and nightmare content
In order to examine possible content differences in nightmares Cuddy and 
Belicki (1992) studied 66 women reporting sexual abuse, 33 reporting physical abuse 
and 70 reporting no abuse. They completed a detailed questionnaire about their 
abusive experience, various measures of well-being and a sleep experiences 
questionnaire in which they recorded the worse nightmares that they could recall 
having and a typical nightmare. They also completed a checklist where they noted the 
presence of various themes, emotions, and objects that had occurred in their 
nightmares. They found that the worse nightmare prove to be better at distinguishing 
between the physical and sexual trauma group. A discriminate function analysis was 
able to sort subjects in sexual versus physical versus no abuse group with 79%
accuracy. The authors argue that this clearly indicates that the damage sustained from 
sexual abuse cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the effects of physical abuse. 
They found that the women who reported sexual abuse tended to have more sexual 
themes in their nightmares, and sexual activity was likely to be associated with such 
negative qualities as distrust, shame, guilt, jealousy, anger, or violence. They states 
that although violence, or the threat of violence was common in all women’s 
nightmares, when explicit details were present, such as blood or dismemberment, the 
dreamer was likely to have been sexually abused. It was found that several types of 
dream characters and objects were more common in the dreams of those who had 
been sexually abuse. They were more likely to have a male stranger as the pivotal 
character of the dream. The characters were often faceless, shadowy, or described as 
somehow evil. Images of snakes and worms were slightly more common in this group 
as were reference to parts of the body (particularly references to sexual anatomy). The 
authors state that higher scores for anatomy occurred usually because sexual trauma 
survivors were more likely to describe the physical appearance of the dream 
characters. However, they highlight that nightmares typically did not replay the actual 
abusive event. This is consistent with Finkelhor’s (1987) argument that many 
survivors of sexual trauma do not fit a typical PTSD profile. The nightmares 
represented the emotions of the dreamers to the event. This suggested that the event 
was not perceived as a sexual act but rather an act of extreme violence.
Stress and recurrent dreams and nightmares
The examination of recurrent dreams may also enhance our understanding of 
the functioning of dreaming. Zadra (1996) highlights that most recurrent dreams have
negative content, arise during periods of stress and resolve when the stressor has been 
dealt with effectively. A number studies have found that 60%-85% of recurrent 
dreams are described as being unpleasant by the subject (Cartwright, 1978; Zadra and 
Donderi, 1992). Robbins and Tanck (1993) and Cartwright (1979) assessed 
retrospective reports accounts of childhood recurrent dreams. They found that 36%- 
90% of these were unpleasant or threatening in nature. Zadra (1996) conducted a 
content analysis of 163 recurrent dreams. These dreams were collected from the 
dream reports of 352 subjects that completed the McGill Sleep/Dream Questionnaire 
as part of our studies on dreams between 1990-1992. The recurrent dream selected 
had to reach the following criteria; the recurrent dream must have occurred for a 
period of at least 6 months, the content of the recurrent dream had to be rated by the 
subject as being ‘always’ or ‘almost always’ identical, the recurrent dream had to be 
described in enough detail to allow content analyses. The recurrent dreams were also 
classified occurring to whether they occurred in adulthood or childhood. It was found 
that 77% of repetitive dreams from adulthood and 81.1% of dreams from childhood. It 
was found that among the dreams containing negative affect, fear or apprehension 
was the most frequently reported emotion, occurring in 67 and 79% of the adult and 
childhood recurrent dreams respectively. The rest of these recurrent dreams contained 
other negative emotions, including sadness, anger, confusion and guilt. Using the 
Achievement Outcomes measure it was found that adult recurrent dreams were nine 
times more likely that childhood recurrent dreams to contain one or more failures. 
Approximately 42% of the adult and childhood recurrent dreams contained one or 
more misfortunes, they majority in which the dreamer was the recipient of this 
misfortune. For both adult and childhood recurrent dreams the most frequent theme is 
one where the dreamer is being chased. Dream theorists generally agree that the
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repetitive dream is related to an unresolved conflict or stressor in the dreamer’s life. 
This is supported by Robbins and Houshi (1983) who found that undergraduate 
students who reported having a recurrent dream also had significantly higher scores 
on the BDI and reported a significantly greater number of problems in their daily lives 
than did undergraduates who did not have recurrent dreams. Brown and Donderi
(1986) examined the relationship of recurrent dreams and well-being in former 
recurrent dreamers, recurrent dreamers and non-recurrent dreamers. They found that 
the recurrent dream group scored consistently lower on measures of well-being that 
the other groups (they had higher scores on depression, anxiety, personal adjustment 
and life events stress. The content analyses of the dream reports also showed that the 
recurrent dreamers experienced more anxious, dysphoric and conflict orientated 
dream content than either of the two groups. Interestingly, past recurrent dreamers 
score higher on the well being measures and positive dream content than the non 
recurrent dreamers. Zadra (1996) suggests that the maintained cessation of a recurrent 
dream is associated with a positive rebound effect on well-being. The finding that 
recurrent dreamers score significantly lower on measures of well-being than non­
recurrent dreamers has been replicated (Zadra, O’Brien and Donderi, 1993). 
Specifically it was found that recurrent dreamers reported higher levels of anxiety, 
neuroticism, depression, somatic symptomatology and life events stress and 
significantly lower levels of personal adjustment. Zadra et al (1993) also included a 
past recurrent dreamers group, however, they found that they did not differ from non 
recurrent dreamers on any of the well-being measures or any of the dream content 
measures.
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These studies provide support for the assertion that dream content changes 
during and following episodes of stress and that the content becomes more negatively 
charged. Furthermore, these negatively charged dreams are associated with attenuated 
well-being.
Zadra, Miller and Dondei (1994) extended these findings to examine the 
relationship between people who experience repetitive dream themes (although not 
exactly the same dream repeated as in recurrent dreams). They found that people with 
repetitive dreams themes were found to score significantly lower on measures of well­
being than those without repetitive dream themes. Furthermore, it was found that this 
group with repetitive dream themes scored higher (better adapted) than those with 
recurrent dreams. Content analysis also found that the dreams of the repetitive dream 
group contained more negative dream elements than did the dreams of the control 
group, however, the frequency and intensity of these negative dream elements was not 
as great as that found in individuals with recurrent dreams. Thus, these results suggest 
that people with repetitive dream themes show deficits on measures of well-being but 
not the extent of those with recurrent dreams. Zadra states that these results form a 
pattern where ‘scores on measures of psychological well-being are inversely related to 
the position of a dreaming experience on the repetition continuum (Domhoff, 1993). 
On the basis of this repetition continuum it is hypothesised that recurrent trauma 
dreams would score even lower on measures of well-being than people with either 
recurrent dreams or repetitive dream themes. Domhoff (1993) argues that the dreams, 
which make up his repetition dimension (i.e. traumatic dreams, recurrent dreams, 
repeated themes and frequent dream elements) all reflect attempts at resolving 
emotional conflicts. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that when the emotional issue has
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been resolved this should lead to the cessation of any type of recurrent dream. Brown 
and Donderi (1986) provide support for this in their finding that the cessation of 
recurrent dreams in adulthood is correlated with an elevation in well being. However, 
the existence of repetitive dreams that are positive has not yet been investigated.
These occur in approximately 10% of recurrent dreams. It is not clear whether people 
who report repetitive positive dreams should show a deficit on measures of well-being
These studies suggest that the theories on recurrent dreams are in line with 
theories suggesting that dreams attempt to resolve current emotional concerns 
(Breger, 1967; Greenberg and Pearlman, 1975; Cartwright, 1977; Fiss, 1986). 
However, there is the problem of inferring causality. Does dream content reflect or 
influence waking adjustment or indeed both?
Interestingly, anecdotal reports have found that old recurrent dreams can 
resurface when a new crisis is faced. For example, Kramer, Schoen and Kinney
(1987) found that many of their Vietnam veterans re-experienced their old traumatic 
dreams when dealing with martial crisis, demonstrating that these dreams can 
resurface when new stressors are faced.
The data reviewed support the generic psychological position that dreams are 
related to waking states. It has been shown that the link between people’s dream 
content and their current level of well being is particularly evident in dreams that 
make up Domhoff s (1993) repetition continuum. Furthermore, the fact that cessation 
of recurrent dreams in adulthood is associated with an increase on self-reported 
measures of well-being suggests that a change from repetitive to progressive dreams 
may reflect how well a person is adapting to waking life situations.
Nightmares and Dissociation
Agargun et al (2003a) examined the relationship of nightmares to dissociative 
experiences in 292 undergraduate students. The subjects completed retrospective 
estimates of nightmare frequency. They were interviewed for childhood traumatic 
events including childhood physical and sexual abuse. Participants completed the Van 
Dream Anxiety Scale, which establishes a reliable and valid measure of dream 
anxiety (Agargun et al. 1999) and also the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; 
Berstein and Putnam, 1986). They found that the subjects with nightmares had 
significantly higher scores of the DES than those without nightmares. Furthermore, 
they found that 55% of the subjects who reported nightmares often, 27% of the 
subjects who reported nightmares sometimes and 24% of the subjects that never 
reported nightmares, reported at least one traumatic childhood event. Chi square 
analysis found that the rate of childhood traumatic experiences was significantly 
higher in the ‘often’ nightmares group versus the ‘sometimes’ and ‘never’ nightmare 
group. The rate of physical abuse was also significantly higher in the ‘often’ 
nightmare group versus the ‘sometimes’ and ‘never group’. This study also found that 
subjects with a history of physical and with a history of sexual abuse had higher mean 
DES scores than those who had not. This replicates previous findings demonstrating 
an association between traumatic events in childhood and dissociative symptomology 
(Speigel et al 1991; Saxe et al 1993). These results indicate a strong association 
between nightmares and childhood traumatic experiences. However, Agargun et al 
(2003b) examine the prevalence of nightmare disorder (ND) in patients with 
dissociative disorders. They compared those with and without nightmares on 
measures of depression, borderline personality, suicide attempts and self-mutilative 
behaviour as well as history of childhood traumatic events. A 57% prevalence of
nightmare disorder was found among patients with dissociative disorders. They found 
that those patients with nightmares had a higher rate of self-mutilative behaviour, a 
history of suicide attempt in the last year and borderline personality disorder than 
those without ND. The patients were not significantly different in terms of age, age at 
onset, BDI, DES and history of childhood traumatic events. The finding that there 
was no association between nightmare disorder and childhood traumatic events is in 
contrast to their previous study (Agargun et al. 2003a). They suggest that this 
difference may be due to the fact that the previous study used a sample of 
undergraduates and not a patient sample as in this study.
The function of nightmares
Hartmann (1973,1991b) postulates that the function of dreaming is to ‘make 
connections’ between recent material and older memories and that during dreaming 
connections can be made much more broadly than in waking. He states that this 
making of connections is not a random process instead the theory asserts that the 
emotion of the dreamer guides the dreaming process to choose patterns in the memory 
net, related to the emotional concerns of the dreamer (Hartmann, 1996).
The problem arises, however, is that if this is happening in dreams, what is 
happening in nightmares. Hartmann (1991b) thus asks if there is a distinction between 
‘dreams that work and dreams that poison.’ He proposes that there may be some 
occasions when trauma is so great that dreams ‘may not be helpful’, but that dreams 
will still be attempting to ‘bring together that which is usually kept apart.’ This theme 
is then taken up in more detail in his (1998) book Dreams and Nightmares: The new 
theory on the origin and meaning of dreams. This book explores the metaphorical
connections that dreams provide in their function of connecting memories, and with 
metaphorical images that can be very discomfiting if the memories involve traumas.
In the light of this work, other related hypotheses will now be reviewed.
Revonsuo’s (2000) Threat Simulation Theory (TST) suggests that nightmares 
may allow the dreamer to adapt to a stressful situation by rehearsing it so that it will 
be easier when they encounter the problem in waking life. This theory states that 
dreaming is an essential biological defence mechanism, evolutionary selected for its 
capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening events. Revonsuo (2000) argues that 
during dreaming the cognitive mechanisms required for efficient threat perception and 
threat avoidance are rehearsed and that this leads to an increased probability of 
reproductive success during human evolution. One hypothesis from the TST is that 
real threatening events encountered by the individual during wakefulness should lead 
to an activation of the system, a threat simulation response, and thus, an increased 
frequency and severity of threatening events in dreams. Valli et al (2003) tested this 
hypothesis by analysing the content of dream reports from severely traumatized and 
less traumatised Kurdish children and non-traumatised Finnish children. They found 
that the severely traumatised children reported a significantly greater number of 
dreams and their dreams included a greater number of threatening events. The dream 
threats of these severely traumatised children were also more severe in nature than the 
threats of less traumatised or non-traumatised children. They found that almost 80% 
of the dreams reported by the children in the severe trauma group included at least 
one threatening event, while 56% of the dreams reported in the less traumatised group 
and 31% of the dreams reported in the non-traumatised group contained at least one
threatening event. However, it could be argued that alternative theories could explain 
these findings. For example, theories proposing that dreaming aids in the solving of 
emotional problems by helping a person to adjust psychological to the threat or 
stressor (Cartwright, 1996; Hartmann, 1998; Kramer, 1993). Valli et al (2003) argue 
that the post traumatic nightmare poses a problem for other theories whereas TST 
predicts that powerful negative stimuli during wakefulness will lead to a strong and 
long lasting threat simulation response.
This Disruption-Avoidance-Adaptation model of dream function was 
proposed by Wright and Koulack (1987) and is a similar principle to systematic 
desensitization therapy. It is suggested that nightmares may serve to reduce the 
salience of a stressor through its repeated exposure, and thus, gradually reduce the 
associated affect.
Picchioni et al (2002) suggest that the function of nightmares is to serve in a 
problem solving capacity during times of stress. They argue that nightmares could 
provide a realistic but harmless environment for the individual to explore potential 
ways to approach the stressful situation.
Kramer’s mood regulatory theory of dreaming
Kramer’s mood regulatory theory (1993) suggests that the function of 
dreaming is to process emotions andjthus, regulate mood. Kramer argues that 
dreaming functions to protect sleep by absorbing the emotional surge that occurs 
during REM sleep and that nightmares represent a failure in this function. The theory 
suggests that dreaming is related to emotional alterations and in most people there is a 
decrease in negative mood from night to morning. However, in the case of nightmares
they suggest that the dreaming process is not effective and so may lead to more 
negative mood states the following day.
Kramer argues that there are two discemable patterns of thematic dream 
patterns across the night. The first is of the ‘progressive-sequential’ type in which 
problem are stated and worked on and resolved, the second is the ‘repetitive 
traumatic’ type in which the problem is stated but cannot be resolved. Kramer argues 
that the effectiveness of dreaming varies from night to night but that the nature of the 
problem solving is emotional. It is suggested that if one has experienced progressive- 
sequential dreaming than there may be a positive acceleration in the emotional state of 
the dreamer. However, dreaming is less successful following the repetitive-traumatic 
type dreaming. It is through this ‘problem solving’ or failure to ‘problem solve’ that 
affective alteration occurs. He suggests that it is through this attempt at ‘emotional 
problem solving’ that the dream succeeds or fails at ‘containing the emotional surge’.
Memory reprocessing
Thus, it could be that the improvement in mood is related to the function of 
REM. The following evidence suggests that sleep have a functional role in the 
reprocessing of memories. Indursky and Rotenberg (1998) found that in depressed 
patients mood in the morning was worse than in the evening. However, for 20% of all 
nights, mood was estimated as more positive in the morning than in the previous 
evening. It was observed that when mood was estimated as being better in the 
morning, eye movement density in REM sleep increased from the first to the fourth 
cycle. However, in all other nights eye movement density was slightly higher in the 
first than in the subsequent cycles. Mood improvement was found to correlate 
positively with eye movement density in the fourth cycle and negatively with REM
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sleep duration in the first cycle. Indursky and Rotenberg (1997) suggest a possible 
functional difference between initial and final REM sleep periods. However, the 
casual nature of the study leads to a number of possibilities. Firstly, it is proposed that 
the increase in eye movement density from cycle to cycle, which is usual for healthy 
participants, corresponds to mental activity with increasing participation of the 
dreamer in dream events (Rotenberg, 1988) and it is this mental activity that Kramer 
(1993) argues is responsibility for mood restoration. The authors argue that several 
lines of evidence lend support to this idea. For instance, REM deprivation studies 
have been shown to cause emotional disturbances in healthy participants (Greenberg, 
1972), while REM deprivation in depressed participants has been shown to cause 
mood improvement (Vogel, 1980). However, the authors acknowledge the alternative 
explanation for these findings; normal eye movements from cycle to cycle are 
accompanied by mood improvement brought about in sleep by an unknown cause. 
Indursky and Rotenberg’s (1998) findings also suggest that REM sleep periods may 
have different functional meanings. Eye movements in the fourth cycle correlated 
positive with mood restoration, but eye movements in the first cycle correlated 
negatively with the same variable. It is also interesting to note that increased eye 
movement density in the first REM period is typical of untreated depression. 
Cartwright et al (1994) suggest this may be an attempt by the brain to compensate for 
depressive disorder, although, these attempts appear to be insufficient. However, they 
highlight that one rare occasion and predominantly in the last cycles, did REM sleep 
in depression become functionally sufficient to perform a compensatory function and 
restore mood. Thus, it is clearly clinically important to take these functional 
differences in REM cycles into account if using REM deprivation in the treatment of 
depression.
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Sleep and Memory
There is an implicit assumption underlying theories which propose an 
emotional processing or problem solving function of dreaming and this involves the 
processing of memories. Recent developments in molecular genetics, 
neurophysiology and the cognitive neurosciences have highlighted a fundamental role 
of sleep in the reprocessing of memories (Smith, 1985,1995; Hennevin et al. 1995; 
Stickgold, 1998; Maquet, 2001, Stickgold et al 2001). However, the proposition that 
either sleep or dreaming plays a role in the offline processing of memories remains 
hotly debated (Home, 2000; Stickgold, 1998; Vertes and Eastman, 2000). Stickgold et 
al (2001) states that ‘evolution assigned sleep a critical role in selectively 
consolidating, translocating, integrating and in some cases weakening memories 
encoded over prior periods of waking’. (Stickgold 2003, pi 8). Research has generally 
suggested that both REM and SWS may be play a role in the consolidation of 
memories, although it seems that the strength of the influence of each of these sleep 
stages depends on the type of memory. Research suggests that declarative memories 
benefit more from SWS, predominantly during early sleep. Smith’s (1996) meta 
analysis concluded that REM sleep plays a critical role in the consolidation of 
procedural learning but not of declarative memory. Subsequent research has 
suggested that this situation is altered when declarative memories are strongly 
associated with affect. For example, Wagner et al (2001) found using the same early- 
night late-night procedure as Phihal and Bom (1997) that while early sleep is better 
overall for simple declarative memory retention that REM sleep augments recall of 
emotionally charged memories. Furthermore, they found that REM sleep might
actually increase the negative reaction to previously viewed pictures with negative 
content (Wagner et al 2002).
Bom and Gais (2003) also assessed whether the benefit of declarative memory 
consolidation from REM sleep is greater for emotionally aversive than for neutral 
material. They compared the recall of emotional and neutral texts following early and 
late nocturnal retention periods filled with sleep or wakefulness. They found that 
neutral texts did not benefit from late sleep, but there was a marked increase in recall 
performance after late sleep for the highly emotional texts. The early retention periods 
did not differentially affect subsequent recall of neutral or highly emotional texts.
These studies suggest that REM sleep (and possible REM sleep dreaming) can 
contribute to the processing of affective memories (Greenberg et al. 1972; Grieser et 
al. 1972; Cartwright et al. 1975). Furthermore, research has shown increased REM 
densities and shortened REM latencies have been reported in patients with major 
depression (Kupfer and Foster, 1972; Cartwright, 1983), the state of bereavement 
(Cartwright 1983; Reynolds et al 1993) and in posttraumatic stress disorder (Ross et 
al. 1989). These findings suggest that REM sleep processes emotional memories. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that changes in REM sleep might hinder the 
processing of traumatic memories during sleep, which could contribute to the 
development of PTSD (Stickgold 2002).
Dreaming and memory
It is reasoned that dreams presumably reflect the activation and recombination 
of memories and thus, may offer insight into which memory systems are activated 
during dreaming. Hartley (1791) first suggested that dreaming might alter the strength 
of associative memories. Stickgold (2003) also argues that ‘dreaming can be seen as a
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probe into the cognitive brain mechanisms involved in this reprocessing of memories 
and emotion, and the investigation of dreaming becomes a logical extension of 
ongoing research into the nature and consequences of sleep-dependent memory 
reprocessing’ (Stickgold 2003, ppl8). A number of research paradigms have 
attempted to identify the relationship between dreaming and these underlying brain 
processes. However, it remains unknown as to whether dreaming is simply an 
epiphenomenon or whether the process of dreaming actually contributes to sleep- 
dependent memory reprocessing.
Dreams do not replay episodic images
Evidence suggests that episodic memory replay does not occur in dreams. For 
example, Fosse et al (2003) found that while neocortical memory traces formed 
during recent waking events frequently contribute to dream scenarios; they only very 
rarely provide the integrated context of episodic memories. They found that only 1- 
2% of dreams reflect the same processes of episodic memory recall that occurs in 
waking life and that the remaining 98-99% of dream elements related to waking 
thoughts and events. Thus, the authors suggest that the brain sources for dream 
elements are not hippocampally mediated episodic memories, but cortical traces of 
discrete components of the episodic memory, which then presumable are combined 
with the associated semantic memories. They argue that ‘we dream about what 
happened not what actually occurred’. They suggest that as these dream reports were 
collected from home recall studies and so contained NREM and REM sleep reports, 
that episodic memory replay may not occur in either of these sleep stages. This is in 
line with imaging studies which have found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
deactivated in REM and NREM sleep (Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997; Maquet
57
et al. 1997; Nofzinger et al. 1997). These structures have been shown to be critical for 
episodic memory access (Squire, 1992b; Schater and Tulving 1994; Squire and 
Knowlton, 1994).
Stickgold et al (2000) have demonstrated robust incorporation of daytime 
experiences into sleep onset mentation. Experts, novices and amnesiacs were required 
to play a computer game called ‘Tetris’ for 7-9 hours over 3-4 days. The authors 
found that all subjects reported similar dream imagery of the game and the imagery 
was limited to those aspects of the experience that were most salient and to which 
subjects appeared to pay the most attention. Importantly, none of the reports had the 
characteristics of episodic memory. Interestingly the authors found that there was 
usually a 24-hour delay after novices start playing before hypnagogic incorporation 
occurs. Stickgold et al (2003) suggest, therefore, that the brain employs a complex 
algorithm to identify memories for sleep onset reprocessing. However, the expert 
players reported images of the game on the first night and did not require this delay. A 
possible reason for this, suggested by the authors is that many players report 
becoming ‘hooked’ on the game on the second day. This suggests a stronger degree of 
emotional involvement, which was not present of the first day. Interestingly, two of 
the five experts who reported Tetris images from earlier versions of the game which 
they had not played for at least one year instead of images from the new game. Thus, 
it is suggested that that the imagery is not necessarily a replay of recent sensory input, 
but instead can incorporate older, strongly associated memories. Of the five patients 
with amnesia 3 reported hypnagogic Tetris images despite being unable to recall 
playing the game before the nights sleep. Thus, the frequency of subjects reporting 
game imagery was similar for normals and amnesiacs (64% vs. 60%). The content of 
these reports were also markedly similar to normals.
The findings suggest that hypnagogic images do not arise from hippocampal 
memory systems and that they are recalled without the activation of this system. Thus, 
the authors argue that this study supports the notion that dream images do not depend 
on the declarative memory system (Squire 1992a). Although the study does not tell us 
whether this hypnagogic mentation contributes to the process of memory 
consolidation and integration it does suggest that these images may reflect the 
underlying neurocognitive system altering strengths, structures and associations 
among emotionally identified memories. Similar findings have been reported by 
Emberger (2001) using an Alpine Racer skiing simulator game. They found that 
images reported from the game tended to be to from scenes, which were high in 
emotional salience, such as crash sites or initial experiences on a steep hill. However, 
despite this subjects reported relatively flat affect during the dreams. This is in sharp 
contrast to the strong emotions associated with hypnagogic replay of traumatic events 
in patients with PTSD.
This study, together, with Stickgold’s (2000) study, suggest that memories are 
initially replayed in near veridical form and that more weakly related images only 
appear later on and these initial images seem to be replayed without the 
accompanying strong emotion. This is in contrast to Hartmann et al’s (2000) model of 
contextual images which states that traumatic memories are first introduced in dreams 
by weakly related images which over time become more veridical in order to allow 
gradual processing of a trauma. Stickgold’s (2000) and Emberger’s (2001) findings 
suggest a form of systematic desensitisation of dreaming in which the emotional 
memories are replayed but without the strong affect, however, this differs from Periis 
and Nielsen’s (1993) theory which suggests that the strong feeling is present together 
with the imagery, however, the motor and sympathetic components are lacking. The
Alpine racer study also examined the functional changes in memories related to 
dreams. This offers insight as to whether these hypnagognic dreams are functional or 
rather just the residue of daily events. Subjects were allowed 2 hours of interrupted 
sleep before being awakened and dream reports were obtained when they began to fall 
back asleep. It was found that subjects no longer reported images from the Alpine 
Racer game or previous skiing experiences; instead they reported images more 
weakly associated with the game experience such as ‘falling downhill’. These 
findings suggest that the memories had been altered during the initial REM sleep 
cycle and were now become integrated into a wider associative network with the 
neocortical semantic memory system. However, further studies are needed to support 
these latter findings. However, these findings offer a glimpse of the underlying 
neurocognitive processes and they suggest that hypnagogic dreaming initiates a 
process leading to the integration of daytime experiences into a wider network of 
semantic knowledge.
There is also evidence for both emotion enhanced REM and REM-facilitated 
retention of emotional salient memories. Studies have found that both depression 
(Cartwright et al 1998) and pre-sleep viewing of unpleasant films (Lauer et al, 1997) 
correlate with reports of negative emotion in early night REM sleep dreaming.
The above studies of dreaming have major implications as they have 
demonstrated the robust incorporation of waking memories into dreams under 
controlled experimental conditions. This has offered insight into the brain 
mechanisms underlying sleep-dependent memory reprocessing. Already these studies 
have suggested that the medial temporal lobe’s declarative memory system does not 
play a part in this process. It has also allowed the examination of the shift in 
hypnagogic dream imagery seen when sleep onset reports are collected later in the
night. It seems that the related images shift from near veridical images to more 
weakly associated images. Hence, these studies will allow for the monitoring of this 
sleep dependent process of memory consolidation and integration. However, it is still 
unclear if dreaming has a role in these processes per se or whether dreams merely 
reflect these processes.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Definition
It has been proposed that sleep disturbances and nightmares are a hallmark of 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD;Harvey et al. 2003; Ross et al. 1989). This is 
an anxiety disorder that was first included in the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1980).According to DSM-IV, the essential feature of PTSD (Criterion A) is the 
development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extremely 
traumatic stressor. PTSD symptoms are further divided into three categories, 
reexperiencing (criterion B) of the trauma, avoidance (criterion C) of trauma-related 
stimuli and increased emotional arousal (criterion D). Reexperiencing includes 
symptoms such as flashbacks, intrusive memories, dreams and distress when exposed 
to stimuli that remind the person of the event. Avoidance includes ‘pushing’ thought 
or feelings out of one’s mind, avoidance of people or places or the inability to recall 
certain aspects of the event. Arousal is characterised by increased jumpiness, 
irritability and sleep disturbances. PTSD should be diagnosed if the symptoms persist 
for at least 1 month. If the symptoms remit within 4 weeks after the traumatic event, 
the diagnosis of an acute stress disorder (ASD) is indicated.
Prevalence of PTSD
In the general population, a lifetime prevalence of PTSD was estimated to be 
between 1% and 9% (Helzer et al. 1987). In the largest population study conducted to 
date, Kessler and colleagues (1995) surveyed 2812 men and 3065 women. They found 
a population prevalence of PTSD to be 8% overall with 10% of women and 5% of 
men to have developed PTSD during their lifetime. In victims of significant trauma, 
20-45% will develop PTSD (Conlon et al. 1999; Murphy et al. 1999). Among soldiers 
who have participated in battles a PTSD prevalence of 15-20% has been reported 
(Card, 1987).
Sleep and PTSD
Two aspects of sleep-related symptoms are characteristic of PTSD and thus an 
important concern of this thesis. These are the re-experiencing cluster (criterion B) 
concerning nightmares and the intrusion of traumatic memories into dreams and the 
hyperarousal cluster (Criterion D), which includes difficulties regulating (i.e. 
initiating and maintaining) sleep, increased body movements during sleep and 
frequent awakenings ( Mellman et al. 1995).
Subjective reports of sleep disturbances in PTSD
Many of the studies assessing sleep disturbances have relied on subjective 
reports from self-reported symptoms, questionnaires and structured interviews. In 
such studies the most frequently reported complaint is of difficulty falling asleep, 
frequent awakenings, shorter sleep duration, restless sleep, daytime sleepiness, 
nightmares and anxiety dreams.
Reported difficulties of initiating and maintaining sleep
In Neylan et afs (1998) reanalysis of the National Veterans Vietnam Veterans 
Readjustment Study, 44% of veterans with PTSD rated themselves as having 
problems with sleep onset either ‘sometimes’ or ‘very frequently’, compared to 6% of 
veterans without PTSD and 5% of civilians. Furthermore, they found that 91% of 
veterans with PTSD related that they had difficulty maintaining sleep either 
‘sometimes’ or ‘very frequently’, compared to 63% of veterans without PTSD and 
53% of civilians. In Ohayon and Shapiro’s (2000) study, based on a large community 
sample, they found that participants with PTSD reported more difficulties initiating 
sleep (41%) compared to those without PTSD (13%). Those with PTSD reported 
more disrupted sleep compared to those without PTSD (47% and 18% respectively). 
Those with PTSD were more likely to report waking up early in the morning than 
those without the disorder (43% and 13% respectively). Kuch and Cox (1992) 
reported that 119 (96%) of their Holocaust survivors reported sleep disturbances. 
Rosen et al (1991) found that 42 Holocaust survivors showed decreased sleep quality 
on all dimensions of the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality questionnaire in comparison to non- 
traumatised controls.
Arousal /awakening threshold
As stated above, patients with PTSD complain that they wake up during the 
night and have difficulty falling asleep gain. Thus, it would be expected that the 
arousal threshold in patients with PTSD would be decrease (i.e. they would be 
awakened from sleep more easily), however, this doesn’t appear to be the case. A 
number of studies have objectively measured the awakening thresholds of patients
with PTSD and found that they have elevated awakening thresholds. Two of these 
studies applied tones during SWS sleep (Dagan et al. 1991) and one during REM 
sleep (Schoen et al. 1984). Therefore, these studies suggest that contrary to subjective 
reports patients with PTSD are in fact more difficult to awaken from sleep than 
normals. Lavie et al (1998) also found that higher awakening thresholds in patients 
with PTSD were positively correlated to the level of depression and anxiety. The 
authors postulate that this finding reflects an ‘active blocking mechanism invoked to 
suppress trauma-related anxiety provoking material during sleep (p. 1063) and /or that 
there is an extreme inward directed attention due to an intense preoccupation and 
inability to disengage from traumatic memories. These authors also suggest that the 
suggestion of ‘deeper’ sleep in patients with PTSD is congruent with findings 
demonstrating an usually low rate of REM elicited dream recall in traumatised 
patients (Hefez et al. 1987; Kaminer and Lavie, 1989). Kramer et al (1984) also 
reported on a lower rate of REM elicited dream recall in a group of non-traumatised 
Vietman veterans. The suggestion that level of arousal may interact with memory 
processes to influence dream recall has been previously raised (Koulack and 
Goodenough, 1976). However, the arousal stimuli used in these studies has been 
neutral tones; thus, it is possible that individuals with PTSD would have lower arousal 
threshold for threatening stimuli.
PTSD and REM sleep______
The dream disturbances of PTSD appear to be relatively specific for this 
disorder (Ross et al. 1994). It has been suggested that dysfunctional REM sleep may 
be involved in the pathogenesis of the posttraumatic anxiety dream (Ross et al. 1994; 
van der Kolk et al. 1984; Mellman et al. 1995). It is, therefore, important to consider
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the findings relating to abnormalities in REM sleep. Differences have been 
demonstrated in the amount of REM sleep, REM latency, density of REM and 
awakening from REM. However, again these findings have been mixed.
PTSD and REM latency and percentage
The percentage of REM sleep has varied between studies. Some studies have 
found a shorter percentage of REM sleep (Lavie et al. 1979; Hefez et al. 1987; 
Scholsberg and Benjamin, 1978; Glaubman et al. 1990). However, other studies have 
reported that PTSD is associated with more REM sleep (Engdahl et al. 2000; Ross et 
al. 1994a, 1994b) and other studies have found normal amounts of REM sleep 
(Mellman et al. 1995). Similarly some researchers have demonstrated prolonged REM 
latencies in patients with PTSD (Kato et al. 1996; Lavie et al. 1979; Hefez et al. 1987; 
Schlosberg et al. 1978; Glaubman et al. 1990). Others have found shortened REM 
latencies (Greenberg et al 1972; Reist et al. 1995; Kauffman et al. 1987). The 
differences in the occurrence of depressive co-morbidity in these samples may 
account for this divergence of findings. Affective disorders have been found to affect 
REM sleep, causing shorter REM latency and increased REM time in the first third of 
the night. A number of studies have attempted to control for co-morbidity. Mellman et 
al examined PSG studies of 25 patients with PTSD and compared them with 16 
patients with Major Depression and 10 controls. They found that the amount of REM
sleep was reduced in the PTSD group compared to the MD group. Furthermore.____
individuals with PTSD had both the highest and the lowest values for REM latency 
compared to the MD group. The authors suggested that a possible explanation for this 
extreme variability in REM latency in PTSD patients might arise from the coexistence 
of pressure for REM to occur, with heightened arousal at night inhibiting the onset of
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REM. Thus, it may be that the extreme variability of REM measures is relatively 
specific to PTSD.
PTSD and REM density
REM density refers to the number of eye movements per REM time. Pillar et 
al (2000) suggest that measuring REM density might serve as a surrogate measure of 
‘stormy’ dreams, without the need to actively awaken subjects and interfere with their 
natural sleep. A number of studies have found that REM density is increased in 
patients with PTSD (Hefez et al. 1987; Mellman et al. 1995a, Mellman et al. 1995b; 
Hurwitz et al. 1998; Ross et al. 1994). Although again it should be noted that 
increased REM density is not specific to PTSD but occurs in other psychiatric 
disorders, particularly in MD. Ross et al. (1994) compared patients with PTSD and 
MD with patients with just MD. They found that REM density was similar in the two 
groups, leading to the conclusion that increased REM density is associated with PTSD 
rather than MD. However, Dow and colleagues (1996) found that both PTSD and MD 
and MD alone had increased REM density, and suggested that this finding in PTSD 
reflects actual depression.
PTSD and dream recall
Kramer et al (1984) compared dream recall rates after spontaneous 
awakenings from REM sleep in Vietnam veterans with and without disturbing NREM 
dreams. They found that those without disturbing dreams had a low rate of dream 
recall. This study, therefore, suggests that a low dream recall may represent a 
‘healthier adaptation’ possible reflecting an avoidance of inner processes as a means 
of adapting.
Lavie and Kaminer (1991) assessed the dreams of 23 Holocaust survivors and 
10 controls. The survivors were divided into two groups according to how 
successfully they had adjusted to post-war life on the basis of clinical interviews 
(assessing problems at work, family problems, social relations, mental problems, 
somatic complaints and general life satisfaction). Sleep assessments included four 
nights of polysomnography and during nights 1, 3 and 4 participants were awakened 
from all REM periods. They found that the control group recalled significantly more 
dreams that the well-adjusted holocaust survivors. The less well adjusted group held 
an intermediate position which was not significantly different from either. The well- 
adjusted group not only did not recall any dream content but in marked contrast to the 
other group they did not recall dreaming at all. Dreams of the control group were 
found to be longer with higher scores for vividness, imagination and emotional 
elements than dreams of the two survivor groups. The well adjusted group had 
significantly higher scores than the other groups for denial of emotions towards the 
dream after awakening. Dream content analysis found that for all anxiety scores 
(anxiety measures related to death, injury, separation, guilt, shame and diffuse 
anxiety) the survivors had higher scores than the control group. There were no 
significant differences between well-adjusted and less well adjusted survivors. Less 
well-adjusted survivors had significantly higher general anxiety, guilt anxiety and 
diffuse anxiety compared to the dreams of controls. The less adjusted group had the 
highest general hostility score, which was significantly different from the control 
group but not from the well adjusted group. However, when the subscales of this 
component were examined it was found that the control group scored significantly 
higher than the other groups for outwardly directed aggression. However, the less
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adjusted group had significantly higher scores on inwardly directed aggression than 
both the well adjusted survivors and the control group. It was found that dreams ‘that 
dealt with danger to existence’ appeared significantly more often in the dreams of the 
two survivor groups in comparison to controls. Content related directly to the 
Holocaust appeared in 4% of the dreams of the well-adjusted, in 7.8% of the less- 
adjusted and none of the controls. However, controls and well-adjusted survivors 
dreamed more about their present life than their past. The percentage of REM 
awakenings that elicited anxiety dreams were 25%, 11% and 5% for the less adjusted, 
well-adjusted and the control group respectively. When these percentages were based 
on the total number of REM awakenings, which elicited some content, they were 
49%, 32% and 6%. Anxiety dreams were defined as dreams in which there was actual 
danger to the life of the dreamer, a physical attack on the dreamer or escape behaviour 
of the dreamer to save his life. Also on awakening the dreamer had to indicate that he 
felt fear or anxiety because of the dream. They concluded that dreaming was modified 
in both groups of holocaust survivors. Both groups recalled fewer dreams than the 
control group. Furthermore, the dream content and structure was qualitatively 
different from that of non-traumatised controls. However, in terms of basic content of 
dreams it seems that the well-adjusted group did not differ from the less-adjusted 
group. Furthermore, even 40 years after the Holocaust content specifically related to 
this dreams were still present in dreams. However, there were important differences 
between these groups of survivors, which the authors believe could be related to their 
success in post war adjustment. They argue that this differences lies in the 
substantially lowered dream recall in the well adjusted survivors (recalling only 34% 
of dreams following REM awakenings) and in the indifference response of well 
adjusted survivors to their dreams on awakening. The authors point out that the
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literature showed no comparable findings of such a low rate of dream recall in a group 
otherwise having normal sleep parameters (Cohen, 1970).
Repetitive post traumatic nightmares are not nightmares 
Hartmann (1996) argues that repetitive post- traumatic nightmares are not 
nightmares and even suggests that they could be renamed as ‘memory intrusion’. He 
postulates that they differ completely from idiopathic nightmares in their content, 
repetitive quality, time of occurrence and underlying biology. He argues that these 
dreams do not participate in the ‘connecting’ functioning of dreaming and that they 
tend to occur in certain types of people. The above research also suggests that PTSD 
nightmares are ‘intrusive memories’ and do not participate in the ‘connecting’ 
function of dreaming as this process may be dysfunctional.
Studies showing how profile of PTSD and idiopathic nightmares differ 
DeFazio (1955) found that 67% of recent combat veterans from Vietnam had 
nightmares. Brill and Beebe’s (1955) follow up study of World War II veterans 
indicated that the presence of nightmares decreased with time and that only those 
veterans with pre-existing low levels of stress tolerance continued to have nightmares 
20 years after exposure to combat. Van der Kolk et al (1981) conducted a survey of 
nightmare frequency among patients from the Boston Vetems Administration 
Outpatient clinic. They found that of the 199 combat veterans, that 59% reported 
nightmares more than once a month, usually with combat-related content, compared 
with 27% of those who had not been in combat. The above studies of personality and 
idiopathic lifelong nightmare sufferers suggest that these nightmares are distinct from 
those who nightmares occuring as a consequence of trauma.
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van der Kolk et al (1984) examined how the nightmares and personalities of 
individuals with persistent traumatic nightmares following combat differ from those 
of individuals who suffer from lifelong nightmares. The first group consisted of 
veterans with frequent nightmares (one a month or more) that began during or after 
their combat experience in Vietnam who had a definite diagnosis of PTSD and with 
the exception of alcohol abuse, no other DSM-III psychiatric disorders. The second 
group consisted of 10 veterans with no actual combat experience but were life long 
nightmare sufferers (and had had thee since childhood). The third group, like the first 
had extensive combat experience but did not report nightmares in the previous 8 
years. All subjects underwent 3-5 hours of psychiatric interviews and interviews about 
their sleep as well as a number of other psychological tests. They found that the 
chronic traumatic nightmares of men who had been in combat differed from veterans 
with lifelong nightmares and no combat experience. The lifelong nightmare suffers 
had a dreamlike content and were rarely repetitive in nature and were not 
accompanied by body movements. Thus, it seems that the exact replay of a on actual 
scene is unique to PTSD, whereas, ordinary nightmares show great variation in their 
content. Incidentally, lifelong nightmare sufferers may report repetitive dreams, 
however, on questioning it seems that although settings, characters or themes may be 
the same (e.g. being chased by a monster figure) these are not the exact repetition of a 
traumatic event. Furthermore, these nightmares tended to occur between 5 am and 
7am. In contrast, of the subjects with PTSD had repetitive dreams that were usually 
exact replicas of actual combat events. These nightmares tended to occur between 
lam and 3 am and all these subjects reported that body movements accompanied their 
nightmares. Furthermore, it was found that both the PTSD group and the lifelong 
nightmare group experienced current difficulties but these difficulties differed in their
nature. The lifelong nightmare group had a number of difficulties in social adjustment 
and even some psychotic features. In contrast, the PTSD group had less disturbances 
of that nature but showed evidence of affective disorders; they also showed evidence 
of the expression of aggression and little control over their destinies in comparison to 
the combat control group. No evidence of ‘thin’ boundaries was found in the 
childhoods of those in the PTSD group, however, evidence for ‘thin’ boundaries was 
found in the childhood of lifelong nightmare suffers. 47% of the PTSD group was 
found to have a ‘good’ premorbid adjustment on a global rating, 40% as ‘average’ and 
13% as ‘poor’. By contrast, only 10% of the lifelong nightmare sufferers were rated as 
having an ‘average’ childhood and adolescent adjustment and 90% were rated as 
‘poor’. Thus, this study supports the notion that the characteristics of those with 
PTSD nightmares differed from those with ordinary idiopathic nightmares. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that there are clear biological differences between 
these nightmares. It has been demonstrated that ordinary idiopathic nightmares nearly 
always occur during long stretches of REM sleep (Hartmann, 1970; Fisher et al.
1974). PTSD dreams can entail muscular activity and partial arousal and they can 
occur in NREM sleep and REM sleep. Also, the content of these PTSD nightmares 
can also be experienced as ‘flashbacks’ during waking. Thus, Hartmann ( ) concludes 
that the PTSD nightmare is not strictly a nightmare but rather an ‘encapsulated 
memory that can intrude suddenly in consciousness either during REM sleep (non- 
REM as well as REM) or during waking. It is not an REM sleep dream, although it 
may intrude upon a dream’ (p i09). Furthermore, post traumatic nightmares in some 
cases can be reduced by medications such as fluoxetine, monoamineoxydase 
inhibitors or other antidepressants. Whereas, idiopathic nightmares are typically not 
affected by these but in severe cases dopamine blockers may help (Hartmann, 1984).
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Hartmann’s research has also suggests that those who develop PTSD with repetitive 
nightmares are not more prone to have nightmares anyway. Hence, this does not offer 
support to the assertion that these nightmares are ordinary nightmares dealing with the 
traumatic incident.
Sleep-dependent memory systems and PTSD.
Stickgold et al (2001) argue that repetitive dreams (reflecting the repetitive 
replay of the episodic memory during sleep) demonstrate a failure in the memory 
processes system. They highlight that outside PTSD episodic memories are almost 
never replayed verbatim in dreams. Thus, the replay of an episodic memory during 
sleep would require the breakdown of the normal blockade of hippocampal outflow to 
the cortex, which prevents the normal integration and subsequent weakening of 
episodic memory. Stickgold et al (2003) postulate that it is this sequence that leads to 
PTSD.
They suggest when an emotional event occurs the amygdale links the episodic 
memory to the emotions experienced. Thus, when an event is recalled it is 
accompanied by the original sensations and emotions, however, eventually the 
relevant information is extracted from this memory and is transferred to semantic 
memory networks located in the brain’s neocortex. This process has been referred by 
as ‘interleaved replay’ (McClelland et al, 1995). Thus, hippocampal memories are 
slowly and repetitively replayed from the hippocampus to the cortex where over time 
memories are incorporated into one’s general semantic knowledge and become 
available for the understanding of future events. It is believed that once this transfer is 
complete there the hippocampal memory is weakened along with its links to
associated affect. Therefore memory can be freed up for the storing of further episodic 
memories. However, it has been argued that occasional this extraction process fails 
and information from the episodic memory fails to be extracted, transferred and 
intergrated into the neocortex and with other similar experiences. Furthermore, the 
weakening of the episodic memory and its associated affect that typically occurs 
following transfer also fails to occur. Thus, if the episodic memory is a traumatic one 
then this could result in PTSD and recover would rely on the reestablishment of these 
failed processes of cortical memory consolidation.
The integration of memories is where sleep may be of key importance. 
Stickgold et al (1998) argue that the more complex components of memory 
integration appear to occur when the brain is ‘off-line’ during sleep. As mentioned 
previously evidence suggests that NREM sleep appears most critical for strengthening 
of hippocampal memories and REM sleep for neocortical memories (Plihal and Bom, 
1997). In addition, semantic memory in humans has been found to preferentially 
activate weak associations in REM sleep, but strong ones in NREM sleep. Stickgold 
et al (1999) found that semantic priming favours weaker associations after REM 
awakenings in sleep inertia procedures. Furthermore, solving anagrams is similarly 
enhances after REM compared with NREM awakenings. This supports the notion that 
REM favours more fluid thinking than NREM. Thus, the bizarre, hyper associative 
nature of dreams may result from the preferential activation of weak semantic 
associations together with a lack of input from the hippocampus. Furthermore, 
hyperactivation of limbic cortices and the amygdale could similarly explain the hyper- 
emotional aspect of dreaming (Merritt et al. 1994). Stickgold et al (2003) argues that 
the preferential activation of weak associative links with the neocortex enhances the 
testing of semantic associations most likely to lead to the generation of new
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relationships between older memories. These authors suggest that while hippocampal 
outflow to the cortex during NREM sleep may serve to reinforce old memories, 
blocking hippocampal outflow during REM sleep will help prevent the reinforcement 
of predictable over-learned patterns and favour the formation of new associative links 
necessary for understanding the meaning of events in our lives.
Therapists aim to help patients with PTSD integrate the traumatic event into 
their lives and understand what it means for them. However, progress can not be made 
until the traumatic event can be discussed without replaying the episodic memory 
with its sensory and affective intensity. This process is similar to the physiological 
process of REM sleep, which includes the integration of the ‘extracted and abstracted’ 
episodic memory in cortical semantic memory networks uninterrupted by the intrusive 
hippocampal replay of episodic memories. In both of the above processes integration 
is the key for a reduction in symptoms. Stickgold et al (2001) propose that sleep, 
particularly REM sleep is programmed for exactly this type of memory transfer and 
integration. Repetitive dreams (reflecting the repetitive replay of the episodic memory 
during sleep) demonstrate a failure in the memory processes system. Stickgold et al 
highlight that outside PTSD episodic memories are almost never replayed verdically 
in dreams. Thus, the replay of an episodic memory during sleep would require the 
breakdown of the normal blockade of hippocampal outflow to the cortex, which 
prevents the normal integration and subsequent weakening of episodic memory. 
Stickgold et al (2003) argue that it is this sequence that leads to PTSD.
What causes the breakdown in memory consolidation?
The sleep of PTSD sufferers is known to be more fragmented than normal and 
studies have suggested that these patients appear to have a high level of vigilance
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even when asleep (Mellman et al, 1995 and Mellman, 1997). The amount of REM 
sleep may also be reduced (Lavie et al 1979; Hefez et a; 1987; Glaubman et al 1990; 
Mellman et al 1995). Both of these observations could be explained by an increased 
release of adrenal adrenaline or brainstem norepinephrine (NE). Norepinephrine also 
regulates the REM-non REM cycle. During REM sleep, activity in the locus coeruleus 
and dorsal Raphe nucleus, brainstem structures that control levels of NE and 
serotonin in the brain, normally ceases (Hobson et al. 1975). Stickgold (2002) suggest 
that a failure to shut down these systems would lead to a dissociated neuromodulatory 
state and incomplete entry into REM sleep. Under these circumstances associated 
processes would be expected to shift towards stronger associations and away from the 
weak associations normally activated during REM. These authors propose that this 
would lead to a breach of the blockade of information flow from the hippocampus to 
the cortex, allowing the replay of traumatic memories. Therefore, the occurrence of 
PTSD may be in part the result of the inability of the brain to inhibit NE or serotonin 
release during REM sleep. Such an increase during sleep would block the activation 
of weak associations within the cortex necessary for the integration of atypical 
memories into normative association networks and would also disinhibit the blockade 
of normal hippocampal outflow (Buzsaki, 1996), leading to the recurrent re-enactment 
of traumatic memories. Furthermore, with integration blocked there would be no 
feedback to the hippocampus and hence it would fail to weaken the episodic memory
of the trauma and its associated affect.___
Brain imaging studies have also suggested that PTSD and REM sleep share 
functional pathways in the brain. Rauch et al (1996) and Shin et al (1997) have shown 
that alterations in the activity of the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior cingulate and 
possibly orbital frontal cortex, and visual cortex when PTSD patients are provoked
with script driven imagery. Hobson et al (1998) have demonstrated that these are the 
very same regions that are activated during REM sleep. These studies support the 
notion that traumatic memories are reprocessed during REM sleep and also the notion 
that PTSD may alter the normal functioning of the brain during REM sleep.
Eve movement desensitisation therapy
Various studies have provided evidence for the efficacy of eye movement 
desensitisation and reprocessing therapy (EMDR) in the treatment of PTSD (see 
Servan-Schreiber, 2000; Shapiro, 1999 for reviews). This involves patients shifting 
their gaze back and forth between two fingers held up in front of the patient on either 
side of the midline or with extremely contralateral movements. Shapiro (1989) 
originally proposed that the directed eye movements involved in EMDR mimic the 
saccades of REM sleep; however, she did not provide details on how this clinical 
improvement might occur. Stickgold (2002) states that if REM supports the memory 
integration of traumatic events then it is sensible to propose that a shift towards this 
brain state may also be beneficial. It has been proposed that repeated saccadic eye 
movements could ‘push start’ brainstem induced REM mechanisms (Nelson,
McCarley and Hobson, 1983) through the reciprocal pathways that normally lead to 
REM sleep. Furthermore, brain-imaging studies have suggested that eye movements 
in REM sleep and wakefulness activate similar cortical areas. Stickgold argues that it 
is the orienting responses induced when a patient is required to constantly shift their 
attention across the midline, which generates a REM-like state, facilitating cortical 
integration of traumatic memories. Thus, it is proposed that the constant reorienting of 
attention demanded by the alternating bilateral visual, auditory, or tactile stimuli of 
EMDR automatically activates brain mechanisms which facilitate this reprocessing. It
is argued that activation of these systems simultaneously shifts the brain into a 
memory processing mode similar to that of REM sleep. This REM-like state permits 
the integration of traumatic memories into associative cortical networks without the 
interference from hippocampally mediated episodic recall. Once this memory has 
been integrated, corticohippocampal circuits induce the weakening of the traumatic 
episodic memory and its associated affect. However, Stickgold (2003) highlight that 
they are not suggesting that the breakdown in this memory processing pathway is 
critical for the development and maintenance of PTSD but rather that is play some 
important role in the disease process.
Sleep deprivation therapy for PTSD?
Research has suggested that post learning sleep may be particularly involved 
in the long-term retention of emotional memories and that it could contribute to the 
development of PTSD. An intriguing study conducted by Wagner and colleagues 
(2006) examined the role of post learning sleep on the retention of neutral and 
emotional memory several year later in a sample of healthy adults. They found that 
sleep after learning compared with wakefulness enhanced memory for emotional texts 
after 4 years. No enhancement was observed for neutral texts. Thus, brief periods of 
sleep immediately following learning cause preservation of emotional memories over 
several years. These findings highlight the importance of sleep for establishing long 
lasting and perhaps even lifelong memory traces in the case of events of strong 
emotional impact. The authors propose that one reason why long-term effects of sleep 
were only found for emotional texts may be due to the deeper encoding level that is 
generally observed for emotional as compared to neutral material (Hamann, 2001).
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The authors suggest that sleep deprivation in the immediate aftermath of 
traumatic events could be a promising therapeutic measure to prevent PTSD. They 
suggest that sleep deprivation would disrupt sleep-dependent processes of neural 
reactivation assumed to be necessary for synaptic and network changes underlying the 
consolidation of new memory traces (Ribeiro and Nicolelis, 2004). They speculate 
that distinct sleep disturbances that frequently follow’traumatic experiences (Caldwell 
and Redeker, 2005) might be regarded as naturally occurring mechanisms helping to 
prevent excessively deep consolidation of these experiences in memory.
Conclusions
This general introduction has provided evidence suggesting that dreaming 
reflects waking life experiences and also that that dreams are related to corresponding 
waking or psychological variables (Domhoff, 1996, 2003). Research was reviewed 
suggesting that dreams may have an adaptive function in that they might provide an 
opportunity for the dreamer to integrate affectively charged material with past similar 
material that has already reached a successful resolution (Hartman 2001). 
Furthermore, such claims were supported by evidence suggesting that emotional 
memories are processed during sleep and this may be reflected by dream content. 
Failures in such memory systems and the consequent development of PTSD were 
discussed. This thesis aims to assess the frequency of nightmares in various 
populations with waking stressors and possible deficits in well-being.
This thesis has the following general aims.
1. To determine if the correlations between measures of 
psychopathology and nightmare frequency, specifically anxiety and 
depression, are increased in ‘hard to reach’ populations with trauma or 
increased daytime stress. Nightmare frequency, anxiety and depression will be 
assessed in patients with sleep apnoea and head injury and also in frontline 
emergency service workers as well as chronic nightmare suffers. It is 
anticipated that nightmare frequency will be significantly elevated in these 
groups due to increased daytime stress or other trauma. The question is then 
whether correlations of nightmare frequency with psychopathology will be 
stronger than in the student samples that are often used in the literature.
2. Nightmare distress has been found in student samples to be a 
major confound of nightmare frequency -  psychopathology correlations, even 
to the extent of rendering such correlations negligible. This has led to the 
counterintuitive conclusion (Blagrove et al, 2004) that nightmare frequency 
per se is not related to waking psychopathology, and that waking 
psychopathology instead simply enhances memory for, sensitivity to and recall 
of nightmares. This study will use more highly stressed or psychopathological 
populations to ascertain whether in them nightmare distress similarly is the 
mediating variable between waking psychopathology and reported nightmare 
frequency.
3. To determine if stricter definitions of nightmares, either by the 
use of the waking criterion or by the requirement of how unpleasant the dream
has to be to be classed as a nightmare, will result in nightmares being a better 
index of waking psychopathology.
4. To assess within subjects correlations of state mood with the 
presence/absence of a nightmare that night in order to determine if day-to-day 
associations between nightmares and anxiety and depression are larger in 
comparison to between subjects analysis.
5. To assess between subjects correlations of individual difference 
variables with the within subjects correlations in aim 4, so as to investigate 
whether there are individual difference variables that predispose some 
individuals to have nightmares under conditions of high anxiety or high 
depression.
6. To assess whether ratings of PTSD correlate with nightmare 
frequency in individuals who have undergone repeated exposure to trauma 
(emergency service workers), and in individuals who have had one severe 
trauma (individuals with traumatic head injury).
7. To assess whether some individuals who may be expected to 
have increased nightmare frequency may not do so due to complete cessation 
of dreaming, either due to disrupted sleep (sleep apnoea patients) or to brain 
injury.
Chapter 2
Study 1: Personality, psychopathology and
nightmares
Introduction
The general introduction has reviewed evidence concerning the relationships 
between nightmares and psychological well-being. That literature is common to each 
of the four studies reported in this thesis. Study 1, unlike the subsequent studies, also 
investigated the emotional profile of dreams. Research exploring the emotions present 
in dreams will thus firstly be reviewed.
Emotion and dreams
It is widely accepted that emotion is a common feature of the dream 
experience. Seligman and Yellen (1987) describe dream emotions as a Timbic bath’ 
that pervades the dream. Hartmann’s (1996) theory of Contextualising Imagery, based 
on the notion that dreaming makes broad connections in the mind, suggests that this 
making of connections is not a random process but that the emotion of the dreamer 
guides the dreaming process to choose patterns in the memory net related to the 
emotional concern of the dreamer. He states:
*'... emotion is the force ihat drives or guides the connecting process and 
determines which of the countless possible connections are actualised at a particular 
time and thus which images appear in the dream. Dream ‘contextualise ’ the dominant 
emotion'
(Hartmann, 1996, pi53).
Imaging studies and emotion
The neuromodulatory systems that are strongly altered in REM are all known 
to play a central role in emotions such as anxiety and fear in waking. Maquet (1997, 
2000) has highlighted that the frontal and temporal coritical regions activated in REM 
are those that receive afferents from the amygdale, while those not being activated do 
not receive such input. The activated regions include Broadman areas 24 and 32 in the 
anterior cingulated, causal orbitiofrontal regions, medial prefrontal area 10, the insula, 
and the entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices (Braun et al, 1997; Braun et al, 1998; 
Maquet et al,1996, 1997; Nofzinger et al, 1997). These regions are held to be central 
components of the highest order control system for emotions (Bechara, Damasio & 
Damasio, 2000). Thus, it seems that the brain is predisposed during REM sleep 
towards complex emotional functioning.
Imaging studies have demonstrated specific activation of limbic and 
paralimbic regions of the forebrain in REM sleep compared to waking (Braun et al, 
1997; 1998; Maquet et al, 1996; Nofzinger et al, 1997). Hobson et al (2003) argue that 
such findings imply that dream emotions may be the primary shaper of dream plots 
rather than following secondary to the dream plot, a point also made in the quote from 
Hartmann (1996) above.
Nofzinger et al (1997) concluded from their PET study that an important 
function of REM sleep is the integration of neocortical function with basal forebrain 
and hypothalamic motivational and reward mechanisms. However, PET studies have
also demonstrated significant deactivation of a large area of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in REM (Braun et al, 1997; Maquet et al, 1996). Single photon emission 
computer tomography (SPECT) and fMRI have demonstrated a similar decrease in 
cerebral blood flow to frontal areas during REM (Madsen et al, 1991a; Lovblad et 
al,1999). However, these findings need to be replicated. The latter observations are of 
interest in terms of the cognitive deficits in memory, orientation and self-reflective 
awareness during dreaming. These new findings suggest that the forebrain activation 
and synthesis processes underlying waking and dreaming are very different. Thus, the 
combination of the preferential activation of subcortical and cortical limbic structures 
which mediate emotion and the relative inactivation of the lateral prefrontal cortex 
involved in directive thought, paints an overall impression of REM sleep (and REM 
dreaming) as an emotion driven cognition with deficits in orientation, memory, 
volition and directive thought. Such findings may suggest that REM sleep plays a role 
in the adaptive processing of emotional and motivational learning (Maquet et al,
1996; Nofzinger et al, 1997). This may explain the emotionality and salience of REM 
dreaming, a view supported by PET (glucose) studies conducted by Gottschalk et al 
(1991a), which found a correlation between content analysed dream anxiety and 
medial frontal activation.
The emotional spectrum of dreams
Surprisingly little work has been carried out on the emotional spectrum of 
dreams and also on how waking emotions may affect dreaming. The current literature 
regarding the emotional characteristics of REM sleep is contradictory. Some authors 
argue that REM mentation is mundane and lacking in strong emotion (Foulkes, 1999; 
Hall &Van de Castle, 1966). However, others have argued that REM mentation is
intense and hyperemotional (Seligman & Yellen, 1987; Merritt et al, 1994; Hobson et 
al, 1998). Some researchers have argued that negative dream emotions outweigh 
positive ones (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Kramer et al, 1971; Winget & Whitman, 
1971; Merritt et al, 1994) whereas others researchers have found a balanced 
proportion (Strauch & Meier, 1996; Fosse et al, 2001; Schredl & Doll, 1998) or even 
found that positive emotions outweigh negative ones (Stewart & Koulack, 1993). It is, 
however, probable that methodological differences between studies can account for 
many of the inconsistencies, as described below.
Specific attempts to elicit emotions are necessary
Hall and Van de Castle (1966) conducted the first large scale dream content 
analysis of 1000 reports. They found the incidence of emotion in only one third of all 
dreams, which appears to be surprisingly low. However, Hall and Van de Castle 
(1966) did not specifically ask participants to report the occurrence of emotions. 
Subsequent studies have shown a similar tendency towards the under reporting of 
emotions (McCarley & Hoffman, 1981), unless the dreamer is specifically instructed 
to describe dream emotions (Blick & Howe, 1984). For example, McCarley and 
Hoffman (1981) found reports of emotions in only 15% of their dream reports, which 
is half that of the suspiciously low frequency reported by Hall and Van de Castle 
(1966).
In contrast, Merritt et al (1994) found a ten-fold increase in the reporting of 
emotion when participants were instructed to note the presence of specified emotions 
as and when they occurred on a line-to-line basis in their reports. These authors 
assessed the emotional profiles of dreams in twenty psychology students (aged 20-50;
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males = 6 and females = 14). Participants were required to transcribe ten dream 
reports on a form specifically designed to capture and assess emotion immediately 
from spontaneous awakenings. Subjects were also asked to record the intensity of 
each emotion they experienced, and dream bizarreness was scored by three 
independent judges.
It was found that only 11 of the 200 dream reports contained no reports of 
emotion. Thus, the remaining 189 reports (95%) contained a total of 809 incidents of 
emotion. Anxiety was the most commonly reported emotion followed by joy/elation 
and these two emotions were found to constitute 58% of all emotion reports. Anger, 
sadness and shame/guilt were reported much less frequently and affection/eroticism 
had the lowest report rate of any emotion in the sample, constituting only 6.4% of 
emotion reports. These authors found that negative emotions were more prevalent in 
dreams, with over two thirds (68%) of the emotion reports in their sample being 
negative emotions. Interestingly, they found that positive emotions were most likely 
to appear in the first quartile of the dream and negative emotions in the last two 
quartiles. They note that while 42% of reports containing emotions began with a 
positive emotion, only 24% ended with one. Furthermore, 58% of dreams began with 
a negative emotion and 76% of the final emotions were negative, suggesting that 
dream emotions tend to go ‘from bad to worse’ (Merritt et al, 1994, p56). However, 
this study was part of a class-exereise-where students* over a period of three weeks, 
were required to record ten dream reports from spontaneous awakenings in their home 
with a word count of at least 50 words. Participants were instructed to score their 
reports for emotions. Fosse et al (2001) argue that this type of spontaneous home 
recall design is likely to sample selectively the most dramatic and emotionally intense
dreams, thus neglecting reports of less salient emotions. Furthermore, the fact that the 
students were known to Merritt et al (1994) may have biased the findings. However, 
these findings do suggest that reports of emotions in dreams increase dramatically 
when a special attempt is made to elicit them.
The rating of emotions in dreams
A further methodological discrepancy between studies concerns how dream 
emotions are rated. Some studies require participants to provide their own estimation 
of dream emotion, whereas, in others, external judges are required to rate the 
transcribed dream reports for emotions. It has been suggested that when external 
judges have scored dream reports, emotions have been strongly underestimated 
compared to subject’s own ratings. For example, Foulkes et al (1996) found that their 
subjects reported at least one emotion in 70% of their laboratory dreams; however, 
Synder (1970) found that only 30% of laboratory dreams were scored as emotionally 
charged by external raters. Furthermore, in home recall studies, such as Hall and van 
de Castle (1966), external judges scored about 0.35 emotions per dream diary, 
whereas dreamers themselves have been found to report about 3.6 emotions per diary 
(Dudley & Ransom, 1988; Merritt et al,1994) or, in one study, up to 8 emotions per 
dream (Nielsen, Deslauriers & Baylor, 1991). Schredl and Doll (1998) found a 
balanced proportion of positive and negative emotions when participants rated their 
own dreams (42.6% negative versus 38.2% positive). However, when external judges 
rated these same dreams, negative emotions were found to outweigh positive ones 
(56.7% negative and 20.6% positive). They concluded that external judges generally 
underestimate the incidence of emotion but that they particularly underestimate 
positive emotions. Schredl (1991) reached a similar conclusion. He compared
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estimates of two 4-point scales concerning emotional intensity (positive and negative 
emotions) to ratings made by external judges on similar scales. The results indicated 
that judges underestimated the intensity of positive emotions in particular but not the 
intensity of negative ones, as reported by the dreamer him/herself. Moreover, other 
studies have indicated that only about 50% or less of the emotions occurring in a 
dream, as measured by self-ratings, were correctly identified by judges (Stairs and' 
Blick, 1979; Borioli, Meier & Strauch, 1984; Foulkes et al, 1988).
Thus the use of external judges to rate dream emotions may explain the 
finding of a higher preponderance of negative emotions in dream reports. For 
example, Cartwright et al (1998), Strauch and Meier (1996) and Fosse et al (2001), 
using first person ratings, found a relatively balanced proportion of positive and 
negative emotions. However, notwithstanding this methodological criticism, Merritt 
et al (2004) found a greater preponderance of negative emotion compared to positive 
using first person ratings.
Explicitly mentioned dream emotion and overall dream emotional tone
Another critical point in evaluating this research regarding emotion in dreams 
is whether only explicitly mentioned emotions were elicited or whether moods (a 
positive or negative general atmosphere) were also included in the analysis. This is 
important since thereis little agreement between psychologists on the terms ‘affect5, 
‘emotion5, ‘feelings5 and ‘moods5 (Davidson, 1994). Snyder (1970), who analysed 
635 laboratory dream reports, highlights that external judges were not able to rate 
such general moods by reading a dream report. Strauch and Meier (1989), analysing 
500 laboratory dream reports, found explicitly mentioned emotions in 50% of their
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dream samples, but in an additional 23.1% of the dreams only moods could be 
detected. Furthermore, they found that dream moods were estimated as intense as 
explicitly mentioned emotions. They found that whereas two thirds of the emotions 
were negative, three out of four moods were positively toned. As a result, 30.9% of 
dreams were positive toned, 28.9% were negative toned, 10.2% contained both types 
of emotions (i.e. mixed) and in 28.4% no emotions were reported. Stairs and Blick 
(1979) asked their participants to report only the two most intense dream emotions; 
44% were negative and 49% were positive. Therefore, it seems that when participants 
are asked to rate the overall emotional tone of their dreams that both moods and 
explicit emotions will form the basis of their judgement, even if they remain 
unmentioned. For example, in Stewart & Koulack (1993), participants were asked to 
estimate the dream affect quality on a 7 point scale ranging from extremely positive to 
extremely negative. The mean value of all subjects’ dreams pointed slightly in the 
direction of positive emotions. Hence, these studies suggest that negative emotions 
may predominate if only explicitly mentioned dream reports are used.
Intensity of emotions
Another factor which may affect the measurement of explicit dream emotions 
concerns the intensity of emotion, particularly the intensity of negative dream 
emotions in comparison to positive ones. For example, McFalls, Roe & Blick (1980) 
reported that anxiety feelings, which often occurred in dream reports, were rated as 
less intense than other emotions such as surprise or interest. Furthermore, a number of 
studies have demonstrated that self-rated positive emotions were slightly more intense 
than negative ones (Strauch & Meier, 1989; Nielsen et al, 1991). Schredl and Doll
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(1998) argue that this may contribute to the overall estimation of negative emotions if 
only occurrence of emotion is measured.
Instrumental awakenings from REM sleep
Another possible confounding variable when looking at the emotional profile 
of dreams is the different methodologies used to elicit dream reports. Some studies 
have used instrumental awakening during REM sleep, whereas others have collected 
dream reports from spontaneous home recall studies. It has been argued that the latter 
reports can be extremely biased. Foulkes (1979) compared spontaneously reported 
home dreams to those elicited during laboratory awakenings from REM and found 
that spontaneously reported home dreams were an extremely biased subset of the most 
dramatic and emotionally unpleasant dreams. It is generally agreed that the REM 
awakening technique is the most appropriate method for obtaining dream reports 
although this paradigm may also influence dream content to a certain extent. Some 
studies have demonstrated that laboratory dreams contain less aggression and 
sexuality than do home dreams (Foulkes, 1979; Domhoff & Kamiya, 1964). Ruf 
(1973) found that laboratory dreams are less intense than dreams recalled at home, 
and Hartmann (1984) also found that nightmares were drastically reduced when 
subjects were polysomnographically recorded in the laboratory, although Weisz and 
Foulkes (1970) did not find any differences in emotional tone between home and 
laboratory dreams. Strauch and Meier (1996) reported that up to 50% of the dreams in 
their study contained at least one laboratory-related element. These findings illustrate 
the advantages and possible disadvantages of laboratory dream reports. However, 
some authors argue that the reliance on home dream reports may lead to a 
predominance of negative emotions in dreams (Fosse et al, 2001).
Dream recall: a confounding variable?
The relationship between dream recall and dream emotions also needs to be 
considered when elevating research on the emotional spectra of dreams. A number of 
studies have found a positive relationship between dream recall frequency and 
intensity of dream emotions (Schonbar, 1961; Belicki & Bowers, 1981, 1982; Schredl 
& Doll, 1998). Furthermore, Belicki et al (1978) found that high dream recall was 
associated with more positive dream emotions. This may be explained by the salience 
hypothesis (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1974) which suggests that the more intense a 
dream is the better it can be remembered. However, it may also be the case that high 
dream recallers are simply better trained at remembering and reporting dream content 
and dream emotions.
Gender
It may be that emotional profiles in dreams are influenced by gender. For 
example, it is generally believed that the expression of emotions in males and females 
is influenced by gender-learned appropriate behaviours. Some studies have found that 
women tend to have more intense dreams (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Winget, 
Kramer & Whitman, 1972; Merritt et al,1994) and more negatively toned ones 
(McElroy, 1952; Strauch & Meier, 1989) than do men. Lortie-Lussier et al (1992) 
studied the dreams of women and suggested that they are linked to the_ social roles of 
women and that new occupational roles are reducing stereotypical feminine dream 
imagery. However, in contrast, Van de Castle’s (1982) study examining the roles of 
women and men in 1950 and 1980 found that there has been little change over a 
period of 30 years in what college students dream about and that sex differences in the
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1980 dreams are the same as those in the 1950 dreams. However, Rubinstein and 
Krippner (1991) collected dreams of males and females in response to a television 
announcement and did not replicate previously reported gender differences such as in 
the amount of aggression, friendliness, sexuality, male characters, weapons or clothes.
However, Hall and van de Castle (1966) found that no single emotion showed 
a difference between men and women when analysed independently, and although 
Merritt et al (1994) found that women reported emotion 23% more frequently than 
men, this difference was not statistically significant. They also found no significant 
differences between any of the dream emotions in their samples of men and women. 
Also, Kahn and Hobson (2002) found that men and women did not differ significantly 
on the number of feelings they reported in their dreams or in the number of positive 
and negative feelings reported. They found that the feelings most often reported in 
dreams were the same for males and females, however, the rank order of these 
feelings was different. For women, the most often reported emotions were, in order of 
frequency: anger, affection, anxiety and joy, whereas, for males the most often 
reported feelings were; joy, affection, anxiety and anger. However, none of these 
differences reached statistical significance. Furthermore, Schredl and Doll (1998) 
found no evidence that women report more intense or more negatively toned dreams 
than men. They found that in the case of explicitly mentioned emotions there was a 
tendency for women to report emotions more often than do men but they suggest that 
this difference may be partly due to dream length, which was higher in women. Thus, 
the weight of the evidence suggests that there are few or no differences between the 
emotional spectrum of male and female dream reports.
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Fosse et al (2001)
As study one is based on many of the same procedures used in the Fosse et al 
(2001) study (with the exception of REM awakenings) a detailed account of this study 
is now provided. As study one assessed the dreams of nightmare sufferers the REM 
awakening procedure was not considered suitable as the appearance of nightmares is 
drastically reduced in the laboratory (Hartmann, 1984).
Fosse et al (2001) assessed the emotional profile of nine healthy individuals 
sleeping in their own homes and monitored by ambulatory polysomnography. 
Participants were awakened 5 to 15 minutes into REM sleep across the night, for 3 
consecutive nights. On awakenings participants were required to write down any 
mentation recalled from the pre-awakening period. For each line in the report they 
were asked to report the occurrence and intensity (ranging from 1-3) of the following 
emotions; anxiety/fear, anger, joy/elation, shame, sadness, surprise, love/eroticism, in 
addition to any other emotions they experienced.
65 of 88 reports (i.e. 74% of reports) had at least one emotion. There were 157 
instances of emotion in total. 48% of the reports, or 65% of those containing 
emotions, contained two or more different emotions, and 16% (or 21% of those 
containing emotions), had at least three different emotions. When sorted into positive 
and negative emotions they found that of the 157 incidences of emotion, 52 (33%) 
were positive, 69 (44%) were negative and 36 (23%) were neutral. However, these 
authors noted that positive emotions were found in 49% of the reports and negative in 
only 42%. This difference between incidence and report prevalence reflected the fact
that when occurring in a report, negative emotions showed a higher frequency than 
did positive emotions (1.73 vs. 1.25). These authors found that the difference between 
positive and negative emotions was not significantly different either on an overall 
incidence basis or a per report basis. Fosse et al also examined the overall intensity of 
positive and negative emotions in each report. Total negative intensity (TNE) and 
total positive intensity (TPE) were calculated as the sum of the highest intensity score 
for each discrete positive and negative emotion, respectively, in the report. It was 
found that the average TPE and TNE did not differ significantly either when tested on 
a per subject basis using average report scores or on a per report basis. They found 
that approximately half of the subjects had higher TPEs than TNEs (n = 5) and half 
had higher TNEs (n=4). Therefore, they concluded that positive and negative 
emotions occur in a balanced fashion.
Prevalence of discrete emotion types
In terms of prevalence of discrete emotions, joy/elation was found to be the 
most prevalent, occurring in 36% of the reports. The second most prevalent discrete 
emotion was surprise (24%), followed by anger (17%), anxiety/fear (11%), and 
sadness (10%). The difference in the occurrence of these emotion types was tested 
using the average report prevalence for each subject. Joy/elation was found to occur 
significantly more than anxiety /fear and also showed a trend towards a higher 
prevalence than anger. When these tests were conducted on a per-report basis, 
surprise was also found to be more prevalent than anxiety/fear.
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Intensity of discrete emotions
26% of the reports had no emotions (intensity score of 0), 18% had an 
intensity score of 1 (low), 28% of 2 (medium) and 28% of 3 (high). Thus, about half 
the reports were given an emotional intensity score of medium or higher. On a per- 
subject basis anxiety/fear was found to be less intense that both joy/elation and anger. 
On a per-report basis, significant overall differences were found in the intensity levels 
of joy/elation, surprise, anger and anxiety/fear. Anxiety/fear was found to be less 
intense than each of the other emotions. They report that the average intensity score 
for anxiety /fear (1.3) per report was one standard deviation below the mean of the 
average intensity score for joy/elation, anger, and surprise (2.1, SD = 0.7) combined. 
Therefore, the authors conclude that not only is anxiety/fear less prevalent than the 
other emotions but that when it does occur it is less intense. Joy/elation was found to 
be significantly less intense than surprise and had a tendency to be less intense than 
anger, despite that fact that it was the most prevalent emotion.
Inter-subiect differences
Fosse et al tested total scores for positive and negative emotions and surprise 
in order to determine if they were stable across subjects. They found significant inter­
subject differences existed for TNE and surprise but no variation was found for 
positive emotions. They concluded that positive emotions are typical of most subjects 
but that both negative emotions and surprise are more typical of some but less so for 
other subjects. Fosse et al (2001) suggest that such variations in negative, positive and 
surprise emotions across subjects may be related to pre-sleep mood. It has been 
previously demonstrated that negative presleep mood can affect emotions in early 
REM sleep. For example, Cartwright et al (1998) found that mental activity in early
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(but not late REM sleep) was more negatively toned than in controls. Furthermore, 
Fosse et al suggest that other factors such as individual differences and personality 
may play a role in the variation of emotions between subjects. These factors will be 
assessed in the current study.
Change in emotion across the night
Fosse et al (2001) assessed the relationship between time spent asleep and the 
intensity of each discrete emotion. Thus, analyses were based on average scores per 
subject. Scores were also calculated for the first half of the night (less than 4 hours 
after sleep onset) and the second half of the night (more than 4 hours). They found a 
significant increase in surprise from the first to second half of the night (13% vs. 29% 
of reports). In contrast no significant change was found across the night for any of the 
other emotions. This was also the case when the data were analysis on a per-report 
basis. No change was found for TPE or TNE. This stability of positive and negative 
emotions across the night is perhaps surprising as many other mentation elements, 
such as, visual vividness, report length and bizarreness all increase considerably as the 
night progresses (Antrobus, Kondo & Reinsel, 1995; Fosse, 2000; Fosse, Stickgold & 
Hobson, 2001; Foulkes, 1962). However, the increase in surprise emotion throughout 
the night may draw parallels to other variations in dream mentation, particularly 
increases shown in dream bizarreness (Fosse, 2000). Fosse et al (2001) point out that 
bizarreness and emotion has been shown to co-vary in dreams (Merritt et al, 1994). 
Fosse et al (2001) suggest that these findings may indicate that different subsets of 
emotions are differentially related to and variously dependent on aspects of the 
hallucinatory scenario and to the dreamer’s ability to think and reflect.
Summary of this chapter and chapter 1 as it relates to study 1
The frequency of nightmares has small to medium between subjects 
correlations with various individual difference measures, such as anxiety and 
boundariness. However, the findings of studies on nightmares, individual differences 
and waking life poor well-being, as described in chapter 1, have been hampered by 
inconsistencies in how nightmares are defined.
Study 1 attempts to assess relationships between nightmare frequency and 
individual difference and poor well-being variables while varying the definitions of 
nightmare used in the analyses. This will provide information on what aspects of 
nightmares are related to poor wellbeing.
This study will also take account of the confounding effects of nightmares 
distress in the apparent relationships between nightmare frequency and psychological 
well-being. Within subjects correlations will be used in addition to more common 
between subjects correlations with nightmare frequency.
Although there has been work on the specific emotions present in dreams, 
there has been little research into the specific emotions present in nightmares. This 
study will assess the emotions present in nightmares and bad dreams.
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General aims and hypotheses of study 1
1. To assess relationships of nightmare frequency with measures of poor 
well-being, boundariness, creativity/fantasy proneness and cognitive arousal. It is 
hypothesised that the frequency of nightmares will be significantly related to all 
measures of psychological well-being, and to boundariness, creativity/fantasy 
proneness and cognitive arousal.
2. To assess the role of nightmare distress as a mediator in the above 
relationships with nightmare frequency. It was hypothesized that nightmare 
distress would be significantly related to all measures of well-being, and that 
partialling out nightmare distress would greatly diminish many of the correlations 
between nightmare frequency and poor well-being.
However, within these general aims the following questions will be assessed.
a) Does the degree of unpleasantness that is required for a dream 
to be classed as a nightmare affect the correlations with well-being?
b) Does the factor of degree of unpleasantness in the definition 
interact with the use of the waking criterion to effect size of correlations 
with well-being?
c) Is there any advantage in counting the number of nightmares 
over a period (whether defined with the waking criterion or not) as opposed 
to the number of nights on which at least one nightmare occurred?
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The questions above relate to between subjects correlations. A further 
class of questions involves the within subjects correlations between 
presence/absence of nightmare each night and state well-being just before and 
just after sleep. These questions are:
d) How do within subjects correlations between nightmare 
frequency and well-being compare in size to between subjects correlations?
e) Are these within subjects correlations affected by the use of the 
waking criterion or strictness of the unpleasantness criterion in defining 
nightmares?
f) Do the within subjects correlations themselves correlate 
significantly with individual difference variables such as neuroticism, 
boundariness, etc.?
Question f) has the novel aim of finding whether there are trait predisposing 
factors that interact with state anxiety or state depression to cause nightmares.
3. This study also aims to compare the emotional profiles of nightmares 
and bad dreams, and to compare the profile of dreams that are not nightmares or 
bad dreams with the normative data of Fosse et al (2001). Given that this sample 
consists predominantly of nightmares sufferers it is hypothesised that:
I
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g) the emotions in their dreams in general will be more negative 
than positive, but no prediction is made about the emotions in their non­
nightmare non-bad dreams;
h) nightmares will have significantly more negative emotions, and 
that these will be significantly more intense, than in bad dreams.
i) nightmares and bad dreams will contain emotions other than 
fear/anxiety.
4. Given that mean dream emotional tone has only been found to have, at best, 
small correlations with waking life poor well-being, no predictions are made as to 
whether incidence or intensity of specific dream emotions, or Total Negative 
Emotions score, will be significantly associated with waking life poor well-being.
Chapter 3
Study 1: Personality, psychopathology and
nightmares
Method
Participants
Part 1 -  Questionnaire study
68 participants (male = 14, female = 54, mean age = 39.18, SD = 18.51; range 
= 18-82) were recruited from the general population through advertisements in the 
local newspaper and radio broadcasts. Advertisements asked for volunteers who had 
nightmares to assist in a research project examining the causes of nightmares. Care 
was taken in the wording of advertisements not to suggest that nightmares were 
distressing (e.g. it was asked ‘do you have nightmares?’ rather than ‘do you suffer 
from nightmares?)’ in order to avoid response bias. Participants were recruited from a 
wide geographical area as the study could be completed via the post. Participants were 
not paid for taking part in the study. The study included people who have frequent 
nightmares and those that do not. Participants were excluded if they had a sleep 
disorder or psychiatric illness. Participants were asked to record any medication they 
were taking at the time of the study. The study and its methods were approved by the 
departmental ethical committee (appendix 1).
Part two -  Diary study
56 of the 68 participants (male =12, female = 44; mean age = 41.05, SD = 
19.08) also completed a 14-day dream diary.
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Measures
Part one:
Nightmare Distress Questionnaire’ (TSfDO, Belicki. 1991)
The NDQ is a 13 item five-choice measure to assess waking distress due to 
nightmares. The NDS has been used in a number of studies with adequate reliability 
and validity (Belicki, 1992; Levin & Fireman, 2001; Madrid et al., 2000). Higher 
scores on this questionnaire indicate a greater distress caused by nightmares, such as 
fear of going to sleep in case a nightmare occurs, or and wishing to have therapy to 
treat nightmares.
State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger. Gorsuch and 
Lushene, 1970T
Trait and state anxiety were measured by the Spielberger STAI-S (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch and Lushene, 1970). The STAI contains two self-report surveys, each with 
20 items that assess worry, apprehension, tension and nervousness. The trait anxiety 
scale measures the ‘general’ level of anxiety and its stability over time and the state 
scale measures how one feels ‘now’. The STAI has been used extensively and, 
construct validity, concurrent validity, and test-retest reliability have been established 
as adequate (Speiberger, Gorush, Lushene, Vagg and Jacobs, 1983). Spielberger et al 
(1983) reported that the mean (and standard deviation) for trait anxiety was 35.55 
(9.76) for males and 36.15 (9.53) for females in a normative samples of working 
adults aged 19-39. The mean (and standard deviation) for state anxiety was 36.54 
(10.22) for males and 36.17 (10.96) for females in the same sample. Responses to the 
items on the trait and state scales are on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘not
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at all’, to ‘very much so’. Each questionnaire is scored on a scale of 1 to 4 with a 
higher resulting score indicating a higher level of anxiety.
Symptom checklist (SCL-90-R;Derogitis. 1977)
The SCL-90-R is a valid multi-dimensional 90-item self-report symptom 
inventory designed to reflect the psychological symptom patterns of community, 
medical and psychiatric respondents. The SCL-90-R consists of nine primary 
symptom dimensions and three global indices of distress. The primary symptom 
dimensions are:
Somatisation: This is indicated by symptoms such as headache or upset 
stomach. These typically have a high prevalence in disorders of functional aetiology.
Depression: This is determined by a broad range of questions related to 
dysphoric mood and affect and cognitive and somatic correlates of depression.
Anxiety: This is manifested by symptoms such as nervousness, tension and 
apprehension.
Interpersonal sensitivity: This reflects feelings of personal inadequacy, as 
manifested by self-deprecation or discomfort during interpersonal interactions.
Hostility: This is demonstrated by negative thoughts, feelings or actions 
stemming from anger.
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Obsessive-compulsive symptoms: These are related to patterns of thought or 
behaviours that are irresistible and unwanted in nature.
Phobic anxiety: This is indicated by irrational responses to situations or 
persons, leading to avoidance of those circumstances.
Psvchoticsim: This dimension is aimed as recognising a spectrum of clinical 
entities ranging from withdrawn schizoid lifestyle to overt psychosis.
The SCL-90-R also has three global indices. Research has suggested that these 
reflect distinct aspects of psychological disorder (Derogatis, Yevzeroff and 
Wittelsberger, 1975). The global distress indices are:
Global Severity Index (GSD: This index best denotes psychological distress 
and is the most sensitive single numeric indicator of a respondent’s distress as it takes 
into account the intensity of distress and the number of symptoms.
The Positive Symptom Distress Index (TSDD: this reflects the average level of 
distress reported for the symptoms that were endorsed. As such it can be interpreted 
as a measure of symptom intensity.
The Positive Symptom Total: This is a reflection of the number of symptoms 
endorsed by the respondent regardless of the level of distress reported. It can be 
interpreted as a measure of symptom breadth.
The SC-90-R is a measure of current, point-in-time, psychological symptom 
status and is not a measure of personality. The internal consistency of the scale is high 
(ranging from 0.77 to 0.90) with high test-retest correlations (ranging from 0.78 to
0.90) (Derogatis, 1983). Each item is rated on a 5-point scale of distress (0-4) ranging 
from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’. Psychological distress, as denoted by the Global 
Severity Index, is calculated by dividing the summed total score by the number of 
items. Within each symptom dimension, scores are averaged across the respective 
items in that dimension.
Derogatis (1994) suggests guidelines for identifying clinical cases on the SCL- 
90-R. It is suggested that a t-score on the General Symptom Index >63 or the presence 
of any two elevated clinical scales >63 has a good predictive value with adequate 
sensitivity and specificity.
I
Creative Experience Questionnaire (CEO: Merckelbach. Horselenberg and 
Muris. 20011.
This is a 25-item self -report measure of fantasy proneness, each item has a 
yes /no format. It has been shown to demonstrate good test-retest stability (r = 0.95) 
and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72). It has been demonstrated to have 
predictive validity (Merckelbach, Horselenberg and Muris, 2001) and concurrent 
validity (Merckelbach, Horselenberg and Muris, 2001). Higher scores are an indicator 
of greater proneness to fantasy,
Arousal Predisposition Scale (APS: Coren, 1988).
This is a 12-item self-report measure of cognitive arousability. This 
questionnaire was developed to attempt to measure a predisposition or a trait of
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cognitive hyperarousal that might predict tendencies towards disrupted sleep patterns. 
Coren (1990) has produced norms for the APS and has reported that the reliability is 
acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was found to be 0.83). A number of studies 
have provided additional support for the validity of the APS (Coren and Aks, 1991; 
Coren and Mah, 1993; and Hicks, Conti and Nellis, 1992).
Responses to the items on the APS are on a 5-point Likert-type scale: Always 
(scored 5), Frequently (scored 4), Occasionally (scored 3), Seldom (scored 2) and 
Never (scored 1). The responses on all the items can be summed to yield an overall 
APS score that could range from 12 (the lowest possible level of arousability) to 60 
(the highest possible level of arousability).
Borderline Personality Scale (STB; Claridge and Broks. 1984).
The Schizotypal Personality scale taps into a variety of different areas of sub- 
clinical schizotypal symptomology. The STB subscale was used in the current study; 
this is largely a measure of emotional instability and personality characteristics of a 
general antisocial kind (Claridge and Broks, 1984). The STB is an 18- item self- 
report measure based on the criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder set out in 
DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Factor analysis has demonstrated 
that the STB produces two factors; a Hopelessness factor, including items associated 
with dejection and purposelessness and thoughts concerned with suicide and self 
harm; and an Impulsiveness factor, including items associated with impulsive 
behaviours which are self-destructive in nature (e.g., alcohol abuse, spending money 
unwisely), and destructive behaviours directed against others and their property. Each 
item on the STB has a ‘yes’ / ‘no’ response format. Scores can range from 0-18, with 
higher scores being indicative of greater psychopathology.
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The General Health Questionnaire fGHO-12; Goldberg and Williams, 19881 
The GHQ-12 is a validated 12-item, self-report instrument for the detection of 
mental disorders in the community and non-psychiatric clinical settings. The 
emphasis in this questionnaire is on how the respondent’s present state differs from 
his/her usual state. The psychometric literature concerning the GHQ-12 revealed 
adequate Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, ranging from 0.78 to 0.97 (Goldberg et al. 
1997; Koeter & Ormel, 1991; Schmitz, Kruse, & Tress, 1999). The GHQ-12 is 
scored as pathologic in case of a change in an individual’s own normal functioning. 
The questionnaire has the following four-point response scale: ‘not at all’, ‘same as 
usual’, ‘rather more than usual’, or ‘much more than usual’. In this study the bimodal 
GHQ scoring method (0-0-1-1) was applied, as recommended by Goldberg and 
Williams (1988). The resulting total scores range from 0 to 12, with higher scores 
indicating higher probability of mental health problems.
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised Short Scale (EPO-R Short 
Scale; EPO-RS. Eysenck and Eysenck, 1991)
This is a 48 item self-report questionnaire. It assesses four dimensions of 
personality: Extraversion, Neuroticism, Lie (social desirability) and Pyschoticism. 
The neuroticism and lie scales were used in this study. The concept of neuroticism in 
part includes emotional lability and reactivity to stress (Roberts and Kendler, 1999; 
Watson, 2000). It is a stable and enduring trait (Santor et al 1997) that can act as a 
broad vulnerability for a wide range of distressing disorders (Costa and McCrae, 
1992). Eysenck and Eysenck (1991) report that in a normative adult sample the mean 
neuroticism score was 5.75 (3.46) for males and 5.50 (2.92) for females. The lie scale
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measures the tendency to manipulate responses for a desired outcome. It is also 
associated with the stable personality trait of ‘social desirability’. This is the tendency 
to attempt to present oneself in a socially favourable light to gain approval (Eysenck 
and Eysenck, 1985; Gudjonsson, 1990b). Eysenck and Eysenck (1991) report that in a 
normative adult sample the mean score on the lie scale was = 3.58 (2.28) for males, 
3.76 (2.38) for females. The reliability estimates of Lie and Neuroticism scales have 
been found to be satisfactory (Rafhasaaon et al. 2006). The validity of this instrument 
is discussed in the EPQ-R manual (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) with reference to 40 
years of development, and a large number of psychometric and experimental studies 
involving the Eysenck Personality Scales. Each item on the neuroticism and lie scales 
has a ‘yes’ / ‘no’ response format. The scales range from 0 - 1 2  and higher scores are 
indicative of greater neuroticism or social desirability respectively.
Life events
A ‘yes / no’ format was used to determine the occurrence of adverse life 
events experienced in the previous year (appendix 2). These were: serious illness; 
accident or injury; caring for someone important to you who has had a serious illness; 
separation or divorce; serious problem in a relationship or with a family member; 
moving house; serious problems at work; minor problems at work; serious financial 
problems; victim of a serious crime; victim of a minor crime; legal difficulties; 
serious disappointment; continuous worry or stress lasting some months, and the 
death of a close family member or friend. The total score was the number of items 
that were reported as having occurred in the previous year.
Childhood events
Four questions were asked about childhood events (appendix 3). These 
questions were formulated based on the subscales of the Child Abuse and Trauma 
Scale (Saunders and Becker-Lausen, 1995). Thus, they assessed childhood neglect, 
childhood abuse (although sexual abuse was not specified) and unreasonable 
punishment, with higher scores indicating greater adversity during childhood. 
Participants responded to three of the questions on a 4-point likert scale with the 
following options; ‘not at all’, ‘mildly’ ‘sometimes’ ‘very much’; These questions 
were:-
As a child did you ever feel unloved or unwanted?
As a child were you ever unreasonably punished?
Did you experience any types of abuse?
The final question, ‘how happy was your childhood?’ was responded to on a 
5-point likert scale ranging from ‘very happy’ to ‘very unhappy’. These items were 
summed to produce a measure of overall childhood adversity.
Boundary Questionnaire: short version fKunzendorf, Hartmann. Cohen and 
Cutler. 1997)
The Boundary Questionnaire measures personality differences in boundary 
structure. The notion of thick and thin boundaries involves the degree of separateness 
(thick boundaries) versus connection (thin boundaries) between a broad range of 
mental functions, processes and entities (Hartman, 1998, p 32; Hartmann, 1989, 
1991). The longer 138-item Boundary Questionnaire had a high test-retest and spilt 
half reliability and has been related to a number of other measures that confirm its 
validity (Hartmann, 1991). The 18 items of the short form of the Boundaries
Questionnaire were selected from the longer 138-item Boundary Questionnaire based 
on their high face validity and high correlation with total scores on the 138 version.
The test retest reliability of the 18 item version was been found to be satisfactory (r =
0.77; p< 0.01; Kunzendorf, Hartmann, Cohen and Cutler, 1997). Furthermore, 
Funkhouser et al (2001) assessed boundariness at the beginning and end of a 26-week 
study, and showed a very high test-retest correlation (r=.87).
Responses range from 0-4, where 0 indicates ‘not true of me at all’ and 4 
indicates ‘very true of me’. A higher score on this questionnaire refers to overall 
thinness of boundaries. The BQ-18 is scored by inverting the rating scales on items 5- 
7 and 16, and then adding the ratings for all the 18 items. Kunzendorf et al (1997) 
classified thick boundariness as a score of < 30 and thin boundariness as a BQ score 
of > 44.
Dream questionnaire
Participants were required to make a retrospective estimate of the frequency of 
their dream recall and the recall of nightmares and night terrors. Nightmares and night 
terrors were clearly defined. A night terror was defined as ‘a sudden awakening in 
fear, but where you do not remember a dream’. Nightmares were defined as ‘a very 
disturbing dream that you can recall clearly’ (appendix 4).
Participants were asked:-
1. How many dreams do you have each week?
2. If you do not have one dream per week how many dreams do you have 
per month?’
3. How often, if at all, do you experience night terrors?’
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4. How many nightmares do you have a month?’
5. If you have nightmares less than once a month, how many do you have 
per year?
Participants were required to write their own responses for the above questions 
and were not constrained by any pre determined response format.
In order to obtain an estimation of how often participants were awakened by 
their nightmares the following question was used:
6. Now, please think about whether you are ever woken up by the emotions or 
events in your nightmares. Please state in what percentage of your nightmares does 
the emotion or the events of the nightmare wake you up. (Please circle one of the 
following)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
none o f them all o f them
This question allowed for the calculation of the proportion of nightmares in 
which the dreamer was awakened and the percentage of nightmares in which the 
dreamer was not awakened. Hence, comparisons could be made with studies in which 
researchers used the waking criterion to define nightmares (Zadra and Donderi, 2000), 
thus differentiating them from bad dreams.
A number of questions were included inquiring about current use of 
medication and previous history of sleep or psychiatric disorders.
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Part 2
Dream and mood diary
A 14-day dream diary was used to provide a prospective measure of dream 
and nightmare frequency. Sleep diaries have been found to provide reliable estimates 
of daily sleep parameters comparable with wrist monitoring (Wilson et al, 1998) and 
electroencephalography (Rogers et al, 1993). The current 14-day diary was based on 
version used by Fosse, Stickgold and Hobson (2001). An example is shown below:-
Please write your dream report below. For each line of your report, indicate the 
appearance of any emotions. Use numbers from 1 to 3 to indicate the intensity 
of the emotions, where 1 is low,2 is medium, and 3 is high.
Explain ‘other’ emotions underneath.
Date Time
A
nger
A
nxiety/fear
Sadness
Sham
e
Joy/elation
Love/erotic
Surprise
O
ther
Participants were required to record the content of their dreams in the left hand 
side of the dream log. The eight columns on the right hand side denote a variety of 
possible dream emotions. If a particular emotion is experienced during a dream then a 
number between 1-3 is put in the appropriate column. The numbers signify how 
intensely the emotion was experienced (where 1 is low, 2 is medium and 3 is high). 
These numbers are placed opposite the line of the dream report in which the emotion
was experienced. After recording dream content the following questions were asked 
about the preceding dream
1. Did the emotions or events of the dream wake you up?
2. How pleasant / unpleasant was the dream? Responses to this item were 
made on a 7-point dream hedonic tone scale (Foulkes et al. 1966) ranging from 1 
(very unpleasant) to 7 (very pleasant).
Participants were asked to report if they consumed any alcohol before sleep 
and approximately how much (see appendix 5 for an example of the daily log).
State mood measures
Participants were also required to complete two Visual Analogue Scales 
(VAS) every morning and every evening for 14 consecutive days. These concerned 
‘happy/depressed’ and ‘relaxed/anxious’. For example, participants were asked to rate 
how anxious or relaxed they felt by putting a cross on the line overleaf.
very quite neither quite very
RELAXED ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel, serene, calm 
untroubled, peaceful, composed
e.g. You may feel tense, nervous, 
jittery, shaky, uneasy
These moods were rated on separate lines because it has been shown that these 
moods can vary independently (Bowen et al. 2004; Watson, 2000, pp.27,45).
Instructions to participants
A detailed instruction sheet was provided to participants (appendix 6). This 
included instructions on completing the dream diary and mood scales. Examples were 
provided of a rated VAS and a dream entry with explicit commenting on the emotions 
experienced during the dream. If more than one dream a night was remembered 
participants reported it used extra sheets provided. Participants were informed that the 
researchers were interested in all their dreams and not just their nightmares, and were 
encouraged to report all information they could remember regardless of how 
unimportant or uneventful it may seem. Participants were reassured that all 
information would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and sensitivity.
Procedure
Participants responded to various advertisements stating that they would like 
to take part in the research. A letter was sent to them along with the questionnaires 
detailed above. A detailed instruction sheet and consent form was enclosed with a 
stamped addressed envelope. In addition to the information sheet, the contact details 
of the researchers were made available should there be any further questions. 
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaires and return them in the stamped 
addressed envelop provided. On the return of these questionnaires, participants were 
sent the dream dairies and asked to return them after the 14-day recording period in 
the stamped addressed envelop provided. This was to try to ensure that the diary was 
completed over consecutive days.
Design
Between subjects correlations will be conducted between dream / nightmare 
variables and waking individual difference and psychopathology/well-being variables. 
Within subjects correlations will also be conducted between dream / nightmare 
variables, dream emotional tone and waking longitudinal variables.
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Chapter 4
Study 1: Personality, psychopathology and
nightmares
Results
Descriptive data
The frequency of dreams, nightmares and bad dreams using the retrospective 
(questionnaire) and prospective (two-week logs) measures are presented in Table 1. 
The table shows two frequency ratings each for dreams, bad dreams, nightmares and 
unpleasant dreams on the logs. The one rating allows participants to record more than 
one dream a night. However, the second prospective ratings of dreams, bad dreams, 
nightmares and unpleasant dreams includes at most only one dream per night, This is 
indicated by (14) in the titles of these variables. In this study nightmares were defined 
as dreams rated as 1 (very unpleasant) or 2 (moderately unpleasant) on the hedonic 
scale and which awaked the sleeper. Bad dreams were defined as dreams which were 
rated as 1 (very unpleasant) or 2 (moderately unpleasant) on the hedonic scale but 
which did not awaken the sleeper. Unpleasant dreams are dreams rated as 1 or 2 on 
the hedonic scale but that may or may not wake the dreamer, that is, nightmares and 
bad dreams combined.
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The frequency of nightmares, bad dreams and unpleasant dreams defined 
only as dreams rated 1 (very unpleasant) on the hedonic scale were also calculated 
using the log data, these were referred to as extreme nightmares, extreme bad dreams 
and extreme unpleasant dreams, and include the letter X or word ‘extreme’ in their 
titles. As above, the inclusion of (14) in their terminology means the number of nights 
with that type of dream is being assessed, those variables without a (14) have the total 
number of that type of dream being assessed.
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Table 1 - Descriptive data for the retrospective and prospective dream variables. 
Data obtained from the two-week logs has been prorated in the following table to
provide a 1-month comparison with the retrospective estimates
Frequency measure Mean (SD) Range
RDF 32.06 (25.14) 2-1603
RNM 2.79 (3.25) 0-15
RBD 2.40 (3.95) 0-22
RUD 5.15(5.29) 0-22
RNT 0.43 (1.25) 0-9
ET 3.41 (0 .83) 1 .8 2 -6 .0 0
LDF 26.30(10.46) 4-58
LNF 5.46 (5.50) 0-24
LBD 2.95 (3.07) 0-13
LUD 8.38(6.61) 0-28
LXNM 1 3.5 (3.50) 0-15
LXBD1 1.3 (0.47) 1-2
LXUD1 4.50 (4.0) 0-15
LDF (1 4 )1 21.12(5.89) 4-30.3
LNF (1 4 )1 4.98 (4.77) 0-17
LBD (1 4 )1 2.90 (3.03) 0-13
LUD (1 4 )1 7.34 (5.50) 0-19
LXNM (1 4 )'-2 3.3 (3.1) 0-11
LXUD (1 4 )1>2 4.2 (3.60) 0-15
LNT 0.89 (0.76) 0-1
Note. RDF = retrospective dream frequency; RNM = retrospective nightmare frequency; RBD = retrospective bad 
dream frequency, RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNT = retrospective night terror frequency; 
ET = dream emotional hedonic tone; LDF = log dream frequency; LNF = log nightmare frequency; LBD = log bad 
dream frequency; LUD = log unpleasant dream frequency; LXNM = log extreme nightmares; LXBD = log 
extreme bad dreams; LXUD = log extreme unpleasant dreams; LDF (14) = log dream frequency 14; LNF (14) = 
log nightmare frequency 14; LBD £14) = log bad dream frequency (14); LUD (14) = log unpleasant dream 
frequency 14; LXNM (14) = log extreme nightmares (14); LXUD (14) = log extreme unpleasant dreams (14), LNT 
= log night terror frequency.
1 Frequency variables with an X in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 (very 
unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
2 Frequency variables with (14) in their tiles means that the measure includes at most only one dream per night. 
Frequency variables without (14) in their title allow for the recording of more than one dream per night.
3 The participant who is recorded as having 160 dreams per month (prorated from their retrospective weekly 
reported amount) also reported 21 dreams over the 14-day period of the diary. Although their retrospective figure 
appears to be an overestimate this figure has been left as reported as only rankings of the retrospective dream 
variables were used in statistical analyses.
Distribution of dream/nightmare/unpleasant dream frequency measures
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Table 2 -  Table 2 shows the frequency of dreams, nightmares and unpleasant dreams
from diaries.
Frequency Dreams Nightmares Unpleasant
dreams
Dreams 
(14)1
Nightmares
(14)'
Unpleasant 
dreams (14)1
0 15 8 15 8
1 9 8 9 9
2 1 8 7 1 9 7
3 8 4 9 4
4 6 6 7 10
5 3 4 6 4 1 6
6 2 1 6 2 3 5
7 2 5 2 3
8 6 1 1 10 3 2
9 3 1 3 7 2
10 9 1 5
11 2 1 9
12 7 5
13 6 1 8
14 4 3
15 1
16 2
17 4
18 1
19 1
21 2
25 1
27 1
Note: Frequency variables with (14) in their tiles means that the measure includes at most only one
dream per night. Frequency variables without (14) in their title allow for the recording of more than 
one dream per night.
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Retrospective measures
On the retrospective measure 45 (66%) participants reported one nightmare or 
more per month, 38 (49%) participants reported one bad dream or more per month 
and 53 (78%) of participants reported that they experienced at least one unpleasant 
dream per month.
Prospective measures.
73% (n= 41) of participants had at least one nightmare over the 2-week study 
period, 67.9% (n= 38) had at least one extreme nightmare, 67.9% (n = 38) had at 
least one bad dream. Thus, 85.7% (n = 48) reported experiencing at least one 
unpleasant dream during the two-week study period and 76.8% had at least one 
extreme unpleasant dream. All participants reported at least two dreams over the two 
week study period. 30.4% (n =17) reported at least one dream per night and 69.9% (n 
= 39) reported less than one dream a night.
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Table 3 - Shapiro-Wilk test statistics confirming that frequency variables are all 
non-normally distributed and, thus, non-parametric statistics will be used in the 
following analyses.
Shapiro-Wilk statistic df P
RUD 0.82 55 <0.01
RNM 0.79 55 <0.01
RBD 0.57 55 <0.01
LUD 0.87 55 <0.01
LUD (14)’ 0.87 55 <0.01
LNM 0.82 55 <0.01
LNM (14)' 0.84 55 <0.01
LBD 0.94 55 0.01
LBD (1 4 )1 0.94 55 0.01
Note. RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM = retrospective nightmare frequency; 
RBD = retrospective bad dream frequency; LUD = log unpleasant dream frequency; LUD (14) = log 
unpleasant dream frequency 14; LNM = log nightmare frequency; LNM (14) = log nightmare 
frequency 14; LBD = log bad dream frequency; LBD (14) = log bad dream frequency (14).
1 Frequency variables with (14) in their tiles means that the measure includes at most only one dream 
per night. Frequency variables without (14) in their title allow for the recording of more than one 
dream per night.
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Table 4 - Spearman’s rho correlations between retrospective and prospective 
frequency estimates.
Retrospective 
dream frequency
Retrospective 
nightmare frequency
Retrospective unpleasant 
dream frequency
Log dream frequency 0.66 (<0.01)
Log dream frequency (14)1 0.56 (<0.01)
Log nightmare frequency 0.24 (0.07)
Log nightmare frequency (14) 0.43 (<0.01)
Log extreme nightmares2 0.51 (<0.01)
1 2Log extreme nightmares (14) ’ 0.52 (<0.01)
Log unpleasant dream frequency 0.57 (<0.01)
Log unpleasant dream frequency (14)1 0.58 (<0.01)
Log extreme unpleasant dreams2 0.45 (<0.01)
1 2Log extreme unpleasant dreams (14) ’ 0.43 (<0.01)
1 Frequency variables with (14) in their tiles means that the measure includes at most only one dream 
per night. Frequency variables without (14) in their title allow for the recording of more than one 
dream per night.
2 Frequency variables with ‘extreme’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 
1 (very unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
Table 4 shows moderately strong correlations between the retrospective and log 
nightmare and unpleasant dream variables.
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Table 5 shows the descriptive data for the individual difference variables.
Table 5 - Descriptive data for the personality variables, and questionnaire and log 
psychopathology/well-being variables (N=67).
Variable or measure Mean (SD) Range
ND 35.18(9.23) 17-57
APS 36.37 (9.62) 3-53
CEQ 9 .94  (4 .4 4 ) 0-21
STB 8.07 (4.24) 0-17
EPQ-N 7.66 (3.23) 0-12
EPQ-L 3.97 (2.71) 0-12
GHQ-12 3.90 (4.17) 0-12
BQ-18 34.67(10.13) 13-53
STAI-T 49.78(13.38) 28-79
STAI-S 47.96(15.29) 23-77
SCL-GSI 1.19(0.76) 0.10-3.54
SCL-D 1.44 (0.98) 0-3 .85
SCL-A 1.00 (0.94) 0 - 4
SCL-PST 48.61 (21.26) 8 - 9 0
SCL-PSD 1.91 (0.61) 0 .8 5 -3 .5 8
LE 3.18(2.49) 0-9
Child 3.98 (3.27) 0-13
Anxiety before sleep on logs 28.90(11.44) 4.77-64.50
Anxiety after sleep on logs 32.84(12.36) 6.15-63.46
Depression before sleep on logs 30.38(11.34) 6.12-65.86
Depression after sleep on logs 33.22(11.69) 7.54- 63.36
Note: ND = Nightmare distress; APS = Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline 
Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Eysenck Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = 
Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-T = Trait anxiety; STA1-S = State anxiety; SCL-GSI = SCL- Global Severity Index; SCL-D = 
SCL depression, SCL-A = SCL-anxiety; SCL-PST= SCL positive symptom total; SCL-PSD = SCL positive symptom distress; 
LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
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The sample mean did not differ on BQ score from the student sample of 
Kunzendorf et al (1997), where ‘thick’ BQ score was defined as < 30 and ‘thin’ BQ 
score was defined as > 44. Using the normative samples of working adults aged 19-39 
in Spielberger (1983, Table 2) trait anxiety was higher than for the normative sample 
(means = 35.55 (9.76) for males, 36.15 (9.53) for females), as was state anxiety 
(means = 36.54 (10.22) for males, 36.17 (10.96) for females). Using the normative 
samples in Eysenck and Eysenck (1991), ages 31-40, neuroticism was not higher than 
for the normative sample (means = 5.75 (3.46) for males; mean = 5.50 (2.92) for 
females), and the Lie scale did not differ from the normative sample (means = 3.58 
(2.28) for males, 3.76 (2.38) for females). Derogatis (1994) suggested guidelines for 
identifying clinical cases on the SCL-90-R, operationally defined as a t-score on the 
General Symptom Index >63 or the presence of any two elevated clinical scales >63. 
Using the Formula 69% of the sample met the clinical criteria for ‘caseness.
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Life events and childhood events
Table 6 shows the number of life events during the previous year reported by 
participants.
Table 6 - Frequency of participants reporting the listed life events in the previous year
Number of life events Frequency Cumulative percent
0 6 8.8
1 18 35.3
2 11 51.5
3 8 63.2
4 3 67.6
5 <5 75.0
6 10 89.7
7 2 92.6
8 4 98.5
9 1 100
Note: Listed life events were: Serious illness/injury/accident; Cared for someone who 
had a serious illness/injury/separation; Separation or divorce; Problems in relationship 
or with family members; Moved house; Serious problems at work; Minor problems at 
work; Serious financial problems; Victim of major crime; Victim of minor crime; 
Legal difficulties; Serious disappointment; Continuous worry /stress/major trouble; 
Death of family member or friend
Of the individual events, 11 (16.2%) reported a serious illness/accident or 
injury, 16 (23.3%) of participants reporting caring for someone with a serious 
illness/injury, 3 (4.4.%) reported experiencing separation or divorce, 26 (38.2%) 
reported problems with relationships or family members, 17 (25%) had moved house, 
9 (13.2%) reported serious problems at work, 25 (36.8%) reported minor problems at 
work, 16 (23.5%) reported serious financial problems.
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No participants reported being a serious victim of crime, however, 11 (16.2%) 
reported being a victim of minor crime, 6 (8.8%) reported legal difficulties, 27 
(39.7%) reported serious disappointment, 34 (50%) reported a continuous worry and 
15 (22.1%) reported the death of a family member or close friend.
Table 7 reports the distribution of responses on the three questions about 
childhood.
Table 7 - Frequency of participant’s responses to statements regarding their 
childhood.
Felt unloved/unwanted as 
a child
Were unreasonably 
published
Experienced any 
types of abuse
Not at all 31 34 50
Mildly 18 14 8
Sometimes 12 15 6
Very much 6 5 4
The responses to statements on happiness/unhappiness of childhood were: 
9 (13.2%) reported that their childhood was ‘very unhappy’,
8 (11.8%) reported their childhood was ‘unhappy’,
18 (26.5%) said ‘fair’,
21 (30.9%) reported a ‘happy’ childhood and 
12 (17.6%) reported a ‘very happy’ childhood.
Appendix Table 1 shows the intercorrelations between the well-being and 
individual difference variables.
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Gender and age
Appendix Table 8 shows the correlations and tests of difference for age and 
gender respectively. The table shows that age is not related to any of the dream type 
frequencies with the exception of bad dream frequency. Appendix Table 9 shows that 
there are no significant sex difference on dream frequency variables between males 
and females. However, there is a trend for females to report more dreams on the logs 
than males in the current study (Ms = 12.86 and 9.50 respectively over 14 nights). 
Appendix Tables 10 and 11 shows that there were no sex differences in any of the 
personality or psychopathology/well-being measures. Appendix Table 12 shows that 
age only had significant correlations with BQ score (thickening of boundaries with 
age) and with life events. As gender and age in general have only small relationships 
with the various measures of dream frequency, personality and psychopathology/well­
being, they were not used as covariates in any of the analyses.
Retrospective frequency estimates and psychological well-being and individual 
differences
The following table shows Spearman’s rho correlations between 
retrospectively measured bad dream, nightmare, unpleasant dream frequency, mean 
dream emotional tone (measured prospectively) and nightmare distress with measures 
of well-being and individual differences. In order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 
errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of significance was set at is p is 
equal to or less than 0.01. "
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Table 8 - Spearman’s rho correlations between retrospective frequency measures 
and nightmare distress with psychopathology and personality variables
RDF RUD RNM RBD ND ET
ET 0.01 -0.39 -0.29 -0.30 -0.33
(0.92) (<0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
ND 0.29* 0.59* 0.50* 0.26 -0.33*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.04) (<0.01)
APS 0.30* 0.33* 0.28 0.31* 0.36* -0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.03)
CEQ 0.20 0.31* 0.38* 0.19 0.36* 0.07
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (<0.01) (0.58)
STB 0.10 0.38* 0.29 0.25 0.44* -0.27
(0.41) (<0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (<0.01) (0.04)
EPQ-N 0.15 0.42* 0.37* 0.36* 0.44* -0.36*
(0.23) (<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01)
EPQ-L 0.07 0.28 0.11 0.18 0.13 -0.26
(0.55) (0.02) (0.38) (0.13) (0.29) (0.05)
GHQ-12 0.02 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.37* -0.12
(0.88) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (<0.01) (0.37)
BQ-18 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.16 0.35* -0.10
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.20) (<0.01) (0.48)
STAI-S 0.01 0.69* 0.48* 0.38* 0.51* -0.56*
(0.97) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .0 1 )
STAI-T 0.21 0.57* 0.46* 0.39 0.58* -0.43*
(0.14) (<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SCL- DEP 0.23 0.54* 0.41* 0.41* 0.33* -0.27
(0.08) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.04)
SCL- ANX 0.28 0.58* 0.47* 0.33* 0.43* -0.34*
(0.04) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.01)
SCL:GSI 0.10 0.59* 0.48* 0.33* 0.61* -0.31
(0.40) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (0.02)
SCL:PST 0.06 0.55* 0.42* 0.40* 0.50* -0.31
' ' (061) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0.02)
SCL:PSD 0.16 0.51* 0.46* 0.22 0.56* -0.31
(0.19) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.08) (<0.01) (0.02)
LE 0.10 0.38* 0.37* 0.29* 0.34* -0.12
(0.40) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.38)
Child 0.07 0.19 0.30* 0.08 0.44* -0.24
(0.59) (0.11) (0.01) (0.50) (<0.01) (0.08)
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Note (table 8): 'RDF = retrospective dream frequency; RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency;
RNM = retrospective nightmare frequency; RBD = retrospective bad dream frequency, ND = Nightmare distress;
ET = dream emotional hedonic tone; APS = Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; 
STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N =Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health 
Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety ; STAI-T = Trait anxiety; SCL-DEP = 
SCL depression, SCL-ANX = SCL-anxiety; SCL:GSI = SCL- Global Severity Index; SCL:PST= SCL positive 
symptom total; SCL:PSD = positive symptom distress; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed
Table 8 shows that retrospectively measured unpleasant dreams are 
significantly positively correlated to most measures of well-being with the exception 
of the GHQ-12 (r = 0.28; p = 0.02), the BQ-12 (r = 0.27; p = 0.03), Eysenck’s lie 
scale (r = 0.28; p = 0.02) and childhood events (r = 0.07; p = 0.11). The latter variable 
is, however, significantly associated with retrospective nightmare frequency (r = 0.30; 
p = 0.01). Nightmares are significantly positively correlated with all measures of 
well-being with the exception of Eysenck’s lie scale (r = 0.11; p = 0.38), the GHQ-12 
(r = 0.24; p = 0.05) and the BQ-18 (r = 0.24; p = 0.05). Bad dream frequency has less 
significant correlations than either unpleasant dream frequency or nightmares 
frequency. It is not significantly correlated to the CEQ, the STB, the GHQ-12, the 
EPQ-L, the BQ-18, the STAI-T, the PSDI global scale of the SCL-90-R or childhood 
events. Dream frequency as measured retrospectively is not significantly associated 
with any of the well-being or individual difference variables, with the exception of the 
APS (r = 0.30; p = 0.01) and nightmare distress (r = 0.29; p <0.01). Inspection of table 
6 shows that in almost all cases unpleasant dreams, that is nightmares defined without 
the waking criterion, have higher correlations than do waking criterion nightmares. 
Furthermore, it can be observed that nightmare frequency has stronger correlations 
with the psychopathology measures than does bad dream frequency. This table also 
shows that nightmare distress is significantly positively related to all psychopathology 
variables (with the exception of Eysenck lie scale). Emotional tone (as measured
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prospectively) is also significantly associated with the majority of individual 
difference and well-being measures. Nightmare distress has higher correlations with 
psychopathology than do the frequency variables or mean dream emotional tone. As 
would be expected, nightmare distress and emotional tone are significantly correlated 
with the frequency of all unpleasant dream types. Thus, partial correlations have been 
conducted below where nightmare distress has been partialled out of the relationship 
between frequency measures and psychopathology (table 9) and where frequency 
measures are partialled out of the relationship between nightmare distress and 
psychopathology measures (table 10). Note that Kendall correlations and Kendall 
partial correlations are used: a Kendall correlation has the same p values as a 
Spearman correlation on the same data, but Spearman’s correlations are typically 
approximately 50% larger. Kendall’s correlation is used as it provides the only non- 
parametric partial correlation. Again in order to reduce the possibility of type 1 errors 
as a result of multiple comparisons the level of significance was set at p = to or <
0 .01 .
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Table 9 - Kendall’s tau_b correlations of retrospective frequency measures with 
well-being and individual difference variables. The original correlations for each 
frequency dream type are presented on the left, and next to them on the right are the 
correlations when nightmare distress has been partialled out. Partialled out variables 
are indicated after hyphens in the top row.
RUD RUD -ND RNM RNM-ND RBD RBD-ND
APS 0.24* 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.23* 0.19
(0.01) (>0.05) (0.02) (>0.05) (0 .01) (<0.05)
CEQ 0.23* 0.13 0.24* 0.15 0.13 0.08
(0.01) (>0.05) (0.01) (>0.05) (0.14) (>0.05)
STB 0.27* 0.15 0.21* 0.10 0.18 0.13
(<0.01) (>0.05) (0.01) (>0.05) (0.04) (>0.05)
EPQ-N 0.32* 0.20 0.26* 0.15 0.26* 0.21*
(<0.01) (<0.05) (<0.01) (>0.05) (0 .01) (<0.01)
EPQ-L 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.12
(0.04) (>0.05) (0.32) (>0.05) (0.12) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.11
(0.02) (>0.05) (0.05) (>0.05) (0.07) (>0.05)
BQ-18 0.19 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.07
(0.03) (>0.05) (0.05) (>0.05) (0.07) (>0.05)
STAI-T 0.53* 0.44* 0.33* 0.21* 0.28* 0.21*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
STAI-S 0.40* 0.26 0.37* 0.25* 0.26 0.22
(<0.01) (<0.05) (0 .01) (<0.01) (0.05) (>0.05)
SCL-GSI 0.44* 0.31* 0.35* 0.22* 0.25* 0.19
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.05)
SCL-PST 0.40* 0.29* 0.30* 0.19 0.28* 0.23*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .01) (<0.05) (0 .01) (0 .01)
SCL-PSD 0.38* 0.25* 0.35* 0.23* 0.16 0.09
(<0.01) (0 .01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.06) (<0.05)
LE 0.30* 0.22* 0.28* 0.20 0.23* 0.19
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.05) (0.01) (<0.05)
Child 0.14 -0.01 0.22* 0.11 0.05 -0.01
(0.11) (>0.05) (0.01) (>0.05) (0.52) (>0.05)
Note: RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM = retrospective nightmare frequency; RBD =
- - ----------------- ------------- -----  ---- ------ - ______________ ___ _ ____
retrospective bad dream frequency; -ND = nightmare distress partialled out; APS = Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ
= Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie 
Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-T = Trait anxiety; 
STAI-S = State anxiety; SCL-GSI = SCL- Global Severity Index; SCL-PST= SCL positive symptom total; SCL- 
PSD = positive symptom distress; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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The above table shows that when nightmare distress has been partialled 
out correlations between nightmare frequency, bad dream frequency and unpleasant 
dream frequency become smaller. When nightmare distress is partialled out of the 
relationship between unpleasant dream frequency and well-being measures some of 
the associations become insignificant with the exceptions of trait anxiety, the three 
global indices of the SCL-90-R and life events. Similarly, when nightmare distress is 
partialled out of the relationship between nightmare frequency and psychopathology 
variables, only trait and state anxiety and two of the global indices of the SCL-90-R 
remain significant. Most of the previously significant correlations between bad dream 
frequency with well-being and personality measures remain significant when 
nightmare distress is partialled out with the exception of the arousal predisposition 
scale (APS), the global symptom index of the SCL-90-R and life events. Thus, it 
seems that retrospective frequency variables are associated with some of the well­
being measures and individual difference variables independently of nightmare 
distress although all associations become smaller and some non significant when 
distress is controlled for. Again, unpleasant dream frequency has the strongest 
correlations with psychopathology when nightmare distress is partialled out.
Table 10 shows Kendall’s tau_b correlations between nightmare distress and 
measures of well-being and personality, and the correlations when the various types 
of retrospective frequency measures are partialled out.
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Table 10 - Kendall tau_b correlations of nightmare distress variables with well­
being and individual difference measures when retrospective frequency measures are 
partialled out. The original correlations with nightmare distress are presented on the 
left, and next to them on the right are the correlations when frequency variables are 
partialled out. Partialled out variables are indicated after hyphens in the top row.
ND ND- RUDF ND-RNM ND-RBD
APS 0.27* 0.19 0.21* 0.24*
(<0.01) (<0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01)
CEQ 0.27* 0.19 0.20* 0.25*
(<0.01) (<0.05) (<0.01) (0 .01)
STB 0.32* 0.23* 0.26* 0.30*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .01)
EPQ-N 0.34* 0.23* 0.27* 0.31*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
EPQ-L 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.08
(0.27) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.28* 0.21* 0.24* 0.26*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
BQ-18 0.25* 0.19 0.20 0.23*
(<0.01) (<0.05) (<0.05) (<0.01)
STAI-T 0.38* 0.19 0.29* 0.35*
(<0.01) (0 .05) (<0.01) (<0.01)
STAI-S 0.42* 0.30* 0.32* 0.39*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .01)
SCL-GSI 0.44* 0.31* 0.35* 0.41*
(<0.01) (0 .01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SCL-PST 0.35* 0.21* 0.27* 0.31*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SCL-PSDI 0.40* 0.28* 0.31* 0.38*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01)
LE 0.25* 0.14 0.16 0.22*
(<0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0.01)
Child 0.33* 0.30* 0.27* 0.33*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Note: ND = nightmare distress; -RUD = retrospective unpleasant dreams partialled out; -RNM = retrospective
nightmare frequency partialled out; -RBD = bad dream frequency partiallecfOutrAPS~="Arousal Prediction Seale;
CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L =
Eysenck Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-T = Trait
anxiety; STAI-S = State anxiety; SCL-GSI = SCL- Global Severity Index; SCL-PST= SCL positive symptom
total; SCL-PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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Inspection of the table overleaf shows that most of the relationships 
between nightmare distress and the well-being and personality variables remain 
significant when frequency variables are partialled out, with the expectation of 
correlations with life events and boundariness which became insignificant when 
retrospective unpleasant dream frequency and nightmare frequency are partialled out. 
Also, the APS, CEQ, trait and state anxiety become insignificant when unpleasant 
dream frequency is partialled out
Table 11 presents correlations of retrospective frequency measures when the mean 
emotional tone of the dream is partialled out.
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Table 11 - K endall’s tau_b correlations o f  retrospective frequency measures with well­
being and individual difference variables. The original correlations are for each frequency 
dream type are presented on the left and next to them are the correlations when mean dream 
emotional tone has been partialled out. Partialled out variables are indicated after hyphens in 
the top row
RUD RUD -ET RNM RNM-ET RBD RBD-ET
APS 0.24* 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.23* 0.20
(0.01) (<0.05) (0.02) (<0.05) (0.01) (<0.05)
CEQ 0.23* 0.23* 0.24* 0.24* 0.13 0.12
(0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (>0.05)
STB 0.27* 0.23* 0.21* 0.18 0.18 0.15
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.05) (0.04) (>0.05)
EPQ-N 0.32* 0.27* 0.27* 0.22* 0.26* 0.22*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01)
EPQ-L 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.11
(0.04) (>0.05) (0.32) (0,05) (0.12) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15
(0.02) (<0.05) (0.05) (>0.05) (0.07) (>0.05)
BQ-18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.10
(0.03) (<0.05) (0.05) (<0.05) (0.20) (>0.05)
STAI-S 0.53* 0.48* 0.39* 0.34* 0.26 0.20
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.05) (<0.05)
STAI-T 0.40* 0.34* 0.33* 0.28* 0.28* 0.23*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .01) (<0.01)
SCL-ANX 0.40* 0.37* 0.30* 0.27* 0.30* 0.27*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0 .01) (<0.01)
SCL-DEP 0.43* 0.39* 0.34* 0.31* 0.24* 0.21*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0 .01)
GSI 0.59* 0.57* 0.35* 0.32* 0.25* 0.22*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
PSI 0.55* 0.53* 0.30* 0.27* 0.28* 0.25*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
PSDI 0.51* 0.48* 0.35* 0.32* 0.16 0.12
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .01) (0.01) (0.06) (>0.05)
LE 0.30* 0.29* 0.28* 0.27* 0.23* 0.22*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01)
Child -----0.14 -  0.10 -  0.22* 0.19--------- 0.06------- 0.02
(0.11) (>0.01) (0.01) (<0.05) (0.52) (>0.05)
Note 1 RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM = retrospective nightmare frequency; RBD = 
retrospective bad dream frequency; -ET = mean dream emotional tone partialled out; APS = Arousal Prediction 
Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; 
EPQ-L = Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-T = Trait 
anxiety; STAI-S = State anxiety; SCL-ANX = SCL-anxiety SCL-DEP = SCL depression; SCL-GSI = SCL- Global 
Severity Index; SCL-PST= SCL positive symptom total; SCL-PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum 
of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
*p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed
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Inspection of table 11 shows that partialling out mean dream emotional tone 
does not greatly alter the size of the correlations with retrospective frequency 
measures. All previously significant correlations between retrospective unpleasant 
dream frequency and measures of well-being and individual differences remain when 
emotional tone is partialled out with the exception of the arousal predisposition scale 
(APS). Similarly all previously significant correlations with nightmare frequency 
remain significant when emotional tone is partialled out with the exception of the 
STB. The majority of bad dream correlations also remain significant with the 
exception of the APS . Thus, it seems to be that retrospective nightmare and 
unpleasant dream frequencies, rather than the average mood of all dreams, are 
significantly related to individual differences variables and well-being.
The following table shows the relationships between emotional tone and 
measures of individual differences and well-being when retrospective frequency 
variables are partialled out.
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Table 12 - Kendall tau b correlations of mean dream emotional tone variables with 
well-being and individual difference measures when retrospective frequency measures 
are partialled out. Partialled out variables are indicated after hyphens in the top row.
ET ET- RUD ET-RNM ET-RBD
APS -0.21 -0.16 -0.18 -0.17
(0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
CEQ -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.63) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STB -0.19 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16
(0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
EPQ-N -0.25* -0.18 -0.21* -0.21*
(0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01)
EPQ-L -0.18 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16
(0.06) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
(0.36) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
BQ-18 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
(0.48) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STAI-S -0.42* -0.34* -0.38* -0.39*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
STAI-T -0.34* -0.27* -0.30* -0.30*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SCL-DEP -0.19 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14
(0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
SCL-ANX -0.23* -0.14 -0.18 -0.19
(0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0.05)
SCL-GSI -0.19 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15
(0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
SCL-PSI -0.19 -0.06 -0.14 -0.15
(0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
SCL-PSDI -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20
(0.02) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0.05)
LE -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06
(0.32) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Child -0.18 -0.15 -0.14 -0.17
(0.06) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Note. ET = mean dream emotional tone; -RUD ^retrospective' unpleasantdream ffequerrcypartialled“Out;-RNM 
= retrospective nightmare frequency partialled out; -RBD = retrospective bad dream frequency partialled out;; 
APS = Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; 
EPQ-N =Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary 
Questionnaire; STAI-T = Trait anxiety; STAI-S = State anxiety; SCL-ANX = SCL-anxiety; SCL-DEP = SCL 
depression, SCL-GSI = SCL- Global Severity Index; SCL-PST= SCL positive symptom total; SCL-PSDI = 
positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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Table 12 shows that when the strongest correlate of well-being, retrospective 
unpleasant dream frequency, is partialled out of the relationship being well-being and 
emotional tone all correlations become insignificant, with the exception of trait and 
state anxiety. Trait and state anxiety as well as neuroticism remain significantly 
associated with mean dream tone when retrospective nightmare frequency is partialled 
out. Thus, some variables, particularly trait and state anxiety appear to be related to 
the emotional tone of all dreams, although their correlations with unpleasant dream 
types are higher.
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Correlations between prospective nightmare and unpleasant dream measures and
individual difference variables.
Table 13 -Spearman’s rho correlations between prospective frequency measures and
psychopathology variables.
LDF LUD LUD 
(14)2
LXUD' LXUD 
(14)12
LNM Is LXNM
1
LXNM 
(14)1-2
BD BD 
(14)2
LXBD1
ND 0.50* 0.51* 0.47* 0.42* 0.40* 0.49* 0.47* 0.40* 0.42* 0.38* 0.37* 0.17
(<•01) (0.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<•01) (<•01) (<.01) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.22)
APS 0.40* 0.35* 0.31 0.39* 0.40* 0.32* 0.32* 0.35* 0.35* 0.22 0.21 0.18
(<.01) (0.01) (0.02) (<.01) (<.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (<01) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19)
CEQ 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.31 0.31 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.20
(0.05) (0.14) (0.20) (0.02) (0.02) (0.40) (0.42) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0-14)
STB 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.40* 0.38* 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.36*
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (<.01) (<.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
EPQ-N 0.46* 0.46* 0.43* 0.50* 0.48* 0.49* 0.47* 0.43* 0.45* 0.24 0.24 0.22
(<•01) (<■01) (<.01) (<•01) (<.01) (<•01) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
EPQ-L 0.14 0.41* 0.41* 0.44* 0.44* 0.48* 0.49* 0.50* 0.49* 0.14 0.13 0.06
(0.30) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<•01) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.32) (0.33) (0.66)
GHQ-12 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.21
(0.14) (0.33) (0.36) (0.14) (0.21) (0.31) (0.39) (0.49) (0.38) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12)
BQ-18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.29 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.34* 0.34* 0.35*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.03) (0.05) (0.50) (0.60) (0.34) (0.23) (0.01) (0-01) (0.01)
STAI-S 0.07 0.41 0.41 0.58* 0.55* 0.42 0.41 0.48* 0.49* 0.22 0.22 0.33
(0.72) (0.04) (0.04) (<.01) (<.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.28) (0.11)
STAI-T 0.39* 0.43* 0.40* 0.50* 0.47* 0.39* 0.36* 0.39* 0.42* 0.38* 0.38* 0.41*
(0.01) (<.01) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0-01) (<.01) (0.01) (0.01) (<.01)
SCLrGSI 0.30 0.42* 0.39* 0.48* 0.45* 0.41* 0.37* 0.37* 0.40* 0.33* 0.34* 0.36*
(0.03) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
SCL:PST 0.24 0.36* 0.35* 0.47* 0.44* 0.39* 0.36* 0.38* 0.42* 0.20* 0.28 0.30
(0.08) (<.01) (0.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<•01) (0.01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
SCL:PSDI 0.31 0.41* 0.39* 0.46* 0.43* 0.36* 0.33* 0.32 0.36* 0.39* 0.39* 0.32
(0,02) (<.01)- (0.01) (<•01) (<.01) (0-01). (fLQlT (0,02) (0.01) (<•01) (<-Ql) (0.02)
SCL-DEP 0.23 0.31 0.27 0.40* 0.40* 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.35* 0.28 0.28 0.29
(0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (<.01) (<•01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
SCL-ANX 0.28 0.42* 0.39* 0.54* 0.51* 0.43* 0.40* 0.45* 0.48* 0.26 0.27 0.36*
(0.04) (<.01) (<.01) (<•01) (<•01) (<•01) (<.01) (<.01) (<•01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
LE 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.20
(0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.45) (0.43) (0.13)
Child 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.38 0.37* 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14) (0.20) (0.28) (0.20) (0.04) (<.01) (0.49)
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Note (table 13): LDF = log dream frequency; LUD = log unpleasant dream frequency; LUD (14) = log 
unpleasant dream frequency 14; LXUD = log extreme unpleasant dreams; LXNM (14) = log extreme nightmares 
(14); LNM = log nightmare frequency; LNM (14) = log nightmare frequency (14); LXNM = log extreme 
nightmares; LXNM (14) = log extreme nightmares (14); LBD = log bad dream frequency; LBD (14) = log bad 
dream frequency (14); LXBD = log extreme bad dream; ND = Nightmare distress; APS = Arousal Prediction 
Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; 
EPQ-L = Eysenck Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI- 
T = Trait anxiety; STAI-S = State anxiety; SCL-GSI = SCL- Global Severity Index; SCL-PST= SCL positive 
symptom total; SCL-PSDI = positive symptom distress index; SCL-DEP = SCL depression, SCL-ANX = SCL- 
anxiety LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
1 Frequency variables with ‘X’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 
(very unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
2 Frequency variables with (14) in their tiles means that the measure includes at most only one dream 
per night. Frequency variables without (14) in their title allow for the recording of more than one 
dream per night.
Table 13 shows the correlations between the prospective nightmare frequency
estimates and the psychopathology variables. The table shows that:
a) For nightmares and unpleasant dreams defined as very unpleasant (extreme), 
or defined as very or moderately unpleasant, correlations with the frequency 
measures are generally higher than with the number of nights measure which 
only counted one nightmare or unpleasant dream per night.
b) For the very unpleasant dream definition of nightmares and unpleasant 
dreams, unpleasant dream frequency correlations were generally higher than 
correlations with nightmares, but these correlations were more similar if the 
very or moderately unpleasant definition was used. Furthermore, when the
very unpleasant definition was used nightmares generally had higher .......
correlations than bad dreams, but these correlations were similar when the 
very and moderately unpleasant criteria was used.
c) In general, correlations tended to be higher with the very unpleasant rather 
than the very or moderately unpleasant criterion of nightmares or unpleasant 
dreams.
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d) In comparison with Table 8, the prospective dream frequency correlations 
were almost all larger than the retrospective DF correlations (14 larger, 1 
smaller, 2 the same; Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = 3.36, p=.001). The 
prospective NF and UD correlations were in general smaller than for the 
retrospective measures (3 larger, 11 smaller, 3 the same; 4 larger, 9 smaller, 4 
the same, respectively). There was a difference between retrospective and 
prospective correlations for nightmare frequency (z = -2.14, p=.033) but not 
for unpleasant dreams (z = -1.39).
e) Life events and adverse childhood mainly had only small or non-significant 
correlations with nightmare / unpleasant dream frequencies.
Partial correlations of nightmare distress and nightmare frequency with 
individual difference variables
Nightmare distress and nightmare/unpleasant dream frequencies are correlated 
with each other as well as with many of the individual difference variables. Partial 
correlations were thus conducted to ascertain the variance in individual difference 
measures attributable to each of these nightmare measures.
As the frequency definitions only including ‘very unpleasant’ dreams had 
the strongest relationships with measures of well-being and personality, these were 
assessed first in the following partial correlations. The following partial correlations 
used frequency measures, which allowed more than one nightmare / unpleasant dream 
per night to be recorded (little difference was found between these and measures only- 
counting one dream per night).
Table 14 shows Kendall’s tau_b correlation’s of log frequency measures (only 
those dream variable rated as very unpleasant on the hedonic scale) with 
psychological well-being and individual difference measures before and after 
nightmare distress is partialled out.
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Table 14 - Kendall’s tau_b correlations between nightmare/unpleasant dream /bad 
dream frequency variables (only those rated as very unpleasant on the hedonic scale) 
and individual difference measures before and after nightmare distress and emotional 
tone have been partialled out. Partialled out variables are indicated after hyphens in 
the top row. Only dreams rated as very unpleasant are classed as
nightmares/unpleasant dreams/bad dreams in this analysis.
LXNM LXNM- LXNM- LXUD LXUD- LXUD- LXBD LXBD- LXBD-
ET ND ET ND ET ND
APS 0.26* 0.18 0.19 0.30* 0.23* 0.23* 0.13 0.07 0.10
(0 .01 ) (<0.05) (<0.05) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (0.24) (>0.05) (0.05)
CEQ 0.18 0.18 0.11 0 .22 0.25* 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12
(0.08) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.03) (0 .01 ) (>0.05) (0.18) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STB 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.31* 0.25* 0.23* 0.27* 0.23* 0.24*
(0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0 .01 ) (0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
EPQ-N 0.35* 0.27* 0.27* 0.38* 0.30* 0.30* 0.17 0 .10 0.13
(<0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0.13) (>0.05) (>0.05)
EPQ-L 0.40* 0.36* 0.42* 0.34* 0.29* 0.36* 0.05 0 .0 0 0.05
(<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0.65) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.13
(0.46) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0 .11) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.16) (>0.05) (>0.05)
BQ-18 0.09 0.07 0.01 0 .20 0.20 0.13 0.26 0.25* 0.24*
(0.36) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.05) (<0.05) (>0.05) (0.17) (<0 .0 1 ) (0 .01)
STAI-S 0.38* 0.21 0.30* 0.43* 0.26* 0.35* 0.28 0.18 0.25*
(0 .0 1 ) (<0.05) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0.09) (>0.05) (<0 .01)
STAI-T 0.30* 0.16 0 .2 0 * 0.37* 0.23* 0.27* 0.32* 0.24* 0.29*
(0 .0 1 ) (>0.05) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
SOM 0.29* 0.23* 0 .2 1 * 0.31* 0.25* 0.23* 0.10 0.05 0.06
(<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0.34) (>0.05) (>0.05)
OCS 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.28* 0.18 0.20 0.27* 0 .2 1 * 0.24*
(0 .12) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0 .0 1 ) (>0.05) (<0.05) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
IS 0.22 0 .10 0.14 0.31* 0 .20 0.23* 0.33* 0.27* 0.31*
(0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0 .01 )
r--s
W
O
o©
(<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
DEP 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.33* 0.28* 0.25* 0.29 0.25* 0.26*
(0 .0 2 ) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
ANX 0.35* 0.28* 0.25* 0.42* 0.36* 0.33* 0.23 0.17 0.19
(<0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (>0 .01 ) (0.04) (>0.05) (<0.05)
HOS 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.21 0 .2 2 *
(0.19) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
PhA 0.24 0 .2 1 * 0.13 0.34* 0.33* 0.24* 0.32* 0.30* 0.29*
(0 .0 2 ) (<0 .01 ) (>0.05) (0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0 .01)
PI 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.25* 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.18 0.20
------------- (0.07) (>0.05) -■(>0.-05)- (0 .0 1 ) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.04) (>0.05) (<0t05)
Psy 0.25 0.23* 0.17 0.31* 0.31* 0.23* 0 .22 0 .2 0 0.19
(0 .0 2 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (>0.05) (<0 .01 )
o©V
, (<0 .01 ) (0.05) (<0.05) (<0.05)
GSI 0.28* 0 .2 2 * 0.17 0.37* 0.32* 0.27* 0.26 0 .2 2 * 0.23*
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (>0.05) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (0 .0 2 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (0 .01)
PST 0.28* 0 .2 2 * 0.19 0.35* 0.30* 0.27* 0.22 0.17 0.19
(0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0.05) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (0.04) (>0.05) (<0.05)
PSDI 0.25* 0.16 0.14 0.36* 0.29* 0.26* 0.27* 0 .2 2 * 0.24*
(0 .0 1 ) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0 .01 ) (<0 .01 ) (0 .01) (0 .0 1 ) (<0 .0 1 ) (<0 .01)
LE 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.13
(0.32) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.30) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.16) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Child 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03
(0.24) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.15) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.53) (>0.05) (>0.05)
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Note (table 14): LXNM = log extreme nightmares; LXUD = log extreme unpleasant dreams; LXBD = log 
extreme bad dream; -ET = mean dream emotional tone partialled out; -ND = nightmare distress partialled out.
APS = Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; 
EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Eysenck Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 =
Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; STAI-T = Trait anxiety; SOM = SCL- somatisation; OCS = 
SCL- obsessive compulsive scale; IS = SCL- interpersonal sensitivity scale; DEP = SCL- depression; ANX =SCL- 
anxiety; HOS = SCL- hostility; PhA =SCL-phobic anxiety; PI =SCL-paranoia; Psy = SCL-psychoticism; GSI = 
SCL- Global Symptom Index; PST= SCL- positive symptom total; PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = 
Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
Frequency variables with ‘X’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 (very 
unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Table 14 shows that when nightmare distress is partialled out the log 
frequency measures defined as very unpleasant become smaller. When nightmare 
distress is partialled out of the relationships of unpleasant dream frequency with well­
being and psychopathology all previously significant correlations remain, with the 
exception of the obsessive compulsive and the paranoid ideation scales of the SCL- 
90-R. This suggests that it is these extreme unpleasant dreams that are diagnostic of 
poor well-being rather than the mean emotion of all dreams. When nightmare distress 
is partialled out the previously significant relationships of nightmare frequency with 
the arousal predisposition scale and the three global scales of the SCL-90-R become 
insignificant. All significant correlations with bad dream frequency remain when 
nightmare distress is partialled out. Thus, these findings confirm the intuitive notion 
that poor waking well-being and some personality traits increase the frequency of 
unpleasant dream types and, furthermore, that this is independent of the distress 
associated with these dream types.
Partialling out mean dream tone seems to have a smaller effect on correlation 
sizes than does partialling out nightmare distress. When mean dream emotional tone 
is partialled out of the relationship between unpleasant dream frequency with well­
being and individual differences all previously significant correlations remain
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significant with the exception of the obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal 
sensitivity and paranoid ideation scales of the SCL-90-R. When mean dream emotion 
is partialled out of the relationship between nightmare frequency and bad dream 
frequency a few more previously significant correlations become insignificant. The 
following table shows the relationships of nightmare distress and mean dream tone 
when log extreme frequency measures are partialled out.
Table 15 - Kendall’s tau_b correlations of well-being and individual difference 
variables with nightmare distress and emotional tone when prospective frequency 
variables are partialled out. Only dreams rated as very unpleasant were classed as 
nightmares/unpleasant dreams/bad dreams for use in partialling out in this analysis.
ND ND- ND- ND- ET ET- ET- ET-XBD
XNM XUD XBD XNM XUD
APS 0.27* 0.21* 0.19 0.26* -0.21 -0.09 -0.06 -0.18
(<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (<0.05) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
CEQ 0.27* 0.23* 0.22* 0.26* -0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.01
(<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.63) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STB 0.32* 0.27* 0.25* 0.30* -0.19 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12
(0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
EPQ-N 0.34* 0.26* 0.25* 0.33* -0.25* -0.09 -0.05 -0.21
(<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0.05)
EPQ-L 0.01 -0.13 -0.11 0.00 -0.18 0.03 0.01 -0.17
(0.27) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.06) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.28* 0.27* 0.24* 0.26* -0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.04
(<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.36) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
BQ-12 0.25* 0.23* 0.20* 0.23* -0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.01
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.48) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STAI-S 0.38* 0.30* 0.28* 0.36* -0.42* -0.28* -0.24 -0.37
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (>0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01)
STAI-T 0.42* 0.36* 0.34* 0.40* -0.34* -0.23* -0.18 -0.27*
( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01)
SOM 0.31* 0.24* 0,23* 0.30* -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 -0.17
(0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
OCS 0.33* 0.30* 0.26* 0.31* -0.23* -0.19 -0.11 -0.17
(0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.01) (<0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
IS 0.31* 0.26* 0.23* 0.29* -0.19 -0.19 -0.13 -0.19
(0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.04) (<0.05) (>0.05) (<0.05)
DEP 0.33* 0.28* 0.25* 0.31* -0.19 -0.08 -0.01 -0.11
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
ANX 0.43* 0.36* 0.34* 0.41* -0.22 -0.06 0.00 -0.17
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.02) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
HOS 0.37* 0.35* 0.32* 0.35* -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.11
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.32) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
PhA 0.40* 0.35* 0.33* 0.38* -0.18 0.00 0.09 -0.03
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.06) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
PI 0.37* 0.33* 0.32* 0.35* -0.21 -0.11 -0.06 -0.13
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Psy 0.32* 0.26* 0.25* 0.30* -0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.04
(0 .0 1 ) (0 7 0 IX 1 0 .01) { 0 .0 1 ) (0.63) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GSI 0.44* 0.39* 0.37* 0.42* -0.19 -0.06 0.02 -0.12
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
PST 0.35* 0.29* 0.27* 0.33* -0.25* -0.06 0.00 -0.13
(0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
PSDI 0.40* 0.35* 0.32* 0.38* -0.18 -0.11 -0.03 -0.15
(0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.06) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
LE 0.25* 0.23* 0.23* 0.23* -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.36) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Child 0.33* 0.31* 0.30* 0.32* -0.07 -0.14 -0.12 -0.17
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 ) (0.48) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
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Note (table 15): ND= nightmare distress; ET =mean dream emotional tone; -LXNM = log extreme nightmares 
partialled out; -LXUD = log extreme unpleasant dreams partialled out; -LXBD = log extreme bad dream partialled 
out
APS = Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; 
EPQ-N =Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Eysenck Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 =
Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; STAI-T = Trait anxiety; SOM = SCL- somatisation; OCS = 
SCL- obsessive compulsive scale; IS = SCL- interpersonal sensitivity scale; DEP = SCL- depression; ANX =SCL- 
anxiety; HOS = SCL- hostility; PhA =SCL-phobic anxiety; PI =SCL-paranoia; Psy -  SCL-psychoticism; GSI = 
SCL- Global Symptom Index; PST= SCL- positive symptom total; PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = 
Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items.
Frequency variables with ‘X’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 (very 
unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Table 15 shows that all relationships of individual difference variables with 
nightmare distress remain significantly correlated when log extreme frequency 
measures are partialled out.
Table 15 also shows that correlations of well-being and individual differences 
with emotional tone generally become much smaller when log frequency measures 
are partialled out. When unpleasant dream frequency is partialled out of the 
relationships of mean dream tone with well-being and individual difference measures, 
all correlations become (or remain) insignificant. When nightmare frequency and bad 
dream frequencies are partialled out nearly all correlations become (or remain) . 
insignificant with the exception of trait anxiety.__________________
The above partial correlations were also conducted for log frequency 
measures, using a criterion of including ‘moderately unpleasant’ and ‘very 
unpleasant’ dreams, in order to quantify the effects of different definitions of 
nightmares. The results are shown in Table 16.
Table 16 - Kendall’s tau_b correlations of frequency variables (using criterion of 
very unpleasant and moderately unpleasant dreams) with well-being and individual 
difference measures, before and after nightmare distress and emotional tone have been 
partialled out. Partialled out variables are indicated after hyphens in the top row.
LUD L U D -
ND
L U D -
ET
LNM LNM-
ND
LNM-
ET
LBD LBD-
ND
LBD-
ET
APS 0.25* 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.09
(0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.02) (>0.05) (0 .0 5 ) (0.13) (>0.05) (>0.05)
CEQ 0.13 0.03 0.12 0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.22
(0.19) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.46) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.04) (>0.05) (<0.01)
STB 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.14 0.17
(0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.08) (<0.05) (>0.05) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05)
EPQ-N 0.34* 0.24* 0.25* 0.38* 0.29* 0.30* 0.19 0.11 0.12
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.07) (>0.05) (>0.05)
EPQ-L 0.31* 0.30* 0.26* 0.37* 0.36* 0.34* 0.10 0.08 0.04
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (<0.01) (0.32) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.12
(0.32) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.30) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.18) (>0.05) (>0.05)
BQ-18 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.26* 0.20 0.25*
(0.19) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.52) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.01) (<0.05) (0 .0 1 )
STAI-T 0.31 0.19 0.09 0.32 0.21 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.06
(0.04) (<0.05) (>0.05) (0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.23) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STAI-S 0.31* 0.18 0.15 0.28* 0.15 0.07 0.30* 0.21 0.21
(<0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.01) (<0.05) (<0.05)
SCL:GS1 0.29* 0.15 0.39* 0.29* 0.15 0.39* 0.26* 0.16 0.21
(0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.05) (<0.05)
SCL:PST 0.26* 0.15 0.32* 0.26* 0.15 0.36* 0.21 0.12 0.16
(0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05)
SCL:PSD1 0.29* 0.16 0.36* 0.27* 0.14 0.29* 0.30* 0.21 0.25*
(<0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (0.01) (>0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.05) (0 .0 1 )
LE 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.05
(0.37) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.32) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.46) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Child 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.28* 0.21 0.24*
(0.02) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.13) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.01) (<0.05) (0 .0 1 )
Note: LUD =  log unpleasant dream frequency; LNM = log nightmare frequency; LBD =  log bad dream frequency; 
-ND =  nightmare distress partialled out; -ET =  mean dream emotional tone partialled out.
APS =  Arousal Prediction Scale; CEQ =  Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; 
EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary 
Questionnaire; STAI-T =  Trait anxiety; STAI-S = State anxiety; SCL: GSI =  SCL- Global Symptom Index; 
SCL:PST= SCL- positive symptom total; SCL:PSD1 = positive symptom distress index; LE =  Sum o f  life events; 
Chil = Sum o f  childhood items.
* p = or <  .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities o f  type 1 errors as a result o f  multiple comparisons the level o f  
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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Inspection of the above table shows that when nightmare distress is 
partialled out of the unpleasant dream frequency measure, including both moderately 
and very unpleasant dreams, correlations with well-being and individual differences 
become much smaller and all previously significant associations become insignificant 
with the exception of the neuroticism and social desirability scales. The majority of 
significant associations with log nightmare frequency also disappear with the 
exception of Eysenck’s neuroticism and lie scales. Associations with log bad dream 
frequency all become insignificant (or remain) when nightmare distress is partialled 
out. As noted earlier when ‘moderately unpleasant’ dreams are included in the 
analysis nightmares do not generally have higher correlations with psychopathology 
than bad dreams. Comparing this table to table 14 shows that frequency measures 
only using ‘very unpleasant’ dreams, have stronger relationships with well-being. In 
the case of extreme unpleasant dreams, defined as very unpleasant, most correlations 
remain significant when nightmare distress is partialled out, which is in contrast to the 
above table where most correlations with unpleasant dream frequency, including 
moderately unpleasant dreams, become insignificant. The following tables shows the 
relationships of nightmare distress and emotional tone with measures of well-being 
and individual differences when these more loosely defined frequency measures are 
partialled out.
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Table 17 - Kendall’s tau_b correlations with nightmare distress and emotional 
tone when prospective frequency variables (using criterion of very unpleasant and 
moderately unpleasant dreams) are partialled out. Partialled out variables are 
indicated after hyphens in the top row.
ND ND-
LUD
ND-
LNM
ND-
LBD
ET ET-
LUD
ET-
LNM
ET-LBD
APS 0.27* 0.20 0.21* 0.24* -0.21 -0.09 -0.09 -0.17
(<0.01) (<0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.03) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
CEQ 0.27* 0.24* 0.26* 0.22* -0.05 0.03 0.00 .002
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.63) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STB 0.32* 0.27* 0.28* 0.28* -0.19 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
EPQ-N 0.34* 0.24* 0.23* 0.30* -0.25* -0.07 0.01 -0.20
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (>0.05) (>0.05) (<0.05)
EPQ-L 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.18 0.00 0.10 -0.16
(0.27) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05) (0.06) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
GHQ-12 0.28* 0.26* 0.26* 0.25* -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.36) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
BQ-18 0.25* 0.22* 0.25* 0.19 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.05) (0.48) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
STAI-S 0.38* 0.30* 0.30* 0.35* -0.42* -0.31* -0.29* -0.39*
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
STAI-T 0.42* 0.34* 0.35* 0.37* -0.34* -0.21* -0.21* -0.27*
(<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SCL:PSDI 0.44* 0.37* 0.37* 0.40* -0.19 0.07 0.13 -0.11
(<0.01) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (<0.01) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
LE 0.25* 0.23* 0.23* 0.24* -0.19 0.03 0.10 -0.13
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.04) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Child 0.33* 0.27* 0.30* 0.27* -0.22 0.02 0.03 -0.13
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0.02) (>0.05) (>0.05) (>0.05)
Note: ND= nightmare distress; ET =mean dream emotional tone; -LUD = log unpleasant dreams partialled out; - 
LNM = log nightmares partialled out; -LBD = log bad dreams partialled out. APS = Arousal Prediction Scale;
CEQ = Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = 
Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; 
STAI-T = Trait anxiety; PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of 
childhood items.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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As with the extreme frequency measures (Table 14) all significant 
relationships with nightmare distress remain when frequency measures partialled out, 
with the exception of the arousal prediction scale when unpleasant dream frequency is 
partialled out. Nearly all significant correlations with mean dream emotional tone 
become insignificant when frequency measures are partialled out with the exception 
of state and trait anxiety.
Summary of data on life events, childhood events and nightmare variables
Nightmare distress had the strongest relationship with adverse life events 
score. Retrospective frequency measures were significantly correlated with the life 
events score, even when nightmare distress was partialled out. Log frequency 
measures and dream emotional tone were not significantly correlated with life events 
score, nor with any of the individual life events items.
Nightmare distress was found to have the strongest correlations with the 
childhood variable, which combined the four items about characteristics of childhood. 
This sum of childhood items was also significantly correlated with retrospective 
nightmare frequency and log bad dream frequency, however, these became 
insignificant when nightmare distress was partialled out. There was no significant 
relationship between dream emotional tone.
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Relationships between prospective mood and nightmare/unpleasant dream 
frequency and occurrence
This section looks at the relationship of mood before and after sleep with the 
nightmare/unpleasant frequency variables and mean dream emotional tone. Levels of 
depression and anxiety were recorded before sleep and on awakening for the 14-day 
study period. Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality found that prospective measures of 
anxiety and depression were normally distributed with the exception of anxiety before 
sleep (Shapiro-Wilk statistic = 0.942, p= .01). Table 18 shows the means and (SDs) of 
pre- and post-sleep anxiety and depression. Anxiety and depression after sleep were 
found to be significantly higher than before sleep.
Table 18 -  Means and (standard deviation) of prospective pre- and post-sleep anxiety 
and depression, from 14 day diaries
Pre-sleep Post-sleep Paired t(56) P
Anxiety 28.91 (11.45) 32.84 (12.36) 4.73* <0.001
Depression 30.38 (11.34) 33.22 (11.69) 4.54* <0.001
* p<0.01
Table 19 shows correlations between retrospective and prospective frequency 
measures, nightmare distress, mean dream tone and anxiety and depression well-being 
measures with mean anxiety before and after sleep.
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Table 19 - Spearman’s rho correlations betw een m ean prospective anxiety and 
m ean prospective depression measures and retrospective and prospective frequency  
measures, nightm are distress, m ean dream em otional tone, trait and state anxiety, and
SCL-anxiety and SCL-depression
Mean anxiety 
before sleep
Mean anxiety 
after sleep
Mean depression 
before sleep
Mean depression 
after sleep
RUD 0.33* (0.01) 0.28 (0.03) 0.24 (0.07) 0.28 (0.04)
RNM 0.19 (0.16) 0.19(0.16) 0.07 (0.62) 0.18(0.18)
ND 0.57* (<0.01) 0.47*(0.01) 0.42* (0.01) 0.46* (0.01)
LNM 0.48* (0.01) 0.46* (0.01) 0.41* (0.01) 0.48* (0.01)
LUD 0.55* (0.01) 0.50*(0.01) 0.42* (0.01) 0.48* (0.01)
LNM (14)2 0.45* (0.01) 0.45*(0.01) 0.39* (0.01) 0.46* (0.01)
LUD (14)2 0.50* (0.01) 0.44*(<0.01) 0.38* (0.01) 0.41* (0.01)
LXNM1 0.42* (0.01) 0.41* (0.01) 0.35* (0.01) 0.43* (0.01)
LXUD1 0.46* (0.01) 0.42* (0.01) 0.39*(0.01) 0.45* (0.01)
LXNM (14)1,2 0.44* (0.01) 0.41* (0.01) 0.38* (0.01) 0.44* (0.01)
LXUD (14)]’2 0.39* (0.01) 0.39* (0.01) 0.33* (0.01) 0.41* (0.01)
ET -0.59* (0.01) -0.66*(0.01) -0.52* (0.01) -0.59* (0.01)
STAI-S 0.71* (0.01) 0.69* (0.01) 0.75* (0.01) 0.75* (0.01)
STAI-T 0.55* (0.01) 0.54* (0.01) 0.50* (0.01) 0.50* (0.01)
SCL-DEP 0.50* (0.01) 0.35* (0.01) 0.39* (0.01) 0.43 *(0.01)
SCL-ANX 0.52* (0.01) 0.48* (0.01) 0.45* (0.01) 0.49* (0.01)
Note: RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM = retrospective nightmare frequency; ND= 
nightmare distress; LNM = log nightmare frequency; LUD = log unpleasant dream frequency;; LNM (14) = log 
nightmare frequency (14); LUD (14) = log unpleasant dream frequency (14); LXNM = log extreme nightmares; 
LXUD = log extreme unpleasant dreams; LXNM (14) = log extreme nightmares (14); LXUD (14) = log extreme 
unpleasant dreams (14). ET = mean dream emotional tone. STAI-S = state anxiety; STAI-T =trait anxiety; SCL- 
DEP = SCL-depression; SCL-ANX = SCL- anxiety.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01). All values are two tailed.
1 Frequency variables with ‘X’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 (very 
unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
2 Frequency variables with (14) in their tiles means that the measure includes at most only one dream per night. 
Frequency variables without (14) in their title allow for the recording of more than one dream per night.
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Table 19 shows that prospective anxiety and depression had correlations that 
were ordered in size as follows: dream emotional tone > nightmare distress > log 
nightmare and unpleasant dream frequencies > frequency of log nightmare and 
unpleasant dreams with criterion of very unpleasant dream emotion > retrospective 
unpleasant dream frequency > retrospective nightmare frequency.
Correlations with nightmares and unpleasant dreams (defined as very 
unpleasant) are smaller than with those defined as moderately unpleasant and very 
unpleasant which is in contrast to correlations with measures of poor well-being and 
individual differences which were higher with these more strictly defined nightmares 
and unpleasant dreams.
State and trait anxiety and SCL anxiety and depression sub scales were all 
significantly associated with prospective measures of anxiety and depression.
However, it is a concern, which will be further addressed in Tables 22 and 23, that 
correlations of prospective anxiety and depression do not differ from each other 
appreciably according to whether they are correlated with the individual difference 
STAI- and SCL-anxiety or SCL-depression measures.
Table 20 shows the relationship between frequency variables and mood before
and after sleep-when reteospecti^e nightmare distress andprospectively measured____
emotional tone are partialled out.
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Table 20 -  Kendall’s tau_b correlations between frequency variables and anxiety and 
depression before and after sleep when nightmare distress and mean dream emotional 
tone are partialled out.
Mean anxiety 
before sleep
Mean anxiety 
after sleep
Mean depression 
before sleep
Mean depression 
after sleep
RUD 0.22 (0.02) 0.20 (0.03) 0.16(0.08) 0.20 (0.03)
RUD-ND 0.05 (>0.05) 0.05 (>0.05) 0.03 (>0.05) 0.05 (>0.05)
RUD-ET 0.12 (>0.05) 0.09 (>0.05) 0.07 (>0.05) 0.10 (>0.05)
RNM 0.13(0.18) 0.14(0 .12) 0.03 (0.75) 0 .13(0 .14)
RNM-ND -0.06 (>0.05) -0.02 (>0.05) -0.12 (>0.05) -0.03 (>0.05)
RNM-ET 0.02 (>0.05) 0.02 (>0.05) -0.07 (>0.05) 0.02 (>0.05)
LUD 0.39* (<0.01) 0.36* (<0.01) 0.30* (<0.01) 0.35* (<0.01)
LUD-ND 0.28* (<0.01) 0.26* (<0.01) 0.21* (<0.01) 0.25* (<0.01)
LUPD-ET 0.20 (<0.05) 0.13 (>0.05) 0.12 (>0.05) 0.14 (>0.05)
LNM 0.35* (<0.01) 0.33* (<0.01) 0.31* (0 .0 1 ) 0.35* (<0.01)
LNM-ND 0.23* (0 .0 1 ) 0.23* (<0.01) 0.22* (0 .0 1 ) 0.25* (0 .0 1 )
LNM -E T 0.16 (>0.05) 0 .11(>0.05) 0.15(>0.05) 0.16 (>0.05)
LXUD1 0.34* (0 .0 1 ) 0.32*(<0.01) 0.29* ( 0 .0 1 ) 0.35* (0 .0 1 )
LXUD' -ND 0 .2 4 * (0 .0 1 ) 0.23*(<0.01) 0.21 *(<0.01) 0.27*(<0.01)
LXUD-ET 0.14 (>0.05) 0.08 (>0.05) 0.11 (>0.05) 0.15 (>0.05)
LXNM1 0.29*(<0.01) 0.29* (<0.01) 0.26* (0.01) 0.31 *(<0.01)
LXNM1 -ND 0 .1 9 (0 .0 5 ) 0.20 (<0.05) 0.18 (>0.05) 0.23* (<0.01)
LXNM1 -ET 0.09 (>0.05) 0.07(>0.05) 0.09(>0.05) 0.12(>0.05)
Note: RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM= retrospective nightmare frequency; LUD = log 
unpleasant dream frequency; LNM = log nightmare frequency; LXUD = log extreme unpleasant dreams; LXNM = 
Log extreme nightmares; -ET=mean dream emotional tone partialled out; -ND = nightmare distress partialled out.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
1 Frequency variables with ‘X’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 (very 
unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
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Table 20 shows that there is little difference between pre- and post-sleep 
correlations with the nightmare and unpleasant dream variables. When nightmare 
distress and emotional tone are partialled out Kendall’s correlations with retrospective 
unpleasant dream frequency and nightmare frequency become very small.
Log frequency correlations, with nightmares or unpleasant dreams defined as 
moderately and very unpleasant, remain significantly correlated with anxiety and 
depression before and after sleep when nightmare distress is partialled out as does log 
unpleasant dream frequency defined as very unpleasant. However, log nightmares 
defined only as very unpleasant remain significantly correlated with depression after 
sleep when nightmare distress is partialled out. However, all correlations with 
frequency measures and anxiety and depression before and after sleep become much 
smaller and insignificant when mean dream emotional tone is partialled out.
Table 21 shows Kendall’s tau_b correlations of nightmare distress and 
emotional tone with prospective anxiety and depression when frequency variables are 
partialled out.
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Table 21: Kendall’s tau_b correlations of nightmare distress and emotional tone with 
prospective anxiety and depression when frequency variables are partialled out.
Mean anxiety 
before sleep
Mean anxiety 
after sleep
Mean depression 
before sleep
Mean depression after 
sleep
ND 0.40* (<0.01) 0.35* (0.01) 0.30* (0.01) 0.35* (0.01)
ND -RUD 0.35* (0.01) 0.30* (0.01) 0.26* (0.01) 0.30* (0.01)
ND- RNM 0.39* (0.01) 0.32* (0.01) 0.20 (0.05) 0.33* (0.01)
ND- LUD 0.30* (0.01) 0.25* (0.01) 0.21* (0.01) 0.25* (0.01)
ND-LNM 0.31* (0.01) 0.26* (0.01) 0.21 *(0.01) 0.25* (0.01)
ND-LXUD1 0.33* (0.01) 0.28*(0.01) 0.23*(0.01) 0.27*(0.01)
ND-LXNM1 0.34*(0.01) 0.29*(0.01) 0.24*(0.01) 0.28*(0.01)
ET -0.43* (0.01) -0.47* (0.01) -0.37* (0.01) -0.43* (0.01)
ET-RUD -0.40* (0.01) -0.44* (0.01) -0.34* (0.01) -0.40* (0.01)
ET- RNM -0.41 *(0.01) -0.45* (0.01) -0.32* (0.01) -0.41* (0.01)
ET- LUD -0.27* (0.01) -0.35* (0.01) -0.25* (0.01) -0.30* (0.01)
ET- LNM -0.31* (0.01) -0.37* (0.01) -0.26* (0.01) -0.31* (0.01)
ET-LXNM1 -0.34*(0.01) -0.39*(0.01) -0.29*(0.01) -0.33*(0.01)
ET-LXUD1 -0.31 *(0.01) -0.37*(0.01) -0.26*(0.01) -0.30*(0.01)
Note: ND= nightmare distress; ET = mean dream hedonic tone; RUD = retrospective unpleasant dream frequency 
partialled out; -RMN= retrospective nightmare frequency partialled out; -LUD= log unpleasant dream frequency 
partialled out; -LNM = Log nightmare frequency partialled out; -LXUD= log extreme unpleasant dream frequency 
partialled out; -LXNM= log extreme nightmares partialled out;
  *p =or <M)1 (in order to reduce the probabilities o f type ! errors as a-result of multiple comparisons4he level of—
significance was set at p = <0.01). All values are two tailed.
1 Frequency variables with ‘X’ in their title refer to extreme dreams defined only as dreams rated 1 (very 
unpleasant) on the hedonic scale.
Table 21 shows that significant relationships of nightmare distress and mean 
dream tone with anxiety and depression remain significant when retrospective and 
prospective unpleasant dream and nightmare frequency variables are partialled out.
Caveat
There is a concern about participants’ ability to distinguish anxiety from 
depression given that Table 19 shows high correlations between the prospective 
anxiety and depression measures, and Table 26 shows that the prospective anxiety and 
depression measures do not show systematic differences in their correlations with 
STAI-anxiety and with SCL-depression and anxiety. Table 26 shows that SCL- 
depression and SCL-Anxiety are also highly correlated with each other, as well as 
with the STAI measures of anxiety.
Table 22 -  Spearman’s rho intercorrelations between anxiety and depression before
and after sleep.
Mean anxiety Mean anxiety Mean depression Mean depression
before sleep after sleep before sleep after sleep
Mean anxiety before 
sleep
- 0.87 (<0.01) 0.90 (<0.01) 0.87 (<0.01)
Mean anxiety after 
sleep
0.87 (<0.01) - 0.88 (<0.01) 0.94 (<0.01)
Mean depression 
before sleep
0.90 (<0.01) 0.88 (<0.01) - 0.92 (0 .0 1 )
Mean depression 
after sleep
0.87 (<0.01) 0.94 (<0.01) 0.92 (<0.01) -
p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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Table 23 -  Spearman’s rho correlations between retrospective anxiety and depression
State Anxiety Trait Anxiety SCL-
Depression
SCL-Anxiety
State anxiety - 0.88 (0 .0 1 ) 0.88 (0 .0 1 ) 0.91 (0 .0 1 )
Trait anxiety 0.88 (<0.01) - 0.78 (0 .0 1 ) 0.70 (0 .0 1 )
SCL-Depression 0.88 (<0.01) 0 .7 8 (0 .0 1 ) - 0.82 (0 .0 1 )
SCL-Anxiety 0.91 (0 .0 1 ) 0.70 (0 .0 1 ) 0.82 (0 .0 1 ) -
I p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Within subjects correlations of prospective anxiety and depression with prospective 
dream variables
This section examines within subjects correlations of pre- and post-sleep 
anxiety and depression with the occurrence / non-occurrence of a nightmare / an 
unpleasant dream / a dreams on that night, and also the correlation with dream 
emotional tone for that night. Once the magnitude of these within subjects 
| correlations is established the following section will investigate whether individual
| differences in the size of these correlations is correlated with individual differences or
psychopathology variables, which would indicate that the effect of waking life anxiety 
| and depression on initiating nightmares / unpleasant dreams / dreams may be
■ modulated by individual differences or psychopathology variables,
i
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Within subjects correlations of anxiety and depression with dream emotional tone
Within subjects correlations were first conducted between mean emotional 
tone of the dream and pre- and post-sleep anxiety, pre- and post-sleep depression, the 
change in anxiety across the night and change in depression across the night. Table 24 
shows the descriptive statistics for these within subjects correlations (WS r).
Table 24 - Descriptive statistics for within subjects correlations (WS r) between mean 
dream tone and pre- and post-sleep anxiety and depression, and change across sleep in 
anxiety and in depression
Mean Median SD Range
WS r with ET and pre-sleep anxiety -0.22 -0.20 0.33 -0.88 - 061
WS r with ET and post-sleep 
anxiety
-0.41 -0.44 0.38 -0.91 -0 .80
WS r with ET and pre-sleep 
depression
-0.15 -0.18 0.37 -0.98 - 0.72
WS r with ET and post-sleep 
depression
-0.39 -0.46 0.33 -0.89 - 0.70
WS r with ET and change between 
pre and post anxiety
-0.17 -0.14 0.37 -0.89 - 0.58
WS r with ET and change between 
pre and post depression levels.
-0.19 -0.23 0.40 -0.89 - 0.74
Note: WSr = within subjects correlation; ET = mean dream hedonic tone.
The above table shows that the correlations of dream tone are higher with 
post-sleep depression and anxiety than with pre-sleep anxiety and depression, 
suggesting that a more negative emotional tone of a dream is more strongly associated 
with higher levels of depression and anxiety on awakening rather than before sleep. 
Using paired t-tests these pre- post-sleep differences were both significant (anxiety: 
t(54) = 3.21, p=.002; depression: t (54) = 3.53, p=.001).
158
Within subjects correlations of anxiety and depression with the occurrence / 
non-occurrence of a nightmare and of an unpleasant dream
Within subjects analyses were conducted to assess the relationships between 
pre- and post-sleep anxiety and depression, and the change between pre- and post­
sleep anxiety and depression, with the occurrence / non-occurrence of a nightmares or 
an unpleasant dreams. As there are two levels of the occurrence / non-occurrence 
variable, and as the anxiety and depression variables were generally normally 
distributed, Pearson’s biserial correlation was used.
The first set of analyses was conducted with the dichotomous variable 
presence of a nightmare versus no nightmare, and then with the dichotomous variable 
presence of an unpleasant dream versus no unpleasant dream. These analyses thus 
included nights where subjects reported no dream at all, as on those nights there is 
thus no nightmare.
Thus across all 14 nights analysis was conducted firstly using unpleasant 
dreams/nightmares with a hedonic tone of 1 (very unpleasant) or 2 (moderately 
unpleasant) (Table 25) and then including only unpleasant dreams/nightmares with 
hedonic tone of 1 (very unpleasant) (Table 26).
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Table 25 - Mean Pearson biserial within subject correlations (WS r) between pre- 
and post-sleep anxiety / depression and the dichotomous variable presence/absence of 
a nightmare or unpleasant dream, where absence of a dream is counted as absence of a 
nightmare or unpleasant dream. Nightmare and unpleasant dreams have a hedonic
tone of 1 (very unpleasant) or 2 (moderately unpleasant).
Mean correlation Median SD Range
coefficient
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety before sleep
0.11 0.13 0.30 -0.49 -  0.63
WS r with nights UD and 
anxiety after sleep
0.28 0.30 0.28 -0.44 -  0.63
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression before sleep
0.09 0.08 0.34 -0.75 -0.10
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression after sleep
0.23 0.24 0.29 -0 .2 6 -0 .1 0
WS r  with nights with UD and
change between morning and 0.17 0.18 0.31 -0.64- 0.70
night anxiety
WS r with UD and change
between morning and night 0.14 0.18 0.36 -0.72 -  0.76
depression levels.
WS r with nights with NM 
and anxiety before sleep
0.12 0.28 0.29 -0.31-0.76
WS r with nights with NM 
and anxiety after sleep
0.36 0.38 0.25 -0.25 -  0.76
WS r with nights with NM 
and depression before sleep
0.08 0.06 0.30 -0.47 -  0.78
WS r with nights with NM 
and depression after sleep
0.30 0.35 0.32 -0.40 -  0.77
WS r with nights with NM
and change between morning 0.17 0.17 0.29 -0 .56 -0 .81
and night anxiety
WS r with nights with NM
and change between morning 0.19 0.24 0.32 -0.55-0.81
and night depression levels.
Note: WS r = within subjects correlation; NM=presence/absence of a nightmare; UD= presence/absence of an 
unpleasant dream.
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Table 26 - Mean Pearson biserial within subject correlations (WS r) between pre- 
and post-sleep anxiety / depression and the dichotomous variable presence/absence of 
nightmares or unpleasant dreams, where absence of a dream is counted as absence of 
nightmare/ unpleasant dreams. Nightmare/ unpleasant dreams have hedonic tone of 1
(very unpleasant).
Mean
correlation Median SD Range
coefficient
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety before sleep
0.12 0.15 0.28 -0.44 - 0.59
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety after sleep
0.32 0.27 0.29 -0.44 -0.69
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression before sleep
0.09 0.17 0.31 -0.33 - 0.99
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression after sleep
0.32 0.32 0.31 -0.33 - 0.99
WS r with nights with UD and
change between morning and night 0.15 0.10 0.34 -0.70 - 0.70
anxiety
WS r with UD frequency and
change between morning and night 0.18 0.21 0.34 -0.68 - 0.76
depression levels.
WS r with nights with NM and 
anxiety before sleep
0.14 0.16 0.25 -0 .18-0 .90
WS r with nights with MN and 
anxiety after sleep
0.32 0.32 0.29 -0 .41-0 .90
WS r with nights with NM and 
depression before sleep
0.09 0.10 0.31 -0.47 - 0.77
WS r with nights with NM and 
depression after sleep
0.30 0.29 0.30 -0.35 - 0.77
WS r with nights with NM and
change between moming and night 0.14 0.10 0.28 -0.39-0.81
anxiety
WS r with nights with NM and
change between moming and night 0.18 0.22 0.29 -0.41 -0.81
depression levels.
Note: WS r = within subjects correlation; NM=presence/absence of a nightmare; UD= presence/absence of an
unpleasant dream.
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The second set of analyses was conducted with the dichotomous variable; 
dream that is a nightmare versus dream that is not a nightmare, and then with the 
dichotomous variable; dream that is unpleasant versus dream that is not unpleasant. 
These analyses thus did not include nights where subjects reported no dream at all.
This analysis of nights where there was a dream was conducted firstly using 
unpleasant dreams/nightmares with a hedonic tone of 1 (very unpleasant) or 2 
(moderately unpleasant) (Table 27) and then including only unpleasant 
dreams/nightmares with hedonic tone of 1 (very unpleasant) (Table 28).
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Table 27 - Mean Pearson biserial within subject correlations (WS r) between pre- 
and post-sleep anxiety / depression and the dichotomous variable presence/absence of 
nightmares or unpleasant dreams, using only nights where a dream did occur. 
Nightmares and unpleasant dreams have hedonic tone = 1 (very unpleasant) or 2 
(moderately unpleasant).
Mean
correlation Median SD Range
coefficient
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety before sleep
0.14 0.14 0.36 -0 .5 1 -1 .0 0
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety after sleep
0.31 0.33 0.34 -0.45 -  0.90
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression before sleep
0.10 0.13 0.36 -0.78 -  0.99
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression after sleep
0.23 0.30 0.33 -0.39 - 0.99
WS r with nights with UD and
change between moming and 0.16 0.20 0.36 -0.63 - 0.80
night anxiety
WS r with UD frequency and
change between moming and 0.14 0.14 0.38 -0.63 - 0.80
night depression levels.
WS r with nights with NM and 
anxiety before sleep
0.14 0.13 0.33 -0.32 - 0.88
WS r with nights with NM and 
anxiety after sleep
0.36 0.43 0.29 -0.40 - 0.88
WS r with nights with MN and 
depression before sleep
0.11 0.08 0.34 -0.58 - 0.80
WS r with nights with MN and 
depression after sleep
0.32 0.38 0.35 -0.43 - 0.77
WS r with nights with NM and
change between moming and 0.17 0.21 0.34 -0.57 - 0.89
night anxiety
WS r with nights with NM and
change between moming and 0.20 0.26 0.35 -0.56 - 0.82
night depression levels.
Note: WS r = within subjects correlation; NM=presence/absence of a nightmare; UD= presence/absence of an
unpleasant dream.
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Table 28 - Mean Pearson biserial within subject correlations (WS r) between pre- 
and post-sleep anxiety / depression and the dichotomous variable presence/absence of 
nightmares or unpleasant dreams, using only nights where a dream did occur. 
Nightmares and unpleasant dreams have hedonic tone of 1 (very unpleasant).
Mean correlation Median SD Range
coefficient
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety before sleep 0.16 0.10 0.34 -0 .4 1 -0 .9 0
WS r with nights with UD and 
anxiety after sleep 0.34 0.28 0.35 -0.45 -  0.90
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression before sleep 0.11 0.16 0.35 -0.42-0.99
WS r with nights with UD and 
depression after sleep 0.35 0.38 0.36 -0.42 -0.99
WS r with nights with UD and
change between moming and 
night anxiety
0.14 0.12 0.40 -0.89-0.80
WS r with nights with UD and
change between moming and 
night depression levels.
0.19 0.21 0.38 -0.84 -0.76
WS r with nights with NM 
and anxiety before sleep 0.16 0.15 0.29 -0.24-0.90
WS r with nights with NM 
and anxiety after sleep 0.33 0.35 0.31 -0.40-0.90
WS r with nights with NM 
and depression before sleep 0.12 0.19 0.36 -0.47-0.80
WS r with nights with NM 
and depression after sleep 0.34 0.38 0.33 -0.47- 0.76
WS r with nights with NM
and change between moming 
and night anxiety
0.13 0.08 0.33 -0.39-0.89
WS r with nights with NM 
and change between moming 
and night depression levels.
0.18 0.21 0.33 -0.41-0.82
Note: WS r = within subjects correlation; NM=presence/absence of a nightmare; UD= presence/absence of an 
unpleasant dream.
Comparisons of the magnitudes of the within subjects correlations
In order to analyse these within-subject correlations with inferential statistics
the correlation coefficients were each converted to a Fisher’s r coefficient. Shapiro- 
Wilk tests showed that almost all of the 32 within-subjects r’s were normally 
distributed. These r co-efficients were then analysed by repeated measures ANOVA, 
one ANOVA for the anxiety correlations, and one for the depression correlations.
Within-subjects factors were:
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a) whether anxiety or depression were assessed pre- or post-sleep,
b) whether a nightmare or unpleasant dream was defined as very unpleasant, or 
as very or moderately unpleasant,
c) whether the dichotomous variable (presence/absence of nightmare/unpleasant 
dream) is assessed for all 14 nights or only for those nights on which there was 
a dream; and
d) whether the waking criterion is used (waking criterion nightmare versus 
inclusive unpleasant dream).
Sphericity was not violated and so no correlations for degrees of freedom 
were used in the following analysis.
Table 29 -  Effects of within subjects factors on within subjects correlations reported 
in Tables 25 - 28, for anxiety and depression analysed separately.
WS correlations with anxiety WS correlations with depression
F( 1,36) P F(1,37) P
Within-subjects factor
Pre-versus post-sleep 9.655 .004 15.028 <.001
Very high versus high 
unpleasantness criterion
0.187 0.67 0.926 0.342
Absence of NM/UD
includes nights with no 
dreams versus only---------
3.128 .085 2.201 0.15
nights with dream.
Waking criterion versus 
no waking criterion
0.030 0.86 0.028 0.87
Note: NM = nightmare; UD= unpleasant dream.
Due to the number o f participants and large number of combinations o f factors threshold for 
significance of p was set at .01 for all interactions between these factors. No interactions were found to 
be significant. In general there were no sex differences in these within-subjects correlations.
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Table 29 shows that the strictness of defining nightmares, whether in terms of 
use of the awakening criterion or the excluding of moderately unpleasant dreams, did 
not affect within subjects correlations with anxiety or with depression. The table 
shows that presence / absence of a nightmare/unpleasant dream has a significantly 
greater association with anxiety and depression after sleep than before sleep. Thus, all 
factors were not significant except for the pre-sleep versus post-sleep factor.
Caveat regarding robustness of the within-subjects correlations
A caveat with the within subjects results so far is that some of the within 
subjects correlations had just one data point for presence of a nightmare / unpleasant 
dream, with all the other data points being for when no nightmare or unpleasant 
dream occurred. In order to determine if this paucity of sampling of presence of a 
nightmare / unpleasant dream caused a lower mean of the within subjects correlations, 
by increasing error variance, the following analyses were conducted.
Firstly, a single mean of all within subjects correlations with anxiety and with 
depression were calculated for all participants. This included all the different types of 
nightmare definition (e.g. very unpleasant dream emotion criterion with waking 
criterion; very and moderate unpleasant dream emotion criterion without waking 
criterion, etc.) If a participant did not have one of the specific types of nightmare 
definition, all the other within subj ects correlations were_ averagejcL The mean of all 
within subject correlations of mean emotional tone with anxiety and depression was 
also calculated for all participants. Table 30 shows the mean and median for all 
participants, for these two variables. 55 participants had produced diary ratings of 
dream emotional tone, however, as some of these had no nightmares or unpleasant 
dreams, the number of participants providing within subject correlations of
166
presence/absence of a nightmare / unpleasant dream is lower (n = 48), but 
included all participants who experienced at least one nightmare or unpleasant dream.
Table 30 -  Mean, median, SD and range of within-subject correlations between 
presence/absence of nightmare or unpleasant dream and anxiety and depression, and 
mean, median, SD and range of within subjects correlations between dream emotional 
tone and anxiety and depression.
Mean Median SD Range
WS correlations o f 0.19 
presence/absence o f nightmare / 
unpleasant dream with anxiety 
and depression (n = 48)
0.15 0.20 -0 .1 8  - 0.60
WS correlations o f dream - 0.29 
emotional tone with anxiety and 
depression (n=55)
-0 .30 0.23 -0 .8 9 -0 .2 1
The table shows that worse mood (anxiety and depression) is associated with 
nightmares and unpleasant dreams, and with more negative dream emotional tone.
This analysis was then conducted again but including only participants who 
reported two or more waking criterion nightmares rated as very unpleasant (hedonic 
tone =1) during the 14 day study period. 24 participants met this criterion. It was 
reasoned that within subjects cnJrreiations might become larger as subjects would have 
more than one data point for presence of a nightmare for all their WS correlations, and 
hence error variance would be reduced. The descriptive statistics of these within 
subject’s correlations are shown in Table 31.
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Table 31 - Mean, median, standard deviation and range of within-subject 
correlations for participants who reported two or more waking criterion nightmares 
rated as very unpleasant (hedonic tone =1) during the 14 day study period. WS 
correlations are between presence/absence of nightmare or unpleasant dream and 
anxiety and depression, and between dream emotional tone and anxiety and 
depression.
Mean Median SD Range
WS correlations o f  
presence/absence o f  
nightmare / unpleasant dream 
with anxiety and depression 
(n =24)
0.25 0.23 0.18 -0 .0 3 -0 .6 0
WS correlations o f dream 
emotional tone with anxiety 
and depression (n=24)
-0.37 -0.40 0.21 -0 .6 8 -0 .0 4
This table shows that the means and medians of this subsample are larger and 
the ranges smaller than for those of the whole sample.
These within subjects analyses were then conducted again but only for those 
participants who reported three or more waking criterion nightmare rated as very 
unpleasant over the 14 day log period. 13 participants met fills criterion. The means 
and median’s of these within subjects correlations are shown in Table 32.
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Table 32 - Mean, median, SD and range of within-subject correlations for 
participants who reported three or more waking criterion nightmares rated as very 
unpleasant (hedonic tone =1) during the 14 day study period. Within subject 
correlations are between presence/absence of nightmare or unpleasant dream and 
anxiety and depression, and between dream emotional tone and anxiety and 
depression.
Mean Median SD Range
WS correlations of 
presence/absence of 
nightmare / unpleasant 
dream with anxiety and 
depression (n =13)
0.24 0.15 0.20 0.02-0.60
WS correlations of dream 
emotional tone with anxiety 
and depression (n = 13)
-0.34 -0.34 0.24 -0.68-0.04
Note: WS= within subject.
This table shows that the medians of the correlations for this subsample are 
comparable to the medians of the correlations for the whole sample of participants. 
Thus, there may be an effect of having too small a sample of participants if the
criterion of number of nights with nightmares is set too high____________________
Tables 30-32 suggest that higher within subjects correlations are obtained by 
using the subsample of 24 participants, defined as having more than one waking 
criterion nightmare with very high unpleasantness. The inferential statistical analysis 
that compared the four factors of the set of within-subjects correlations was thus 
repeated using this subsample, while acknowledging that the sample size is small for a 
4-way ANOVA.
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Shapiro-Wilk tests showed that the Fisher r transforms of the within subjects 
correlations for the 24 participants were normally distributed. The Fisher’s r variables 
were analysed by repeated measures ANOVA; one ANOVA was conducted for 
anxiety and one for depression. The results are shown in Table 33. Sphericity was not 
violated for either ANOVA and so no corrections for dfs were used.
Table 33 - Table showing effects of repeated measures factors on within subjects 
correlations, for anxiety and depression analysed separately. Only data from 24 
participants, defined as having more than one waking criterion nightmare with very 
high unpleasantness during the 14 day diary period, are included.
Ws correlations with anxiety Ws correlations with depression
F(l,22) P F(1,23) P
Within-subjects factor
Fre-versus post-sleep 8.28 0.01 7.50 0.01
Very high versus high
0.00 0.10 0.97 0.33
unpleasantness criterion
Waking criterion versus no waking
1.61 0.22 0.39 0.54
criterion
Absence o f NM/UPD includes
nights with no dreams versus only 0.79 0.38 2.71 0.11
nights with dream.
Note: NM = nightmare; UD= unpleasant dream.
----------- DuelO-the Jiumher ofiparticipanls and largenumberof combinationsoffa_Qtorsthreshoidfor sigpificance^pf p. was
set at .01 for all interactions between these factors. No interactions were found to be significant. In general there 
were no sex differences in these within-subjects correlations.
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As with the previous ANOVA for the entire sample (shown in table 29), 
none of the factors were significant except for the pre-sleep versus post-sleep factor.
Within subjects correlations of anxiety and depression with the occurrence / non­
occurrence of a dream
The results in this section have shown that the within subjects correlations of 
state anxiety and state depression with presence/ absence of a nightmare or unpleasant 
dreams are generally small. However, as reviewed in the introduction there have been 
reports that increased state anxiety and state depression can increase the likelihood of 
dream recall: a check must therefore be made as to whether poor waking mood before 
sleep, in increasing nightmare and unpleasant dream occurrence, is actually increasing 
the occurrence of all dreams. Thus, to address this potential confound in the results, 
within-subjects correlations between pre sleep anxiety / depression and the 
presence/absence of a dream were computed, and the results are presented in Table 
34.
Table 34 -  Mean, median, SD and range of within-subjects Pearson correlations 
between pre-sleep anxiety and depression and presence / absence of a dream that 
night (n=51)
Mean Median SD Range
Pre-sleep anxiety 0.01 0.01 0.29 -0.72-0.57
Pre-sleep depression 0.01 ----- 0.03 0.27 ---------0.54 -  0,57-----
It can be concluded from the above table that pre-sleep anxiety and depression 
do not affect dream recall. The only effect of pre-sleep mood is thus specifically on 
the presence of nightmares and unpleasant dreams, although this effect is small.
Comparison of within-subiect and between-subiect correlations of presence of
nightmares with state anxiety and depression
Participants assessed their state anxiety and depression before and after sleep 
for 14 nights. Table 35 shows the mean of these state anxiety and state depression 
measures, and the between-subjects Kendall’s correlations of those means with the 
number of nightmares and unpleasant dreams that occurred across the 14 nights. In 
this analysis only dreams rated as very unpleasant were categorised as nightmares or 
unpleasant dreams. This restriction of definition was used because between-subject 
correlations of well-being and personality variables with nightmare and unpleasant 
dream frequencies were higher when this restriction was used (see Table 13; however, 
note that this restriction did not lead to significant changes in within-subject 
correlations, see Tables 29 and 33).
Table 35 - Mean and standard deviation of state anxiety and state depression 
measures, and the Kendall’s between-subjects correlations and (probabilities) of those 
means with the number of nights on which a nightmare (NM) or unpleasant dream 
(UD) occurred across the 14 nights. NM and UPD are defined as dreams scored as 
very unpleasant, the former waking up the sleeper, the latter defined without the 
waking criterion (n = 56).
Mean SD NM UPD
Presleep anxiety 28.91 11.45 0.29 (0.004) 0.33 (0.001)
Postsleep anxiety---------- 32.84 12.36------------  0 ,30(0 .003) 0.31 (0,002)
Presleep depression 30.38 11.34 0.26 (0.009) 0.28 (0.004)
Postsleep depression 33.22 11.69 0.31 (0.002) 0.34 (0.001)
172
Table 36 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the within- 
subject Kendall correlations between the state anxiety and state depression scores 
over 14 nights with the presence or absence of a nightmare / unpleasant dream on 
each night. For 37 participants a Kendall correlation could be calculated for each of 
the 4 within-subject combinations.
Table 36 - Mean, standard deviation and median of Kendall’s within-subjects 
correlations between presence or absence of a nightmare (NM) or unpleasant dream 
(UD) and state anxiety and state depression variables across the 14 nights. NM and 
UD are defined as dreams scored as very unpleasant, the former waking up the 
sleeper, the latter defined without the waking criterion (n = 37).
Correlates NM presence/absence UD presence/absence
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Presleep anxiety 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.15
Postsleep anxiety 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.24 0.27 0.21
Presleep depression 0.07 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.29 0.06
Postsleep depression 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.28
In order to compare these means of the within-subject correlations with 
between-subjects correlations, the latter must only be calculated for the 37 
participants used for the within-subject correlations shown in Table 36. Table 37 
shows these between-subjects correlations. Note that the exclusion of 19 participants 
who wereincludedin the results of Table 35 has resulted in a decreasein some_ofthe 
between-subjects correlations, because the exclusion of participants restricts the range 
of the data as these 19 participants had no nightmares or no unpleasant dreams.
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Table 37 - Between-subjects Kendall’s correlations and (probabilities) between 
means of state anxiety and state depression and number of nights on which a 
nightmare (NM) or unpleasant dream (UD) occurred across the 14 nights. NM and 
UD are defined as dreams scored as very unpleasant, the former waking up the 
sleeper, the latter defined without the waking criterion. Only participants included in 
Table 36 are included here (n = 37).
Correlates NM UPD
Presleep anxiety 0.24 (0.057) 0.23 (0.065)
Postsleep anxiety 0.27 (0.030) 0.22 (0.080)
Presleep depression 0.27 (0.030) 0.19(0.119)
Postsleep depression 0.32 (0.012) 0.25 (0.046)
A comparison of Tables 36 and 37 shows that for pre-sleep mood between- 
subjects correlations are far higher than within-subjects correlations, and for post­
sleep mood the between-subjects and within-subjects correlations are similar in size.
Predisposition for nightmares and unpleasant dreams
The aim of this section is to test the hypothesis that individual differences lead 
to some people being more susceptible to the occurrence of nightmares. To do this
between-subject correlations were calculated between 17 psychopathology and____
individual difference variables and the 32 types of within-subject correlations of state 
anxiety or state depression with nightmare/unpleasant dream variables. The 32 types 
of within-subjects correlations occur due to the combinations of the following factors, 
all of which have two levels:
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Mood: anxiety versus depression
Time of assessment: Pre-sleep versus post-sleep
Use of waking criterion: Nightmare versus Unpleasant dream
Dream emotional tone criterion: Very unpleasant versus very or moderately
unpleasant
Frequency assessment: Number of occurrences over 14 nights versus Number of 
nights
All 32 combinations of within-subjects variables were utilised in case the 
predisposing factors only correlated significantly with some of the WS correlations. 
WS correlations were converted to Fisher’s r values, and these Fisher’s r values were 
correlated with each of the individual difference variables.
The 32 x 17 between-subjects correlations are shown in Appendix Table 13 
(placed in appendix due to lack of significant results and large size). A summary of 
the correlations for each individual difference variable is presented in Table 38. The 
correlations involving pre-sleep anxiety or depression are summarised separately from 
the post-sleep mood variables because the former address whether the individual 
difference variables interact with pre-sleep mood to cause nightmares, whereas the 
latter address whether the individual difference variables interact with the presence of 
nightmares to cause more negative waking mood.
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Table 38 -  Summary of 32 between subjects correlations for each of 17 Individual 
difference variables. Summary data are the number of the 32 correlations that are 
significant at the level of p<.05, and, where one or more significant correlations 
occurred, the highest correlation co-efficient. Highest n for the correlations = 48.
Correlations with pre­ Correlations with post­
sleep WS correlations sleep WS correlations
Individual Number o f  significant Number o f  significant
difference positive correlations (and positive correlations (and
variable highest r value if highest r value if
significant) significant)
ND 0 0
APS 0 0
CEQ 0 0
STB 1 (r = -31) 0
EPQ-N 0 0
EPQ-L 0 4 (r = .40)
GHQ-12 2 (r = .32) 0
BQ-18 0 0
STAI-S 0 0
STAI- T 0 0
S C L -G S I 0 0
SCL- PST 0 0
SCL- PSDI 0 0
Child 0 0
LE 0 0
RUD 0 0
RNM 0 0
Notes: WS = within subject; ND = nightmare distress; APS = arousal predisposition scale; CEQ = 
Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie 
Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; 
STAI-T = Trait anxiety; SCL- GS1 = SCL- Global Symptom Index; SCL-PST= SCL- positive symptom total; 
SCL-PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items. RUD= 
retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM=retrospective nightmare frequency.
For the cases where more than 1 correlation in one cell is significant it is acknowledged that the 32 correlations 
summarised in each cell are not independent from each other, as all the correlations have some data in common 
with some of the other correlations. Some correlations were significantly negative, but as only significantly 
positive correlations were predicted, and as it is difficult to interpret what significantly negative correlations mean 
apart'from being a chance’ efFect, those correIations are noi recorded"
However, none of the above correlations involving pre-sleep mood were 
significant at the 0.01 level. This stricter significant threshold was used in order to 
correct for the large number of correlations. Hence, the hypothesis that individual 
differences lead to some people being more susceptible to the occurrence of 
nightmares under conditions of state anxiety or depression was not confirmed.
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Therefore, it can be concluded that none of the individual difference variables 
used here interacts with state anxiety or state depression to cause nightmares. Also, 
none of the above correlations involving post-sleep mood were significant at the 0.01 
significance threshold. Hence, individual differences do not lead to some people 
having a more negative state response to the occurrence of nightmares.
As stated in the text regarding Tables 30-32  above, better estimates of within 
subjects correlations may be provided by using the sub sample of 24 participants that 
had more than one waking criterion nightmare defined as very high unpleasantness. 
The correlations between within subjects correlations and well-being and personality 
variables were repeated with just this sub-sample. These correlations are shown in 
Appendix Table 14 and summarised in Table 39.
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Table 39 -  Summary of 32 between subjects correlations for each of 17 Individual 
difference variables. Summary data are the number of the 32 correlations that are 
significant at the level of p<.05. n for all correlations = 24.
Correlations with pre­ Correlations with post­
sleep WS correlations sleep WS correlations
Individual Number o f  significant Number o f  significant
difference positive correlations (and positive correlations (and
variable highest r value if highest r value if
significant) significant)
ND 0 0
APS 0 0
CEQ 0 0
STB 0 0
EPQ-N 0 0
EPQ-L 0 8 (r = .61)
GHQ-12 0 0
BQ-18 0 0
STAI-S 0 0
STAI- T 0 0
S C L -G S I 0 0
SCL- PST 0 0
SCL- PSD 0 0
Childhood 0 0
Sum o f  life events 1 (r = .41) 0
RUD 0 0
RNM 0 0
Notes: WS = within subject; ND = nightmare distress; APS = arousal predisposition scale; CEQ = 
Creative experiences questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie 
Scale; GHQ-12 = General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; 
STAI-T = Trait anxiety; SCL- GSI = SCL- Global Symptom Index; SCL-PST= SCL- positive symptom total; 
SCL-PSDI = positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events; Child = Sum of childhood items; RUD = 
retrospective unpleasant dream frequency; RNM= retrospective nightmare frequency.
For the cases where more than 1 correlation in one cell is significant it is acknowledged that the 32 correlations 
summarised in each cell are not independent from each other, as all the correlations have some data in common 
with some of the other correlations. Some correlations were significantly negative, but as only significantly
positive correlations were predicted, and as it is difficult to interpret what significantly negative correlations mean, 
apart from being a chance effect, those correlations are not recorded.
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The data of Table 39 again show that there are very few significant 
correlations between the personality variables and the within subjects depression 
correlations, or with the anxiety correlations. Pre sleep correlations did not remain 
statistically significant at the stricter significance threshold of 0.01. However, post 
sleep correlations remained significant after this correction for the large number of 
correlations. Overall, therefore, using a sub-sample that had somewhat larger and 
arguably more appropriate within subjects correlations, there was still no evidence 
that any of the personality variables were correlated significantly with the within 
subjects correlations. Therefore, it can be concluded that none of the individual 
difference variables used here interacts with state anxiety or state depression to cause 
nightmares or unpleasant dreams, and the individual differences used here do not lead 
to some people having a more negative state response to the occurrence of nightmares 
or unpleasant dreams.
Predisposition for increased dream recall under conditions of high anxiety or high 
depression
In order to determine whether for some subjects there is a predisposition to 
increase dream recall due to pre-sleep anxiety or depression, point biserial within 
subject correlations between anxiety and depression and presence / absence of a 
dream the following night were correlated with each of the personality variables. The 
within subjects correlations of the 51 participants who had a dream on at least one 
night but not on other nights were first converted into Fishers r values. The WS pre- 
sleep depression correlation was normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk statistic = 0.98, 
df = 51, p = 0.43) and the WS pre-sleep anxiety correlation was approximately 
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk statistic = 0.95, df = 51, p = 0.02). The Fishers r 
values were then correlated between subjects with each of the individual difference 
variables.
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For anxiety as a pre-sleep correlate of dream recall, all the between 
subjects rs had an absolute value less than 0.16, and were all highly non-significant. 
For depression as a pre-sleep correlate of dream recall, all these between subjects rs 
had an absolute value less than 0.17 and again were highly non-significant.
It can thus be concluded that pre-sleep mood not only has a negligible effect 
on dream recall, but that this effect is not increased for some participants due to some 
personality susceptibility. The only effect of pre-sleep mood is thus on the presence of 
nightmares, although this is small, and as with dream recall this effect is not 
modulated by personality.
The emotional profile of dreams
680 dreams were reported across the 14-day diary period. In these dreams 
1396 emotions were reported, which is a mean of 2.05 emotions per dream. 107 
dreams contained no emotions. Thus, 84.29% of all reports contained at least one 
instance of emotion.
Frequency and intensity of discrete emotions
The scoring method of Fosse et al (2001) was used, which records frequency 
(i.e. number ofdreams-in which the_emotion was pre5ent)undintensity (i.e. score on 
scale of 1 -  3 for when the emotion occurs) of seven major emotions (Anxiety/fear; 
Anger; Shame; Sadness; Joy/elation; Love/eroticism, and Surprise). Other negative 
and positive emotions could be reported: in this study other negative emotions 
reported were frustration, stress, confusion, disgust, pity, jealousy, rejection and 
irritation. Other positive emotions reported were relief, excitement, interest and 
comfort.
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The data are calculated on a per subject basis, that is, the mean of each 
variable is calculated for each participant, and then the overall mean is calculated with 
each participant being treated equally, irrespective of each person’s number of 
dreams. This equal representation method is described by Zadra et al (2006).
Two measures of emotion intensity were calculated. One measure assessed the 
intensity of an emotion only when it occurred (e.g., the sum of the intensity scores for 
anxiety divided by the number of times anxiety occurred. As intensity can be scored 
as 1, 2 or 3 this method results in a mean intensity ranging from 1 to 3). The second 
measure looked at the mean intensity of that emotion across all dream reports, thus, 
for instances when a dream was reported but not with that particular emotion that 
dream was included in the denominator for the calculation of the mean. (This method, 
for example, would calculate the sum of the intensities of anxiety and divide that sum 
by the total number of dream reports). Shapiro-Wilk tests show that most of the 
emotion variables are not normally distributed and so non-parametric statistics were 
used.
Table 40 shows the frequency and intensity (using both intensity measures 
detailed above) of discrete emotions experienced across all types of dreams in the 14- 
day study period, calculated on a per subject basis as above.
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Table 40 -  Mean frequency and intensity (standard deviation) of discrete emotions 
experienced in all dream types across the 14 day dream diary.
Frequency (%) Intensity when 
emotion occurred
Intensity across all 
dream reports
Anxiety/fear 46% (0.23) 2.14(0.60) 0.99 (0.58)
Anger 25% (0.24) 1.96 (0.66) 0.47 (0.46)
Shame 15% (0.23) 1.64 (0.66) 0.23 (0.32)
Sadness 26% (0.25) 2.06 (0.68) 0.53 (0.48)
Other negative 9% (0.15) 2.02 (0.72) 0.18(0.34)
Joy/elation 25% (0.27) 1.99 (0.69) 0.47 (0.51)
Love/eroticism 13% (0.24) 1.94 (0.77) 0.22 (0.36)
Other positive 2% (0.05) 1.92 (0.74) 0.04(0.10)
Surprise 32% (0.28) 1.85 (0.64) 0.32 (0.28)
The order of frequency of the emotion types was: 
anxiety/fear > surprise > sadness > anger and joy/elation > shame > 
love/eroticism > other negative > other positive.
Wilcoxon tests showed that anxiety/fear occurred significantly more often 
than each of the other emotions (all zs > 3.1 and all ps < .01). Surprise was 
significantly more prevalent than all remaining emotions except sadness (all zs > 2.0
and all ps < .05). Sadness was significantly more prevalentthan iove/eroticismnnd------
joy (both zs > 4.3, both ps < .01). Anger was significantly more prevalent than shame 
and love (both zs >3.6, both ps < .01). Joy/elation was significantly more prevalent 
than love/eroticism ( z = 0.4.68; p < .01), and there was no significant difference in 
frequency between love and shame (z = -1.14; p =0.15).
182
Anxiety/fear was the most intense emotion, followed by sadness. In 
general, discrete negative emotions were more intense than positive ones.
Total positive and total negative emotions
The scoring method of Fosse et al (2001) was again used. Scores of frequency 
of total positive or total negative emotions were calculated for each participant as the 
total number of dreams that had at least one positive, or one negative emotion 
respectively. Surprise was considered to be neutral and not included in the positive or 
negative emotion categories. Intensity of total positive and total negative emotions 
was calculated as first as the sum of intensity scores within each dream, which were 
then summed for each participant. Table 41 shows the frequency and intensity scores 
for the total negative and total positive emotions and surprise.
Table 41 -  Mean frequency and intensity (standard deviations) of total negative and 
total positive emotions and surprise in all dreams across the 14 day dream diary.
Frequency (%) Intensity when 
emotion occurred
Intensity acrdss all 
dream reports
Total negative 
emotions
64% (0.21) 2.03 (0.53) 1.21 (0.90)
Total positive 
emotions__
19% (0.17) 2.00 (0.66) 0.40 (0.48)
Total surprise 
emotions
32% (0.28) 1.85 (0.64) 0.32(0.28)
183
Negative emotions were found to be significantly more prevalent than 
positive emotions (Wilcoxon test, z = 5.74; p <.01). Indeed, only one subject reported 
a higher frequency of positive emotions compared to negative. Negative emotions 
were also significantly more prevalent than surprise (z = -4.64; p <.01). Surprise also 
occurred significantly more often than positive emotions (z = - 3.31; p = <.01). These 
results are to be expected as the sample consisted predominantly of nightmare 
sufferers.
In cases where emotions did occur, negative and positive emotions did not 
differ in intensity (z = -0.12; p = 0.91). Furthermore, neither negative nor positive 
emotions differed in intensity to surprise (z = -1.32; p = 0.19 and z = -1.92; p = 0.055 
respectively). However, when the sum of intensity scores were divided by the number 
of dream reports, the intensity of negative emotions was significantly greater than that 
of positive emotions (z = -4.87; p < 0.001). Total negative emotions were also 
significantly more intense than surprise (z = -6.19; p < 0.01). Total positive were 
significantly more intense than surprise emotions (z = -2.82; p =<0.01).
The emotional profile of dreams and psychological well-being
The Spearman’s rho correlations shown in Table 42 demonstrate that none of
the correlations, betweenfrequencymeasure^ and measures of well-being or_____
individual differences are significant.
Table 42 -  Spearman rho correlations and (ps) between the frequency of negative, 
positive and surprise in dreams with measures of well-being and individual 
differences.
FNE FPE FSE
ND 0.04 (0.77) -0.04 (0.76) 0.11 (0.43)
APS 0.22 (0.10) -0.27 (0.04) -0.02 (0.99)
CEQ -0.08 (0.54) 0.16(0.24) 0.17(0.21)
STB 0.22 (0.10) -0.06 (0.66) -0.13(0.32)
EPQ-N 0.24 (0.08) -0.09 (0.49) -0.08 (0.53)
GHQ-12 0.00 (0.99) 0.15(0.27) 0.05 (0.70)
BQ-18 -0.02 (0.88) 0.11 (0.41) 0.05 (0.73)
STAI-T 0.28 (0.05) -0.14(0.33) -0. 06 (0.68)
STAI-S 0.27 (0.19) -0.32(0.11) -0.15(0.46)
SCL-GSI 0.05 (0.70) 0.02 (0.85) 0.02 (0.85)
SCL-PST 0.03 (0.85) -0.13(0.93) 0.10(0.46)
SCL-PDS 0.17(0.21) -0.09 (0.49) 0.03 (0.81)
LE 0.01 (0.96) 0.66 (0.63) 0.19(0.15)
Note: ND = nightmare distress; APS = arousal predisposition scale; CEQ = Creative experiences 
questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie Scale; GHQ-12 = 
General Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; STAI-T = Trait 
anxiety; SCL- GSI = SCL- Global Symptom Index; SCL-PST= SCL- positive symptom total; SCL-PSDI = 
positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events;. FNE = total frequency of negative emotion; FPE = 
Frequency of positive emotion; FSE =total frequency of surprise emotion.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01). All values are two tailed.
The Spearman’s rho correlations shown in Table 43 demonstrate that the 
majority of correlations between emotion intensity measures and measures of well­
being or individual differences are not significant, although adverse life events, 
adverse childhood experiences and the positive symptom index of the SCL-90-R are 
significantly associated with one of the measures of intensity of negative emotions. 
Furthermore, the intensity of surprise when it occurs is significantly associated with 
the positive symptom index of the SCL-90-R.
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Table 43 - Spearman’s correlations between individual difference variables and 
the total intensity of positive, negative and surprise emotions when they occur and per 
dream report.
INE/ IPE/ ISE/ INE IPE ISE
DRF DRF DRF
ND 0.25 0.09 0.20 0.30 -0.01 0.22
(0.06) (0.53) (0.14) (0.03) (0.96) (0.14)
APS 0.15 -0.15 0.09 0.27 0.14 0.20
(0.28) (0.27) (0.53) (0.04) (0.34) (0.18)
CEQ 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.27
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.44) (0.47) (0.07)
STB 0.18 -0.06 -0.04 0.26 0.08 0.28
(0.17) (0.64) (0.79) (0.05) (0.56) (0.06)
0.22 -0.04 -0.03 0.19 -0.10 0.12
EPQ-N (0.10) (0.79) (0.80) (0.17) (0.49) (0.44)
GHQ-12 0.16 0.18 0.32 0.09 0.23 0.33
(0.24) (0.19) (0.32) (0.49) (0.11) (0.02)
BQ-18 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.32
(0.12) (0.16) (0.33) (0.13) (0.10) (0.03)
Trait 0.33 -0.05 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.28
Anxiety (0.02) (0.75) (0.79) (0.13) (0.93) (0.08)
State 0.06 -0.26 -0.11 0.39 0.08 0.03
Anxiety (0.76) (0.21) (0.60) (0.06) (0.73) (0.89)
SCL-GSI 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.33
(0.16) (0.57) (0.36) (0.05) (0.17) (0.02)
SCL-PSl 0.19 0.07 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.41*
(0.15) (0.60) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (<0.01)
SDL-PDI 0.21 0.00 0.13 0.41* 0.25 0.34
(0.13) (0.98) (0.33) (<0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
Life Events 0.40* 0.22 0.26 0.07 0.05 0.20
(<0.01) (0.10) (0.05) (0.63) (0.72) (0.18)
Child 0.33* 0.14 0.33* 0.13 0.01 0.13
(0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.36) (0.95) (0.40)
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Notes: INE/DRF= intensity of negative emotions per dream report; IPE/DRF = intensity of positive emotions 
per dream report; ISE/DRF = intensity of surprise emotions per dream report; INE= intensity of negative emotions 
when it occurred; IPE = intensity of positive emotions when it occurred; ISE = intensity of surprise emotions when 
it occurred; ND = nightmare distress; APS = arousal predisposition scale; CEQ = Creative experiences 
questionnaire; STB = Borderline Personality Scale; EPQ-N = Neuroticism; EPQ-L = Lie Scale; GHQ-12 =
Genera] Health Questionnaire; BQ-18 = Boundary Questionnaire; STAI-S = State anxiety; STAI-T = Trait 
anxiety; SCL- GSI = SCL- Global Symptom Index; SCL-PST= SCL- positive symptom total; SCL-PSDI = 
positive symptom distress index; LE = Sum of life events; Child= sum of childhood events.
*p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01). All values are two tailed.
Relationships between emotions in dreams and pre- and post-sleep mood
In contrast to measures of well-being and individual differences, Table 44 
shows that the frequency of negative and positive emotions (but not surprise) in all 
dreams is significantly related to mean anxiety and depression before and after sleep.
The intensity of negative and positive emotions that occur are not significantly 
related to pre- and post-sleep anxiety or depression. However, the difference between 
intensity of negative and positive per occurrence is significantly associated with post­
sleep anxiety and pre-sleep depression and there is a strong trend for an association 
with pre-sleep anxiety and post-sleep depression (p = 0.02). The intensity of negative 
and positive emotions per report is not significantly related to anxiety and depression 
before or after sleep. However, again the difference between the intensity of positive 
and negative emotions per dream is significantly positively related to anxiety and 
depression before and after sleep. Thus, it seems that in general elevated levels of 
depression and anxiety before sleep is related to a higher frequency of negative 
emotions in dreams, and these in turn are related to elevated post sleep anxiety and 
depression.
Table 44 -  Spearman rho correlations between frequency and intensity of negative 
and positive emotions and mean anxiety and depression pre- and post- sleep.
Pre-sleep
anxiety
Post-sleep
anxiety
Pre-sleep
depression
Post-sleep
depression
Freq NE 0.38* (<0.01) 0.42 *(<0.01) 0.37* (0 .0 1 ) 0.35* (0.01)
Freq PE -0.28 (0.04) -0.39* (0 .0 1 ) -0.30* (0 .0 1 ) -0.35* (0.01)
Freq SE -0.21 (0.12) -0.20 (0.13) -0.18(0.18) -0.14(0.29)
Difference in NE and 
PE
0.37* (<0.01) 0.45* (0 .0 1 ) 0.37* (0.01) 0.38* (<0.01)
Intensity NE per 
dream
0.29 (0.03) 0.26 (0.05) 0.21 (0.13) 0.21 (0.13)
Intensity PE per 
dream
-0.16(0.23) -0.27 (0.04) -0.24 (0.07) -0.27 (0.04)
Intensity SE per 
dream
0.01 (0.93) -0.05 (0.71) -0.08 (0.57) -0.04 (0.76)
Difference in NE and 
PE per dream
0.44* (0 .0 1 ) 0.45* (0 .0 1 ) 0.34* (0.01) 0.36* (0.01)
Intensity NE per 
occurrence
0.28 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) 0.24 (0.07) 0.36 (0.02)
Intensity PE per 
occurrence
-0.04 (0.78) 0.00 (0.99) -0.04 (0.77) 0.05 (0.72)
Intensity SE per 
occurrence
0.15(0.32) 0.10(0.52) 0.06 (0.69) 0.12 (0.43)
Difference in NE and 
PE per occurrence
0.34 (0.02) 0.35* (0.01) 0.38* (0.01) 0.35 (0.02)
Note: Freq NE = frequency of negative emotion; Freq PE= frequency of positive emotion; Freq of surprise 
emotion; NE= negative emotion; PE= positive emotion; SE =surprise emotion.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Comparisons between nightmares, bad dreams, and non-unpleasant dreams
The following section addresses the frequency and intensity of emotions in 
nightmares and bad dreams.
Table 45 - Frequency (and standard deviation) of discrete emotions and overall 
negative, positive and surprise emotions in nightmares, bad dreams and all other 
dreams. All other dreams are defined as dreams with emotional hedonic tone > 2, i 
dreams rated as mildly unpleasant to very pleasant.
Nightmares Bad dreams All other 
dreams
Anxiety/fear 82% (0.26) 61% (0.45) 33% (0.27)
Anger 39% (0.39) 42% (0.43) 19% (0.24)
Shame 24% (0.39) 17% (0.35) 15% (0.26)
Sadness 47% (0.41) 34% (0.44) 21% (0.24)
Other negative 6% (0.19) 15% (0.31) 10% (0.17)
Joy/elation 13% (0.30) 8% (0.23) 30% (0.30)
Love/eroticism 17% (0.36) 10% (0.28) 14% (0.26)
Other positive 3% (0.16) 1% (0.06) 2% (0.05)
Surprise 26% (0.36) 17% (0.33) 32% (0.30)
TNE 85% (0.16) 80% (0.31) 54% (0.25)
TPE____________ _____2%-(0T1)-___ 5% (0.11) -__ 24% (0.19)
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For clarity, the frequencies of discrete emotions in nightmares, bad dreams 
and all other dreams are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - Frequency of discrete emotions in nightmares, bad dreams and all other 
dreams.
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Table 45 and Figure 2 show that nightmares and bad dreams contain more 
instances of discrete negative emotions and less instances of positive emotions than 
other dreams. These descriptive statistics demonstrate that although anxiety/fear is the 
most prevalent emotion, other negative emotions occur frequently. This has 
implications for defining nightmares as containing solely anxiety or fear.
Table 46 - Mean intensity (Standard deviations) of emotions when they are present, 
for nightmares, bad dreams and all other dreams.
Nightmares Bad dreams All other 
dreams
Anxiety/fear 2.61 (0.47) 2.28 (0.76) 1.81 (0.58)
Anger 2.23 (0.82) 2.00 (0.73) 1.73 (0.69)
Shame 1.90 (0.90) 1.98 (0.90) 1.54 (0.62)
Sadness 2.51 (0.60) 2.03 (0.84) 1.82 (0.67)
Other negative 2.67 (0.82) 2.28 (0.67) 1.89 (0.72)
Joy/elation 1.40 (0.70) 2.00(1.00) 2.06 (0.66)
Love/eroticism 1.45 (0.69) 1.89 (0.93) 1.98 (0.81)
Other positive 2.00(1.41) 2.00(1.41) 2.00 (0.71)
Surprise 1.90 (0.72) 2.06 (0.88) 1.79 (0.68)
Total negative 
emotions
2.47 (0.48) 2.10(0.68) 1.80 (0.51)
Total positive 
emotions
1.43 (0.64) 2.33 (0.83) 1.79 (0.52)
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Table 47 - Mean intensity (and standard deviations) of emotions per dream, for 
nightmares, bad dreams and all other dreams (e.g. the intensity of emotions was 
divided by the number of nightmares).
Nightmares Bad dreams All other 
dreams
Anxiety/fear 2.16 (0.82) 1.39 (1.16) 0.39 (0.36)
Anger 0.81 (0.90) 0.87(1.01) 0.17 (0.24)
Shame 0.40 (0.69) 0.34 (0.73) 0.10(0.15)
Sadness 1.18(1.06) 0.71 (1.04) 0.20 (0.23)
Other negative 0.18(0.56) 0.34 (0.73) 0.12(0.24)
Joy/elation 0.19(0.54) 0.29 (0.76) 0.35 (0.38)
Love/eroticism 0.26 (0.61) 0.18(0.55) 0.11 (0.19)
Other positive 0.04 (0.18) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04(0.11)
Surprise 0.46 (0.65) 0.37 (0.75) 0.38 (0.50)
Total negative 4.61 (2.35) 3.84 (2.61) 1.00 (0.57)
emotions
Total positive 
emotions
0.48 (1.08) 0.51 (1.26) 0.51 (0.43)
There are only a few significant differences between nightmares and bad 
dreams in Tables 45 -  47 and Figure 2. Anxiety/fear occurs significantly more often 
iTrnrghtmaresthanbaddreams,however, the frequencyof^allotheremotionswasnot 
significantly different between bad dreams and nightmares. When anxiety occurs in 
nightmares it is more intense that when it occurs in bad dreams. There is also a trend 
for sadness to be more intense when it occurs in nightmares compared to bad dreams, 
however, this just missed statistical significance (p = 0.05). There is a trend for 
anxiety to be more intense in nightmares, however, this is not significant (p = 0.08). 
The intensity of anger per dream is higher in bad dreams than in nightmares.
Details of the Wilcoxon tests for these differences are reported in Appendix 
Table 15. In general, frequency and intensity of positive emotions were lower in 
nightmares and bad dreams than in all other dreams, and frequency and intensity of 
negative emotions were higher in nightmares and bad dreams than in all other dreams.
Comparisons between emotions in non-nightmare non-bad dreams and the normative 
data of Fosse et al f2001)
In the previous section the dreams rated as pleasant, neutral or just mildly 
unpleasant were compared to nightmares and bad dreams. This raises the question of 
how these non-nightmare non-bad dreams compare to the normative data in ordinary 
dreamers of Fosse et al (2001). Figures 3 and 4 show the frequency of emotions and 
their intensity when they occur in non-nightmare non-bad dreams from the current | 
study, and the data reported by Fosse et al.
Figure 3 -  Frequency of discrete emotions in dreams not rated as very or 
moderately unpleasant, a comparison with data from Fosse et al (2001).
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Figure 4 -  Intensity of discrete emotions when they occur in dreams not rated as very 
or moderately unpleasant, a comparison with data from Fosse et al (2001).
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Anxiety, shame and sadness occur more frequently in the non-nightmare 
non-bad dreams from the current study than in Fosse et al (2001), although only 
anxiety is more intense. It can be concluded that even the non-nightmare non-bad 
dreams of our sample are more negatively toned than for non-nightmare sufferers.
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Chapter 5
Study 1: Personality, psychopathology and
nightmares
D iscussion
Retrospective and prospective measures of nightmare frequency
The first aim of this study was to assess correlations of retrospective and 
prospective frequency variables with measures of psychological well-being and other 
individual difference variables. The current study found that retrospective measures 
produced significantly lower estimates of waking criterion nightmares defined as 
moderately or very unpleasant, compared to daily logs. However, if waking criterion 
nightmares were defined only as very unpleasant, the retrospective estimate was no 
longer significantly lower than the logs. Thus, when nightmares were defined more 
loosely, logs yielded a prevalence that was 95% higher than retrospective reports, 
however, a stricter definition on the logs yielded a frequency only 25% higher than 
the retrospective estimate. There was no significant difference between the frequency 
of dreams or bad dreams between prospective and retrospective methods.
These results offer support for previous studies showing lower frequency 
estimates produced by retrospective reports compared to logs. Blagrove et al (2004) 
found that logs produced a mean estimate of nightmare frequency (using the waking 
criterion) that was 25% higher than the questionnaires. Wood and Bootzin (1990) 
found that retrospective self-reports produced an estimation of nightmare frequency
that was 2.5 times lower than the log estimate. Salvio et al (1992) also reported that 
nightmares were 10 times more prevalent than had previously been estimated using 
retrospective measures. Zadra and Donderi (2000) also found that retrospective 
reports produced lower estimates of nightmare frequency but that this difference was 
greater for nightmares compared to bad dreams. However, in contrast to the Zadra and 
Donderi study, the current study did not find a significant difference between the 
estimated frequency of bad dreams between prospective and retrospective measures.
Zadra and Donderi (2000) suggested that nightmares might produce lower 
estimates compared to bad dreams because of the stronger negative dream content of 
nightmares. However, Blagrove et al (2004) and the current study found that the 
lower estimates of nightmare frequency produced by retrospective reports may be a 
simple function of forgetting over time rather than a result of the stronger emotional 
content of nightmares. However, it may also be the case that keeping a log increases 
the frequency of nightmares.
In Zadra and Donderi’s (2000) study it could be argued that estimates of bad 
dream frequency are not as low as nightmare frequency because their sample had 
many more bad dreams than nightmares (a mean of 0.92 nightmares a month 
compared to 2.45 bad dreams). Thus, participants may have had more access to 
instances of bad dreams in memory and so retrospective underestimation is less. 
However, in this study participants had more nightmares than bad dreams (a mean of 
3.3 nightmares were reported per month and 1.3 bad dreams) and nightmare 
frequency was still underestimated in relation to bad dreams. Therefore, limited
access to instances of these dream types does not seem to be able to account for the 
specific underestimation of nightmares.
There are a number of possibilities concerning the different estimations of 
nightmare frequency found between retrospective reports and daily logs in the current 
study. The first concerns a methodological problem. Participants were asked to 
estimate the percentage of their nightmares (not defined with a waking criterion) that 
wake them up. The scale ranged from 0-100% going up in intervals of 20. As 
intervals goes up by 20% this only allows for a very rough measurement of how many 
nightmares caused awakening. This could have led to errors in calculating 
retrospective bad dreams and nightmare frequency. Alternatively, it could be that 
participants have difficulty retrospectively estimating the number of dreams that 
specifically cause them to wake up. Blagrove and Haywood (2006) assessed whether 
people believe they are able to judge if the imagery or emotion of a dream caused 
them to wake up. They found that judgements of being woken by a dream were made 
with high certainty particularly for very unpleasant dreams. However, such 
judgements may not be as accurate when assessed retrospectively. Alternatively, it 
may be that keeping a log increases the number of unpleasant dreams or that ratings 
are more severe immediately after or on the same day that an unpleasant dream has 
occurred as the dream is still in mind. This contrasts with making a retrospective 
rating when the emotion of the dream is not so raw. Furthermore, individuals with 
nightmares are often highly distressed by their experiences and so the number of 
nightmares may be embellished in order to gain access to help. Logs often ask details 
about the dream (including sometimes content) which may lead to a secondary 
assessment of the dream experience, for example, writing down traumatic nightmare
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scenes may lead one to re appraise the emotional intensity of the dream again and rate 
it as more severe /unpleasant. Thus, this study and previous research has 
demonstrated that retrospective and prospective measures produce different estimates 
of nightmare frequency, however, some of the above arguments caution that it should 
not be assumed that one measure is more accurate than the other. Future nightmare 
research would benefit from using both measures.
Correlations between nightmare/bad dream/unpleasant dream frequencies and 
well-being and individual difference variables.
The current study found that frequency of retrospective and log very 
unpleasant nightmares had higher correlations with psychological well-being 
measures than the frequency of retrospective and log very unpleasant bad dreams. 
However, when the definition of nightmares and bad dreams both included 
moderately and very unpleasant dreams, correlations with psychological well-being 
were similar.
The finding that very unpleasant nightmares had stronger correlates with well­
being than do very unpleasant bad dreams is in line with Zadra and Donderi (2000). 
These findings were used as support for the waking criterion in the definition of 
nightmares, in that if researchers restrict their definitions to those disturbing dreams 
that waken the sleeper then the results may be confounded by having participants with 
bad dreams in the control group thus inflating the well-being of this comparison 
group.
However, this study did not support the use of the waking criteria in that on 
both retrospective and prospective measures, unpleasant dream frequency, that is 
disturbing dreams that may or may not awaken the sleeper, have higher correlations 
with psychological well-being than do waking criterion nightmares or bad dreams 
alone. This is in line with the findings of Blagrove et al (2004) who found that the 
frequency of all distressing dreams, whether or not the negative emotion woke the 
dreamer was an even better index of psychopathology than nightmare frequency 
defined with the waking criterion only.
Nightmare frequency, nightmare distress and psychological well-being.
The current study assessed a number of measures of well being including, 
neuroticism, general symptoms of mental health, trait and state anxiety and borderline 
personality.
One aim of the current study was to assess whether other characteristics of 
unpleasant dream types might be better indicators of psychopathology than frequency 
variables.
Previous research has shown that whether a nightmare is reported is more 
dependent on an individual’s global dream processes and attribution than by the 
phenomenal qualities of that specific nightmare (Levin & Fireman, 2002a).
Study one found medium to moderate correlations between retrospective and 
prospective frequency variables with measures of psychological well-being. This 
section will discuss between-subjects relationships of well-being with log measures
defined as very unpleasant as these tended to be stronger than relationships with 
frequency measures defined as both moderately unpleasant and very unpleasant.
Nightmare distress was significantly positively associated with all measures of 
psychological well-being and was the strongest correlate of well being measures. 
Furthermore, all significant relationships with nightmare distress remained when 
frequency was controlled for (with the exception of the arousal predisposition scale). 
Unpleasant dream/ nightmare frequency measures were found to be better correlates 
of poor well-being than was mean emotional tone of dreams.
When nightmare distress was partialled out of the relationship between 
retrospective frequency measures and psychological well-being, trait anxiety, state 
anxiety, and two of the global scales of the SCL-90-R remained significantly 
correlated. Thus, with a few exceptions, poor waking psychological well-being was 
associated with higher unpleasant dream/nightmares as estimated retrospectively.
When nightmare distress was partialled out of the relationships of log 
unpleasant dream frequency with well-being variables, the correlations became 
smaller, although mostly they remained significant. When nightmare distress was 
partialled out of the relationships with log nightmare frequency and well-being 
measures, some of these become insignificant. However, correlations with 
neuroticism, state and trait anxiety, somatization and SCL- anxiety all remained 
significant.
2 0 2
These findings support the intuitive hypothesis that poor waking well-being is 
associated with an increased frequency of ‘very unpleasant’ dreams and, furthermore, 
that this association is not solely a matter of how distressed one is by nightmares, a 
possibility supported by the results of Blagrove et al (2004).
Furthermore, all significant association between unpleasant dream frequency 
and well-being remained when mean dream emotional tone was partialled out, with 
the exception of the obsessive compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity and paranoid 
ideation scales of the SCL-90-R. When emotional tone was partialled out of the 
relationships between well-being and nightmare frequency, the arousal predisposition 
scale, state and trait anxiety and the positive symptom distress index of the SCL-90-R 
became insignificant. Thus, when the mood of all dreams is partialled out, the 
frequency of these extreme unpleasant dream types continues to be related to the 
majority of well-being measures. Furthermore, when the frequency of unpleasant 
dreams was partialled out of the relationships between mean emotional tone and well­
being measures all associations become insignificant.
These partial correlations provide further evidence for the importance of 
unpleasant dream/nightmare frequency as a dream measure that is associated with 
waking poor well-being. In these correlations it was found that in general the 
unpleasant dream/nightmare partial correlations remained significant, whereas, the 
mean tone partial correlations did not. These results can be explained in terms of the 
distribution of mean emotional tone of dreams across the sample of dreams. The mean 
tone of dreams is slighter more negative for people who have poorer well-being. 
However, the bell-shaped curve of the mean tone values results in there being a large
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proportional increase in the extreme cases, nightmares/unpleasant dreams, for what is 
a relatively small change in mean tone. This supports the contention of Zadra and 
Donderi (2000) that it is the number of extreme types of dreams that correlate more 
highly with psychological well-being than mean dream emotional tone. However, the 
results of study one oppose those of Zadra and Donderi (2000) on the need to define 
the extreme dreams as not only unpleasant but also causing waking. These results 
support the general tenor of work over recent decades, which specify the frequencies 
of nightmares (Hartmann, 1984) and reactions to nightmares (Belicki, 1992a, b) as the 
main correlates of poor well-being.
The findings of this study are in accordance with Levin and Fireman (2002a) 
and Blagrove et al (2004) in that correlations between nightmare frequency and 
psychopathology become smaller when nightmare distress is controlled for, and that 
the relationships between psychopathology and nightmare distress were stronger than 
with frequency measures. Blagrove et al (2004) found that correlations between 
unpleasant dream frequency and well-being were maintained when nightmare distress 
was partialled out, whereas, correlations between nightmare frequency and well-being 
became insignificant. This study offers some support to these conclusions in that 
unpleasant dream frequency had higher and more significant correlations with well­
being when nightmare distress was partialled out compared to nightmare frequency, 
however, the majority of significant correlations remained significant with nightmare 
frequency. However, when frequency measures were used which defined nightmares 
as very unpleasant and moderately unpleasant, as in Blagrove et al (2004), all 
correlations between unpleasant dream frequency and nightmare frequency measures 
become insignificant, with the exception of neuroticism and the social desirability
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scale. However, the unpleasant dream and nightmare frequency measures including 
‘moderately unpleasant’ dreams used in this study had similar correlations with 
psychopathology, whereas, in Blagrove et al’s study unpleasant dream frequency was 
a higher correlate of well-being than nightmare frequency.
Levin and Fireman (2002a) also found that both nightmare frequency and 
nightmare distress were significantly associated with most measures of psychological 
disturbance (including the SCL-90-R), and that these relationships were often stronger 
for the distress dimension, although theirs was a state distress measure. However, 
Belicki (1992a) found that only nightmare distress and not frequency, was associated 
with the number of symptoms presented on the SCL-90-R. One possible explanation 
for this may be that arguably the volunteer sample used in this study is more extreme 
than the 85 undergraduate students used by Belicki (1992a) who received course 
credit for their participation. Furthermore, Belicki’s participants reported fewer 
nightmares than the current study and relied upon a retrospective measure of 
nightmare frequency.
Schizophrenia spectrum
As previously reviewed there are some lines of evidence to suggest that 
frequent nightmares may have a specific association with schizophrenic spectrum 
disorders, and, in particular, schizotypy (Claridge et al, 1997; Fennig et al, 1992; 
Hartmann, 1984; Hartmann et al, 1981, 1987; Heinrichs & Carpenter, 1985; Herz & 
Melville, 1980; Kales et al, 1980; Levin, 1990,1998; Levin, Galin & Zywiak, 1991; 
Levin & Raulin, 1991; Levin & Stiritz, 1998). Some investigators have suggested that 
nightmares and schizophrenia may share a common biology (Doty, 1989; Fischman,
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1983; West, 1962). However, other studies argued that frequent nightmares are 
reflective of a ‘global maladjustment rather than specific psychotic symptomology’ 
(Berquier & Ashton, 1992). The results of the current study are in line with the 
assertion that frequent nightmares are associated with general psychopathology rather 
than specifically psychotic symptomatology: state and trait anxiety, neuroticism and 
all subscales of the SCL-90-R except hostility, paranoid ideation were correlated with 
the frequency of unpleasant dreams, and the highest correlations were for the anxiety 
scale rather than psychoticism, even when nightmare distress was partialled out..
Levin and Fireman (2002a) found that with the exception of the phobia 
subscale on the SCL-90-R, nightmare distress was significantly associated with all 
measures of psychopathology, however, in contrast to this study, they found that 
nightmare frequency was not related to either measure of SCL-90-R depression (or 
the BDI), state or trait anxiety or the psychoticism scale on the SCL-90-R.
It could be the discrepancies between the current study and Levin and Fireman 
(2002a) is a result of the more extreme sample recruited in this study. Levin and 
Fireman recruited undergraduate students who received course credits for their 
participation and were required to have at least 3-10 nightmares a year. However, this 
study advertised for those who suffer from frequent nightmares and those that do not 
to volunteer in a research study. It is possible, therefore, that the sample used in study 
one contained individuals who were more concerned by their nightmares. Levin and 
Fireman report that that using the guidelines (Derogatis, 1994) for identifying clinical 
cases on the SCL-90-R that 55.6% of their sample met the criteria for ‘caseness’, 
whereas, this study found that 69% of the sample met the same criteria for ‘caseness’. 
Furthermore, Levin and Fireman (2002a) defined nightmares as ‘a scary dream that
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| awakens the dreamer from sleep’, thus restricting this definition to waking criterion
|
| nightmares may have reduced relationships with psychopathology. Moreover, it is
likely, with the use of this inclusion criterion, that individuals experiencing bad
| dreams but no nightmares could have ended up in one of the comparison groups, thus
elevating psychopathology scores in those groups. Also, the definition of nightmares 
used in Levin and Fireman’s (2002a) study suggests that fear/ anxiety must be the 
dominant emotion to be classified as a nightmare, thus very disturbing dreams 
dominated by other negative emotions would not be classified as a nightmare. 
Moreover, although these authors found no relationship with state and trait anxiety 
measures they found SCL-90-R anxiety was significantly higher in the high nightmare 
group. To summarise, however, the current study and Levin and Fireman’s study both 
reached the same general conclusion; that there was no evidence to suggest a specific 
relationship between nightmare frequency and psychosis proneness.
The notions that frequent nightmares appear to be indicative of a general 
psychopathology rather than specific psychotic symptomatology is supported by 
Berquier and Ashton (1992). These authors found that their subjects scored 
significantly higher on the EPQ Neuroticism scale and on the 8 clinical scales of the 
MMPI. Frequent nightmare sufferers were not found to be significantly higher on 
psychoticism scales. It is perhaps important to note that similar samples were used in 
bothThese studies. Berquier and Ashton used a sample, of 30 non-clinical adults with a 
mean age of 34.7 (ranging from 19-63). Similarly, study one consisted of a sample of 
non-clinical adults with a mean age of 39.18 (ranging from 18 -  82). Both studies also 
used advertisements to recruit participants.
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Borderline Personality
This study hypothesised that borderline personality would be associated with 
both the frequency and distress dimension of nightmares/unpleasant dreams. The 
finding that borderline personality (as measured by the STB) was significantly 
associated with nightmare distress (r = 0.44; p <0.001) is in line with the findings of 
Claridge et al (1997) who also found a significant positive correlation between 
nightmare distress and borderline personality (r = 0.39, N = 179; p <0.001). 
Furthermore, the results from the current study are in accord with Claridge, Davies, 
Bellhouse and Kaptein (1998), who found that relationships of borderline personality, 
nightmare distress and childhood sexual abuse and neglect were all significantly and 
positively associated. The current study has extended previous findings by confirming 
a relationship between unpleasant dream frequency and borderline personality, which 
remains when nightmares distress and mean dream emotional tone are controlled for.
Childhood measures
Four questions were asked concerning participants perceptions of their 
childhood. These included feeling ‘unloved or unwanted’, being ‘unreasonable 
published’ or experiencing any type of abuse. Childhood items were significantly 
correlated with retrospective nightmare frequency and log bad dream frequency 
(defined as very unpleasant, and moderately unpleasant); however, all correlations 
became insignificant when nightmare distress was partialled out. Nightmare distress 
was the strongest correlate of childhood items and these correlations remained when 
frequency variables were controlled for.
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Therefore, it can be concluded that a history of childhood adversity is related 
to how distressed one is by nightmares but does not lead to an increased frequency of 
nightmares in adulthood. The lack of a relationship with nightmare frequency was not 
expected, given that childhood trauma increases the risk for the development of 
anxiety disorders (Bremmer et al, 1993; Kendler et al, 1992; Kessler et al, 1997; 
Yehuda, 2004), but the relationship with nightmare distress may result from 
participants with a history of childhood adversity having a generally increased 
emotional reactivity to all aversive stimuli. Previous studies have found that patients 
with childhood trauma and adult anxiety disorders show an increased sympathetic 
nervous system response to psychological stress during adulthood (Bremmer et al, 
2003; Heim et al, 2002; Metzger et al, 1999). A very interesting study by Otte et al 
(2005) may offer insight into the relationship between nightmare distress and 
childhood trauma. They examined the salivary cortisol and 3-methoxy-4-hydroxy- 
phenylglycol (MHPG, the major metabolite of noradrenaline) response to laboratory 
stress challenges in police academy recruits without current psychopathology during 
academy training, before actual critical incident exposure. They found that a history 
of childhood trauma in these recruits without current psychopathology was associated 
with an increased catecholamine response to simulated police-related stress. They 
propose that the mechanism by which childhood trauma exposure could increase the 
catecholamine response to adult stressors probably involves the amygdala. It has been 
suggested that prior trauma-induced activation of the amygdale enhances 
neuroendocrine and sympathetic nervous system responses to subsequent novel 
stressors through CRF pathways to the hypothalamus and locus ceruleus (Sanchez et 
al, 2001). Otte et al (2005) suggest that one possible explanation for their findings is 
that trauma exposure during childhood, a period of heightened plasticity of
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corticolimbic neuronal systems, increases amygdala reactivity in adulthood to novel 
stressful or neutral situations, so that subsequent responses are affected.
The increased catecholamine response after childhood trauma could also be 
explained by the development of fear networks that contain information about stimuli, 
responses and meanings related to emotional events (Foa et al, 1989). Such networks 
are characterised by mental representations that are readily activated by many internal 
and external cues. Childhood trauma might lead to a lower threshold for interpreting 
stimuli as threatening, and thus attention may be biased towards searching for and 
identifying threatening information, leading to a higher catecholamine response (Foa 
et al, 1989). Such an explanation could also help to explain the relationship found in 
this study between life events and nightmare distress, which is described next.
Life events.
Participants were given a checklist of 14 life events in order to determine if 
they had experienced any of them within the previous year. 91.2% of the sample 
reported that they had experienced at least one of the life events listed in the previous 
year. The life events variable was the sum of the number of events that the person 
indicated had occurred.
Nightmare distress had the strongest relationship with life events, which 
remained when frequency measures were controlled for. Retrospective frequency 
measures were significantly correlated with life events but log frequency measures 
were not. When nightmare distress was partialled out retrospective unpleasant dream
and bad dream frequency both remained significantly correlated with life events. 
Adverse life events score was not significantly correlated with dream emotional tone.
Although there does seem to be some relationship here with retrospective 
frequency a measure a caution is needed. It may be that this correlation is confounded 
by willingness or tendency to remember negative events, and that the non-significant 
relationship between log frequency measures and adverse life events is the truer 
finding than that of the retrospective nightmare and unpleasant dream measures. 
However, this issue is still open because of past findings relating nightmare frequency 
to waking stress.
For example, Chivers and Blagrove (1999) found that that nightmare 
frequency was significantly correlated with stress as measured by the General Health 
Questionnaire (which examines current life events rather than stable traits), and 
Hartmann (1984) reported periods of stress were a precipitating factor for increased 
nightmares in his nightmare sufferers. Cemovsky (1984) found correlations between 
life events and sleep disturbances especially the occurrence of nightmares. Picchioni 
et al (2002) found a significant relationship between nightmares (intensity and 
frequency and daily stressors (using the Hassles and Uplifts Scale; Delongis et al, 
1988). Krakow et al (1993) reported that 12 out of 20 nightmare sufferers had 
reported a traumatic incident or stressful period prior to the nightmare. These included 
job loss, pregnancy, death of a loved one, divorce, physical abuse, burglary, rape, 
starting college or a new job. In line with this research Kales et al (1980) reported that 
of 60% of their sample reported the occurrence of a major life event preceded the 
onset of their nightmares.
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Kothe Sc Pietro wsky’s (2001) reported that 31.6% of the nightmares were 
considered to be associated with a previous stressful occurrence and 75.5% of the 
nightmares were thought to reflect something within the participants’ life. However, 
using the ‘Social Readjustment Rating Scale’ (SRRS; Holmes Sc Rahe, 1967), Kothe 
Sc Pietrowsky found no relationship between life events and frequency of nightmares. 
Such a negative finding was also reported by Belicki (1987). Furthermore, Belicki 
(1992a) and Cemovsky (1984) also found no relationship between nightmare 
frequency and recent life stress.
As a caveat here, it is accepted that the simple summing of number of life 
events ticked is a coarse procedure for the summarising of the life events items, and
that the life events could have been weighted to take the severity of the life event into
(
account. For example, the death of a close family member or friend is more severe 
than a minor problem at work. However, as individual differences in response to the 
life events are not known, and as there are individual differences for criteria used to 
tick some of the items, it was decided that the scale already has some coarseness in its 
application, and that a more sophisticated weighting formula would still retain some 
of these uncertainties.
Non-well being Individual Differences
In addition to. well-being measures this study also assessed some non- 
psychopathological measures of individual difference. These included the Arousal 
Predisposition scale, the Creative Experiences Questionnaire and the Boundaries 
Questionnaire.
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Arousal Predisposition Scale
This scale was significantly positively correlated to retrospective unpleasant 
dream and bad dream frequency and to prospective unpleasant dream and nightmare 
frequency measures, including dream frequency. However, all these correlations 
become insignificant when nightmare distress was controlled for, with the exception 
of log dream frequency and log unpleasant dreams rated as very unpleasant. These 
findings are in line with Coren (1988). He found significant correlations between the 
APS score and the frequency of nightmares, and Hicks, Fortin and Brassington (2002) 
reported that their high arousability group were significantly more likely to 
experience fantasy nightmares, post traumatic nightmares and night terrors than the 
low arousability group. However, these studies did not control for the influence of 
nightmare distress on these relationships. The current study thus extends these 
findings by suggesting that the influence of arousal is through nightmare recall but 
also in producing more very unpleasant dreams.
In contrast to the Hicks, Fortin and Brassington (2002), this study found that 
dream frequency was significantly positively correlated with total APS score. One 
reason for this may be the difference in reporting methods; this study used two-week 
diaries, whereas, Hicks et al. asked participants to respond on a 5-point likert scale to 
the retrospective question ‘I remember my dreams’, and on which participants may
vary in what they consider to be very frequent or infrequent. It may be that th is_____
measure of cognitive arousal is significantly related to dream recall in this study as the 
scale was designed to predict sleep difficulties. Hence, those participants with high 
arousability scores may have more nocturnal awakenings and hence, remember more 
dreams. This notion is supported by Coren (1988) finding in two sample of university
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students that total APS scores was significantly positively related to frequent night 
awakening (r = 0.40 and r = 0.32). This is in line with the evidence that poor sleepers 
and insomniacs have higher dream recall, which is reviewed in the introduction to the 
next study.
Creativity
The creativity questionnaire was significantly positively related to 
retrospectively measured nightmare and unpleasant dream frequency but to none of 
the log measures. However, none of these retrospective correlations remained 
significant when nightmare distress was controlled for, whereas nightmare distress 
remained significantly related to creativity when all frequency measures were 
partialled out. The findings are in accordance with Hartmann (1984) and Belicki and 
Belicki (1982) who suggest a relationship between nightmares and creativity, 
however, the current study indicates that this relationship is mediated by nightmare 
distress.
Boundaries Questionnaire
In the current study the BQ-18 was only significantly related to log bad dream 
frequency and not to any of the retrospective frequency measures. However, this 
association did not remain when nightmare distress was partialled out. This is in 
contrast with Hartmann (1989) and Levin (1991.) who also found that frequent 
nightmare sufferers reported evidence of thinner boundaries as measured by the 
Boundary Questionnaire. The correlation between nightmare distress and BQ 
remained significant when nightmare frequency and unpleasant dream frequency 
measures were partialled out. This study therefore shows that the tendency for
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permeable cognitive boundaries is related more strongly to nightmare distress rather 
than the frequency of nightmares.
The findings are in accordance with Belicki (1992a) in that she demonstrated a 
significant relationship between boundaries and nightmare distress. However, in line 
with the findings from the current study she did not find a significant relationship 
between boundaries and the frequency of nightmares..
In contrast to Hartmann, Elkins and Garg (1991), who demonstrated that thick 
boundaried participants report fewer dreams than thin boundaried subjects, this study 
found no significant association between dream frequency and thin boundaries 
(although there was a trend in this direction for retrospective estimates (p = 0.07)). 
This is in line with Beaulieu-Prevost & Zadra (in press) who report that although 
many studies have reported positive correlations between dream recall frequency and 
measures of absorption and psychological boundaries, a majority of these studies have 
relied exclusively on retrospective measures. They found that scores on measures of 
absorption and psychological boundaries are not related to log dream recall frequency, 
but rather to people’s tendency to underestimate or overestimate their dream recall 
frequency on retrospective questionnaires.
Between subjects correlations - of -mood before and after sleep
Mean anxiety and depression were generally found to be significantly higher 
in the morning compared to before sleep. Mean dream emotional tone was the 
strongest correlate with mean state anxiety and depression ratings before and after 
sleep. Nightmare distress was also significantly correlated with these state mood
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measures. All these significant associations remained significant when frequency 
measures were controlled for. Retrospective frequency measures were not 
significantly related to mood before and after sleep. However, all log frequency 
measures, including dream frequency were significantly related to mood before and 
after sleep. These correlations remained significant when nightmare distress was 
partialled out, however, they generally became insignificant when emotional tone was 
partialled out.
These findings suggest that that mean state anxiety and depression levels 
before and after sleep are generally more related to the tone of all dreams rather than 
to the frequency of nightmares or unpleasant dreams. This is not in agreement with 
Zadra and Donderi’s (2000) contention that it is the number of extremely unpleasant 
dreams/nightmares, rather than mean dream tone, that is the best correlate of poor 
waking mood.
Within subjects correlations of mood before and after sleep
The analysis of within subject correlations showed that the presence or 
absence of a nightmare or unpleasant dream has a significantly greater association 
with anxiety and depression after sleep than before sleep.
The importance of the post-sleep correlations is inline with Kothe and 
Pietrowsky (2001), who found that state anxiety scores after a night with a nightmare 
were significantly higher compared to those after a night without a nightmare. They 
reported that following a nightmare, participants felt more aroused, sad, anxious, less 
relaxed, less self-confident and less content than after a night without a nightmare.
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This finding is also in line with Kramer’s (1993) Mood Regulatory theory. Kramer 
argues that dreaming functions to protect sleep by absorbing the emotional surge that 
occurs during REM sleep and that nightmares represent a failure in this function. 
Kramer and Roth (1980) found that the decrease in unhappiness from night to 
morning was related to whom, and to a lesser extent what we dream about. He 
suggests that dreaming is related to emotional alterations and in most people there is a 
decrease in negative mood from night to morning. However, in the case of nightmares 
they suggest that the dreaming process has not be effective and so may lead to more 
negative mood states the following day. The findings on the current study are in line 
with the notion that nightmares are related to significantly poor mood the following 
day.
Within subjects correlations between waking mood and presence/absence of a 
nightmare/unpleasant dream were not different if dreamless nights were included or 
not included in the analysis. This indicates that waking mood had no relationship with 
the presence of a dream, and, indeed, when within subjects correlations were 
computed between waking mood and presence/absence of a dream, these correlations 
were found to be negligible. Therefore, previous associations of low waking mood 
with dreaming (Cohen, 1974a, b) were not supported. Hence, it seems that the only 
effect of pre sleep mood is on the presence of nightmares/ unpleasant dreams, 
although this is small.
Cellucci and Lawrence (1978) used participants who reported two or more 
nightmares per week who recorded dreams and mood for 8 weeks. In their study 
participants were required to rate on a 10-point scale their general (average) and 
maximum anxiety for that day. Nightmares were defined as ‘subjectively disturbing
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anxiety provoking dreams from which a person usually awakens. As well as 
indicating the presence of a nightmares, participants were required to rate the intensity 
of the nightmare on a 10-point scale. These authors found within subject support for a 
relationship between anxiety and nightmares, with daytime general anxiety correlating 
moderately (0.34 -  0.42), and maximum anxiety in the day correlating moderately 
(0.30 - 0.40) with presence of a nightmare the following night. These correlations are 
higher than in the current study. The difference between the findings of Cellucci and 
Lawrence (1978) and the current study could be a result of the different measures of 
anxiety used, general or maximum anxiety rather than state anxiety here. Also, their 
length of diary keeping was far longer.
This study was the first to address the issue of the nightmare waking criterion 
in a within subjects manner. In accordance with the between subjects results of 
Blagrove et al (2004) and Blagrove and Haywood (2006), this study found that use of 
the waking criterion did not increase the within subjects association with anxiety or 
depression when awake. Also, and moving further from the importance of strict 
definitions of nightmares hypothesised by Zadra and Donderi (2000), there was no 
significant difference between WS correlations defined with very unpleasant 
emotional tone versus defined with very or moderately unpleasant tone.
Comparison of Within Subject and Between Subjects correlations 
Pre-sleep mood between-subjects correlations were far higher than within- 
subjects correlations, whereas for post-sleep mood the between-subjects and within- 
subjects correlations were similar in size. The latter result indicates that reactions to
dreams can either be assessed immediately or as a mean reaction to a mean type of . 
dream, and that both methods indicate the effect of dream emotions on waking 
emotions. This accords with Wasserman and Ballif (1984-85), who had participants 
attribute their moods to 1 of 10 possible causes (e.g., interpersonal relationships, 
personal concerns) and to rate the influence of their dreams for 28 days. Across Ss 
and days, 11% of recalled dreams were perceived by Ss as the most influential cause 
of their moods as compared to other causes, and 35% of recalled dreams were 
considered moderately influential.
The results concerning pre-sleep variables and nightmares/unpleasant dreams, 
however, are more complicated. Significant correlations are only found with a lengthy 
sampling and averaging of data, rather than by matching each evening’s data with the 
dream data of that night. A similar pattern of results, but regarding sexual dream 
content rather than nightmares, was obtained by Robbins et al (1985). They 
investigated the relationship between anxiety level and symbolic sexual dream content 
in 123 undergraduates. Anxiety, assessed by self-reports over a 10-day period, was 
positively related to the use of sexual symbolism identified from dream reports 
obtained over the same period. However, as in the longitudinal data from the current 
study, the appearance of symbolic dreams, was not preceded by elevated levels of 
anxiety. This paper also shows that negative emotion in waking life might be 
associated with non-negative dream content, just as Foulkes and Rechrtschaffen 
(1964) found that seeing  ^a violent film did not result in violent dreams, but rather 
more vivid dreams. Furthermore, Proksch and Schredl (1999) found that the dreams 
of an acute divorce group were not, as expected, more negatively toned but instead 
showed more "primitivity" and "unsuccessful roles." These three papers show that 
dream emotions and events may not be continuous in a simple way with waking
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emotions and events, and hence aid in understanding why the between subjects 
correlations between waking variables and nightmare/unpleasant dream frequencies 
are not large.
Between subjects correlations for pre-sleep variables are, however, larger than 
the within subjects correlations. What may be occurring is that dreams are affected 
not just by the immediately preceding day and evening but by many of the preceding 
days. Along these lines, Nielsen et al (2004) found that average ratings of 
correspondences between dreams and daytime events were high for predream days 1 
and 2, low for days 3 and 4 and high again for days 5-7 (albeit only for participants 
who rated their confidence in recall of events as high and only for females). Delayed 
incorporations were more likely than immediate incorporations to refer to events 
characterized by interpersonal interactions and positive emotions. However, it should 
be noted that between subjects methods do allow for an influence of dreams on 
waking mood, and that the within subjects method used here is a purer method for 
elucidating the effects of waking mood on dream emotions. This method indicates 
that such effects are small.
Predisposition to nightmares
None of the individual difference variables used in this study interacts with 
state anxiety or state depression to cause nightmares or unpleasant dreams, and these 
individual differences did not lead to some people having a more negative state 
response to the occurrence of nightmares or unpleasant dreams. It had been 
hypothesised that variables that have been shown to be associated as a main effect 
with nightmare frequency would also have an interactive effect under conditions of 
high state anxiety or depression, or that variables shown to be associated with trait
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nightmare distress might interact with the presence of nightmares to increase state 
anxiety or depression. An enormous data analysis has resulted in the brief conclusion 
that none of these variables are predisposing factors for nightmare aetiology or for 
reaction to nightmares.
It was found that larger estimates of within subjects correlations were 
provided when only a sub-sample of participants were used who had more than one 
waking criterion nightmare defined as very high unpleasantness. However, even when 
using this sub-sample there was still no evidence that any personality variables 
modulated the within subjects correlation.
Prevalence and intensity of emotions in dreams and nightmares.
This study instructed participants to note the presence of specified emotions as 
and when they occurred on a line-to-line basis in their dream reports. They were 
required to rate the intensity of each reported emotion from 1 (low) to 3 (high) for 
every dream over 14 consecutive nights. The frequency of emotions was calculated as 
the total number of dreams with each emotion divided by the number of dreams. 
Emotion intensity was calculated per dream report and also only for instances when 
the emotion was reported. There was a mean of 2.05 emotions per dream, and 84.29% 
of all dream reports contained at least one instance of emotion.
The incidence of emotion in dream reports in this study is far higher than that 
reported by Hall and Van de Castle (1966) who found an average of 0.35 emotions 
per dream report. However, these authors did not specifically ask participants to 
report the occurrence of emotions. Merrit et al (1994), in a home dream recall study,
instructed participants to note the presence of specified emotions as and when they 
occurred on a line-to-line basis in their reports (as in this study) and found an average 
of 3.6 emotions being reported per dream, which is higher than in this study. 
Furthermore, Merrit et al (1994) reported a prevalence rate of 95% for the occurrence 
of emotions in dreams, which is also higher than in the current study. There are a 
number of explanations for these differences. Firstly, Merritt et al (1994) had a small 
sample of only twenty students who completed the research as part of a class project. 
Participants were required to produce ten dream reports over the course of three 
weeks and score them for emotion. This may have led to a biased selection of only the 
most intense and dramatic dreams, therefore leading to an underreporting of less 
emotionally salient dreams. In contrast, this current study allowed participants to 
record as many dreams as they could recall per night, and as the study took place via 
post participants could be assured anonymity and experimenter bias was hopefully 
lessened.
Strauch and Meier (1996) used first person ratings and instrumental 
awakenings from REM sleep, finding an emotion in 72.5% of 500 REM reports from 
44 subjects. Fosse et al (2001), using the same procedures, found emotion in 74% of 
88 REM reports from 9 subjects. Thus, these prevalence rates of emotions are 
approximately 10% lower than the 84.29% found in this study. There are two 
posslhiiities for this fmdingvThe first is that Fosse et al and Slxmich and Meier both 
used REM instrumental awakenings, which reduces the possibility of participants 
forgetting dreams after awakening, particularly those that were not emotional salient. 
The second possibility is that nightmare sufferers may have more emotions in their
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dream reports or possibly that they remember more emotions due to increased 
negative content of dreams (in line with the salience hypothesis).
It should be noted, though, that as the current study relied on home recall it 
cannot be certain what underlying stage of sleep the dream reports are from. In 
Stickgold et al’s (1994a) study, dream recall following spontaneous awakenings in the 
home was monitored by REM views (‘nightcap’). They observed that reports over 50 
words long had a 76% probability of occurring following REM sleep arousals, and 
only a 24% chance of following NREM arousals. The current study had 64% of all 
reports being over 50 words long. Therefore, it is likely that a good proportion of the 
dream reports in this study were from sleep stages other than REM. Although these 
may have fewer emotions than REM dreams (Foulkes, 1966) the counteracting factors 
in the previous paragraph may still explain the high frequency of emotions in the 
home dream participants here.
Total prevalence of negative and positive emotions
Of the 1396 instances of emotion, this study found that 64% were negative, 
19% were positive and 17% were surprise, which is classed as neutral. Overall it was 
found that the frequency and intensity of total negative emotions was significantly 
greater than the prevalence and intensity of negative emotions. This is not surprising 
in a sample of subjects with frequent nightmares.________
Those studies using first person ratings of emotion and instrumental 
awakenings from REM sleep have reported a relatively balanced proportion of total 
positive and total negative emotion (Strauch & Meier, 1996; Cartwright, Luten,
Young, Mercer & Bears, 1998). However, Hall and van de Castle (1966) and Merritt 
et al (1994) found a higher proportion of negative emotions. Therefore, this suggests 
that home recall studies may overestimate the percentage of negative emotions.
Foulkes et al (1979) compared dreams spontaneously recalled at home and those 
elicited under controlled laboratory condition. He found that home dreams constituted 
an extremely biased subset of the most dramatic and emotionally unpleasant dreams. 
Also, Fosse et al (2001) caution that when one departs from the strict sampling 
protocol of REM mentation, the resulting mentation report becomes increasingly 
biased towards including the most emotional and otherwise salient dreams. Thus, this 
may in part account for higher proportion of negative emotions in this study.
However, the main reason for the high proportion of negative emotions in this study is 
that the sample consisted predominantly of frequent nightmare sufferers and so many 
more unpleasant dreams were reported. Moreover, 69% of this sample was found to 
meet the criteria for clinical ‘caseness’ on the SCL-90-R, thus, the continuity 
hypothesis would predict that these individuals would show an increased prevalence 
of negative emotions in dreams. In comparison the Fosse study and Strauch and Meier 
study used healthy participants. Nevertheless, although lab awakenings may in some 
circumstances be the gold standard when assessing the prevalence of emotions in 
normal dreamers, home diaries are arguably more reliable when assessing nightmare 
sufferers as nightmares are markedly reduced in the laboratory (Hartmann 1984).
This study found that anxiety was the most prevalent emotion, found in 46% 
of the reports. The second most prevalent emotion was surprise found in 32% of the 
reports, followed by sadness (26%), anger (25%), joy/elation (25%), shame (15%)
and love/eroticism (13%). This supports the continuity hypothesis; that individuals 
with poorer waking well-being will have increased negativity in dreams.
Total intensity of negative and positive emotions for all dreams 
The intensity of negative emotions per dream report was significantly higher 
than the intensity of positive emotions or surprise emotions. However, when intensity 
of emotions were divided by the prevalence of these emotions, so as to assess 
intensity only for occasions when an emotion occurred, there was no difference 
between the intensity of positive, negative and surprise emotions. For both intensity 
measures, though, anxiety had the highest mean score.
As the sample in this study consisted primarily of frequent nightmare sufferers 
the data were analysed to explore the emotional profile of dreams rated 3 (slightly 
unpleasant) to 7 (very pleasant) on the hedonic scale, in order to make more 
meaningful comparison to previous research. However, negative emotions were still 
moie prevalent than positive emotions (54% and 24% respectively). These findings 
are not in line with Fosse et al (2001) who found a balanced proportion of negative 
and positive emotions (44% and 49% respectively). This study also found a higher
 prevalence of most discrete emotiQns. especially the negative ones, compared to Fosse
et al (2001). Fosse et al (2001) found significant inter subject differences in the total 
intensity of negative and surprise emotions but no comparable variation in positive 
emotions. They suggested that positive emotions were typical of most people but that 
negative emotions and surprise are more typical of some but less so for other subjects.
The emotional profile of non-nightmare non-bad dreams
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Thus, the current study extends these findings by showing that this population has a 
very high levels of negative emotions.
I
|
i
|
| Prevalence and intensity of emotions in dreams and their relationship with
psychological well-being
As correlations of well-being individual difference variables with overall 
: dream emotional tone were mainly small, ranging from .12 to .56 (Table 8),
| correlations with specific emotions in dreams were conducted in order to determine if
| the prevalence or intensity of negative or positive emotions or discrete emotions
!
I experienced during dreams had a larger relationship with psychological well-being or
j with mood before and after sleep.
I
None of the correlations between the frequency of negative and positive 
; emotions and psychological well-being measures were significant. The intensity of 
negative emotions (when they occurred) was significantly correlated to the positive 
symptom distress index of the SCL-90-R and the intensity of surprise when it 
occurred was significantly related to the total positive symptom scale of the SCL-90- 
R. Intensity of surprise per report was significantly positively correlated with 
childhood events. The intensity of negative emotion per report was correlated with 
. - life, events and childhood events. These correlations between surprise and well-being 
measures could be because people with poorer waking well-being have more 
bizarreness in their dreams. For example, Fosse et al (2001) found that the increase in 
surprise in their data was paralleled by an increase in bizarreness; furthermore, 
bizarreness and emotion have been reported to covary in dreams (Merritt et al. 1994).
Total frequency and intensity of negative, positive and surprise emotion with 
mean mood before and after sleep.
The frequency of all negative emotions and the difference between negative 
and positive emotions was significantly positively associated with anxiety and 
depression before and after sleep. The total number of positive emotions was 
significantly inversely related to depression before and after sleep and anxiety after 
sleep.
These results suggest that higher scores on anxiety and depression before sleep 
increase the number of negative emotions and decrease the number of positive 
emotions, and these negative dream characteristics are also related to increased 
negative mood on awakening. These findings can be explained by the continuity 
hypothesis and are also in line with Kramer’s (1993) mood regulatory theory.
These findings show that correlations with mood before and after sleep are 
more robust than those with trait well-being measures. Therefore, it could be 
suggested that although an individuals emotional status plays an role in dream 
emotionality, it seems that state factors are more important in determining the 
frequency and intensity of emotions in dreams, although these state factors must be 
averaged over a period of time rather than dealt with in a within subjects longitudinal 
manner.
Emotions in nightmares and bad dreams
This study assessed the prevalence and intensity of discrete emotion types in 
bad dreams and nightmares. It was hypothesised that nightmares would have
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significantly higher emotional intensities than bad dreams. Furthermore, it was 
predicted that nightmares and bad dreams would contain emotions other than fear.
Anxiety was significantly more prevalent in nightmares than in bad dreams 
(82% and 61% respectively). Shame and sadness were more prevalent in nightmares 
compared to bad dreams, although these differences were not statistical significant. 
Anger occurred approximately evenly in nightmares and bad dreams (39% and 42% 
respectively). When intensity was scored only for emotions that occurred, the 
intensity of anxiety was significantly greater in nightmares compared to bad dreams, 
and there was a trend for sadness to be more intense in nightmares although this was 
not significant (p =0.05). These results are in accord with the same comparisons made 
by Zadra, Pilon and Donderi (2006), which will now be described.
Zadra, Pilon and Donderi (2006) assessed the variety and intensity of emotions 
in nightmares and bad dreams using a sample of 90 undergraduate students who 
recorded their dreams for 4 consecutive weeks and, for each dream recalled, noted the 
emotions present and their intensities on a 9-point scale. Of the 90 subjects 40% 
reported having had at least one nightmare and one bad dream over the 4 week study 
period. These authors divided participants into two groups depending on which dream 
types they reported on the logs. Participants who reported at least one nightmare and
one bad dream, were classified into the nightmare and bad dream group (NM+BD___
group). Participants who reported at least one bad dream but no nightmares were 
classified into the bad dream group (BD group).
The emotional intensities of bad dreams and nightmares were calculated by 
averaging the ratings reported by each participant across all of the bad dreams or 
nightmares reported. Firstly, they found that the intensity of bad dreams from the BD 
group and bad dreams from the NM+BD group was not significantly different, and 
that there were non-significant differences between the BD and NM+BD groups for 
the emotion categories of fear, sadness, anger, frustration, confusion and other. (They 
were unable to conduct comparisons for the emotional categories of disgust and guilt 
due to the small proportion of subjects reporting these emotions.) This is very relevant 
to the current study as it suggests that the rating of emotional intensities for bad 
dreams is not affected by the experiencing of nightmares. Zadra et al suggest that it is 
therefore probable that the intensity rating of a bad dream reflects an independent 
assessment of that dream experience, and not a comparison of it to other disturbing 
dreams, including nightmares
Secondly, these authors reported that the mean emotional intensities for fear in 
nightmares were significantly greater than those reported in bad dreams. They were 
unable to conduct statistical comparisons for emotional intensities for nightmares and 
bad dreams across the remaining seven emotion categories (anger, sadness, 
frustration, disgust, confusion, guilt, other) due to the large proportion of students 
who did not report one or more of these emotions, but there was not any appreciable 
difference between nightmares and bad dreams in the incidence of these emotions.
The current study accords with these findings, and extends them by also 
assessing intensity of the individual emotions, finding there that anxiety/fear, when 
present in a nightmare, is more intense than when present in a bad dream.
Waking criterion and emotional intensity
The waking criterion has been assumed to be a measure of nightmare intensity 
in that the sleeper is awakened from a nightmare because of the extreme intensity of 
the emotions experienced. Thus, if the emotional intensity is not sufficient to wake the 
sleeper then the dream is not classified as a nightmare. However, surprisingly there 
has been very little empirical evidence to support the notion that nightmares are more 
intense than bad dreams (disturbing dreams that do not waken the sleeper). In fact, 
Krakow et al’s (1995) treatment studies highlight that less than 25% of chronic 
nightmare patients report always awakening from their nightmares. Furthermore, 
Zadra and Donderi (1993) found that approximately 45% of bad dreams have 
emotional intensities equal to or greater than those of the average nightmare in 
participants who have both bad dreams and nightmares. However, this current study 
has found that nightmares contain significantly more fear/anxiety than bad dreams 
and that this fear is significantly more intense. These findings also show a trend for a 
greater frequency and intensity of other negative emotions in nightmares compared to 
bad dreams. These data support Zadra and Donderi’s (2000) contention that 
nightmares are emotionally more severe than bad dreams, but the data here do not 
support their contention that nightmare frequency is thus a higher correlates of poor 
psychological well-being than bad dream frequency.
Nightmares as frightening dreams
The general introduction highlights the debate over the definition of a 
nightmare as a ‘frightening dream’ (Bixler et al, 1979; Hartmann, 1984; Pietrowsky & 
Kothe, 2003; Wood & Bootzin, 1990). It has been argued that there is no empirical
evidence that the affective content of nightmares is restricted to fear alone. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that although fear may be a dominant emotion of nightmares 
individuals also report experiencing intense unpleasant emotions other than fear 
(Belicki & Cuddy, 1991; Zadra & Donderi, 1993). A number of researchers have, 
thus, defined nightmares as disturbing dreams involving any unpleasant emotions 
(e.g., Blagrove et al 2004; Zadra & Donderi, 2000). However, these data, and the data 
of the current study, show that although fear is the dominant emotion in both 
nightmares and bad dreams these dreams also contain a variety of other unpleasant 
emotions. Similarly, Zadra, Pilon and Donderi (2006) found that thirty percent of 
nightmares and 51% of bad dreams contained primary emotions other than fear. 
Therefore, these findings should be considered in the definition of nightmares.
Summary of mai or/new findings
This study found that nightmare distress did not render nightmare frequency- 
psychopathology correlations negligible suggesting that nightmare frequency is not an 
artefact of nightmare distress.
The analysis of within subject correlations showed that the presence or 
absence of a nightmare or unpleasant dream has a significantly greater association 
with anxiety and depression after sleep than before sleep.
Pre-sleep mood between-subjects correlations were far higher than within- 
subjects correlations, whereas for post-sleep mood the between-subjects and within- 
subjects correlations were similar in size.
None of the individual difference variables assessed in this study predispose 
individuals to have nightmares under conditions of high anxiety or high depression.
This was despite individual difference variables in many cases having significant 
between subjects correlations with nightmare frequency.
This study provides support for the assertion that waking criterion nightmares 
are more intense than non-waking criterion nightmares.
Summary and indications for the next study
This study found support for the continuity hypothesis in that poor waking 
well-being was significantly related to the prevalence of unpleasant dreams / 
nightmares and reactivity to them. However, the between subjects correlations with 
psychological variables were generally small, and the pre-sleep mood within subjects 
correlations were negligible: a new variable, sleep quality was thus introduced as a 
possible correlate of dream and nightmare frequency. In order to further explore the 
relationship with poor well-being it was decided to recruit a population that had an 
objective measurable psychopathology as well as deficits in subjective well-being. 
The population chosen was individuals with sleep apnoea and daytime sleepiness and 
snoring. Study two thus examines nightmare prevalence and its correlates in patients 
with sleep apnoea compared to sleepy/snoring controls.
As the measurement of discrete dream emotions was not found to have any 
advantage over dream emotional hedonic tone or nightmare/unpleasant dream 
frequency measures, discrete dream emotions were not to be assessed. As no 
measures of psychological predisposition to nightmares/unpleasant dreams were 
found, such predispositions were also not assessed in the next study.
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Chapter 6 
Study 2: Apnoea and nightmares
Introduction
Sleep apnoea
Sleep apnoea is a sleep disorder in which the sleeper repeatedly stops 
breathing during the night. The effects of untreated sleep apnoea can have marked 
detrimental effects on daily functioning. Patients mainly report diurnal symptoms, the 
most frequent and disruptive being excessive daytime somnolence (EDS). Disordered 
sleep combined with periods of cerebral hypoxia during apnoeic episodes can result in 
cognitive impairments (Brown, 1994), irritability, mood and personality changes 
(Engleman et al.1994) and problems in personal relationships (Cartwright & Knight, 
1987). Furthermore, patients with sleep apnoea have increased morbidity compared 
with the general population (Sharafkhaneh et al 2004; Smith et al 2002; Partinen and 
Guilleminault et al 1990) and have a greater incidence of inactivity, cardiovascular 
and other organ manifestations. The general introduction reviewed evidence 
suggesting that anxiety, depression and stress symptoms may affect the frequency of 
nightmares. As a result of the physical, psychological and social effects of sleep 
apnoea it is anticipated that nightmare frequency will be elevated in this group 
compared to sleepy/snoring controls.
This chapter will review evidence to support the assertion that sleep apnoea is 
associated with chronic sleep fragmentation (leading to excessive daytime sleepiness),
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increased psychopathology, cognitive impairments affecting daily functioning and 
decreased quality of life. Methodological shortcomings of this field of research will 
be summarised. Evidence will be reviewed assessing how apnoea, and various other 
sleep disorders affect dream recall and dream content. It is hypothesised that patients 
with apnoea will have an elevated nightmare frequency and more negatively toned 
dreams than sleepy/snoring controls.
Definition and measurement of obstructive sleep apnoea.
Obstructive sleep apnoea/ hypopnoea syndrome (OSAHS) can be defined as 
‘the coexistence of daytime sleepiness with irregular breathing at night’ (Scottish 
Intercollegiate Guidelines Network, June 2003). When people with this condition fall 
asleep the muscle tone in the upper pharyngeal airway decreases resulting in 
narrowing of the upper airway. This leads to an increase in inspiratory effort, in an 
attempt to overcome this airway narrowing. In turn, this leads to a transient arousal 
from deep sleep to wakefulness or to a lighter sleep phase where normal airway 
muscular tone can be restored. This cycle can repeat itself hundreds of times 
throughout the night leading to the fragmentation of normal sleep architecture and the 
subjective experience of unreffeshing sleep. The collapse of the upper airway during 
sleep can be complete with total restriction of the airway (apnoea), or it can be 
partially restricted, resulting in hypoventilation.
An apnoea is defined as a pause in breathing for ten seconds, whereas a 
hypopnoea is a ten second event where breathing is continued but ventilation is 
reduced by at least 50% from the previous baseline during sleep. The apnoea/ 
hypopnoea index (AHI) is used to assess the severity of OSAHS; this measures the 
frequency of hourly apnoeas and hypopnoeas. OSAHS may be subdivided into
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varying degrees of breathing abnormality, depending on the AHI. Mild is considered 
to consist of an AHI of 5-14/hr, moderate of 15-30/hr and severe with an AHI of over 
30 per hour. However, SIGN highlight that any cut off in AHI attempting to stratify 
the severity of OSAHS is arbitrary as severity can vary from night to night and 
symptoms from day to day in any individual. Clinically significant OSAHS is likely 
to be present when AHI> 15 events/hour asleep accompanied by daytime sleepiness 
and a minimum of two of the above features of the condition. Oximetry is often used 
as the first screening tool for OSAHS. These are spectrophometric devices that detect 
and calculate the differential absorption of light by oxygenated and deoxygenated 
haemoglobin in blood to produce a measure called the Sp02. This is a measurement of 
the oxygen saturation of the arterial blood arriving at the fingertip or earlobe with 
each pulse beat. Commonly used oximetry methods include counting the number of 
oxygen desaturations (dips) per hour greater than an agreed value (often a 4% SpC>2 
dip rate of more than 10 per hour)
Prevalence of obstructive sleep apnoea
The SIGN guidelines estimate that the prevalence of OSAHS in middle-aged 
men (30- 65 years) is in the range of 0.3-4% (Stradling & Crosby, 1991; Young et al, 
1993). The prevalence of OSAHS in middle-aged women has been studied less but it 
has been suggested that it is probably about half that of males, at around 0.5 -1% 
(Bearpark et al, 1995). SIGN reports that approximately 50% of all patients with 
OSAHS are obese (BMI>30kg/m2).
Measurement of daytime sleepiness
The Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS; Johns, 1991) is a validated measure of 
daytime sleepiness in a variety of different situations. The maximum score is 24.
235
Patients can be subdivided clinically into the normal range (ESS<11), mild subjective 
daytime sleepiness (ESS =11-15), moderate subjective daytime sleepiness (ESS = 15- 
18) or severe subjective daytime sleepiness (ESS>18). Clinically the ESS is the best 
measure available to inform clinicians as to the patient’s perception of their 
sleepiness, however, the correlation between the ESS and OSAHS severity is weak 
(Kingshott et al. 1998; Kingshott et al. 1995; Engleman et al. 1997). The standard 
objective measurement of sleepiness is the Multiple Sleep Latency Test (MSLT) 
(Carskadon et al. 1986). This involves a series of 20 minute naps administered over 2 
hour intervals for a total of 8 hours. Patients are left to lie down in a darkened room 
connected to electroencephalographic (EEG) monitoring. The patient is told to try and 
go to sleep. The time required for EEG confirmed sleep is recorded and averages over 
the five sessions reflecting the patient’s tendency to fall asleep. A MSLT of less than 
5 minutes is considered pathological. Normal volunteers score with the range of 10 to 
20 minutes.
Sleep fragmentation in healthy adults.
It is of relevance to this review to determine how sleep fragmentation 
(observed in patients with sleep apnoea) affects healthy adults without the confounds 
of co-morbid conditions associated with sleep apnoea. Research has suggested that 
daytime alertness can be impaired in both normal subjects and patients with sleep 
disorders, despite nocturnal sleep periods of normal duration (Carskadon et al, 1982; 
Bonnet, 1985; Stepanski et al, 1984). Bonnet (1985) hypothesised that in addition to 
sleep duration ‘sleep continuity’ must independently mediate recuperative sleep 
processes. Thus, it has been argued that disruption to sleep whether, ‘external’ (e.g. 
tones) or ‘internal’ (e.g. apnoea or periodic limb movements) may impair recuperation
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even though total sleep time may be unaffected. Research has examined the effects of 
experimentally induced arousals or awakenings using predominantly auditory 
stimulation. Experimental sleep fragmentation studies have aimed to determine the 
level of sleep disruption required to contribute to subsequent daytime sleepiness. The 
assumption of this research is that sleep must be uninterrupted for some minimum 
time period if it is to be restorative. Arousals or awakenings have been delivered at 
various rates and on different schedules (e.g. once per minute, once per five minutes, 
once per ten minutes) in order to determine the effects on daytime sleepiness. For 
example, Bonnet (1985) woke eleven young adults once every minute in a 6-night 
protocol. They reported performance defects and significantly reduced next day 
alertness after two nights of sleep fragmentation. Stepanski et al (1987) examined five 
healthy controls using EEG/EMG changes as the measure of arousal. In three 
conditions, arousals were administered once per 5 minutes, once per 10 minutes and 
once per minute for 4 hours, followed by solid sleep. The authors found significant 
decreases in MSLT scores after two nights of sleep fragmentation and no significant 
difference between conditions.
The majority of sleep fragmentation studies in healthy subjects have found 
significant impairments in daytime functioning. It has been consistently demonstrated 
that sleep fragmentation increases objective daytime sleepiness, as measured by the 
Multiple Sleep Latency Test (MSLT; Stepanski et al. 1987; Levine et al. 1987; Rochrs 
et al. 1994; Philip et al. 1994), single nap latencies (Bonnet, 1985; Bonnet, 1986; 
Bonnet, 1987; Bonnet et al. 1991) and Maintenance of Wakefulness Test (Martin et 
al. 1996). Bonnet and Arand (2003), in their review, concluded that thirteen of 
fourteen studies found significant increases in objective daytime sleepiness after
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various sleep fragmentation paradigms. These authors analysed the results of eight of 
these studies and found that sleepiness increased as the rate of fragmentation was 
increased (Pearson’s r = 0.775, p<0.01). Increases on subjective measures of 
sleepiness have also been demonstrated using the Stanford Sleepiness Scale (Bonnet, 
1986; Bonnet, 1987; Bonnet, 1989; Kingshott et al. 2000) and the Clyde Mood Scale 
(Bonnet, 1987; Bonnet, 1989; Bonnet, 1989). Furthermore, studies have demonstrated 
more negative mood following sleep fragmentation using the Clyde Mood Scale 
(Bonnet, 1987), the Profile of Moods States (Bonnet, 1991) and the UWIST mood 
adjective checklist (Martin et al, 1961; Kingshott et al. 2000). This deterioration in 
mood and the stress of excessive sleepiness supports the prediction of increased 
nightmare frequency and lower emotional tone of dreams in sleep apnoea.
However, some studies have failed to find differences in daytime sleepiness 
associated with different degrees of sleep fragmentation (Stepanski et al. 1987; Martin 
et al, 1996). For example, Levine et al (1987) found no increase in sleepiness, 
compared to uninterrupted sleep, when arousals were at the rate of one per ten 
minutes of sleep. On this basis it has been suggested that segments of sleep must be at 
least ten minutes in duration in order to be restorative (Downey & Bonnet, 1987; 
Levine et al. 1987), although this is controversial.
Sleep fragmentation compared to sleep deprivation
Some researchers have compared directly the effects of sleep fragmentation 
with sleep deprivation. Downey & Bonnet (1987) suggested that the one arousal per 
minute schedule of sleep fragmentation produces sleepiness comparable with total 
sleep deprivation. Levine et al (1987) found no significant difference in MSLT score
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between total sleep deprivation and 1-min sleep fragmentation (latencies were 2.2 and 
4.1 minutes respectively). Bonnet at al. (1986) found that performance deficits were 
significantly greater following total sleep deprivation than following 1 -minute sleep 
fragmentation on a number of addition problems and simple reaction times, although 
no significant differences were found on vigilance tasks or nap latencies. Spath- 
Schwalbe and Kern (1991) compared the effects of sleep deprivation and sleep 
fragmentation on hormones. They found that profiles of cortisol and ACTH peaked 
shortly after the initiation of sleep deprivation or sleep fragmentation and then showed 
the same pattern of inhibition followed by a later peak in both conditions. This pattern 
was significantly different from the normal sleep condition. Therefore, studies that 
have directly compared sleep fragmentation and sleep deprivation on hormones, 
objective sleepiness and psychomotor performance have, to date, provided strong 
evidence that a high frequency of sleep fragmentation is effectively the same as total 
sleep deprivation. Furthermore, sleep fragmentation has far higher detrimental effects 
on respiratory parameters, such as upper airway collapsibility, than does sleep 
deprivation (Series et al, 1994; Espinoza et al, 1991).
Sleep architecture and sleep fragmentation in apnoea
Sleep apnoea causes significant sleep fragmentation and considerably disturbs 
sleep architecture, causing EEG arousals of various durations, changes in sleep stage 
and frequent awakenings. This results in an almost complete deprivation of REM 
sleep and stages 3 and 4 of NREM sleep (Lamphere et al. 1990; Sforza et al. 1990). 
Stepanski et al (1984) reported that patients with sleep apnoea spent only 10.3% of 
their total sleep time in REM sleep, compared to 17.4% in healthy controls. Stage 1
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sleep accounted for 47.9% of total sleep time in the apnoea group compared to only 
15% in the control group.
Evidence for EDS in patients with sleep apnoea
Many studies have supported the finding that populations with excessive 
daytime sleepiness exhibit many instances of nocturnal sleep disruption 
(Guilleminault et al, 1976; Montplasisir, 1976; Zorick et al, 1978). Roth et al (1980) 
reported a correlation between nocturnal sleep disruption and daytime sleepiness in 
patients with sleep apnoea and normal controls. They found that in patients with sleep 
apnoea only arousals associated with respiratory events correlated significantly with 
daytime sleepiness on the MSLT. More recently, Furuta et al (1999) found that the 
MSLT score showed significant negative correlations with the number of awakenings 
and with the apnoea/hypopnea index. These authors found no relationship between 
hypoxia in sleep and either MSLT or ESS. Other studies have also found an 
association between complaints of daytime sleepiness and an abnormal number of 
short EEG assessed arousals lasting between 2 and 14 seconds in patients with Upper 
Airway Resistance syndrome (Guilleminault et al, 1993; Guilleminault et al. 1991. 
Stepanski et al (1980) found that in patients with sleep apnoea (as well as with 
periodic leg movements, and insomnia, and in healthy controls), total number of 
arousals correlated with sleepiness index. Thus, research has consistently 
demonstrated that sleep apnoea leads to excessive daytime sleepiness, as measured 
subjectively and objectively.
This suggests that patients with sleep disordered breathing experience severe 
daytime sleepiness despite having often obtained 8-10 hours of total sleep. Sleep 
fragmentation also has a further effect: Phillipson et al (1980) found that sleep
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fragmentation impaired the ability of dogs to arise from sleep in response to 
hypercapnia and hypoxia. Thus, they concluded that sleep fragmentation is 
responsible not only for daytime sleepiness in sleep apnoea but also for changes in the 
acute response to airway occlusion resulting from sleep apnoea. This would further 
increase the hypothesised life stress caused by sleep fragmentation.
This section supports the notion that patients with sleep apnoea will have 
increased life stress as a result of excessive tiredness. Whether this is mediated by 
hypoxemia rather than sleep fragmentation would not affect this conclusion, but the 
evidence is that it is sleep fragmentation that directly causes daytime sleepiness 
(Roehrs et al, 1989; Colt et al, 1991; Bonnet and Arand, 2003.) The next section will 
review evidence that psychopathology is increased and quality of life is decreased in 
patients with sleep apnoea.
Sleep apnoea and depression
A number of studies have found that patients with sleep apnoea have elevated 
levels of depression in comparison to healthy controls (Millman et al. 1989; Aiken et 
al. 1998; Cheshire et al. 1992; Guilleminault et al. 1977; Reynolds et al. 1984; 
Engleman et al. 1994; Derderian et al. 1988; Kales et al. 1985). Symptoms of anxiety 
and depression are also recognised in other respiratory diseases such as asthma, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and sarcoidosis (Rimington et al 2001; van 
Manen et al 2002; Chang et al 2001).
Methodological problems
It is difficult to interpret the literature regarding the prevalence of depression 
in patients with sleep apnoea due the differences in methodologies, including different
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measures, control groups and also the cross sectional design of most of these studies. 
For example, some instruments measuring depression may contain somatic references 
and items related to sleep behaviours (e.g., fatigue, sleep disruption, task 
performance; see, for example, Millman et al, 1989). The BDI has been used to show 
the presence of depression in apnoea patients (e.g., Vandeputte and de Weerd, 2003; 
Watson et al, 1987) but also contains some somatic items and items referring to sleep. 
However, depressed mood due to apnoea has been shown by Reynold et al (1984), 
and Kales et al (1985) have shown depression in patients with severe sleep apnoea 
recommended for tracheotomy.
Many studies have utilised the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1940). This has 550 items covering a broad range of 
psychiatric symptoms, personality features and psychological difficulties. A number 
of studies have reported that patients with assorted disorders of initiating and 
maintaining sleep (DIMS) score higher on MMPI scales Depression and Hysteria 
(Bonnet & Arand,1995; Kales et al. 1983). Levin et al (1984) also demonstrated that 
Paranoia scores differentiate mild from severe DIMS. It has been demonstrated that 
sleep apnoea patients have significantly elevated scores on at least some MMPI scales 
in comparison to normals, these are primarily, Depression, Schizophrenia and 
Hypochondriasis (Ramos & Espinar, 1992; Beutler et al. 1981). Beutler (1981) 
compared subjects with narcolepsy and sleep apnoea and found that both groups were 
significantly elevated on MMPI measures in comparison to normals. Kalogjere- 
Sackellares and Cartwright (1997) found that the MMPI profiles of patients with 
organic insomnia (e.g. sleep apnoea) did not differ from those with ‘psychologically- 
based’ insomnia, and 79.3% of the cases contained at least 1 clinical scale in the
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psychopathology range. They argue that their results support Kales et al’s (1983) 
notion of the ‘internalisation of psychological distress’, as expressed in various 
constellations of neurotic symptoms of which depression is a common candidate as 
well as anxiety, somatic symptoms, passive aggressive or passive dependent character 
styles. Other studies have also shown an increased level of depression in patients with 
excessive daytime sleepiness. For example, Mosko et al. (1989) assessed patients with 
sleep disorders including sleep apnoea, narcolepsy and periodic limb movements.
They found that approximately one quarter of all the patients assessed described 
themselves as depressed and between 58% and 71% of patients reported symptoms 
during the last 5 years that were consistent with episodes of major depression.
Comparison of psychological disturbance in patients with sleep apnoea and 
primary snorers
Aikens, Wallace & Mandelson’s (1999) research is one of the few published 
studies to compare psychological disturbance in patients with sleep apnoea and 
primary snorers. They highlight that little is known about psychological disturbance in 
primary snorers and that this group would constitute an effective control group when 
assessing psychological factors in sleep apnoea. They hypothesised that primary 
snoring would be associated with less disturbance than observed in sleep apnoea, but 
with greater disturbance than seen in the general population. 98 patients were selected 
from the 499 patients who consecutively underwent overnight diagnostic 
polysomnography after referral to a sleep disorders centre. Forty-seven of these had 
received a diagnosis of primary snoring, based on an AHI of between 1.0 and 4.9. For 
each of these patients a patient with sleep apnoea was randomly selected from those 
with the same age and gender. The 47 selected sleep apnoea patients were similar to
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the unselected sleep apnoea patients in age, although they were more likely to be 
male. Subjects completed the sleep habits questionnaire and the MMPI. They were 
interviewed by a psychiatrist and underwent PSG followed by 4-trial MSLT. It was 
found that the sleep apnoea patients had a mean of 2.3 MMPI clinical elevations (i.e. 
in the disturbed range), which was significantly greater than the snorers group mean 
of 1.6 elevations. More than twice as many sleep apnoea patients than primary snorers 
fell into the disturbed range for the Depression scale (49% vs 25%) and on the 
Hysteria scale (35% versus 16%). The authors conclude that the sleep apnoea patients 
have ‘relatively more inactivity, anergia, guilt, pessimism, and low self esteem 
accompanied by prominent somatic concerns’ (pp357), although the snorers also had 
higher rates of disturbance than the MMPI reference norms. The authors suggest that 
primary snoring may be located midway along a general continuum between 
normalcy and sleep apnoea in terms of symptoms and complications, although 
interpretation of differing MMPI elevations between these group of data is 
complicated by the presence of organic disease, in that some of the somatic 
consequences of sleep apnoea (fatigue, low energy, headaches) are similar to the 
criteria for diagnosing somatization disorder. It was, however, found that a higher 
total number of MMPI elevations were significantly associated with lower sleep 
efficiency, lower average blood saturations during non-REM, and greater wake time 
after sleep onset.
Negative findings for association between depression and apnoea
However, other studies have reported that patients with sleep apnoea do not 
show clinically significant levels of depression or that they have depressive symptoms 
no higher than control groups (Flemons et al, 1994,1997; Gall & Isaac, 1993; Lee,
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1990). Pillar and Lavie (1998) did not observe any relationship between depression 
and the severity of sleep apnoea in men, but did for women.
Pre and post CPAP studies and psychopathology.
Some studies have compared mood before and after treatment with CPAP. 
Reductions in depression have been shown by Derderian et al (1988), Li et al (2004), 
Ramos-Platon and Sierra (1992), Sanchez et al (2001) and Tsai (1997), and, in a 
placebo controlled cross over design (Engleman et al. 1994), although Bum-Hee et al 
(1999) found that CPAP and placebo CPAP groups both showed significant 
improvements in mood states (although their duration of CPAP was only 1 week and 
so the placebo effect may have diminished with greater time). Borak et al (1996) 
evaluated the effects of nocturnal CPAP on emotional and cognitive functioning in 
patients with sleep apnoea. They assessed 20 patients with severe sleep apnoea with a 
number of cognitive and psychological tests (depression, anxiety and mental stress) 
before, after 3 months and a year of CPAP treatment. They found that the majority of 
patients presented with symptoms of anxiety (14 patients), depression (11 patients) 
and mental stress (14 patients). Furthermore, mental stress and anxiety was 
significantly correlated with the AHI. There was a negative correlation between 
mental stress and duration of stage 2 NREM sleep. However, correlations between 
emotional status and severity of hypoxemia during sleep were weak and not 
significant. This suggests it is the sleep fragmentation rather than the hypoxemia that 
contributes to the emotional disorders in patients with sleep apnoea. However, these 
authors found that although cognitive functioning improved, there was no significant 
improvement in emotional status at 3 months or 1 year after CPAP. Borak et al 
suggest that this may be the result of the population studied, the patients in their study
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had severe apnoea (AHI of 67), whereas studies that did find an improvement, such as 
Bearpark et al (1987) and Engleman et al (1994), studied patients with less severe 
apnoea. However, a recent meta analysis of 4 randomised controlled trials consisting 
of patients with mild and severe sleep apnoea before and after treatment, found that 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression scores (HADS) and the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) were significantly improved following treatment (National Health and Medical 
Research Council, 2000), although the improvement in mood according to Millman et 
al (1989) is only significant for those who initially had severe depression.
Confounding factors in mood and psychopathology relationships.
Bardwell, Berry, Ancoli-Israel & Joel (1999) highlight that much of the 
research examining sleep apnoea and mood has suffered from small sample sizes, lack 
of control groups and inconsistent or undisclosed criteria for diagnosing sleep apnoea. 
They highlight that patients often suffer from co-morbid conditions, for example, 
hypertension, which are rarely controlled and which have been associated with 
various psychological characteristics (Diamond, 1982; Dimsdale et al.1986). 
Furthermore, they point out that previous research has often ignored the influence of 
weight and age, which are associated both with sleep apnoea and psychological 
factors, and found that after controlling for hypertension and age, almost none of the 
relationships between sleep variables and dysphoric mood remained significant. 
Bardwell et al. (1999) similarly suggest that depression and total mood disturbance 
are related more to age, weight and/or hypertension than they are to sleep apnoea. 
These papers do, however, offer some support to studies demonstrating that patients 
with sleep apnoea experience more anger than patients without sleep apnoea, and that 
patients with sleep apnoea have higher levels of fatigue.
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In general these findings support the notion that patients with sleep apnoea 
experience elevated levels of general psychopathology in comparison to healthy 
controls and primary snorers. The following section reviews studies assessing general 
health and quality of life in patients with sleep apnoea.
General health and sleep apnoea.
Recently, general health outcome measures have received growing recognition 
as relevant measurements for evaluating health care services and clinical trials. These 
general health evaluation questionnaires aim to quantify self-perceptions concerning 
general health and functional well-being. Using these measures, several studies have 
shown that sleep apnoea is associated with poor quality of life (QoL) (Baldwin et al, 
2001; Bennet et al, 1999, using the Medical Outcomes Study Short form 36 Health 
Survey questionnaire of Jenkinson et al, 1996; Briones et al, 1996; D’Ambrosio et al. 
1999; Gall et al 1993). There are also significant improvements in the health of 
patients with sleep apnoea following CPAP (Jenkinson et al, 1997; Smith and 
Shneerson, 1995).
Fomas et al. (1995) assessed the relationship between physiological 
disturbances, expressed as the number of respiratory events per hour and general 
health status and the degree of hypersomnolence. The authors assessed 103 
consecutive patients admitted for sleep studies with suspected sleep apnoea. A group 
of 40 non-snoring healthy subjects were used as a control group. No significant 
differences were found in general health status when patients were divided into three 
groups according to the severity of the respiratory events during the night, but patients 
with sleep apnoea scored significantly worse on general heath status in comparison to 
controls. This suggests that some individuals with severe apnoea may be more
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tolerant and less distressed by their symptoms than some individuals with mild 
apnoea.
Interactions between QoL and mood in sleep apnoea.
Akashiba et al (2006), using the SF-36 QoL measure and the Zung self-rated 
depression scale (Zung, 1965), found a significant relationship between depression 
and QoL in patients with sleep apnoea, and argued that mood variables may play a 
more important role than Excessive Daytime Somnolence in QoL. Thus, it may be 
that sleep apnoea (through sleep fragmentation or reduction of sleep duration) affects 
mood, which in turn affects QoL.
This review of the literature suggests that mood and quality of life is often 
impaired in patients with sleep apnoea. However, Lee (1990) argues that too much 
emphasis has been put on psychopathology, specifically depressive symptoms in 
patients with sleep apnoea. He argues that the symptoms presented in sleep apnoeic 
patients are often totally understandable and proportionate to the quality of life they 
experience as a result of this disorder. Patients are often forced to leave their jobs and 
stop driving due to the effects of daytime sleepiness. Some patients report personal, 
family or sexual problems. Many patients admit to personality changes such as 
irritability, which may also lead to loss of friendship and isolation. Since CPAP can 
prevent apnoeas and improve sleep architecture and abolish episodes of nocturnal 
hypoxia (Leech et al. 1992) it is reasonable to expect that patients established on 
CPAP may be able to return to work and continue to drive, etc., and these factors are 
liable to increase mood. Furthermore, patients no longer have the anxiety that may be 
triggered by fear of nocturnal apnoeas and the consequences of apnoea on their 
general health (e.g. increased risk of cardiovascular illness).
248
BMI and mood
As the majority of patients with sleep apnoea are obese consideration needs to 
be given to the relationship between BMI and psychopathology. The review of this 
literature is not exhaustive but offers some insight as to whether obese individuals are 
at a higher risk for mental disorders and general psychopathology. Lamertz et al 
(2002) highlight that in most industrialised countries an elevated BMI is not only 
associated with increased risk for physical health but also with social stigma (Pi- 
Sunyer et al 1993) and other penalties (Wadden & Stunkard 1985), including mental 
disorders (Moore et al, 1997; Larsen, 1990) and elevated general psychopathology 
(Lamertz et al, 2002; Moore et al, 1997; Tiggemann et al, 1994), although it can be 
unclear how general psychopathology relates to defined DSM-IV diagnoses (Laessle 
et al.1989). Indeed, only a few studies with representative samples of adults and 
adolescences have found significant (but weak) correlations between obesity and 
psychopathology when assessed by standardised measures (Istvan et al. 1992; 
Kohlmann & Weidner, 1996). Other studies have demonstrated lower rates of 
psychopathology in individuals with obesity or have not found elevated 
psychopathology (Krch et al 1997; Friedman et al. 1995).
Impairment o f cognitive functioning
A number of studies have demonstrated that increased sleepiness in healthy 
normals and in patients with EDS, impairs cognitive functioning (Wilkinson, 1968; 
Levine et al, 1987; Rosenthal et al, 1993; Stepanski et al, 1987; Bonnet, 1985, Martin 
et al, 1996; Stepanski et al, 1987; Bonnet, 1989). However, as with mood, a clear 
pattern of deficits has not emerged. There are a number of reasons for these
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inconsistent findings. Investigators have used different methodologies, different 
control populations and different sample of patients.
Some studies have assessed the neurocognitive functions of primary snorers. It 
has been demonstrated that relative to normals primary snorers show deficits in 
focused attention (Verstraeten et al. 1997; Dealberto et al. 1996) and fine motor 
control (Verstraeten et al. 1997). Behavioural research has documented significant 
daytime cognitive and behavioural dysfunction in patients with sleep apnoea that 
seem to extend beyond that associated with simple sleepiness (Arens et al 2000; 
Marrone et al 1998).
A model of cognitive impairment in sleep apnoea
Beebe and Gozal (2002) have proposed a basic model, which provides a 
conceptual understanding of the behavioural and cognitive effects of sleep apnoea. 
They propose that patients with sleep apnoea have disrupted sleep and also 
intermittent hypoxemia and hypercarbia. They argue that these disturbances alter the 
efficacy of the restorative processes occurring during sleep and they also lead to a 
number of cellular and biochemical stresses that lead to disruption of functional 
homeostasis and altered neuronal and glial viability within particular brain regions. 
Beebe and Gozal propose that dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a primary 
manifestation of the adverse cellular and biochemical events triggered by obstructive 
sleep apnoea. In their model this results in dysfunction of the ‘executive system’, 
which is composed of behavioural inhibition, working memory, contextual memory, 
analysis/ synthesis, set-shifting and self-regulation of affect and arousal.
Executive functioning impairments in patients with sleep apnoea
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One measure of behavioural inhibition is the Stroop Colour-Word Interference 
task. Naegele et al (1995) found that adults with untreated sleep apnoea perform 
poorly on this task. Apnoea patients also make significantly more impulsive errors 
than controls on a maze completion task (Bedard et al 1991). Clinical measures of set 
shifting include perseveration in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST, Heaton et 
al 1993), where, again, adults with untreated sleep apnoea have been found to perform 
poorly (Naegele et al 1995; Redline et al 1997). Self- regulation of affect and arousal 
refers to the internal modulation of affective states and arousal, although this is 
difficult to measure in the laboratory. The many reports of ‘mood swings’, irritability 
and affect lability are consistent with the notion of a weakness in this executive 
function. Continuous performance tests are often used as they require sustained 
vigilance on monotonous tasks over time. Poor performance on these tasks have been 
well documented in patients with untreated sleep apnoea, and deficits are more 
prominent towards the end of the tasks (Redline et al 1997). Therefore, this suggests 
that the problem is one of sustaining attention and effort rather than poor initiation or 
short-term maintenance of attention. Patients with untreated sleep apnoea also 
perform poorly on tasks involving working memory such as digit span, which 
involves the ability to repeat back digit strings and to mentally reverse them (Naegele 
et al 1995; Redline et al 1997); such working memory capacity is necessary for 
effective planning (Fuster, 1997). Studies have also demonstrated that patients with 
sleep apnoea perform poorly on verbal fluency, even when their language functions 
are otherwise intact (Bedard et al 1991; Neagele et al 1995): such verbal fluency 
indirectly measures mental flexibility and analytic/synthetic skills, which are thought 
to be important for creative, goal directed thought and problem solving.
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Bebe and Gozal (1999) conclude from their review that, aside from sleepiness, 
executive dysfunction appears to be the most prominent area of cognitive impairment 
in untreated sleep disordered breathing, with deficits on this exceeding those on 
measures of visual and verbal ability (Bedard et al 1991) and long-term memory 
(Bedard et al 1991; Naegele et al 1995; Redline et al 1998; Haywood et al 1992).
Sleepiness and executive functioning
Research suggests that normal sleepiness cannot account for the executive 
functioning deficits displayed by patients with sleep apnoea. Executive functioning 
has been found to correlate better with blood gas abnormalities and sleep 
fragmentation than with either subjective or objectively measured sleepiness (Bedard 
et al 1991; Cheshire et al. 1992). Furthermore, Gozal et al. (2001a, b) demonstrated 
that children with sleep apnoea frequently display executive functioning deficits 
despite the fact that pre-pubertal children typically do not suffer daytime sleepiness 
unless their disease is moderate to severe. Some studies have also concluded that 
patients whose sleep has been normalised by CPAP may continue to show deficits on 
executive functioning tests (Bearpark et al. 1987; Bebard et al 1993; Feuerstein et al 
1997; Naegele et al et al 1995). Gozal and Pope (2001) also found residual learning 
deficits long after sleep-disordered breathing had resolved. This persistence of 
executive dysfunction raises the possibility that neurological damage occurs as a 
result of sleep disordered breathing, and may in fact be only partially reversible.
Effects of cognitive impairments on daily life
The notion that patients with sleep apnoea may have cognitive deficits, 
particularly deficits in ‘executive functioning’, is important because of the
252
consequences of these impairments on everyday life. Adults with obstructive sleep 
apnoea have been found to have occupational and social failures related to poor 
planning, disorganisation, diminished judgement, low motivation, rigid thinking and 
affective lability (e.g. Day et al. 1999; Doghramji 1993; Redline & Strohl, 1999). 
Furthermore, a number of studies have reported that sleep apnoea in children is 
associated with failure in school, behaviours similar to attention deficit disorder 
(Bower et al. 2002; Gozal 2000; Guilleminault et al 2000), and behaviours such as 
being unusually inattentive, hyperactive, impulsive, aggressive and rebellious (Dahl et 
al, 1996a,b). Bebe and Gozal (1999) highlight that executive functions allow people 
to make use of their basic skills in response to a complex challenging external 
environment. Cognitive impairments here that may result in social and occupational 
problems are also important because of their inevitable effects on mood. Thus, 
organic together with psychological factors may be responsible for low mood in these 
patients. This supports the hypothesis that patients with sleep apnoea will have 
increased life stress. The initial hypothesis of this chapter is that they will thus have 
more negatively toned dreams and a greater nightmare frequency. Evidence for this 
will now be reviewed.
Apnoea and dreaming
Evidence has been reviewed above that sleep apnoea is associated with poor 
well-being and elevated general psychopathology. Research reviewed in chapter 1 has 
demonstrated that waking life stress causes negatively toned dreams and that these in 
turn affect daytime mood (Schredl, 1999 for review). This is stated in the continuity 
hypothesis of dreaming (Cartwright and Lamberg, 1992), which argues that dreams 
reflect the waking life concerns of the dreamer.
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The idea that dreams can convey information about the somatic concerns of 
the dreamer is still a prevalent concept in the literature. Sacks (1996) provided an 
anecdotal report of a person who had vivid dreams of becoming a statue and within 
weeks developed postencephalitic Parkinsonism. Saabini (1981) and van de Castle 
(1994) also provide hundreds of anecdotal accounts of dream content reflecting 
worsening symptoms or even seemingly forewarning of physical illness. Smith (1986) 
concluded in his review that dreams are sensitive to various health conditions, 
demonstrating that death and separation references in the dreams of medical patients 
had a prognostic value for clinical outcome. Dream content has also been related to 
the menstrual cycle (Bucci et al, 1991) and migraine (Heather-Greener et al, 1996). 
Studies that have assessed the emotional tone of dreams in patients with insomnia, 
and then apnoea, will now be reviewed.
Insomnia and the emotional tone of dreams
Ermann (1995) reported that the dream reports of patients with insomnia 
contained significantly more negatives in self-descriptions than healthy controls. The 
authors argue that this may be a reflection of the negative life events experienced by 
these patients. Moreover, negative sleep onset mentation in insomniacs was 
demonstrated by Antrobus and Saul (1980). Schredl (1991), in a small pilot study, 
found no heightened occurrence of problems in the dreams of insomniacs in 
comparison to controls, however, he did Find that patients had a significantly reduced 
number of dream persons in comparison to controls. Schredl argues that this is in line 
with the continuity hypothesis as these patients in general described themselves as 
introverted. Schredl et al (1998) assessed 198 patients with primary insomnia and 722 
healthy controls. All patients with insomnia and a subgroup of healthy controls
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(N=30) were evaluated polysomnographically for two consecutive nights. They 
completed a sleep questionnaire (SF-B) and were required to record their dream 
experiences after each night in the laboratory. On the sleep questionnaire patients 
reported considerably lower scores on sleep quality, feeling refreshed in the morning 
and emotional balance in the evening. Heightened scores were also found for sleep 
related psychosomatic symptoms, nocturnal awakenings, occupational stress and the 
occurrence of waking problems. Significantly increased scores were also reported for 
personal, occupational and health problems by patients with insomnia. In line with 
these problems, Schredl et al found that patients with insomnia rated their dream 
emotions as significantly more negative than controls. Dream content analysis showed 
that patients’ dreams were characterised by heightened occurrences of aggression, 
problems, negatives in self-description and themes of depression, in comparison to 
controls. The authors also found an increased occurrence of health themes in the 
dreams of patients, which they argue reflects increased health concerns in waking life. 
This study supports the continuity hypothesis of dreaming in that waking life 
stressors, which were present in the group with insomnia, were reflected in their 
dreams.
Ohayon and Morselli (1994) and Hoffman et al (1996a) reported heightened 
nightmare frequency in patients with insomnia in comparison to healthy controls. 
Johnson and Spinweber’s (1983) study of Navy enlisted men demonstrated consistent 
correlations between disturbing dreams and poor sleep quality. A similar conclusion 
was reached by Haynes and Mooney (1975) in their study of college students. Hence, 
such studies support the notion that, in those with poor sleep quality and insomnia, 
dream content is more negatively charged, possibly as a result of the increased waking 
stress due to daytime sleepiness.
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Dreams of patients with sleep apnoea.
Hobson et al (1965) found significantly more respiratory themes in REM 
dream reports elicited after short apnoeas in healthy controls than in dreams after 
regular breathing. Santamaria et al (1998) found that the dreams of patients with sleep 
apnoea were predominantly negatively toned prior to CPAP therapy. However, they 
were unable to compare these with dreams following CPAP as dream recall frequency 
was drastically reduced.
Gross and Lavie (1994) assessed 33 patients with sleep apnoea who were 
already established on CPAP. They conducted dream awakenings during one night 
with a CPAP mask and one night without CPAP, awakenings were conducted with or 
without sleep apnoeas prior to awakenings. The authors found that the influence of 
breathing pattern on the content of dreams appeared to be stronger than the influence 
of CPAP. There was a tendency towards an increased rate of dream recall and longer 
dream reports in the apnoeic condition on untreated nights. Dream reports were also 
found to include significantly more characters, activities and social interactions when 
elicited during untreated nights and after awakenings preceded by sleep apnoeas.
They found no direct incorporation of the apnoea into dream reports, but dream 
reports from the untreated nights and from the sleep apnoeas appeared to be more 
negatively toned than after CPAP- nights and after awakenings without apnoeas. 
Moreover, dreams reported after regular breathing were more positive than dreams 
after awakenings proceeded by apnoeas. The significant difference in the emotional 
colouring of the dreams was found to be independent of dream length. Thus, the 
global emotional tone of the dreams appears to be altered by the apnoeic condition. 
They argue that the apnoeas influence psychological well-being in a negative way
256
and, in turn, affect the activation of memory elements involved in dream production 
(Foulkes, 1985). Hence, they argue that in this way the emotional tone of the dream 
generally becomes more negative although the dream may not contain direct 
references to the apnoeic stimuli. This finding was partly confirmed by Schredl 
(1998). He found that personal problems and occupational stress were reflected in the 
dreams of patients with sleep apnoea by increased negative feelings, aggression and 
occupational themes. However, his dream content analysis did not reveal a 
preponderance of negative emotions in the dreams of patients with sleep apnoea in 
comparison to healthy controls. Schredl (1991,1998) found no heightened occurrence 
of breathing related dreams in patients with sleep apnoea in comparison to healthy 
controls (although there is the complicating factor of stimulus habituation, since sleep 
apnoeas occur regularly throughout the night). Schredl (1998) concludes that the 
findings of Gross and Lavie of increased negative tone of dreams in patients with 
sleep apnoea may be an artefact. He argues that patients underwent a night without 
CPAP and this knowledge may have triggered anxieties about the possible effects of 
recurring sleep apnoeas.
Schredl et al (1999) assessed 44 patients with sleep apnoea and healthy 
controls. Participants were given the SF-B sleep questionnaire, measuring sleep 
quality, the feeling of being refreshed in the morning, emotional balance in the 
evening, tiredness in the evening, and sleep related psychosomatic symptoms. They 
were given several measures of waking stressors and a dream recall scale for the 
previous two weeks. Patients were then awakened and dream reports obtained towards 
the end of laboratory nights with standard polysomnography. Patients reported 
considerably lower scores for sleep quality, feeling refreshed in the morning, and 
emotional balance in the evening than did controls. Patients did not differ from
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controls in respect to partnership and family related problems but more often reported 
occupational problems and health problems. In terms of dream content the authors 
found that high Respiratory Disturbance Index (RDI) was related to more realistic and 
less intense dreams. Leisure time activities were more often found in these dreams. 
Furthermore, as RDI increases the negative emotions of the dream decrease (r = - 
0.352), low minimal blood oxygen saturation was associated with more positive 
emotions. These findings seem to suggest that the greater the severity of the apnoea 
the less negative and more neutrally toned the dream emotions. The authors also 
reported a significant reduction in dream bizarreness associated with a high RDI.
They argue that the latter may be explained by arousal accompanying sleep apnoea in 
that these arousals interfere with the dream formation process. They suggest that the 
heightened occurrence of occupational themes related to low minimal blood oxygen 
saturation and high RDI is possibly a reflection of stress due to the severity of the 
sleep disorder. It could thus be suggested that individuals with severe apnoea do not 
have a sufficient amount of consolidated sleep to allow the formation of dreams with 
bizarre plots and negative emotions. Therefore, this suggests that nightmare frequency 
will be low in those with severe apnoea. Schredl et al’s (1999) study also suggests that 
patients with severe apnoea will have more neutral and positively toned dreams.
Nightmares and snoring
There is evidence that snorers experience more negative dream content in the 
form of nightmares than healthy controls. This is of relevance here as the control 
group in the present study consists of sleepy snorers. Research has indicated that sleep 
is more fragmented in subjects who snore than in those who do not (Thoman, 1997). 
There is also evidence that daytime mood may be impaired in snorers in comparison
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to healthy non-snoring controls. For example, Vandeputte & Weerd (2003) 
demonstrated that 31% of patients who snored had some form of depression (i.e., 
rated mild or above using the Beck Depression Inventory). Thoman (1997) 
investigated 37 older women with snoring (age range 65-94) and found that snoring 
was positively correlated with the frequency of nightmares (r = 0.59; p<0.001), 
although snoring was not significantly correlated with depression scores (r = 0.23; 
p>0.05). The authors did not report whether an association existed between 
nightmares and respiratory disturbance index. This research suggests a significant 
relationship between snoring and nightmares and that sleep fragmentation may be 
associated with nightmares, although it is unclear what definition, if any, of a 
‘nightmare’ was used.
DeGroen et al (1993) studied 98 male Dutch veterans, who had been exposed 
to excessive stress during World War II. 56% of this sample suffered from 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Unsurprisingly the authors found that PTSD was highly 
associated with the occurrence of anxiety dreams. However, they also found that 
snoring was strongly associated with anxiety dreams. This relationship was 
independent of the use of sedatives, antidepressants, smoking, alcohol and coffee 
consumption. Furthermore, they demonstrated that snorers with respiratory pauses 
appeared to have significantly more anxiety dreams compared to snorers without 
respiratory pauses. The difference between snorers without respiratory pauses and 
non-snorers was not significant. The authors argue that as habitual heavy snoring in 
combination with respiratory pauses is the most common symptom of sleep apnoea 
(Kapuniai et al. 1988) then it is reasonable to suggest that the occurrence of apnoeic 
episodes explains the relationship between snoring and anxiety dreams. (The authors 
propose that in subjects with a history of trauma or extreme stress the repression of
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traumatic memory content may fail during such apnoeic episodes resulting in the 
reliving of those experiences.) These findings lend support to the hypothesis here that 
nightmare frequency will be elevated in the group with sleep apnoea, and would also 
be high in the sleepy/snoring controls. However, it is acknowledged that there are 
obvious difficulties in generalising the DeGroen et al (1993) findings to other 
populations due to the fact that 56% of the veterans met the criterion for PTSD and all 
had experienced traumatic incidences in their past. Furthermore, anxiety dreams were 
undefined by the authors.
Nightmares in children with sleep apnoea.
Some studies have looked at nightmare frequency in children with sleep 
apnoea. Guilleminault et al (1996) assessed children with Sleep Disordered Breathing, 
including those with sleep apnoea and Upper Airway Resistance Syndrome (UARS). 
They reported that this group had significantly more nightmares / night terrors and 
sleep waking than would be expected in the general population. Owens et al (1997) 
assessed the incidence of parasomnias in a sample of children less than 6 years old (n 
= 81) and children between 6-12 years old (n = 83) who were diagnosed with sleep 
apnoea or behavioural-based sleep disorders (BSD). The children’s Sleep Habits 
Questionnaire (SHQ) was completed by the parents of those children under six. The 
only item on the SHQ that differentiated between diagnostic groups was ‘wakes 
alarmed by a scary dream’: the behavioural-based sleep disorder group had a higher 
mean score on this item than did the apnoea group. For the children aged between six 
and twelve, no parasomnia was more common in the sleep apnoea group than in the 
BSD group, although for the older sleep apnoea group incidence of bed wetting, sleep 
walking, rocking in sleep and unrecalled nightmares were significantly higher than
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population norms. Also the older children with sleep apnoea were significantly more 
likely to be ‘terrified during a dream’ than population norms. Thus, the above 
evidence is suggestive that sleep apnoea is associated with an increased incidence of 
nightmares in comparison to healthy controls. However, this research may not be 
generalisable to adults as sleep apnoea manifests itself differently in children (for 
example, daytime sleepiness is a less common symptom in children).
Dream content and nightmares in adults with sleep apnoea
MacFarlane and Wilson (2006) examined the influence of specific sleep 
disorders (including sleep apnoea) on dream content through retrospective analysis of 
questionnaire data of patients attending a Sleep Disorders Clinic. Data were collected 
from 124 subjects who demonstrated obstructive sleep apnoea, narcolepsy, an EEG 
arousal disorder during sleep, or periodic leg movements during sleep. The 42-item 
Whaler Physical Symptom Inventory was used to quantify somatic concerns. Dream 
content and dream frequency were assessed with a 37-item dream questionnaire. Ten 
symptom-dream pairs were selected as mutually relevant, for example reporting 
muscular weakness and dreaming of not being able to move, or reporting difficulty 
breathing and dreaming of choking or not being able to breathe. These pairs were 
analysed in order to determine whether those with a particular daytime somatic 
symptom report a related dream with a significantly greater frequency that those who 
are asymptomatic. They found that of the entire sample 84.6% (n = 105) reported 
having nightmares. This included 30 subjects with narcolepsy, 29 with obstructive 
sleep apnoea, 26 with increased cyclical alternating pattern (CAP) and 20 with 
periodic leg movements. The following table demonstrates the frequency at which 
nightmares occurred in each sleep-disordered group.
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Table 48 -  Data from MacFarlane and Wilson (2006) on dream content and 
nightmares in adults with sleep disorders
Frequency of reporting nightmares
Group Never Sometimes Often Always
Narcolepsy 11 20 7 3
CAP 15 19 6 1
Apnoea 12 27 1 1
PLMS 21 19 1 0
Note: CAP = cyclical alternating pattern, PLMS = periodic limb movement 
syndrome.
It can be observed from Table 48 that the majority of patients with sleep 
apnoea report having nightmares ‘sometimes’. However, it is not clear what the 
definition for ‘sometimes’ is. It seems that these patients do not report nightmares 
‘often’ or ‘always’ in this study. However, it has been demonstrated that retrospective 
estimates produce lower estimates of nightmares compared to logs. The fact that 27 
out of the 29 patients with sleep apnoea reported ‘sometimes’ having nightmares 
suggests that nightmare prevalence may be raised in this population.
These authors also found that patients with sleep apnoea do not dream of 
choking/ feelings of suffocation with a greater frequency than non-apnoeic patients. In 
fact they found that only 40% of patients with sleep apnoea report being bothered by 
difficulty breathing on the Whaler physical symptom inventory. However, in the 
sample as a whole difficulty breathing (reported by 17 patients) was significantly 
related to dreams of choking or not being able to breathe. Similarly, somatic
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complaints of excessive perspiration were significantly related to dreams of 
perspiring. The other symptoms dream pairs were not significant. The authors suggest 
that this may be because the other symptom-dream pairs could not really be 
considered to be good matches when considering direct dream manifestation of 
somatic complaints (with the exception of reports of paralysis and dreams of not 
being able to move, which was not significantly correlated). For example, the authors 
correlated somatic complaints of ‘poor health in general’ with dreams of ‘dying/being 
dead’ and complaints of ‘abnormal blood pressure’ with dreams of ‘heart pounding’.
The evidence above provides support to the notion that dream emotional tone 
may be more negative in some patients with sleep disorders and that nightmare 
frequency may be increased, even if the specific dream content does not match the 
disorder. The following section of this review will examine whether sleep disorders 
also affect dream recall in general.
Sleep disorders and dream recall
Schredl (1998b) found a heightened dream recall frequency in patients with 
narcolepsy, which he interpreted as an effect of disinhibited REM sleep regulation. 
Other studies have reported that patients with narcolepsy report vivid, frightening and 
disturbing dreams at night (Broughton et al., 1988; Montplaisir and Godbout, 1986). 
This is believed to reflect the physiological abnormality of REM sleep in narcolepsy.
Many authors have reported a significaht positive correlation between dream 
recall frequency and frequency of nocturnal awakenings (Cory et al, 1975; Halliday, 
1988; Schredl and Montasser, 1996-1997). Furthermore, a number of studies have 
found a significant relationship between poor sleep quality and dream recall 
frequency (Arand et al. 1972; Lugaresi et al, 1983; Borbely, 1984; Schredl et al.
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1997). Schredl et al (1998) demonstrated that whereas dream recall frequency was 
significantly increased in patients with insomnia in comparison to controls, this 
difference disappeared when frequency of nocturnal arousals was partialled out. In 
contrast, partialling out the ‘occurrence of problems’ did not considerably reduce this 
difference between insomniac patients and controls. Thus, it can be concluded that 
dream recall frequency is heightened in patients with insomnia primarily due to 
increased nocturnal awakenings rather than daytime stress (measured by occurrence 
of problems). Schredl argues that this supports the arousal-retrieval model of dream 
recall (Koulack and Goodenough, 1976). Although this model acknowledges the 
influence of visual memory and salience of dream imagery it also emphasises the 
importance of sleep parameters in explaining the inter-individual variability of dream 
recall frequency. This model may also account for findings by Hartmann (1984) that 
some individuals who suffer from nightmares also have a pattern of prolonged and 
interrupted REM sleep. However, it could be that these individuals also have more 
interest and preoccupation with their dream life, a factor that has been found to 
increase dream recall (Halliday, 1992). Against this, Schredl et al (1998) found that 
increased dream frequency in patients with insomnia could not be attributed to a 
heightened interest in dreams as patients did not differ from controls on the variable 
‘engagement with dream during the day’, which the authors used to estimate interest 
in dreams (Schredl, 1997).
However, two studies have not found an elevation in dream recall frequency in 
patients with insomnia (Schredl, 1991; Erman et al, 1993), although they both had 
small sample sizes and the latter had inadequate gender-matching and non­
standardised interview schedules.
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I It is clear that in other patient groups, such as patients with clinical depression,
| variables other than nocturnal awakenings must be responsible for the dream recall
I
[
differences between patients and controls. Although sleep quality is low in depressed 
patients, which includes frequent nocturnal awakenings, a number of studies have 
reported that dream recall frequency is also low (Riemann et al. 1990a; Schredl, 1995)
Dream recall and respiratory disturbance
Monday et al (1987) found a tendency for increased dream recall in subjects 
with asthma with nocturnal attacks in comparison to matched healthy controls, 
although this difference was not statistically significant. The number of REM 
awakenings for the asthmatic and control groups were 43 and 46 respectively, but 
asthmatic subjects reported 35 (81%) dreaming experiences versus 28 (61%) for 
controls. However, asthmatic subjects had a significantly higher vivid impression of 
being woken from a dream without any ability to remember any of the dream content 
than did controls. The authors suggested the term ‘white dream’ for this phenomenon 
of the vivid sensation of ‘coming out from a dream’ without being able to remember 
any content. However, none of the asthmatic subjects reported that they were 
dreaming when awakened from a nocturnal attack, thus the authors argued that 
hypoxemia at the time of nocturnal attacks could not be responsible for the poor 
dream recall as ‘white dreams’; further evidence for this was that ‘white dreams’ were 
also reported by subjects who did not show significant (>4%) oxygen desaturations. 
The authors propose that poor dream recall by asthmatic subjects during nocturnal 
attacks could be because dreams leading to nocturnal attacks are strongly repressed. 
However, they also suggest that physiological distress at the time of the nocturnal 
attack makes the patient less attentive to the dream content.
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Dream recall in sleep apnoea
Schredl et al (1998) found a slightly elevated dream recall frequency in 
patients with sleep apnoea in comparison to healthy controls. These authors compared 
dream recall estimates over a 2-week period of 236 patients with sleep apnoea with 
722 healthy controls. They found that neither the Respiratory Disturbance Index 
(RDI) nor maximal decrease of blood oxygen saturation as severity measures were 
significantly correlated with dream recall frequency. They reported that the 
heightened dream frequency was best explained by the lower emotional balance of the 
patient group in the evening. They argue that this supports the salience hypothesis of 
dream recall (Cohen and MacNeilage, 1974) in that the more negative the pre-sleep 
mood the more negative the dream affect and the higher the probability of dream 
recall. They conclude that heightened dream recall in patients with sleep apnoea can 
be partly explained by the fractionated sleep profile (frequent arousals) and by this 
daytime stress.
/
Gross and Lavie (1994) reported that dream recall was better with REM 
awakenings after the occurrence of sleep apnoeas than with REM awakenings after 
regular breathing (using nights when patients were treated with CPAP). The authors 
argue that this finding is in line with the Functional State-Shift Model (Koukkou and 
Lehmann, 1983). This theory proposes that dream recall is dependent upon the 
difference between the functional state of the brain during sleep and during 
wakefulness. It is argued that the closer the distance between these two states the 
higher the dream recall. It is reasoned that sleep apnoea is characterised by numerous 
brief awakenings resulting in a higher state of brain arousal and that this elevated state
produces the basis for improved dream recall. Schredl et al (1999) in a further study 
with sleep apnoea patients confirmed the previous findings of heightened dream recall 
in comparison to healthy controls. However, contrary to their previous research of 
1998, Schredl et al (1999) found that the difference in dream recall between apnoea 
patients and control was not significantly reduced when ‘frequency of nocturnal 
awakenings’ or ‘emotional balance in the evening’ was partialled out. Therefore, they 
argued that frequent arousals due to sleep apnoeas lead to higher functional states 
during REM sleep and as a result dream recall is enhanced. Again this study lends 
support to the hypothesis that dream recall will be significantly elevated in the apnoea 
group.
Dream recall in patients with restless leg syndrome
Schredl (2001) investigated the dream recall frequency of 131 patients with 
restless leg syndrome in comparison to healthy controls. In RLS leg movements can 
be accompanied by short arousals and cause pronounced sleep fragmentation (Sforza 
et al. 1999). Patients reported considerably lower scores for sleep quality as well as 
for the feeling of being refreshed in the morning and for emotional balance in the 
evening, (the latter possibly reflecting the stress associated with having a sleep 
disorder). Dream recall frequency and the scores of ‘engagement’ in dreams did not 
differ significantly between the control group and the patient group. These findings do 
not support the arousal retrieval model, particularly since the authors report that the 
frequency of nocturnal awakenings was significantly higher in the patient group. 
However, dream recall frequency was found to be negatively associated with the 
number of periodic leg movements with arousal (PLMAI). Thus, as the severity of the 
PLM disorder increases the likelihood of reporting a dream decreases. Schredl argues
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that this suggests that the microarousals causing a distinct sleep fragmentation may 
actually interfere with the process of dreaming itself or with the process of dream 
recall.
Hypotheses:
Having reviewed the literature on apnoea and psychopathology, apnoea and 
sleep quality, apnoea and nightmare and dream frequency, and literature on the effects 
of sleep fragmentation and of other sleep disorders on dreaming, the following 
hypotheses have been derived for study 2.
a) Levels of anxiety and depression will be significantly higher in the sleep 
apnoea group than the sleepy/snoring control group.
b) There will be a higher frequency of nightmares in the apnoea group than in the 
sleep/snoring control group, and both groups will have a higher frequency of 
nightmares than the general population.
c) Nightmare frequency will increase due to increased levels of disorder severity 
and waking psychopathology from the sleepy/snoring controls to the mild to 
the moderately severe apnoeics, however, those with the severest apnoea, 
despite having the most waking stress, will not have sufficient periods of 
consolidated sleep with which to support the formation of nightmares or 
dreams. Data from the apnoea and sleepy/snoring control groups will be 
combined for this analysis in order to provide data from people with a low 
diprate. The specific hypothesis is that, as the diprate increases, nightmare 
frequency will form an inverted U shaped curve, as a result of the combination 
between increasing waking distress but also increasing sleep fragmentation.
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d) The dreams of untreated sleep apnoea patients will be significantly more 
negatively toned than when they are treated with CPAP.
269
Chapter 7 
Study 2: Apnoea and nightmares
Method
Participants.
49 consecutive patients attending a sleep disordered-breathing clinic in a 
District General Hospital were recruited. They were referred by their GPs (or ENT 
specialists) and complained of daytime sleepiness and most had been told they were 
heavy snorers. The study and its procedures were approved by the departmental and 
local ethical committees (see appendix 20 and 21).
Those who were referred for sleep studies received a patient information sheet 
and consent form (see appendix 16 and 17). A diagnosis of Sleep Apnoea Syndrome 
(SAS) was made when they had significant daytime tiredness and a raised Epworth 
Sleepiness Score, together with a positive (limited channel) home sleep study showing 
a dip in (peripherally measured) oxygen saturation 10 or more times per hour 
(Embletta Portable Diagnostic System; ResMed, Abingdon, UK).
26 patients (21 males) were diagnosed with sleep apnoea (mean age 55.00; SD 
= 10.78). 23 (17 males) were classed as sleepy/snoring controls (mean age 50.14; SD 
= 8.76)
Mean 4% dip rate for the SAS group was 30.95 per hour (SD= 20.71; range 
7.40- 75.80) compared to 4.05 in the sleepy/snoring control group (SD= 2.88; range 
0.60-9.40). This difference was statistically significant (t (44) = -6.33; p =0.001). SAS
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patients had a mean BMI of 36.19 (SD= 5.9) compared to sleepy/snoring controls 
who had a mean BMI of 33.02 (SD= 7.80). This difference was not statistically 
significant (t (46) = -1.06; p =0.11) Mean Epworth sleepiness score was elevated in 
the apnoea group (14.73 SD= 5.39 and 10.47, SD = 4.61 respectively; t (43) = -2.85; p 
= 0.007).
Follow up.
10 of the 26 patients with SAS took part in a follow-up study after a minimum 
of three months on successful CPAP therapy. CPAP use resulted in abolition of 
almost all apnoeas, with a 4% dip rate in this group, measured by simply oximetry, 
after 1 month of treatment, improving from a mean of 37.73 to 0.54 events per hour.
Table 49 - Means (and standard deviations) for participants before and after 
CPAP therapy.
Pre-CP AP Post-CPAP
Age 58.5 (6.92) -
Height 113.95 (18.05) -
Weight 113.95 (18.05) 114.69 (20.57)
BMI 37.3 (6.71) 37.15 (7.44)
ESS 15.1 (3.54) 8.11 (4.81)
Note: BMI = Body Mass Index; ESS = Epworth Sleepiness Scale.
No significant difference was found in weight before and after CPAP (t = 
1.108; p= 0.19) or BMI (t (7) = 1.43; p =0.19). Epworth sleepiness scores were 
significantly lower following CPAP (t (8)= 4.08; p =0.004).
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Materials
Embletta Portable Diagnostic System (ResMecL Abingdon. UK).
The Embletta sleep recording system is a portable digital recorder that is a 
complete system for the diagnosis of sleep-disordered breathing. The Embletta’s 
diagnostic signals include position and activity, leg movement, oxygen saturation, 
pulse, oral flow, event button and two respiratory effort signals through the XactTrace 
Respiratory Inductive Plethysmograph (RIP) sensors. Each sleep data trace was 
manually reviewed by a Chief Cardiorespiratory technician to ensure that the dip in 
oxygenation was due to an obstructive not central apnoea.
Oximetry
Oximetry is a spectrophometric device that detects and calculates the different 
absorption of light by oxygenated and deoxygenated haemoglobin in blood to produce 
a measure called the Sp02. This is a measurement of the oxygen saturation of the 
arterial blood arriving at the fingertip or earlobe with each pulse beat. The number of 
oxygen desaturations (dips) per hour was counted. Sleep apnoea was defined as a 4% 
Sp02 dip rate of more than 10 per hour. Due to the use of a different machinery some 
patients had 5% Sp02 dip rate values but these can used interchangeable with the 4% 
measure.
The Epworth Sleepiness Scale fESS)
The Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS; Johns, 1991) is widely used in research 
and clinical practice and is a validated measure of the propensity of subjects to fall 
asleep in a variety of different everyday situations. The self-reported propensity to fall
asleep has been used as a surrogate for daytime tiredness and the ESS has been used 
in a variety of sleep disorders. For example, a cut off score of 10 on the ESS gave a 
sensitivity of 93.5% and specificity of 100% in distinguishing narcoleptic patients 
from normative subjects (Johns, 2000) and a cut-off of 14 gave a sensitivity of 97% 
and a specificity of 100% (Parkes et al. 1998). ESS scores correlate with objective 
data obtained using the multiple sleep latency test (MSLT), a standardised objective 
test of sleepiness, which provides a mean sleep onset latency score based on 
scheduled sleep opportunity across the day (Carskadon et al. 1986). The reliability of 
the ESS is reported to be similar to that of the MSLT-derived measures (n=87, r = 
0.81, p<0.001). Clinically the ESS is the best measure available to inform clinicians 
as to the patient’s perception of their sleepiness, however, the correlation between the 
ESS and OSAHS severity is weak (Kingshott et al. 1998; Kingshott et al. 1995; 
Engleman et al. 1997) and it is not recommended as a screening tool.
The scale requires participants to rate how likely they would be to doze off in 
8 situations, based on their usual way of life in recent times, using a scale from 0 
(would never dose) to 3 (high chance of dozing). The maximum score is 24. Patients 
can be subdivided clinically into the normal range (ESS<11), mild subjective daytime 
sleepiness (ESS =11-15), moderate subjective daytime sleepiness (ESS = 15-18) or 
severe subjective daytime sleepiness (ESS>18).
Sleep and mood diary
A ‘yes’ ‘no’ format was used to determine the presence of a dream and an 
awakening as a result of dream emotions or events. Participants rated the overall 
mood of the dream on a 7-point hedonic scale (Foulkes et al. 1996) ranging from 1
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(very unpleasant) to 7 (very pleasant). The mid point of the scale included an option 
for ‘neither pleasant or unpleasant or mixed’ (see appendix 18 for example).
Participants were also required to complete two Visual Analogue Scales 
(VAS) every morning for the ten consecutive days. VAS scales questions about 
‘happy/depressed’ for low mood and ‘relaxed/anxious’ for anxiety. These moods were 
rated on separate lines because it has been shown that these moods can vary 
independently (Bowen et al. 2004; Watson, 2000, pp.27,45). These scales and the 
questions above were identical to those used in study one.
Participants were instructed to complete their sleep diary for 10 consecutive 
days immediately after waking. Sleep diaries filled out immediately on waking, have 
been shown to be highly correlated with objective estimates of sleep (Espie et al 1989; 
Wilson etal. 1998).
Procedure
Participants were approached following their initial appointment at a Sleep 
Disorder Breathing Clinic at a district general hospital and invited to take part in the 
research. The aims of the study were explained those who agreed to participate. This 
information was also provided in writing (appendix 16). Written consent was obtained 
if participants were willing to take part (appendix 17). It was emphasised that this 
research was entirely separate from the treatment received at the hospital and that 
refusal to take part would in no way affect the standard of care they received. If sleep 
apnoea was suspected during the initial consultation, patients were required to attend 
a follow up hospital appointment approximately two weeks later in order to collect the 
equipment for their home sleep study (Embletta Portable Diagnostic System; ResMed,
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Abingdon, UK). During this two-week period participants were asked to complete a 
10-day sleep and mood diary. The Epworth Sleepiness Scale and other demographic 
data were obtained from the initial consultation appointment. Participants were asked 
to bring their completed diaries with them when they attended their follow up 
appointment. Those diagnosed with sleep apnoea (as a result of their home sleep study 
and clinical interview) received an in-hospital auto-titration to maximise CPAP 
pressure. They were advised to use their machine (Sullivan S6, Sydney, New South 
Wales) as much as possible when asleep. Overnight oximetry was performed at 1 
month, whilst using CPAP, to confirm the abolition of desaturations. Weight, BMI 
and Epworth Sleepiness Scores were also recorded during this follow- up hospital 
session.
Those with sleep apnoea established on CPAP therapy were written to after a 
minimum of three months after starting treatment (see appendix 19 for copy of letter). 
Participants were sent a 10-day sleep diary (identical to the one they had previously 
completed) and asked to return this to the hospital after they had completed it (in the 
stamped addressed envelop provided).
Design
A between subjects design was used to compare the sleep apnoea patients with 
patients who received a negative diagnosis of sleep apnoea (i.e., sleepy/snoring 
controls). The independent variable in this first part of the design was whether 
patients had received a diagnosis of sleep apnoea. The dependent variables of interest 
were frequency of dreams, number of nightmares, emotional tone of the dreams and 
scores on anxiety and depression scales.
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Dip rate was then used as a predictor of the dependent variables, using both 
groups combined in order to have a wide range of diprate.
A within subjects design was employed to assess patients with sleep apnoea 
before and after CPAP. The independent variable was CPAP status and the dependent 
variables of interest were frequency of nightmares, dreams, mean emotional tone of 
dreams and scores on anxiety and depression measures. Change in dip rate was 
assessed as a predictor of change in dependent measures.
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Chapter 8 
Study 2: Apnoea and nightmares
Results
Definition of nightmares and unpleasant dreams
In this study nightmares were defined as dreams on the logs that were rated very 
unpleasant or moderately unpleasant and that woke up the sleeper, unpleasant dreams 
were defined as dreams that were rated very unpleasant or moderately unpleasant, 
irrespective of whether they were the cause of the sleeper waking. We included the 
moderately unpleasant category due to the small number of dreams rated as very 
unpleasant, indeed neither group recorded at least one very unpleasant dream every 
night. Also, study 1 showed that between subjects correlations with personality 
variables, and within subjects correlations with pre and post-sleep mood did not differ 
between the use of the very unpleasant criterion alone, or the use of the criterion of 
moderately or very unpleasant.
Table 50 - Number of dreams rated as moderately, or very unpleasant
Moderately unpleasant Very unpleasant
Apnoea group (n = 26) 20--------------------------- 9-----------------  -
Sleepy/snoring control 13 8
group (n = 23)
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Descriptive statistics
Table 51 shows the means and standard deviations (SD) for dream and mood 
variables in patients with sleep apnoea and sleepy/snoring controls.
Table 51 - Means and standard deviations for dream and mood variables in patients 
with apnoea and sleepy/snoring controls
Apnoea group 
means (SD)
Apnoea 
group range
Sleepy/
snoring control group 
means (SD)
Sleepy/
snoring control 
group range
Test of difference1 ' 
z(p)
Body Mass 
Index
36.20 (5.90) 28.10-48 33.02 (7.78) 24.17-52.42 t = -1.06 (0.11)
Dip rate 30.95(20.71) 7.40-
75.80
4.05 (2.88) (0.60-9.40) z = -5.67* (<.001)
Dream frequency 
per 10 days
6.5 (3.52) 0-10 5.35 (3.45) 0-10 z = -1.44 (0.15)
"Nightmare 
frequency per 10 
days
0.85(1.24) 0-6 0.78(1.28) 0-5 z=-0.78 (0.44)
Bad dream 
frequency per 10 
days
0.23 (0.51) 0-2 0.13(0.34) 0-1 z =-0.62 (0.53)
Unpleasant 
dream frequency 
per 10 days
1.11 (1.63) 0-8 0.91 (1.13) 0-5 z = -0.63 (0.53)
Dream emotional 
tone
3.64 (0.66) 1.90-5 4.21 (1.19) 2-6.25 t = 2.04 (0.05)*
Epworth 14.73 (5.39) 2-24 10.48 (4.61) 0-18 t = -2.85* (0.01)
sleepiness s c al e- ' ..... ---  . . . --------------- •
Anxiety 4.93 (1.64) 2.28-9 4.66(1.44) 1.53-7.33 t = -0.59 (0.56)
Depression 4.65 (2.03) 0-9 4.49(1.30) 1.65-6.67 t = -0.30 (0.77)
1 Tests o f difference were either t-tests or chi squared depending on whether the variables were 
normally distributed.
* p<0.05. All values are two tailed.
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Inspection of table 51 shows that the frequency of dreams, nightmares and unpleasant 
dreams is slightly greater in the sleep apnoea group compared to sleepy/snoring 
controls, however, none of these differences are statistically significant. Dip rate is 
significantly higher in the apnoea group. BMI is not significantly different in either 
group.
The mean dream emotional tone in the sleep apnoea group (3.64) is significantly more 
negative than in the sleepy/snoring control group (4.21). The mean emotional tone in 
the apnoea group represents the point between ‘slightly unpleasant’ and ‘neither 
pleasant or unpleasant’, whereas the mean dream tone in the sleepy/snoring control 
group represents the point between ‘neither pleasant or unpleasant’ and ‘slightly 
pleasant’. Therefore, although the patients with sleep apnoea syndrome do not have 
more nightmares or unpleasant dreams, overall their dreams are significantly more 
negatively toned than for sleepy/snoring controls.
The mean scores for anxiety and depression represents approximately the midpoint of 
the VAS line between relaxed /anxious and happy/ depressed (the line was 9cm in 
length). Therefore, the mean mood reported by both sleepy/snoring controls and 
apnoea patients tends to be in the neutral range with a slight tendency to the negative 
direction, with mean anxiety and depression slightly higher in the apnoea group. As
expected^ Epworth sleepiness scale is signifieantly higherinThe group with sleep------
apnoea syndrome.
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Frequency of unpleasant dreams and nightmares
61% of those with sleep apnoea syndrome had at least one unpleasant dream and 
23.1% had two unpleasant dreams or more during the 10-day study period. 43.5% of 
sleepy/snoring controls had at least one unpleasant dream and 30.43% had two or 
more. When prorated to 1 month, sleep apnoea patients reported a mean of 2.58 
nightmares and 3.38 unpleasant dreams. When prorated to one month sleepy/snoring 
controls report 2.37 nightmares and 2.77 unpleasant dreams. Thus, while not differing 
significantly from each other, both groups reported more than one nightmare a month 
and so would be considered by some researchers to be frequent nightmare sufferers 
(Belicki & Belicki, 1986; Berquier & Ashton, 1992; Hersen, 1971; Kales et al, 1980; 
Levin, 1989).
Distribution of variables.
Dream variables were assessed for normality. Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality 
demonstrated that dream frequency (S-W statistic = 0.87; p<0.01), nightmare 
frequency (0.68; p<0.01), unpleasant dream frequency (0.68; p<0.01) and diprate 
(0.77; p =00.001) are not normally distributed. Dream emotional tone (0.961; p= 
0.18), mean anxiety (0.998; p=0.90), mean depression (0.981; p=0.63) and ESS were 
normally distributed (0.977; p=0.52).
Dream frequency. ------------------  -------------------------------------------------
A spearman’s rho correlation was conducted in order to determine if there was a 
relationship between the number of dreams recalled and severity of sleep apnoea. No 
significant relationship was found between dip rate and dream recall (r =0.21; p=
0.16), therefore, dream frequency does not increase with severity of sleep apnoea.
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Relationships between nightmares / unpleasant dreams /dream emotional tone and 
apnoea severity and Epworth Sleepiness Scale
Spearman’s rho correlations were conducted for each group in order to examine the 
relationships between frequency measures and emotional tone with a measure of 
objective apnoea severity (dip rate) and subjective severity of sleepiness (ESS). 
Correlations were also conducted with BMI in order to assess any confounding effects 
of this variable. In order to reduce the probabilities if type 1 errors as a result of 
multiple comparison the level of significance was set at p=<0.01.
Table 52 - Spearman’s rho correlations (p) of frequency measures of unpleasant 
dream types and emotional tone (ET) with body mass index (BMI), dip rate, Epworth 
Sleepiness Scale (ESS), for the sleep apnoea group and sleepy/snoring controls.
BMI Dip rate ESS
NM  freq (sleepy/snoring control) -0.06 (0.80) -0.27 (0.22) 0.32 (0.14)
BD freq (sleepy/snoring control) 0.21 (0.34) -0.02 (0.93) 0.51 (0.13)
UD freq (sleepy/snoring control) 0.03 (0.89) -0.20 (0.37) 0.47 (0.02)
ET (sleepy/snoring control) -0 .14(0.54) -0.07 (0.77) -0.61 (0.02)
NM  freq (apnoea) 0.20 (0.33) -0.08 (0.70) 0 .14(0 .54)
BD freq (apnoea) -0.08 (0.70) -0.25 (0.23) 0.02 (0.93)
UD freq (apnoea) 0.12(0.55) -0 .14(0 .52) 0.05 (0.82)
ET (apnoea) -------- ---------- ------ 0 .20(0 .33) —OvfB (0t56}~ ----------0,18 <0.41)
Note: BMI = body mass index; ESS= Epworth Sleepiness Scale; NM freq = nightmare frequency; BD freq = bad 
dream frequency; UD freq =unpleasant dream frequency; ET = dream emotional tone.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 error as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
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Table 52 shows that there are no significant relationships between nightmare-type 
variables and BMI or dip rate in either group. However, there is a trend for positive 
correlations between mean dream emotional tone and unpleasant dream frequency 
with ESS in the sleepy/snoring control group (p =0.02).
Given these findings for the two groups, and in order to further assess the effect of dip 
rate on nightmare-type variables the two groups were combined in order to utilize the 
variation in dip rate within the sleepy/snoring control group as part of the 
investigation of the apnoea group. Note that there is no difference in BMI between the 
two groups. Table 53 shows that even when the two groups are combined there are 
still no significant relationships between unpleasant dream / nightmare measures and 
apnoea severity, as assessed by diprate.
Table 53 - Spearman’s correlations (p) of nightmare/unpleasant dream frequency 
measures and dream emotional tone with diprate for all participants combined
Diprate
■Nightmares -0.11 (0.48)
Bad dreams -0.11 (0.48)
Unpleasant dreams -0.12(0.43)
Emotional tone -0.11(0.46)
Given this lack of a simple relationship between nightmare-type variables and apnoea 
severity the hypothesised quadratic relationship was investigated next, using all 
participants combined.
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Quadratic relationships between nightmare frequency and apnoea variables 
The relationship between nightmares and dip rate was further investigated using a 
quadratic regression curve in order to test for the hypothesised inverted U shape 
function. However, there was no pronounced U shape curve and the model was not 
statistically significant (F(2,43) = 0.67; P = 0.514, R2 = 0.03), with severity of apnoea 
only explaining 3% of the variance in nightmare frequency (see appendix 22), 
therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.
A regression curve (quadratic) was also conducted in order to explore the possibility 
of an inverted U shaped curve between emotional tone and dip rate (all participants 
were used). The graph is shown in Fig 5.
Figure 5 - Graph showing the quadratic curve between mean emotional tone and unpleasant 
dream frequency for all participants
m ean dream em otional to n e
I B
60.00 80 0020 00 40 00000
d ip ra te
This graph shows a U shaped curve when dip rate is the independent variable and 
emotional tone is the dependent variable. The regression shows that this model very 
nearly reaches statistical significance (F (2,14) = 3.13; p = 0.054). According to the
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0 0 •  •R value (R =0.13) dip rate accounts for 13% of the variance m emotional tone.
However, the graph also shows that there is a greater range in mean emotional tone
values for lower dip rate scores, and as severity of the apnoea increases the variance
in mean emotional tone decreases. For example, for dip rate values over 40 the
variance in emotional tone is small and mean emotional tone of dream seems to
cluster between 4 and 5. This suggests that individuals with severe apnoea are having
dreams, which are more neutrally toned. Thus, the dreams of people with more severe
apnoea, contrary to the initial hypothesis, seem to be more neutrally toned than those
with less severe apnoea or no apnoea.
In order to assess these differences in variance in emotional tone, severity of apnoea 
was divided into three groups defined as the highest, middle and lowest thirds of the 
dip rate distribution. A one-way ANOVA was conducted, and Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance demonstrated a statistically significant difference in variance 
between groups (4.38; p= 0.02). The difference in emotional tone between the three 
diprate groups was not significant (F (2,42) = 2.68; p =0.08). Therefore, as severity of 
the apnoea increases the variance in emotional tone decreases significantly, although 
the mean of emotional tone does not change significantly.
In order to determine whether this difference in variance is confounded by BMI, the
variance of BMI at levels^of apnoea^everity was assessed. Levene’s testfound no___
significance difference in variance of BMI between the groups of increasing apnoea 
severity (1.70; p= 0.19). Thus, the difference in variance of emotional tone can be 
attributed to the presence and severity of apnoea rather than to any confound with 
BMI.
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Relationships between nightmares/unpleasant dreams and mood 
Participants were asked to rate their levels of anxiety and depression every morning 
for the ten-day study period. As demonstrated in Table 51 mean anxiety and 
depression did not differ between the apnoea group and sleepy/snoring controls. 
However, an investigation is needed of whether there are relationships between the 
mood variables and the frequency variables and emotional tone within the sleep 
apnoea and sleepy/snoring control groups. Table 54 shows the Spearman’s rho 
correlations of frequency measures and dream emotional tone (ET) with anxiety and 
depression, for the sleep apnoea and sleepy/snoring control groups separately. Again 
because a number of correlations were conducted the stricter significance threshold of 
was used.
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Table 54 - Spearman’s rho correlations (p) of frequency measures of unpleasant 
dream types and emotional tone with anxiety and depression, for the sleep apnoea 
group and sleepy/snoring controls
Depression Anxiety
NM freq (sleepy/snoring control) 0.34 0.39
(0.12) (0.07)
BD freq (sleepy/snoring control) 0.03 0.18
(0.89) (0.43)
UD freq (sleepy/snoring control) 0.29 0.36
(0.20) (0.10)
ET (sleepy/snoring control) -0.29 -0.30
(0.29) (0.10)
NM freq (apnoea) 0.19 0.14
(0.36) (0.51)
BD freq (apnoea) 0.36 0.29
(0.07) (0.16)
UD freq (apnoea) 0.26 0.18
(0.22) (0.39)
ET (apnoea) -0.29 -0.30
(0.16) (0.15)
Note: NM freq = nightmare frequency, BD freq = Bad dream frequency, UD freq = unpleasant dream 
frequency; ET= emotional tone.
Table 54 shows that none of the nightmare-type or emotional tone variables are 
significantly related to anxiety or depression the following day in either the apnoea or 
sleepy/snoring control group.
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This raises the question, however, whether state anxiety or state depression are related 
to the nightmare-type variables longitudinally. This is now investigated.
Within subjects correlations between state anxiety and state depression and 
nightmare-type variables
Each participant recorded the emotional tone of a dream, if they had one, on each of 
the 10 mornings, recorded whether the dream woke them up, and then rated their level 
of anxiety and of depression.
Within subject correlations were computed between the two mood variables and the 
dream variables:
1. Presence or absence of a dream
2. Emotional tone of the dream
3. Presence or absence of a nightmare, defined with waking criterion
4. Presence or absence of an unpleasant dream, i.e. nightmare defined without 
the waking criterion
As many of the participants’ 10 values of anxiety or of depression were not normally
distributed, KendalTs co-efficient of concordance was usecLas the measure of______
correlation. Within-subject (WS) correlations with emotional tone of the dream were 
only used in the data analysis if at least 5 dreams had occurred. For the 
presence/absence of a type of dream/nightmare measures most participants gave a full
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data set for all 10 nights, participants who provided fewer than 5 data points for a 
within-subject correlation were omitted from the data analysis for that correlation.
Table 55 - Within subject correlations with anxiety, for the apnoea group and the 
sleepy/snoring control group. Data presented for each group’s within subjects 
correlations are mean, median, SD, maximum and minimum, number of correlations 
calculated (n), and number of correlations that were significant (# sig.)
Apnoea participants Sleepy/snoring control participants
Correlate Mean Median SD Range n # sig Mean Median SD Range n # sig z P
Presence of a 
dream
-.10 -.14 .26 -.46 - .30 8 0 .15 .22 .35 -.72 - .73 14 2 1.84 .065
Dream tone -.38 -.36 .33 -.81 - .19 16 4 -.52 -.59 .20 -.81 --.19 12 3 1.25 n.s.
Presence of a 
nightmare
.35 .42 .30 -.39 - .82 15 1 .34 .40 .16 .04 - .48 6 0 .234 n.s.
Presence of 
an unpleasant 
dream
.33 .43 .37 - .3 9 - .8 2 16 2 .35 .38 .25 .04 - .82 7 1 .434 n.s.
Table 55 shows that apnoea participants and sleepy/snoring controls have 
moderately sized correlations between morning anxiety and presence of a nightmare, 
presence of an unpleasant dream, and dream emotional tone. For the dream tone 
variable the number of significant within subject correlations is above that expected 
by chance. The two groups do not differ in the size of these correlations. However 
presence of a dream has a small negative effect on anxiety for the apnoea participants,
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but a small positive effect on anxiety for the sleepy/snoring controls. A comparison 
with Table 54 shows that the between and within-subject correlations of anxiety with 
nightmare and unpleasant dream frequency are of similar size for the sleepy/snoring 
control group, but WS correlations are larger for the apnoea group. WS correlations of 
anxiety with dream emotional tone are larger than the between-subjects correlations 
of mean anxiety and mean dream emotional tone for both groups.
Table 56 shows that apnoea participants and sleepy/snoring controls have moderately 
sized correlations between morning depression and presence of a nightmare, presence 
of an unpleasant dream, and dream emotional tone. The two groups do not differ in 
the size of these correlations. For the dream tone variable the number of significant 
within subject correlations is above that expected by chance. However, presence of a 
dream has no effect on depression for either the apnoea participants or the 
sleepy/snoring controls.
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Table 56 - Within subject correlations with depression, for the apnoea group and the 
sleepy/snoring control group. Data presented for each group’s within subjects 
correlations are mean, median, SD, maximum and minimum, number of correlations 
calculated, and number of correlations that were significant.
A p noea  participants S leep y /sn o r in g  control participants
Mate M ean Median SD R ange N # sig M ean Median S D R ange n #  sig . z P
trace of a 
ttam
.06 .06 .32 -.46 - .45 8 0 .09 .22 .39 -.72 - .63 14 1 0.21 n.s.
taut tone -.37 - .3 9 .30 - .7 3 - .1 4 14 4 -.5 0 -.48 .22 -.81 --.12 12 4 1.03 n.s.
race of a 
ightmare
.27 .32 .36 -.27 - .73 14 1 .23 .21 .36 - .3 0 - .7 6 6 1 0 .37 n.s.
trace of 
i unpleasant
Ml
.25 .28 .39 -.41 - .76 15 2 .33 .40 .33 -.30 - .76 7 1 0 .3 2 n.s.
A comparison with Table 54 shows that the between and within-subject correlations 
of depression with nightmare/unpleasant dream frequency do not differ consistently. 
WS correlations of depression with dream emotional tone are larger than the between- 
subjects correlations of mean anxiety and mean dream emotional tone for both 
groups.
Within subject correlations for effects of morning mood on dreams the next night 
showed no pattern of significant results, there is thus no association between morning 
mood and dream variables of the following night.
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Comparisons pre and post CPAP
10 patients with sleep apnoea syndrome agreed to take part in a follow up study after 
a minimum of 3 months successful treatment with CPAP. Table 57 shows the 
descriptive statistics for demographic variables, dream and well-being variables 
before and after CPAP therapy.
Table 57 - Descriptive statistics for demographic variables, dream and well-being 
variables before and after CPAP therapy
Pre CPAP Post CPAP Tests o f  difference1
Dream frequency 7.7 (3.30) 4.7 (3.12) z = -2.25; p = 0.02*
Nightmare frequency 0.80 (0.63) 1.25 (0.50) z = -1.34; p = 0.18
Unpleasant dream 1.0 (0.82) 1.6 (0.89) z = -0.58; p = 0.56
frequency
Emotional tone o f the 3.55 (0.60) 3.99 (0.89) t = -1.33; p = 0.21
dream
Anxiety 4.22(1 .21) 2 .98(1 .35) t =  1.72; p = 0.14
Depression 4.15(1.38) 2.71 (1.06) t = 2.17; p = 0.07
Body mass index 37.30(6.71) 37.15 (7.45) t =  1.43; p = 0.195
Systolic blood pressure 154.60 (21.80) 150.25 (26.71) t =0.96; p = 0.37
Diastolic blood pressure 90.1 (8.22) 85.12(10.02) t =  1.77; p =  0.12
Di prate----------------------------- 37.73 <20.32) 0.54(0 .60) t— 7.44; p— 0.001------------
Epworth sleepiness scale 15.10(3.54) 8.11 (4.81) t = 4.08; p =  0.004).
N ote:1 tests o f difference were either chi squared or t-tests depending on whether the variables were 
normally distributed.
* significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 57 confirms the relative absence of apnoeas with CPAP. There are no 
significant differences before and after CPAP in BMI, systolic and disystolic blood 
pressure, but subjective sleepiness as measured by the ESS is significantly lower. 
There are trends towards patients reporting less anxiety and depression when 
established on CPAP. Contrary to what would be expected with more consolidated 
sleep, dream recall is significantly lower with CPAP, and there is a slight increase in 
the frequency of nightmares and unpleasant dreams, but mean emotional tone of 
dreams changes very little. Levene’s test for equality of variance found that there was 
no significant difference in the variance of emotional tone before and after CPAP 
therapy (F= 0.20; p=0.899).
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Chapter 9 
Study 2: Apnoea and nightmares
D iscussion
Waking life stress is known to cause negatively toned dreams, and these in 
turn affect daytime mood (Schredl, 1999). This is stated in the continuity hypothesis 
of dreaming (Cartwright & Lamberg, 1992), which argues that dreams reflect the 
waking life concerns of the dreamer. Research reviewed in the introduction to this 
chapter has supported the assertion that patients with sleep apnoea syndrome have 
increased waking stress as a result of chronic sleep fragmentation leading to daytime 
sleepiness and possible mood impairments. Study two assessed between subjects and 
within subjects correlations between nightmares/unpleasant dreams and mood in 
subjects with sleep apnoea and BMI matched sleepy/snoring controls, and also 
assessed the relationship between diprate and dream/nightmare/unpleasant dream 
frequency using all participants in the analysis.
Prevalance of nightmares
 - This-study found no differencein the ffequency of nightmares or unpleasant
dreams between participants with sleep apnoea syndrome (SAS) or sleepy/snoring 
controls. However, interestingly there appears to be an elevated frequency of 
nightmares in both groups compared to general population norms.
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When prorated to 1 month and 1 year respectively, sleep apnoea patients 
reported a mean of 3.38 and 40.51 unpleasant dreams and sleepy/snoring controls 
reported a mean of 2.77 and 33.21 unpleasant dreams. Thus, clearly both groups 
reported more than one nightmare a month and as such, would be considered by some 
researchers to be frequent nightmare sufferers (Belicki & Belicki, 1986; Berquier & 
Ashton, 1992; Hersen, 1971; Kales et al, 1980; Levin, 1989). It was found that 61% of 
those with sleep apnoea syndrome had at least one unpleasant dream and 23.1 % had 
two unpleasant dreams or more during the 10-day study period. 43.5% of 
sleepy/snoring controls had at least one unpleasant dream and 30.43% had two or 
more. This is well in excess of population estimates. For example, Hartmann (1984) 
reported that the average number of nightmares experienced by adults is estimated to 
be one or two per year. The American Sleep Disorders Association (1990) estimated 
that 5% of the adult population experience at least one nightmare per month, and 
Hublin et al (1999) found that 3% of adults had nightmares weekly, whereas 10% had 
nightmares monthly. Also, a recent study by Spoormaker et al (in press) found that 
2.2% of the Dutch population suffered ‘much’ or ‘very much’ from nightmares, 
whereas 7% suffered a Tittle’. Thus, it seems that the prevalence of nightmares found 
in this study in both the sleep apnoea and sleepy/snoring control group (57.6% and 
39% respectively for the 10 day study period) is well in excess of that in the general 
population.
Support for this study’s finding of elevated nightmare frequency in the 
sleepy/snoring control group
It is interesting to note the elevated prevalence of nightmares in the 
sleepy/snoring control condition compared to population norms. This finding is in line
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with Thoman et al (1997), who found that female subjects who reported more snoring 
also had more nightmares. Furthermore, DeGroen et al (1993) found that snoring was 
strongly associated with the occurrence of anxiety dreams. It may be that this 
population have lower well-being compared to the general population and so 
experience more unpleasant dreams. For example, Aikens, Wallace & Mandelson
(1999) found that primary snorers showed elevated scores on the MMPI scales 
compared to population norms. They suggested that primary snorers might be located 
along a general continuum between normalcy and sleep apnoea in terms of symptoms 
and complications, a suggestion supported by Thoman et al’s (1997) finding that sleep 
is more fragmented in snorers than non-snorers, and by the relationship between 
chronic nightmares and fragmented REM sleep (Hartmann, 1984).
Support from this study for previous studies with S AS and NMS
The findings that patients in the sleep apnoea group report at least 2 waking 
criterion nightmares a month and 3.38 unpleasant dreams a month supports findings 
from previous studies. For instance, Guilleminault et al (1996) assessed children with 
Sleep Disordered Breathing, including those with sleep apnoea and Upper Airway 
Resistance Syndrome (UARS) and found they had significantly more nightmares/ 
night terrors and sleep walking than would be expected in the general population. 
Owen et al. (1997) also reported that unrecalled nightmares were significantly 
increased in the sleep apnoea group in comparison to population nonns. MacFarlane 
and Wilson (2006) found that 69% of patients with sleep apnoea reported nightmares 
‘sometimes’, although only one patient reported nightmares ‘often’ and only one 
‘always’. However, it is not clear what time period ‘sometimes’ represents in this 
study, in order to meaningfully compare MacFarlane and Wilson’s findings to that of
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the current study or to population norms. However, the current study did find that 
61% of patients with sleep apnoea syndrome had at least one unpleasant dream in the 
10-day reporting period, which is comparable to the MacFarlane and Wilson finding 
of 69% experiencing nightmares ‘sometimes’. This comparison is problematic, 
however, in that MacFarlane and Wilson (2006) used a retrospective measure of 
nightmare frequency, which has been shown to produce a lower estimate of nightmare 
frequency (Wood & Bootzin, 1990; Zadra & Donderi, 2000; Salvio et al, 1992).
Well-being measures in sleep apnoea group and sleepy/snoring controls
It was hypothesised that participants in the sleep apnoea group would have 
poorer scores on the well-being measures compared to sleepy/snoring controls, 
however, this hypothesis was not supported. Patients with untreated sleep apnoea and 
sleepy/snoring controls reported mean levels of anxiety and depression that were in 
the neutral range on the VAS rating scales of relaxed/anxious and happy/depressed.
Thus, importantly, this study found that mood is not significantly lower in 
sleep apnoea patients compared to BMI matched sleepy sleepy/snoring controls. Both 
the sleepy/snoring control and apnoea group are liable to have health problems due to 
their elevated BMI (such as hypertension), however, the additional effect of having 
sleep apnoea does not seem to cause a further significant reduction in mood. 
Moreover5 it may be thatlevels-ofianxiety and depression are mcreased injhe apnoea 
and sleepy/snoring control group relative to the general population. This explanation 
may account for the elevated prevalence of nightmares in both groups. The 
introduction to this chapter reviewed much evidence suggesting that mood was 
impaired in patients with sleep apnoea. However, many of these studies used healthy
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control comparison groups. For example, a number of studies have suggested that 
patients with sleep apnoea have elevated levels of depression in comparison to healthy 
controls (Aiken et al, 1998; Cheshire et al, 1992; Derderian et al, 1988; Engleman et 
al, 1994; Guilleminault et al, 1977; Kales et al, 1985; Millman et al, 1989; Reynolds 
et al, 1984). However, healthy control groups may not be the best comparison group 
to use because they do not take account of the confounding health problems in a high 
BMI group. For instance, Bardwell et al (1999) suggest that depression and total 
mood disturbance are related more to age, weight and/or hypertension than they are to 
sleep apnoea.
Furthermore, symptoms of anxiety and depression are recognised in other 
respiratory diseases such as asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
sarcoidosis (Rimington et al, 2001; van Manen et al, 2002; Chang et al, 2001). 
Thoman et al (1997) also suggests that snorers have elevated health concerns. They 
found that the 37 snorers in their study reported a number of health problems 
including heart trouble (n=9), high blood pressure (n=l 1) and arthritis (n=24). Other 
studies have also suggested that daytime mood may be impaired in snorers (without 
sleep apnoea) in comparison to healthy non-snoring controls. Vandeputte and Weerd 
(2003) demonstrated that 31% of patients who snored had some form of depression 
(i.e. mild or above using the Beck Depression Inventory), and Mendelson et al (1992) 
found that primary snorers are just as likely to have been treated for depression in the 
past as patients with obstructive sleep apnoea.
Importantly, all patients who completed questionnaires in the current study 
had been referred to the sleep clinic for suspected sleep apnoea and the majority were
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reporting daytime sleepiness and/or snoring. Thus, even those in the sleepy/snoring 
control group had a complaint that warranted screening for sleep apnoea. Moreover, 
patients had not yet received a diagnosis for sleep apnoea when they completed the 
sleep and mood diaries, which may have created anxiety and uncertainty in both 
groups. The sleepy/snoring control group reported a mean Epworth Sleepiness Score 
of 10.48, which is only slightly less than the criterion for moderately pathological 
sleepiness (ESS<11 is normal, ESS 11-15 = moderate sleepiness).
However, in contrast to the current study, Aikens et al (1999) found that 
approximately twice as many sleep apnoea patients than primary snorers fell into the 
disturbed range for the Depression scale (49% versus 25%) and the Hysteria scale 
(35% versus 16%). Furthermore, Watson et al (1987) correlated the BDI and sleep 
apnoea syndrome and found a significant correlation between depressive 
symptomatology and the frequency of apnoeas-hypopneas per hour of sleep. In 
contrast, dip rate was not correlated with anxiety and depression in the current study. 
However, the current study did not use standardised trait measures of well-being.
Within subjects correlations
Within-subjects correlations between the presence of an unpleasant dream or 
nightmare with anxiety and depression the following day were no differentin the 
sleepy/snoring control group compared to the apnoea group. Therefore, although it 
may be expected that the presence of an unpleasant dream would have more of a 
detrimental effect on patients with sleep apnoea than sleepy/snoring controls, this was 
not the case.
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In study 1 the WS correlations anxiety with presence/absence of a nightmare 
or unpleasant dream were both .24, and the WS correlations of depression with 
presence/absence of a nightmare or unpleasant dream were .26 and .28. In the current 
study, apnoea and sleepy/snoring control groups did not differ in size of WS 
correlations, these being .33 - .35 for anxiety, and .23 - .33 for depression. As these 
are Kendall’s correlations, the effects are of moderate size. The main important 
conclusion, however, is that the individuals undergoing investigation for apnoea had a 
greater anxiety response to nightmares and unpleasant dreams than did the 
participants in study 1.
The apnoea and sleepy/snoring control participants differed in their between- 
subjects correlations of mean anxiety and mean depression with number of 
nightmares and number of unpleasant dreams; apnoea group had Spearman 
correlations of .14 - .26 and sleepy/snoring controls had correlations of .29 - .39. In 
contrast, Study 1 had these between-subject correlations of .41 to .50. It is not clear 
why for this one class of correlation, the apnoea group had such low co-efficients.
Nightmares, dream emotional tone and severity of sleep apnoea
Our initial analysis of the results followed previous work in comparing an 
apnoea group with sleepy/snoring controls. In accordance with previous research
there was not a higher number of nightmares in the apnoea group. There was, ........
however, significantly more negative emotional tone for the apnoea group. This 
finding is in line with some previous research. For example, Santamaria et al (1998) 
found that the dreams of patients with untreated sleep apnoea were predominately 
negatively toned. However, as with work on nightmare frequency, treating apneoic
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patients as a group can result in no difference from controls. For example, Schredl’s 
(1998) content analysis of the dreams of patients with sleep apnoea did not reveal a 
preponderance of negative emotions compared to healthy controls.
The lack of conclusiveness in the literature about negative dreams and apnoea 
had resulted in the hypothesis that there would be an inverted U shaped curve between 
nightmare frequency and severity of apnoea (using a 5% Spfb dip rate measure, and 
combining the high diprate apnoea group with the lower diprate sleepy/snoring 
control group). Thus, patients with moderate sleep apnoea would show a higher 
frequency of nightmares/unpleasant dreams as a result of increased waking stress, but 
nightmares/unpleasant dreams would be lower in patients with severe apnoea, as 
despite increased waking stress these patients would not have sufficient periods of 
consolidated sleep to support dreams or nightmares. However, the quadratic 
regression curve between dip rate and nightmare frequency in the current study was 
not statistically significant, but the quadratic curve between mean dream emotional 
tone and dip rate was very nearly significant (p = 0.054). This graph showed that the 
dreams of patients with mild/moderately apnoea were more negative than the dreams 
of sleepy/snoring controls and severely apnoeic patients, as hypothesised, but, their 
dreams were not unpleasant, instead being around the neutrally toned mark.
— , Rather than differences in mean emotional tone, what was striking about the 
graph was that as diprate increased, there was a reduction in variation of dream 
emotional tone. When dip rate was separated into three group of increasing severity, 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance confirmed that the difference in variance 
was significantly different. Thus, patients with severe apnoea are having fewer
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positively charged and fewer negatively charged dreams. An explanation of this could 
be that the sleep of patients with higher diprate is so fragmented that it interferes with 
the process of dreaming, thus not allowing dreams plots and dream emotion to 
develop. This is in line with Schredl et al’s (1999) finding that high Respiratory 
Disturbance Index (RDI) was related to more realistic, less bizarre, less intense 
dreams with lower negative emotions. These findings are in line with the finding that 
as apnoea severity increases dreams become more neutrally toned (i.e. less negative, 
bizarre and intense). Of relevance to this is Merritt et al’s (1994) demonstration that 
positive emotions were most likely to appear in the first quartile of the dream and 
negative emotions in the last two quartiles. They note that while 42% of reports 
containing emotions began with a positive emotion, only 24% ended with one. 
Furthermore, 58% of dreams began with a negative emotion and 76% of the final 
emotions were negative, suggesting that dream emotions tend to go ‘from bad to 
worse’ (Merritt et al. 1994, p56). Therefore, it could be sleep is so fragmented in 
patients with severe sleep apnoea that there is not a sufficient amount of consolidated 
sleep for dreams to go ‘from bad to worse’ and as a result dreams remain 
predominantly neutrally toned.
These findings suggest that sleep fragmentation actually interferes with the 
process of dreaming rather than with the recall of a dream. Stepanski et al (1984) 
reported that patients with-sleep apnoea spent onIy-lfr3% of theirtotal-sleep tima in _ 
REM sleep compared to healthy controls that spent 17.4% of their sleep time in REM 
sleep. Thus, it can be proposed that the greater the severity of apnoea the less time is 
spent in REM sleep and the less time there is for dream plots to develop. The results 
therefore suggest that it is those patients with milder apnoea who report more
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unpleasant dreams, and that the current finding that the apnoea group as a whole had 
more negative mean dream emotional tone than the sleepy/snoring controls was 
because of the patients with less severe apnoea.
Dream frequency and apnoea.
This study found a trend towards higher dream recall in the sleep apnoea 
group (p = 0.15 for a 2-tailed test). Dip rate, however, was not significantly associated 
with dream recall frequency. These are in line with previous findings. For example, 
Schredl et al (1998) found that neither the Respiratory Disturbance Index (RDI) or 
maximal decrease of blood oxygen saturation as severity measures were significantly 
correlated with dream recall frequency. Furthermore, although dream recall frequency 
has been found to be elevated in patients with sleep apnoea in comparison to healthy 
controls (Gross and Lavie, 1994; Schredl et al, 1998, 1999), Schredl et al (1998) 
argued that the heightened dream frequency in their sample was best explained by the 
lower emotional balance in the evening present in the patient group. They argue that 
this supports the salience hypothesis of dream recall (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1974) in 
that the more negative the presleep mood the more negative the dream affect and the 
higher the probability of dream recall. They conclude that heightened dream recall in 
patients with sleep apnoea can be partly explained by the fractionated sleep profile 
(frequent arousals) and by daytime stress.
Dream emotional tone and subjective sleepiness
There was a trend for mean dream emotional tone (and unpleasant dream 
frequency) to be positively related to subjective sleepiness (ESS) in the sleepy/snoring
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control group but not in the sleep apnoea group (p = 0.02). This can be accounted for 
as follows.
In the sleepy/snoring control group as subjective sleepiness increases so does 
unpleasant dream frequency, and dream tone becomes more negative. This may be 
due to stress-related aspects of sleepiness. However, a significant correlation would 
not be expected in the apnoea group as the sleepier people in the apnoea group have a 
higher diprate, and thus have more neutrally toned dreams irrespective of stress. There 
is no association of dream emotional tone and dip rate in the sleepy/snoring control 
group, possibly because of the low range of dip rate scores in the sleepy/snoring 
control group (0.60 -9.40, as compared to the apnoea group’s diprate range of 7.40- 
30.95). It may be that ESS is more informative of the effect of sleep disruption for the 
sleepy/snoring control group, as opposed to the apnoea group, where previous 
research indicates that the correlation between sleep AHI and RDI indices and the 
ESS is weak (Chervin & Aldrich, 1999; Chervin, Aldrich, Pickett & Guilleminault, 
1997; Engleman et al. 1997; Kingshott et al, 1995, 1998).
Mood before and after CPAP
Mean levels of anxiety and depression decreased following CPAP but the 
differences were not significant. There was no decrease in BMI or blood pressure 
after CPAP. These findings accord with previous studies. For example, Derderian et 
_ al _(1988) reported that patients with severe sleep apnoea (AHI = 40.7) showed 
significant improvements in POMS depression, fatigue and total mood disturbance 
two months after treatment with CPAP. Ramos-Platon and Sierra (1992) found a 
decrease in scores on the MMPI, particularly on the depression scale, one year 
following treatment with CPAP. Engleman et al (1994) found a reduction in anxiety
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and depression using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) with CPAP. 
Sanchez et al (2001) also assessed the effectiveness of CPAP treatment on levels of 
depression, state anxiety and trait anxiety. They assessed 51 patients with sleep 
apnoea (mean AHI = 61.32) before, after 1 month and 3 months of CPAP treatment. 
They found that CPAP therapy produced a decrease in depression scores 1 month and 
3 months following CPAP. Trait anxiety was decreased 1 and 3 months after 
treatment and a decrease in state anxiety was found at 3 months after treatment, 
suggesting that decreases in depressive symptoms occur earlier than decreases in 
anxiety. Indeed, the current study found that depressive symptoms were reduced more 
than those of state anxiety after a minimum of three months on CPAP.
However, Borak et al (1996) found no significant improvement in emotional 
status at 3 months or one year after CPAP. This is possibly due to the severity of the 
apnoea in their study, the mean AHI in the Borak et al study was 67, as against 38.05 
(N= 19) in the current study. The mean AHI in the Bearpark et al (1987) and 
Engleman et al (1994) studies was 30 and 28 respectively which is similar to our 
sample and these authors also found improvements in mood following successful 
CPAP therapy. Therefore, perhaps improvements in mood are less evident in patients 
with very severe apnoea following CPAP therapy. It may be that mood impairments 
in patients with very severe apnoea may be in part a result of dysfunction in the
prefrontal cortex (PFC). manifested behaviourally by so-called ‘executive______
dysfunction’ (Beebe & Gozal. 2002). One symptom of weakness in executive 
functioning is difficulties with the self-regulation of affect (e.g. irritability and 
affective lability). Dahl et al (1996a,b) have used a PFC model to account for the 
association betweens sleep disruption and emotional disturbances in children, which
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is consistent with poor behavioural inhibition, and attenuated self-regulation of affect 
and arousal state in some patients with apnoea. Indeed, some studies have concluded 
that patients whose sleep has been normalised by CPAP may continue to show 
deficits on executive functioning tests (Bearpark et al, 1987; Bebard et al, 1993; 
Feuerstein et al, 1997; Naegele et al,1995).
CPAP and the frequency of dreams and nightmares
This study found a significant reduction in dream recall following treatment 
with CPAP therapy. This had also been found by Santamaria et al (1998), and is in 
line with the Functional State-Shift Model (Koukkou & Lehmann, 1983), where the 
number of nocturnal awakenings/arousals becomes less, resulting in a lower state of 
brain arousal than when untreated, and hence a decrease in dream recall. This finding 
is also in line with the arousal-retrieval model of dream recall (Koulack and 
Goodenough, 1976), which holds that increased awakenings result in increased dream 
recall. However, mood measures showed a tendency to improve with CPAP 
treatment, and therefore the effect of a more negative presleep mood causing 
increased dream recall pre-CPAP cannot be excluded.
When on CPAP therapy, patients showed a slight increase in the frequency of 
nightmares and unpleasant dreams, but mean emotional tone showed a slight tendency 
To become more positive (although thes&frifferences werenot significant). This 
suggests that there may be more range in the emotional tone of dreams following 
CPAP. However, Levene’s test for equality of variance found that there was no 
significant difference in the variance of emotional tone before and after a minimum of 
three months of CPAP therapy.
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As with the results of the current study, Gross and Lavie (1994) reported that 
dream reports from untreated nights were more negatively toned than dreams after 
nights with CPAP. Although Schredl (1998) argues that the Gross and Lavie finding 
may have been an artefact, in that patients underwent a night without their CPAP 
machines which may have triggered anxieties about the possible effects of recurring 
apnoeas, that objection does not apply to the current study.
Limitations of study 2
The sleepy/snoring control group was used rather than healthy controls as it 
enabled control over such confounding factors as BMI, sleepiness, hypertension, and 
recruitment from hospital. It was intended to recruit, from a slimming organisation, a 
second control group with matched BMI but who were not complaining of sleepiness; 
however, this was not possible.
A further limitation of this research was that standardised measures of well­
being, which could have been compared with population norms, were not included. 
Instead, this study used VAS state measures of anxiety and depression, in order to 
minimise what was required of the participants. However, study one found mean VAS 
ratings were significantly correlated with SCL- anxiety and depression as well as with 
state and trait anxiety, although such correlations may have been increased .if theV AS. 
had assessed maximum or average daily anxiety or depression, as in Cellucci and 
Lawrence (1979), rather than the morning state.
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The follow up study assessing dreams after CPAP consisted of only ten 
patients. This was in part due to some of the baseline apnoea group patients not being 
treated with CPAP, or having very poor compliance with CPAP was poor and so they 
could not be included in the study. Research with a larger sample size is needed to 
explore the effects of CPAP on variance of dream emotional tone.
Summary of novel findings
This study found that, as diprate increased there was a significant reduction in 
the variation of dream emotional tone, however, there was no significant difference in 
mean emotional tone. Thus, it seems that as sleep apnoea increases in severity dreams 
become more neutrally toned.
Summary
This study has found that two groups with various aspects of chronic poor 
psychophysiological well-being have more nightmares / unpleasant dreams than the 
normally healthy population, and that the apnoeic group has a more negative mean 
emotional dream tone than the sleepy/snoring group. Study 1 had found relationships 
between nightmare / unpleasant dream frequency and poor psychological well-being, 
including life-event concerns and traumas. Study 3 now follows on from these with 
the aim of assessing the effect of frequent waking life stresses, as assessed by a post- 
traumatic stress scale, on dream emotion and nightmare / unpleasant dream frequency.
Chapter 10 
Study 3: Nightmares in Fire-fighters
Introduction
I
j
!
Nightmares in Emergency Service Personnel
This chapter looks at the impact of exposure to traumatic incidents on the 
frequency of nightmares by assessing nightmares and their correlates in one group of 
emergency service personnel. To data, there have been no systematic studies of the 
frequency of nightmares in this population. It is hypothesized that nightmare 
prevalence will be elevated in this population and that the frequency of nightmares 
will have significant relationships with measures of well-being. Study one looked at 
the impact of life events on nightmare frequency and found that life events had 
stronger correlates with nightmare distress rather than the prevalence of nightmares. 
Yet it could be argued that the life events listed in study one are not sufficiently 
traumatic or frequent enough to highlight a relationship with the frequency of 
nightmares. Study two looked at repeated failures of breathing, finding a high 
incidence of nightmares for the group but no linear relationship between nightmares 
and frequency of apnoeic episodes within the group. Yes, of course, participants had 
no real knowledge of the severity of their condition. Study 3 aims to assess 
emergency service personnel as this population are repeated exposed to traumatic 
incidents.
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Prevalence of traumatic stress in the general population 
Although most people experience a certain amount of stress and daily hassles, 
serious traumatic events are rare and unexpected and, thus, not a common occurrence 
in most people’s lives. The following studies highlight the prevalence of traumatic 
stress in the general population. Norris (1992) conducted a study of 1000 people (age 
range 18-60+) from four Southern US cities. She found that 69% experienced at least 
one major traumatic stressor over their lifetime and that 21% reported experiencing at 
least one traumatic event in the past year. In a survey of 1000 people in Winnipeg, 
Canada, Stein and colleagues (1997) found that 74% of women and 81% of men 
reported at least one traumatic event, and 46% of women and 55% of men reported 
experiencing more than one event. In the largest prevalence study of trauma, Kessler 
et al (1995) surveyed a representative national sample of 5877 persons (2812 men and 
3065 women) in the United States. This study assessed 12 categories of trauma (rape, 
molestation, physical attack, combat, shock (trauma to significant other), threat with 
weapon, accident, disaster, witness, neglect, physical abuse and other trauma. They 
found that the majority of people had experienced at least one event. Approximately 
one quarter of the sample reported experiencing only one major trauma. 15% of men 
and 14% of women reported experiencing two, 10% of men and 5% of women and 
experienced three and 10% of women and 6% of men had experienced four major 
traumatic events. Therefore, over 35% of the men and 25% of the women reported 
more than one maj or traumatic event in their lives so far.--------
Trauma and sleep
There is little doubt that sleep is severely disrupted following exposure to a 
traumatic event. For example, Kato et al (1996) interviewed people three and eight
309
weeks after the Hashin earthquake in Japan in 1995. Sleep disturbance was the most 
frequently reported symptom (63% reported sleep disturbance at 3 months and 46% at 
8 weeks). North et al (1999) found that 70% of survivors of the Oklahoma City 
bombings suffered sleep disturbances 6 months after the event and more than 50% 
had nightmares. Schuster et al (2001) used randomised digit dialling in the United 
States within 1 week of the September 11 terrorist attack. They questioned 560 adults 
about their own reactions and the reaction of their children (n = 170). They reported 
that 11% of adults and 10% of children had significant difficult falling asleep or 
staying asleep since the attacks. However, for most people the sleep disturbances 
following trauma are transient (Lavie, 2001) but for others the sleep disturbance 
becomes a persistent problem and typically forms part of the Acute Stress Disorder 
(ASD) and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnoses (as discussed in the 
general introduction, chapter 1).
Dreaming, nightmares and trauma
This section commences with an account of the effects of being a victim of 
trauma on dreams. The last paragraph of the section concerns those who witness the 
trauma of others. It is acknowledged that this distinction is, in reality, blurred, and that 
the witnessing of trauma can itself be traumatic.
A number of researchers have examined the effects of trauma on dreams and 
nightmare. Hartmann (2001) states that dream content is altered after a trauma but that 
in the majority of people as the trauma resolves ‘more and more usual’ dream material 
is introduced along with the direct or metaphorical representations of the trauma (p2).
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He states that within time dreams will eventually return to their normal pattern. Thus, 
it seems that there is a gradual integration and making of ‘connections’ between the 
traumatic event with other events in the person’s life. Hartmann (1973, 1991b) 
postulates that the function of dreaming is to make connections between recent 
material and older memories and this process can be reflected by changes in 
dream/nightmare content after a trauma. He suggests that the PTSD nightmare 
involves an absence or ‘failure’ or this connecting’ or ‘absorbing’ process.
Hartmann (1996) suggested that emotions are central to prominent dream 
imagery and that the dream images create a picture context for, or ‘contextualise’ the 
dominant emotional concern of the dreamer.
Nightmares have been reported to occur in a large percentage of the 
population following an intensely frightening or highly emotional experience (Hefez 
et al, 1981; Ross et al, 1989). For example, Wood et al (1989) conducted a systematic 
evaluation of the effect of an earthquake (7.1 on the Richter scale) on the frequency of 
nightmares in a sample of students living in the San Francisco area where the 
hurricane struck, compared to control subjects from an unaffected university. A 3- 
week prospective measure of nightmare frequency was obtained. It was found that 
nightmares were most frequent among subjects close to the earthquake. For example, 
over the 3 week period approximately 40% of the San Jose State students and 
Stanford ^ tudents Teported oneormoremghtmaresabout an earthquake, as compared 
with only 5% of the control students from Arizona. This finding supports the view 
that the experience of a potentially traumatic experience can result in more frequent 
nightmares, particularly about the event itself. However, the authors did not find that 
the nightmares about the event were significantly more intense than those not about
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the event. One study found that the dreams of Palestinian children living in Gaza 
under violent conditions contained more aggression, persecution and negative 
emotions than in the dreams of children living in a more peaceful area in Galilee 
(Punamaki, 1997, 1998). Similar results on Palestinian children were found by Valli 
et al (2006).
For those who witness events, even on the television, there can be an effect on 
dreams. Hartmann and Baslile (2003) examined a series of twenty dreams - the last 
ten dreams recorded before 9/11/01 and the first ten dreams recorded after 9/11/01 - 
from sixteen individuals in the United States who regularly record all their dreams. 
Blind scoring demonstrated that dreams after 9/11/01 had more intense imagery, did 
not contain significantly more content related to the attacks. Nielsen et al (2006) 
obtained retrospective estimates of nightmare frequency for 23,990 respondents to an 
Internet questionnaire. An increase in nightmare frequency was observed post- 
September 11 only for male respondents - particularly for 10- to 29-year-olds. This 
increase was sustained 2 years later. These effects were maintained when dream recall 
was held constant. The authors state that the nightmares of males may be 
differentially sensitive to traumatic events for which victims and/or perpetrators are 
primarily male.
Emergency services: a ‘high risk’ population?
Evidencesuggests thatthereis'areiationshipbetween exposuretotraumatic 
events and physical and psychological well-being (Everly & Lating, 1995; James, 
1988; Tedeschi, Park & Calhoun, 1998). However, research has tended to focus on 
direct victims of trauma and only recently has widened to include the potentially 
adverse effects of traumatic incidents on those who aid the victims (Grevin, 1996;
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Mitchell & Dyregrov, 1993). Due to the high level of exposure to traumatic incidents, 
it has been demonstrated that a range of professionals, including police, ambulance 
and fire personnel, can become secondary victims of trauma, exhibiting symptoms 
akin to direct victims (Genest, Levine, Ramsden & Swanson, 1990). One reason why 
emergency services may not have been investigated as extensively as ‘primary 
victims’ of disasters (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) could be due to the perception that 
victims are ‘helpless and resourceless’ , whereas helpers are ‘strong and resourceful’ 
(Short, 1979). However, emotional distress is recognised to be widely prevalent 
among emergency care workers (Mock et al, 1999).
There is little published research as to the actual prevalence of traumatic 
stressors experienced by emergency service personnel, however, it is undoubtedly far 
in excess of that experienced by the general population. Emergency workers are 
required to cope with extraordinary and persistent occupational demands that are 
cumulative. These include threats to their own and co-workers safety, dangerous fire 
suppression, injuries and deaths, injuries and deaths of children or infants, gruesome 
victims incidents, body handling, completed suicides and mass casualty accidents 
(Beaton and Murphy, 1995; Comeil, 1995). Beaton et al (1995) found in a survey of 
self-reports of 2,000 professional fire-fighters and paramedics that approximately 
90% were confronted with at least one distressing mission including dead, dying or 
severely injured persons within the pastyear.Clohessyand Eihers’ (1999)sample of 
56 ambulance workers reported that incidents involving children were the most 
stressful (32%), followed by organisational managerial problems (29%), dealing with 
distressed relatives (23%), dealing with dead or dying patients (16%) and shift work 
(14%). Encountering personal threats and dealing with uncooperative and abusive
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patients have been identified as factors that contribute to the stress of emergency 
medical service personnel. Little research has examined the degree to which such 
factors affect the stress and anxiety levels of emergency medical services personnel 
and even less is know about their anxiety level at work.
The National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control has declared that 
fire fighting is the most dangerous occupation in the United States (Hildebrand, 
1984a). Everyday approximately 280 fire fighters are killed or injured. Every year, 
over 650 are forced to retire due to occupational illness, including psychological 
stress (Hildebrand, 1984b).
Limitation in examining distress in emergency services workers
There are a number of inherent methodological and theoretical difficulties in 
studying emergency service workers. They are undoubtedly a self-selected 
occupational group and may not be representative of the general population. It could 
be that they are more resilient to dealing with stress and trauma as they selected 
themselves for the profession. However, Moran and Britton (1994) concluded from 
their sample of emergency workers that they were no ‘hardier than most.. ..(nor 
possessed any) particular coping styles’ and that the coping and personality measures 
used in their study were not statistically significant predictors of their reactions to 
traumatic incidenfs. H6wever, s(Mefe^M'chers claim that coping resources of 
emergency service workers are based on experience and years of service. For 
example, Hytten and Hasle’s (1989) findings suggest that experienced or ‘seasoned’ 
emergency workers possess more effective cognitive and behavioural coping 
strategies. Moreover, those who choose not to take part in research studies may be
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suffering from more psychological distress, particularly in light of the fact that 
avoidance is one of the characteristics of PTSD. Alternatively, it could be that those 
choosing not to respond are those who are not experiencing any significant problems 
and therefore see no value in completing research questionnaires, thus inflating the 
apparent level of psychopathology of the group.
Increased occupational stress
Several studies have demonstrated high levels of occupational stress in 
emergency service workers (Cydilka et al, 1980; Hammer et al, 1990). Furthermore, 
work stress and low social support have been associated with high levels of 
depression and anxiety among those employed in the health care services (Bennett et 
al 2001;Tennant, 2004). Clohessy and Ehlers (1999) found that 29% of ambulance 
workers reported that organisational/ managerial problems were among the most 
distressing aspects of their work. Violant and Aron (1993) found that organisational 
stressors, mediated by job satisfaction and organisational goal orientation, increased 
psychological distress over six times more than inherent police stressors in a sample 
of American police officers.
Bennett et al (2004) found that ‘caseness’ on the Posttraumatic Diagnostic 
Scale (Foa, 1995) was predicted by the degree of stress experienced as a result of 
organisationalTactors, whereas, incident factors "were not predfcttve of^caTeness’. 
These authors also found that organisational stress contributed more to levels of 
anxiety and depression than the stress associated with incidents. These findings 
suggest that organisational factors need to be considered when planning to minimise 
distress amongst ambulance personnel. However, this study does not provide details
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on the specific issues that may need to be addressed in preventative strategies. 
Furthermore, the study is cross-sectional and as such it is difficult to determine the 
direction of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. It may 
be that depressed or anxious workers may have distorted perceptions of the level of 
work stress and as such inflate the association between these variables. Therefore, 
these studies seem to suggest that occupational factors lead to elevated levels of stress 
in emergency service workers and in some incidents can lead to increased levels of 
psychopathology.
Well-being in emergency service workers
The stress associated with emergency responses may also contribute to more 
general problems of depression or anxiety. Bennet et al (2001) found that 10% of their 
617 sample of British Ambulance workers reported ‘probable’ levels of clinical 
depression and 22% reported ‘probable’ levels of anxiety based on the HADS scores. 
Regression analysis showed that the strongest predictor of anxiety was background 
stressors such as work-home conflict, tension with colleagues, and the unpredictable 
nature of the work. Incidents with children were the only incident stressors to 
independently predict anxiety scores. Together, it was found that these variables 
accounted for 38 percent of the variance in anxiety scores, and a similar set of 
predictors accounted for 31% of the variance in depression scores.
Alexander and Klein (2001) in a sample of 110 Scottish ambulance workers, 
found that 32% met the GHQ screening criteria for ‘caseness’. Mock et al (1999) 
assessed anxiety levels in emergency medical service providers in order to determine 
the effects of experienced violence during a shift and the effects of different shift
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schedules. In a three month prospective observational study, 23 emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs) and 40 paramedics were observed. It was found that paramedics 
had lower anxiety scores than EMT’s and that years of experience decreased anxiety 
scores. They found that there was no significant difference in anxiety state scores 
(using the Spielberger State-Trait Inventory) between those EMS providers who had 
encountered violence during the preceding 12 hours and those who had not. 
Furthermore, they conclude that although the working environment of EMS providers 
contains many stressors, this population were no more anxious than the general 
working public. Furthermore, they found that there was no difference in anxiety levels 
in providers who worked 12 and 24 hour shifts.
Prevalence of PTSD
The majority of studies assessing psychopathology in the emergency services 
have focused on the examination of post traumatic stress disorder symptoms. As 
emergency service personnel encounter potentially traumatic situations with some 
regularity, this may make them increasingly prone to develop PTSD, as research 
generally suggests that repeated exposure to potentially traumatic incidents has a 
sensitising effect, increasing vulnerability to the condition (Breslau, Chilcoat, Kessler 
& Davis, 1999; Dougall, Herberman, Delahanty, Inslicht & Baum, 2000)._Indeed, 
studiesofemergencystaff respondingtodisastersreportPTS&prevalenceratesof 
between 10% and 17% (Anderson, Christensen and Petersen, 1991; Durham, 
McCammon and Allison, 1985; McCammon, Durham, Allison & Williamson, 1988; 
Weiss et al, 1995).
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PTSD in ambulance workers
Rentoul and Ravenscroft (1993) studied the London Ambulance Service and 
found that 15% of frontline staff could be given a full diagnosis of PTSD. Of their 
sample, 53% met the criteria for ‘recent mental disturbance’. Thompson and Suzuki 
(1991) assessed 40 experienced ambulance workers selected randomly from the 
London Ambulance service, using the Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz et al, 
1979) and the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg & Hiller, 1979). They 
found high scores on the intrusion scale of the IES and 60% showed signs of 
‘probable psychological distress’ (as identified by the GHQ). Bennett et al (2004) 
assessed the prevalence of PTSD in a sample of 617 British Ambulance workers using 
the Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995). They found that the overall 
prevalence of PTSD in this sample was 22%. This rate is similar to the average rate of 
21% reported in other studies (Grevin, 1996; Clohessy and Ehlers, 1999). Bennet et al 
report that just under half their participants reported currently having ‘troubling 
memories of events that have occurred in work’, while nearly two-thirds reported 
having had such memories at some time in the past. They found that a high percentage 
of paramedics rather than Emergency Medical Technicians reported having troubling 
memories of the past. It was reasoned that as paramedics are more senior than 
emergency medical technicians this difference might reflect length of time working in 
emergency setting rather than any inherent difference between the two groups. 
Regression "analysis' showed: PDS scores to be independently associated with the stress 
resulting from organisational factors, the frequency with which traumatic incidents 
were encountered, length of service and dissociation at the time of the incident. These 
variables accounted for 48% of the variance in PDS scores. These authors also found 
a gender difference in prevalence of PTSD. 32 women (35%) and 261 (51%)
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completed the PDS, indicating experiencing recurrent memories of an event (or 
events) for at least one month: The percentage of the overall sample to achieve the 
criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD was 15 percent among the female and 23 percent 
among male ambulance personnel. This difference was found to be statistically 
significant (X = 4.67; p<0.05). Thus, this study suggests that women report 
significantly lower levels of PTSD and also anxiety than men, although this finding is 
tentative due to the small number of women in the sample. However, this finding 
certainly requires more investigation as it is in contrast to the trends found in the 
general population (Kessler et al, 1995). It is also possible that women had better 
access to, or better utilised social support or other coping mechanisms in comparison 
to men, and it may also be that women who select themselves for the ambulance 
service are hardier than those in the general population.
PTSD in mountain rescuers
Mountain guides constitute a high risk population in terms of the development 
of primary and secondary PTSD symptoms because of adverse mountain conditions, 
sudden changes in weather conditions, avalanches, rock or ice falls and crevasses, 
which are a risk to themselves and their clients. Furthermore, many mountain guides 
are members of mountain rescue services and as such often risk their lives in search 
and rescue operations or the recovery of bodies. Sommer et al (2004) assessed the 
- prevalence o f PTSI>symptoms in Swiss mountain guidesr552 participants completed 
the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS), the General Health Questionnaire 
and the Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC-29). These authors found that although Swiss 
mountain guides had been exposed to many traumatic situations, each involving threat 
to life, serious injury, or death, the prevalence rate of PTSD was very low (2.7%), and
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subsyndromal PTSD was established in just 1.5% of participants. Furthermore, they 
found that the mountain guides who were involved in mountain rescue teams did not 
differ significantly from those who were only involved as expedition leaders or 
guides, but they did show significantly lower GHQ total scores and higher SOC 
scores than non-rescuers. According to the GHQ-28, approximately 75% of the 
sample showed no signs of mental disorder, while less than 25% were identified as 
showing such signs. The low prevalence of PTSD in this population is not consistent 
with the findings from other high-risk populations. The authors highlight that studies 
relating to PTSD in different types of rescue workers, of similar age and with a 
comparable duration of professional experience, report prevalence rates of more than 
18% (Wagner et al, 1998; Clohessy and Ehlers, 1999, as described above). The 
findings of this study are important as they suggest the existence of protective factors 
in this population. For example, the authors suggest that the development of PTSD 
may depend on the subjective appraisal of the traumatic situation. Ballenger et al
(2000) have highlighted the high correlation between the level of danger perceived by 
the individual exposed to the trauma and the likelihood of developing PTSD. This 
suggests that a high tolerance of the mountain guides towards objectively dangerous 
situations may be the reason for their low rate of PTSD symptoms. Although the 
gender bias in this study may be a factor, it is unlikely that this can account for the 
low levels of PTSD since comparable high-risk groups with higher prevalence rates 
also show a predominance o fm alep ®  et al, 1999; Wagner ef al,
1998; Gershon, Lin & Li 2002). This study also suggests that SOC cannot be seen as a 
protective factor against PTSD but rather as a psychological marker for the degree of 
health and/or disease.
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Bennett et al (2004) found that the severity of PTSD was also predicted by the 
frequency of incident-related stress and length of service. This suggests that risk of 
developing PTSD increases over time rather than lessening of impact as individuals 
habituate the their experiences ‘on the road’.
PTSD in Fire fighters
Bryant and Harvey (1995) reported that 37% of their fire-fighters suffered 
from PTSD symptoms. McFarlane (1989) found prevalence rates of 32%, 27% and 
30% in a sample of fire fighters 4,11 and 29 months after an Australian bush fire. 
About 20% of these fire fighters had perceived the situation as life threatening, 41% 
had to protect themselves from the fire, 23% suffered property damage and 25% were 
injured (McFarlane, 1987). These authors found a tendency of fire fighters to avoid 
thoughts and feelings associated with a traumatic event. However, in this study many 
of the fire fighters were personally affected by the disaster in that they were victims, 
not only helpers. Hence, it can be argued that this study doesn’t reflect prevalence 
rates of PTSD arising just from helping other people in an emergency.
Wagner et al (1998) investigated the prevalence of PTSD and co-morbid 
symptoms among professional fire fighters. They examined a sample of 402 German 
fire fighters (mean age = 39.68; SD = 9.68); their average job experience was 15.80 
years (SD=9.66). Particrpants were administered the General Health Questionnaire 
(Goldberg and Hiller, 1979), the PTSD symptom scale (Foa et al, 1995) and a number 
of subscales measuring ‘openness’, substance misuse and bodily complaints. They 
found that a prevalence rate of PTSD symptoms of 18.2%. This prevalence is lower 
than in the McFarlane study, however, the latter study involved fire fighters who
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shared first hand the experience of a severe traumatic event. Approximately 27% of 
participants had a mental disorder according to the GHQ. An analysis of the 
comorbidity of PTSD with other psychiatric dysfunctions showed that 39.7% of fire­
fighters with PTSD symptoms (N=23) suffered from depressive mood, 60.3% (N=35) 
displayed social dysfunctions and 19.0% (N=l 1) were substance abusers. These 
authors also reported that in comparison to the general population fire fighters with 
PTSD symptoms showed a significantly higher level of substance abuse and bodily 
complaints, especially cardiovascular symptoms, tension and pain. Regression 
analysis revealed that job experience and the number of distressing missions during 
the last month were significant predictors of the extent of traumatic stress in fire 
fighters.
Haslam et al (2003) assessed 31 staff from a Fire and Rescue Service using the 
Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS: Foa, 1995) and in depth interviews concerning 
incidents and symptoms of PTSD. All were in or had been in active service. They 
found that the most common event to cause distress in fire fighters was child fatalities 
(31%), serious accidents (28%), followed by life-threatening illness in the fire-fighters 
own family and ‘other’ (e.g. death within their family). Two participants met the 
DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. However, these events were related to life threatening 
illnesses in their family and other traumatic incidents rather than as a direct 
experience of their work.Anumberreportedthattheyhadoxperiencedone or more of 
the symptoms associated with the symptoms of PTSD. The most common symptoms 
were feeling emotionally upset when reminded of the traumatic event (55%), having 
upsetting thoughts or images about the event (32%), and having trouble falling asleep 
or staying asleep (23%). Of the 22 that reported one or more PTSD symptom, 13 had
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experienced the symptoms for more than 3 months, 3 for between 1 and 3 months, 
and 6 had experienced the symptoms for less than once a month. Half of those who 
reported one or more symptoms said that these symptoms had not interfered with 
other areas of their life. Of those who reported some interference, the most common 
area was ‘general satisfaction with life’ (55%); this was followed by ‘relationships 
with your family’ (45%) and ‘overall level of functioning in all areas of your life’ 
(36%). The qualitative data yielded by this study found that the most common 
psychological response (65%) cited after an incident was rumination, and specifically 
worrying about similar results happening to them or their families. Rumination has 
been previously related to PTSD symptom severity (Ehlers, Mayou & Bryant, 1998). 
The second most common response was trouble sleeping. One third of participants 
stated that they had tried to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the incidents 
and many stated that if they did not do this that they would be unable to do their job. 
Flashbacks were cited by over one-quarter of the participants. Some were associated 
with feelings of helplessness, other were associated with incidents involving horrific 
injuries and were most common among road traffic accidents. Hypersensitivity to 
smell was also reported, the most commonly reported being the smell of burnt flesh. 
Such symptoms of hyper-arousal are characteristic of PTSD (Helzer et al, 1987). The 
fire fighters in this study stated that feelings of helplessness lead to beliefs that they 
should have done more, which causes incidents to be perceived as traumatic. Such 
feelings of guilt and helplessness are also characteristic of PTSD (Briere, 1998).
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Conclusions on PTSD in emergency service workers
Rates of PTSD in ambulance service workers are generally high and research 
indicates that they vary between 20 and 21 percent (Grevin, 1996; Clohessy and 
Ehlers, 1999). The rate of PTSD is estimated to be around 17 and 18 percent among 
fire-fighters (Wagner et al, 1998; Perkonigg et al, 2000). This difference is probably a 
result of the fact that ambulance service workers respond to more emergency calls 
than the police and fire service combined (James and Wright, 1991) and, therefore, 
may suffer from greater psychological distress than these other groups (Mannar et al, 
1996). However, the rate of PTSD is clearly elevated in these populations in 
comparison to prevalence rates of between one and two percent in community based 
samples (Perkonigg et al 2000). Persons with persistent PTSD symptoms often suffer 
from poor job satisfaction, absenteeism from work, or early retirement (Hall et al, 
1979). ‘ Subthreshold ’ PTSD has also been associated with levels of social and work 
morbidity comparable to full PTSD (Zlotnick et al, 2002).
The large fluctuation in prevalence rates of PTSD symptoms may be the result 
of variations in the types of research participants, sample size, and selection of PTSD 
measures. For example, researchers who studied mixed groups of emergency 
responders reported lower rates of PTSD (e.g. 6%, Andersen, Chhristensen & 
Petersen, 1991; Epstein, Fullerton & Ursano, 1988; 9%, Marmar, Weiss, Metzler, 
Ronfeldt & Foreman, 1996H 4-17%,MeGammon, Durham, Ailison & Williamson, _ 
1998) than researchers who have examined rates of PTSD in large samples of fire­
fighters only (e.g. 18.5%, Al-Naser & Everly, 1999; 37% Bryant & Harvey, 1995; 17- 
22%, Comeil, Beaton, Merphy et al, 1999). However, each of these studies (Al-Naser 
& Everly, 1999; Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Comeil, Beaton, Murphy et al, 1999) suffers
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from the same flaw in that PTSD symptoms were assessed with the Impact of Events 
Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979) which is an incomplete measure of 
PTSD symptoms (compared to DSM-IV criteria) that does not assess all of the Cluster 
C symptoms of avoidance or any of the Cluster D symptoms of hyperaroual. 
Furthermore, as Del-Ben et al (2006) highlight, many researchers have evaluated fire­
fighters and other respondents with regard to a single recent traumatic event, whereas 
it may be the cumulative impact of multiple events over years of fire fighting that is 
more critical to the development of PTSD.
Neuroticism
Yehuda and McFarlane (1995) argued that there was a demonstrated role of 
vulnerability factors in the development of PTSD. Psychiatric factors such as a history 
of major depression or psychological dimensions such as neuroticism may place some 
individuals at greater risk for the development of PTSD following exposure to a 
traumatic event. Bromet et al (1998) found that several specific types of trauma, along 
with history of affective disorders in women and history of anxiety disorders and 
parental history of mental disorders in men, were significantly associated with PTSD 
in the National Comorbidity (NCS; Kesller et al, 1995) study data.
McFarlane (1988) found elevated neuroticism was associated with PTSD in 
fire-fighTers exposed to anatural disaster. Furthermore^neuroticism has heen 
associated with PTSD in other groups of trauma victims such as Vietnam veterans 
with combat related PTSD (Talbert et al 1993), young urban adults (Breslau et al, 
1991), road traffic accident victims (Holeva & Tarrier, 2001) and in bum survivors 
(Fauerbach et al, 2000).
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Cox et al (2004) investigated the relative importance of neuroticism and self- 
criticism in the only survey of PTSD in a nationally representative sample. Regression 
analyses found that elevated levels of neuroticism were significantly associated with 
PTSD among men and women who had experienced one or more traumatic events. 
After controlling for types of trauma experienced and other previously identified 
factors (e.g. psychosocial factors such as a non-confiding relationship with mother; 
Bromet et al, 1998), neuroticism remained significantly associated with PTSD in 
males and females. Thus, this study suggests that neuroticism is a promising candidate 
as a potential psychological determinant in PTSD. However, there are a number of 
limitations of this study. First the study is cross-sectional and because all the 
variables were assessed simultaneously the alternative explanation that elevated 
neuroticism is a consequence of severe and persistent PTSD cannot be excluded.
Dissociation
Dissociation at the time of any traumatic event may contribute to the 
development of PTSD as it may inhibit the cognitive processes required to integrate 
cognitive and emotional responses to the trauma into general memory systems in 
order to make them less ‘traumatic’ (Horowitz, 1979; Brewin & Holmes, 2003).
Weiss et al (1995) demonstrated the role of dissociation in predicting post-traumatic
syi^lom^in emergency service^personneTMaimar-eTaL^1999-) found that______
dissociation around the time of the trauma was strongly predictive of symptomatic 
response and long-term distress in emergency service personnel involved in the 
collapse of a freeway as a result of the Loma Prieta earthquake in California. Hodgins, 
Creamer and Bell (2001) found trait dissociation to be associated with PTSD
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symptoms in junior police officers. Bennet et al (2004) administered the Cognitive 
Appraisal Questionnaire (Bennett, Conway & Clatworthy, 2004) to their sample of 
617 British Ambulance workers. This includes a measure of dissocative symptoms at 
the time of a work-related traumatic event. They found that the degree of dissociation 
at the time of the index incident was associated with frequency of encountering 
potentially traumatic incidents and organisational stressors and the degree of PTSD 
symptoms experienced as a result of both. This suggests that the more ambulance 
personnel experienced a variety of stressors, the more likely they were to engage in 
dissociation when facing a particularly threatening situation. Thus, this suggests that 
emergency service workers using dissociation as a coping mechanism may be at more 
risk from developing symptoms of PTSD.
Shift work
It has been suggested that long working hours and 24-hour shift are a major 
contributing factor to emergency medical service workers burnout (Fontanarosa,
1990). As shift work is a source of stress it is necessary to briefly consider the effects 
of shift work.
Individuals who regularly work atypical hours are at greater risk for physical 
and psychological impairment or disease than typical day workers (e.g. Costa, 1996;
CostaeTar,2000).ThisnskisbeiievedtobeaTesultofthephysieal^nd--------------
psychological stress that develops from work schedule-related disruptions of their 
biological functions, sleep, and social and family life. Furthermore, this risk is 
increased by extended hours of work beyond the standard 40-hour week (Costa et al, 
2000). Shift work has been associated with adverse health and well-being outcomes in
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some individuals. In fact, it is well accepted that shift work has a negative impact on 
health, as it interferes with physical, mental and social well-being (World Health 
Organisation, 1948). It has been found to perturb psychophysical homeostasis 
(circadian rhythms, eating and sleeping hours), decrease vigilance and performance 
(errors and accidents), impair family and social relationships and is also a recognised 
risk factor for gastrointestinal, psychoneurotic and cardiovascular disease (Costa,
1996). However, Costa (2003) highlights that tolerance to shift work is an extremely 
complex phenomenon. He argues that ‘tolerance’ goes beyond that of ‘adjustment’ 
which is mainly a biological response in terms of circadian rhythms and performance 
efficiency which includes physical and mental signs of decreased health and well­
being, and, in particular, chronic fatigue, digestive, sleep and mental disorders 
(Andlauer & Reinberg, 1979; Harma, 1993). In an extensive review of the literature, 
Harrington (1978) estimated that 20-30% of workers dislike shift work and suffer 
from serious troubles, mainly due to circadian disruptions and severe sleep problems 
that cause them to quit. However, 10% do not complain at all during their working 
life.
Sleep and shift work
Sleep is the primary function that is most disrupted by shift work. Both the 
quality and quantity of shiftworker’s sleep has been found to suffer (Costa, 1996). 
This enviabiyresults in fatigue (Luna, French&Mitcha,1997;Tepas & Carvalhais, 
1990). Furthermore, severe sleep disturbances over time can result in the development 
of chronic fatigue, anxiety, nervousness and depression (Costa et al, 2000). Kalitema 
et al (1995) found that after 3 years follow up on young shift workers rigidity of 
sleeping habits was the only variable that consistently correlated with poor health.
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Good sleep hygiene is one of the most important factors in counteracting stress 
and improving tolerance to shift work. Costa et al (2003) argue that the more a worker 
is able to adopt proper sleeping regimes and avoid external sleep disturbances, the 
more they are able to compensate for the sleep disruption as a result of working 
irregular hours (Akerstedt, 1996). Some studies have also shown that shift workers 
who usually take naps show a better tolerance to shift work (Costa et al, 1995).
Health and shift work
Gastrointestinal disorders are the most prevalent health complaint associated 
with shift work (e.g. Vener et al, 1989; Angersbach et al, 1980), although it appears 
that night work and not just shiftwork appears to be the critical factor in the 
development of gastrointestinal disease (Angersbach, 1980). In a review of 36 
epidemiological studies covering 50 years of data and 98, 000 workers, Costa (1996) 
found that disorders of the digestive tract were 2-5 times more common among shift 
workers who experienced nightwork than among day workers and shift workers who 
did not work at night. Tucker et al (2000) also reported that the development of 
digestive problems was associated with working longer shifts (i.e. 12 hours vs 8 
hours) and with relatively early changeovers (i.e. 6 am vs 7am).
 In-armeta-analysis n f the epidemiological literature on shift work and heart___
disease, Boggild and Knutsson (1999) reported that shiftworkers have a 40% greater 
risk for cardiovascular mortality or morbidity than day workers. It has been suggested 
that the risk factors associated with cardiovascular disease are consistent with many of 
the problems associated with shiftwork, such as gastrointestinal problems, sleeping
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dysfunction, smoking and poor working conditions. Furthermore, shift work can also 
act as a stressor, increasing the stress response over time and resulting in increased 
blood pressure, heart rate, cholesterol and alterations in glucose and lipid metabolism 
(Costa, 1996).
Psychological effects of shift work
Although physical disorders in shift workers (e.g. gastrointestinal complaints) 
have received the most attention, the psychological and emotional distress that 
accompanies shift work is increasingly being recognised (e.g. Barton et al, 1993; 
Williamson, Gower and Clarke, 1994). Although some studies have found that the 
magnitude of the effects is sometimes low (Barton, 1994; Tucker, Barton and Folkard, 
1996) Costa et al (1996) have suggested that psychological distress often 
accompanying shiftwork from its onset may be the primary factor that provokes many 
(varying between 20-50% in different studies) to leave shift work.
Individual differences and adaptation to shiftwork
Folkard, Monk and Lobban (1979) suggested that people have different 
circadian types and that this may explain why people adapt better than others to shift 
work.
Personality factors may also play a role. For example, Introverts have been 
-shown to have an earlier circadian phase.(i.e. theyaremore monung orientated) than 
extroverts (Vidacek et al, 1987). Circadian adjustment to shift schedules also seems to 
occur faster in extroverts than introverts (Colquohoun & Condon, 1980). Researchers 
have reported a relationship between neuroticism and shiftwork tolerance across 
several studies in that shift workers who are very neurotic are less tolerant to shift
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work (e.g. Iskra-Golec, Marek & Noworol, 1995; Costa et al, 1995). However, 
Kalitema et al (1995) found a significant correlation between neuroticism and poor 
health after 1 year, but not after 3 years. Similar negative results have also been 
reported in other longitudinal studies (Wynne et al, 1986; Bohle & Tilley, 1989).
This may suggests that neuroticism may increase with exposure to shift work and, 
hence, it acts more as an outcome or strain measure than a moderator variable (Bohle 
& Tilley, 1989).
Social functioning and shiftwork
Shift work has been demonstrated to impair family relationships. Shift 
workers report that family and social difficulties are their prominent concern rather 
biological factors. Individuals engaged in shift work, especially night work, are often 
out of phase with society and as a result they can face greater difficulties as most 
family and social activities are arranged during daylight hours. Shift work can also 
interfere with family relations. Time pressure can be a constant problem for those 
with a high family burden and can lead to strain in marital relationships and have 
adverse consequences for parenting and children’s education, etc.
Working hours
Spurgeon et al’s (1997) review found no clear evidence to confirm or 
diseonfirm health and safety relateckproblems of long working Jiours^however, sorne  ^
studies have suggested that the longer the working period (beyond 9 hours) the higher 
the fatigue, risk of accident and health troubles (Rosa, 1995; Colquhoun et al, 1996). 
Many studies have highlighted the negative effects on fatigue, performance 
efficiency, sleep, family and leisure times of 12 hour shifts in comparison to 8 hour
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shifts (Rosa, 1995, Fischer et al, 2000). However, other studies have not found any 
detrimental effects on performance, sleep (Axelsson et al, 1998), health (Smith et al, 
1998a), safety (Laundry & Lees, 1991) or quality of life (Kogi et al 1989).
Therefore, this evidence suggests that shiftwork can act as a stress factor or a 
trigger when it is matched with conflicts such as endogenous rhythms, demanding 
work conditions and interference in family and social life.
The above review has shown that experiencing waking traumatic episodes has 
a negative effect on psychological well-being, that emergency service workers in 
general have a high incidence of PTSD and other psychopathologies, and have the 
further stress of doing shift-work. This chapter will now conclude with a review of 
literature on sleep and dreams in the target population of this study, and a list of the 
aims of the study.
Sleep and dreams in fire fighters
Haslam et al (2003) found that one third of their 31 fire service personnel 
reported experiencing problems sleeping after an incident. Some of the respondents 
reported bad dreams and nightmares. However, the exact proportion experiencing 
unpleasant dreams was not reported. The authors found that such dreams were related 
to incidents involving serious injuries; others were concerned with feelings of failure 
and feeling trapped. They report an extract from a 53 year-old leading fire-fighter 
talking about a recurrent dream after an incident.
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‘this lump on the road burning that turned out to be a young boy ...I think what 
makes me feel bad about it is because I didn’t even realise it was a person. There was 
this thing on the road, and I didn ’t recognise it as being a person. ’
Fullerton et al (1992) reported that many fire-fighters had difficulty sleeping 
and that several experienced nightmares. However, no specific information was 
reported on prevalence. Mills and Mills (2005) looked at the symptoms of PTSD in 
emergency medical residents (EMR) who routinely deal with death and dying. Four 
groups of residents were assessed; a) those incoming to be first year EMR (MS4), b) 
interns finishing the first year of training (Rl), C) residents finishing the second year 
of training (R2), d) residents graduating from the programme (R3). The authors found 
that 30% of residents reported symptoms associated with PTSD. Furthermore, they 
found that there was a positive correlation of PTSD symptoms with increased level of 
EMR training, with the R3 group reporting the most symptoms. Table 58 illustrates 
data on the percentage and number of participants experiencing sleep difficulties and 
dream disturbances.
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Table 58 -  Data from Mills and Mills (2005) showing percentage (and 
number) of participants in 4 years of residence training who experience sleep 
difficulties and dream disturbances.
Difficulty sleeping % (n/total) Dream disturbances % 
(n/total)
MS 4 0 (0/16) 0 (0/16)
R1 21.43 (3/14) 14.29 (2/14)
R2 15.38(2/13) 30.77 (4/13)
R3 43.75 (7/16) 25 (4/16)
Table 58 shows that sleep difficulties and dream disturbances increase with 
length of EMR training. However, the authors do not specifically comment on the 
nature or frequency of these dreams.
Although there have been no controlled systematic studies investigating sleep 
and dreams of emergency service personnel these preliminary data suggest that sleep 
disturbances may be more frequent than in the general population and that these sleep 
disturbances may worsen with increased exposure to traumatic work related incidents. 
It is also unclear as to whether the nightmares reported are idiopathic nightmares, 
nightmares in response to the traumatic events, or repetitive posttraumatic nightmares.
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Aims of study 3:
1. To assess the prevalence of nightmares in a population exposed 
to frequent trauma. It is hypothesised that nightmare frequency will be 
elevated in this population as a result of the traumas experienced.
2. Given that the rate of PTSD is elevated, to determine if the 
frequency of nightmares can be predicted by PTSD scores.
3. To determine if neuroticism, depression and anxiety predict the 
frequency of nightmares in a population where PTSD would be the expected 
predictor (notwithstanding the fact that PTSD and anxiety are highly 
correlated).
4. To assess trait nightmare distress in this population and its 
correlates with well-being measures.
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Chapter 11 
Study 3: Nightmares in Fire-fighters
Method
Participants
57 front-line fire-fighters were recruited from three local fire stations (female 
= 1, male = 56; mean age = 37.64; SD = 7.48; range 22-53). Their mean number of 
years in the service was 10.38 (SD = 7.65; range =1-30).
Participants were reassured that all information would be treated with the 
utmost confidentiality and sensitivity.
Materials
Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS: Foa, 1995).
The 17-item (part 3) PDS sub-scale used in this study, measures re- 
experiencing traumatic memories, attempts at avoidance, and arousal both at the time 
of re-experiences and more generally. The frequency of each symptom is rated on a 
four-point scale, ranging from 0 (‘not at all or only one time’) to 3 (‘5 or more times a 
week/almost always’). The PDS is based on the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
AssociatTon,T994) diagpostic criteria and provides both a severity scoTdanda 
diagnostic categorisation for PTSD based on the pattern of sub-scores. A diagnosis of 
PTSD requires the existence of symptoms for a period of one or more months. 
Participants are asked to identify a key work-related incident that resulted in troubling 
memories and to report the frequency of symptoms in relation to the incident. The
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PDS demonstrates good positive psychometric characteristics, including high internal 
consistency (alpha = 0.92 for the 17 items), good test-retest reliability (k = 0.74), and 
good sensitivity and specificity with respect to PTSD diagnosis (0.82 and 0.77 
respectively). The PDS had achieved an 86% concordance with diagnoses made with 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders (Foa, 1995) and correlates 
strongly with other indicators of PTSD-type symptoms (Coffey, Dansky, Falsetti, 
Saladin & Brady, 1998).The PDS has not been normed on the general population; 
however, Foa (1995) reports PDS data for a group of 248 individuals, sampled from 
treatment and research centres that have high numbers of PTSD sufferers. It has been 
argued that because this instrument is criterion based (i.e. evaluates whether a client 
meets or does not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD), general population norms are 
not required for its function. Therefore, the PDS does not yield standardised T scores, 
but rather defines PTSD symptom severity as ‘mild’, ‘moderate’, ‘moderate to severe’ 
or ‘severe’. The cut-off scores used to determine severity were derived from a sample 
of 376 women with sexual or physical assault histories. However, Foa (1995) cautions 
that these are only rough estimates of PTSD severity, probably because the severity of 
assault related posttraumatic stress in her female assault victim sample may or may 
not compare to those of females victims of other types of trauma or of males with a 
trauma history of any type. However, the PDS is the only published test that yields a 
reliable and meaningful DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis, although it should be coupled with 
a formal diagnostic interview before a specific diagnosis can be made (Briere, 1997a).
One of the 17 questions on the PDS asks whether participants have ‘bad 
dreams or nightmares about the traumatic event’. Responses to this item will be used 
as a separate variable in study three, and PDS scores when correlated with nightmare 
variables will therefore have this item omitted.
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Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAPS: Zigmond & Snaith. 1983).
Anxiety and depression were assessed using the 14-item Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Participants are required to 
underline one of four statements that relate most specifically to them and how they 
have been feeling in the last week. Each statement has a rating of 0 to 4 and higher 
scores indicate higher levels of anxiety and/or depression. The HADS is a reliable 
screening instrument for clinically significant anxiety and depression. It has good 
reliability and validity and is widely used in clinical settings (Johnston et al, 2000). 
Crawford, Crombie and Taylor (2001) administered the HADS to a non-clinical 
sample, broadly representative of the general adult UK population and found a mean 
Anxiety score of 6.14 (3.76) and a mean Depression score of 3.68 (3.07). The test 
authors of the HADS recommended cut-off scores that are indicative of clinical levels 
of depression and anxiety (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994). A score of 8 or above is 
considered to be indicative of ‘possible’ clinical levels of each emotion. A score of 11 
or above is considered indicative of a ‘probable’ diagnosis of depression or anxiety. 
However, while the HADS is a screening measure of anxiety and depression, it does 
not necessarily mean that elevated scores reflect clinical levels of depression and 
anxiety.
The Evsenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised Short Scale (EPO-R Short
Scale; EPQ-RS. Evsenckfet aLT985Y -------------------------
This self-report questionnaire was described in Chapter 3, which is the method 
section for study 1. For this study only the neuroticism scale is used.
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Dream/Sleep Questionnaire
Participants were required to make a retrospective estimate of the frequency of 
their dream recall and the recall of nightmares and repetitive nightmares (appendix 
23). Nightmares were defined as ‘a very disturbing dream that you can recall clearly’.
Participants were asked:-
1. How many dreams do you have each week?
2. If you do not have one dream per week how many dreams do you have
per month?’
3. How many nightmares (if any) do you have a month?
4. If you have nightmare less than once a month, how many do you have
a year?
5. Are nightmares a problem for you?
6. Do you ever have the same nightmare being repeated?
7. If so, how often do you have such a repetitive nightmare?
Participants were required to write their own responses for most of the 
questions above and were not constrained by any pre-determined response format. 
However, questions 5 and 6 were responded to on a yes/no format.
Participants were asked to rate the emotional fone of their average dream on a 
7-point dream hedonic tone scale (Foulkes et al, 1966) ranging from 1 (very 
unpleasant) to 7 (very pleasant). The question asked:-
8. On average, how would you rate the overall mood of your dreams?
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Participants were asked to provide their own responses to the following 
questions about their sleep on an average night on a rest day.
9. On average, what time do you turn the light out to go to sleep?
10. How long does it normally take you to fall asleep?
11. What time do you normally wake up?
12. Between falling asleep and waking up, how much of the time as you
usually awake during the night?
Participants were asked to rate their overall sleep quality on a 5-point likert 
scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good).
Procedure
Station officers of three local fire stations were contacted and informed about 
the aims and objectives of the study. Questionnaire packs containing a letter inviting 
participants to take part, consent forms, the questionnaire measures described above 
and a stamped addressed envelope were distributed to fire-fighters by their station 
officers. Participants were informed that the study aimed to assess sleep quality, 
dreams and mood. Contact details for the researchers were also provided in case of 
questions. If participants were happy to take part they were required to complete the 
questionnaires and return them in the stamped addressed envelope provided. 
Participants were reassured that consent forms would be stored separately from their 
questionnaires when received.
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Design
This is a correlational study in which regression analyses were used to 
determine factors predicting PDS score, nightmare frequency, and presence of 
repetitive nightmares and of trauma dreams/nightmares.
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Chapter 12 
Study 3: Nightmares in Fire-fighters
Results
This study assessed nightmare frequency and its correlates in emergency service 
workers. A retrospective measure was used in this study in order to increase 
compliance. As studies 1 and 2 confirmed that unpleasant dream frequency, defined 
without the waking criterion, is the better index of psychopathology, the following 
definition of a nightmare was used; ‘a very disturbing dream that can be clearly 
recalled’. Table 59 shows the mean scores and range for dream frequency variables 
and well-being measures in this population.
Table 59 -  Table 59 shows the mean frequency of dreams and nightmares per month, 
mean emotional tone of the dreams, and poor well-being and sleep variables.
Mean (standard deviation) Range
Dreams per month 29.58(11.44) 0-57
Nightmares per month 1.19(2.28) 0-10
Dream emotional tone 4.23 (0.82) 3-7
Neuroticism 4.03 (3.06) 0-11
'PDS: severity o f symptoms 7.37 (7.73) 0-31
’PDS: Total positive symptoms 5.33 (4.54) 0-17
Anxiety 5.93 (3.90) 0-19
Depression 4.23 (3.95) 0-15
Sleep quality 3.58(1 .05) 1-5
Sleep latency 19.48(16.98) 1 .5 -9 0
Sleep efficiency 87.29% (11.14) 4 9 .21 -99 .64%
Note: 1PDS= post traumatic diagnostic scale.
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Table 59 shows that this sample of fire-fighters experience on average one nightmare 
per month. In this study very unpleasant dreams were labelled as 1 on the hedonic 
scale and very pleasant dreams were labelled as 7. Participants rated the emotional 
tone of their average dream as 4.23, which is in the neutral range (‘neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant’). Mean sleep quality was 3.58 suggesting that on average participants 
rated their sleep between ‘neither good nor poor’ and ‘rather good’. On average 
participants took about 20 minutes to fall asleep on a rest day and their average sleep 
efficiency was fairly good (87.29%). In Eysenck and Eysenck (1991), the normative 
sample means for neuroticism at ages 31-40 are 5.75 (3.46) for males and 5.50 (2.92) 
for females. The mean of this predominantly male sample was 4.03 (3.06) which is 
less than for the general population. Crawford, Crombie and Taylor (2001) 
administered the HADS to a non-clinical sample, broadly representative of the general 
adult UK population, and found a mean Anxiety score of 6.14 (3.76) and a mean 
Depression score of 3.68 (3.07). Thus, the mean anxiety score presented in table 59 is 
again lower than the general population, whereas the depression score for the sample 
is slightly above that of the general population. The mean PDS severity score of 7 is 
low as this scale ranges from 0-51. The total number of symptoms that could be 
endorsed on the PDS is 17 and so a mean score of 5.33 is also low.
Nightmare frequency
63.16% (n =36) reported no nightmares per month;
10.53% (n= 6) reported one nightmare per month;
17.54% (n = 10) reported two nightmares per month; and 
8.77% (n = 5) reported more than 3 per month.
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Therefore, 36.84% participants reported experiencing at least one nightmare per 
month
Nightmare distress
Only one participant stated that nightmares were a problem for them.
Repetitive nightmares
25.9% (n= 15) of fire-fighters report the occurrence of repetitive nightmares. 
Participants were asked how often they experienced repetitive nightmares, however, 
of the 15 reporting them, only 9 answered this question. The mean frequency of 
repetitive nightmares based on these 9 participants was 11.28 per year (SD =10.01, 
range = 1.50-24).
Of those reporting at least one nightmare a month, 57.1% (n = 12) report the 
occurrence of repetitive nightmares.
Trauma nightmares
One of the questions on the PDS scale was ‘having bad dreams or nightmares about 
the traumatic event’. Participants were required to respond ‘not at all’, ‘once in a 
while’, ‘half the time’ and ‘almost always’.
68.4% (n=39) of participants responded ‘not at all’; 
26.3% (n=15) responded ‘once in a while’; and 
5.3% (n= 3) responded ‘half the time’.
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Anxiety and depression
A score of 8 or above is considered indicative of ‘possible’ clinical levels of 
depression and anxiety. 27.6% (n =16) reported ‘possible’ clinical levels of anxiety 
and 15.5% (n = 9) reported ‘possible’ clinical levels of depression.
A score of 11 or above is considered indicative of a ‘probable’ diagnosis of 
| depression or anxiety. 12.1% (n = 7) and 10.3% (n= 6) of participants reported these
levels of anxiety and depression respectively.
itI
I PTSD
t
i
| 24.6% (n=14) of participants met the criteria for ‘caseness’ on the PDS scale (Foa,
t
1995). Five were considered to have PTSD with mild severity, six with moderate 
severity and three with moderate to severe severity.
i
i
|
Self-reported sleep quality
Table 59 shows that mean sleep quality was rated as average to rather good. Table 60 
provides a breakdown of how participants rated their sleep.
Table 60 -  Frequency of self-reported quality of sleep categories
Sleep quality Frequency
Very poor 1.7% (n =1)
Rather poor 17.5% (n=10)
Neither good nor poor 20.7% (n = 12)
Rather good 39.7% (n= 23)
Very good 19.0% (n= 11)
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Inspection of the table suggests that the majority of participants reported good sleep 
quality but 19.2% (n = 11) reported poor sleep.
Sleep latency
55.2% (n = 32) reported an average sleep latency of 15 minutes or less;
32.8% (n = 19) reported an average sleep latency of 16 - 30 minutes;
8.6% (n = 5) reported a sleep latency of 31 - 60 minutes; and 
1 participant (1.7%) reported a sleep latency of over an hour.
Sleep efficiency
Number of hours of actual sleep was calculated by subtracting the time spent awake 
during the night and sleep latency from time spent in bed. Sleep efficiency was 
calculated by dividing the number of hours slept by the number of hour spent in bed 
xlOO.
73.7% (n = 42) participants had a sleep efficiency of over 85%;
14.0% (n = 8) had a sleep efficiency of between 16-30 minutes,
7.0% (n = 4) had sleep efficiency between 65-75%
5.3% (n = 3) had a sleep efficiency of less than 65%.
Distribution of variables.
Shapiro-Wilk tests were conducted to assess normality of distribution. The results are 
shown in Table 61.
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Table 61 - Shapiro-Wilk statistics for dream variables and well-being measures
Shapiro-Wilk statistic
Nightmare frequency 0.55 (p<0.01)
Dream emotional tone 0.70 (p<0.01)
’PDS: Severity o f symptoms 0.80 (p<0.01)
PDS: Total positive symptoms 0.91 (p<0.01)
Neuroticism 0.92 (p<0.01)
Depression 0.90 (p<0.01)
Anxiety 0.94 (p<0.01)
Note: ’PDS: Post traumatic diagnostic scale.
Table 61 shows that all the Shapiro-Wilk tests were significant, thus none of the 
variables are normal distributed and, therefore, non-parametric statistics will be used. 
Intercorrelations between the well-being variables are shown in Table 62.
Table 62 - Intercorrelations between measures of well-being (Spearman’s rho)
Depression Anxiety Neuroticism 'PDS:SS 'PDS:TPS
Depression - 0.67* ( p<.01) 0.45* ( p<.01) 0.53*. ( p<.01) 0.57 (p<.01)
Anxiety 0.67* ( p<.01) - 0.67* ( p<.01) 0.67* ( p<.01) 0.76 (p<.01)
Neurotism 0.45* ( p<.01) 0.67* ( p<.01) - 0.43* (p<.01) 0.45 (p<.01)
'PDS: SS 0.53* ( p<.01) 0.67* ( p<.01) 0.43* ( p<.01) • 0.58 (p<.01)
’PDS: TPS 0.57 (p<.01) 0.76 (p<.01) 0.45 (p<.01) 0.58 (p<.01)
Note: 1 PDS:SS = Post traumatic diagnostic scale: severity of scores; PDSiTPS; posttraumatic 
diagnostic scale: Total positive symptoms
* p<.01
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Nightmares and well-being
Kendall’s tau_b correlations were conducted to assess the relationship between 
nightmare frequency, repetitive nightmares, traumatic nightmares and dream 
emotional tone with PDS, neuroticism, anxiety and depression. Relationship with age 
and years in job were also assessed. The number of nightmares per year variables was 
used in the following analysis in order to include more subjects.
Table 63 - Kendall’s tau_b correlation coefficients (p values) between dream 
variables, age, number of years in the fire service and measures of well-being.
Age Years in 
post
PDS-.SS1 PDS^PS1 Neuroticism Anxiety Depression
Nightmare -0 .1 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 .2 1 0 .2 9 * 0 .2 6 * 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 8
frequency ( p = 2 6 ) ( P = .9 9 ) ( p = .0 3 ) ( p < 0 .0 1 ) ( p = .0 1 ) ( p = .0 4 ) ( p = .0 8 )
Repetitive l O oo oo
i
- 0 . 1 0 0 .2 6 0 .2 8 * 0 .3 0 * 0 .1 1 0 . 0 6
nightmares ( p = .0 5 ) ( P = .3 4 ) ( p = .0 2 ) ( p = .0 1 ) ( p = .0 1 ) ( p = 3 2 ) ( P = .6 0 )
Trauma - 0 .0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 4 * 0 .3 2 * 0 . 2 6 0 . 2 6 0 . 2 2
nightmares ( p = 7 7 ) ( p = .7 1 ) ( P = .0 0 ) ( p < 0 .0 1 ) ( p = .0 2 ) ( p = .0 2 ) ( p = .0 6 )
Emotional tone - 0 . 0 7 - 0 .0 1 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 .1 5 - 0 . 1 8 - 0 . 1 5 - 0 . 0 9
( p = .5 4 ) ( p = 9 4 ) ( p = . 4 6 ) ( P = .1 7 ) ( p = . l l ) ( p = . 1 7 ) ( P = .4 0 )
Note: PDS:SS = Post traumatic diagnostic scale: severity of scores; PDS:TPS: Posttraumatic diagnostic scale: Total 
positive symptoms.
1 scored here with nightmare question removed
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <fr.01)~. AlTv"alues~aretwo tailed.______________________ _ ______
Table 63 shows that age and number of years in the service is not significantly related 
to any of the unpleasant dream variables or the dream emotional tone.
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It can be observed that nightmare frequency and the presence/absence of repetitive 
nightmares is significantly positively correlated with the number of total positive 
symptoms on the PDS (with the nightmare question on this scale having been 
omitted) and neuroticism but not with anxiety and depression. The presence or 
absence of trauma dreams was significantly related to the number of total positive 
symptoms and the measure of symptom severity on the post traumatic diagnostic 
scale, however, anxiety and neuroticism just missed statistical significance (p=0.02). 
Mean dream emotional tone was not significantly related to any of the well-being 
measures. Thus, it seems that it is the frequency of these extreme dream types rather 
than mean dream emotional tone that has the strongest relationships with measures of 
well-being.
Sleep quality
Kendall’s tau_b correlations were conducted to determine the relationship between 
sleep quality and well-being and dream variables. These are shown in Table 64.
3 4 9
Table 64 -  Kendall’s tau_b correlations between sleep quality; sleep efficiency, sleep
latency and well-being and dream variables.
Sleep quality Sleep latency Sleep efficiency
Age 0.00 (0.96) -0.15 (0.11) 0.02 (0.86)
Years in job -0.09 (0.38) -0.14(0.15) -0.03 (0.74)
Neuroticism -0.08 (0.50) 0.03 (0.79) -0.03 (0.71)
Anxiety -0.18(0.08) -0.00 (0.98) -0.10(0.31)
Depression -0.13(0.21) 0.02 (0.84) -0.09 (0.34)
PDS: Severity of symptoms -0.21 (0.04)' -0.04 (0.69)' -0.02 (0.86)'
PDS: Total positive symptoms -0.26* (0.01)' -0.02 (0.83)’ -0.07 (0.48)1
Nightmare frequency -0.10(0.33) -0.04 (0.70) -0.13(0.19)
Repetitive nightmares -0.06 (0.63) -0.16(0.16) 0.02 (0.86)
Trauma nightmares -0.23 (0.06) 0.10(0.40) -0.25 (0.02)
Mote: PDS = Post traumatic diagnostic scale.
'scored here with sleep quality question removed
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities o f  type 1 errors as a result o f  multiple comparisons the level o f  
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Table 64 shows that sleep quality is significantly negatively related to the number of 
total positive symptoms on the PDS (with the sleep quality item omitted), suggesting 
that those reporting more symptoms of posttraumatic stress rate their sleep quality as 
worse. The inverse relationship between sleep efficiency and the presence of 
traumatic nightmares very nearly reaches statistical significance (p=0.02).
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Factors predicting repetitive nightmares
The above tables show that the presence of repetitive nightmares is related to the total 
number of positive symptoms on the posttraumatic diagnostic scale and neuroticism.. 
As these variables are non-normally distributed and repetitive nightmares is a 
dichotomous variable a logistical regression was conducted. All factors that correlated 
with repetitive nightmares were entered as predictors. The symptom severity score on 
the posttraumatic diagnostic scale was also entered as a predictor (as it was very 
nearly significantly related to repetitive nightmares (p = 0.02)). Anxiety was also 
entered as a predictor as it had a correlation of 0.11 and is correlated with other 
nightmare frequency variables.
Pallant (2005) advises that multicollinearity can be a problem when using logistical 
regression and that this exists when the independent variables are highly correlated (r 
= 0.9 and above). Table 62 shows that the highest correlation between predictor 
variables was r = 0.76 (between anxiety and total number of positive symptoms on the 
PDS scale).
•j
The Omnibus tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness of fit’ was significant (x (4)= 
17.49; p < 0.01) suggesting that this model is a better predictor than the statistical 
estimation using no predictors (73.7%). Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R square tests 
suggests that between 26% and 39% of the variance in the presence or absence of 
repetitive nightmares are explained by the predictors. The model correctly classifies 
75% of overall cases into either having or not having repetitive nightmares. The 
model had a negative predictive value of 90.5% and a positive predictive value of 
55.5%. This means that the model was able to correctly identify 90% of the
participants that did not have repetitive nightmares and 55% of those who did have 
repetitive nightmares. Table 65 below demonstrates that number of total positive 
symptoms on the PDS, neuroticism and anxiety all contribute significantly to the 
predictive ability of the model.
Table 65 - Wald test statistic and probability for the prediction of the presence of repetitive nightmares
Predictors Wald test
PDS: Symptom severity 0.82 (0.97)
PDS: Total Positive Symptoms 4.19* (0.04)
Anxiety 5.81* (0.02)
Neuroticism 4.25* (0.04)
Note: PDS = Post traumatic diagnostic scale
* p  =  <  .05.
Factors predicting traumatic nightmares
Tables 63 and 64 show that both PDS variables are significantly correlated with the 
presence or absence of traumatic nightmares. Anxiety, neuroticism and sleep 
efficiency were related to presence/absence of traumatic nightmares although these 
just missed significance (p = 0.02). Therefore, these factors were entered as 
predictors.
Omnibus tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness of Fit’ was significant (x2 (4)- 14.45 
p = 0.01) suggesting that this model is a better predictor than the statistical estimation 
using no predictors (73.7%). Cox and Snell andNagelkerke R square tests suggests 
that between 22% and 33% of the variance in the presence or absence of traumatic 
nightmares are explained by these predictors. The model correctly classifies 80.7% of
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overall cases into either having or not having trauma nightmares. The model had a 
negative predictive value of 95% and a positive predictive value of 75%. This means 
that the model was able to correctly identify 95% of the participants that did not have 
trauma nightmares and 75% of those who did have trauma nightmares. The table 
below demonstrates that sleep efficiency is the only variable that significantly 
independently contributes to the predictive ability of the model.
Table 66 - Wald test statistic and probability for predictors o f the presence o f  traumatic 
nightmares/bad dreams
Predictors Wald test
PDS: Symptom severity 0.10(0.75)
PDS: Total Positive Symptoms 0.13 (0.72)
Anxiety 0.18(0.67)
Neuroticism 0.20 (0.66)
Sleep efficiency 4.84* (0.03)
Note: PDS = Post traumatic diagnostic scale 
* p<0.05
A logistical regression could not be conducted on the frequency of nightmares as 
reducing this variable to a dichotomous one resulted in all correlations (as shown in 
tables 63 and 64) becoming insignificant. Therefore, partial correlations were 
conducted between nightmare frequency and measures of well-being, controlling for 
the effects of age, sleep quality, sleep latency, sleep efficiency and mean emotional 
tone of dreams. These are shown in Table 67 below.
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Table 67 - Kendall’s tau-b partial correlation coefficients between number of 
nightmares per year with well-being before and after age, sleep quality, sleep 
efficiency, sleep latency and emotional tone are partialled out
N eu rotic ism P D S: SS P D S:T P S D ep ression A n x ie ty
Nightmare freq uency 0 .26* 0.21 0 .2 9 * 0 .1 8 0 .2 0
(< 0 .0 1 ) (< 0 .0 5 ) (p < 0 .0 1 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (< 0 .0 5 )
Age partialled out 0 .26* 0 .2 2 0 .3 0 * 0 .1 7 0.21
(< 0 .0 1 ) (< 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (< 0 .0 5 )
Sleep e ffic ie n c y  partialled  out 0 .2 6 * 0 .21 0 .2 8 0 .1 7 0 .1 9
(< 0 .0 1 ) (< 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (< 0 .0 5 )
Emotional ton e  partialled  out 0 .2 3 * 0 .2 0 0 .2 7 * 0 .1 6 0 .1 7
(< 0 .0 1 ) (< 0 .0 5 ) (< 0 .0 1 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 )
Anxiety partialled  out 0 .1 9 0.11 0 .5 2 * - 0 .0 9
(< 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) (> 0 .0 5 )
Depression partialled  out 0 .1 2 0 .0 6 0 .4 1 * 0 .0 3 -
(> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) (> 0 .0 5 )
PDS:SS partialled  out 0 .2 0 - 0.21 0 .0 9 0 .0 9
(< 0 .0 5 ) (< 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 )
PDS:TPS partialled  out 0 .1 6 -0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 3
(> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 )
Neuroticism  partialled out - 0 .1 2 0 .2 0 0 .0 8 0 .1 0
(> 0 .0 5 ) (< 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 ) (> 0 .0 5 )
Note: PDS:SS =  Post traumatic diagnostic scale: symptom severity; PSD: TPS = Post traumatic diagnostic scale: 
Total positive symptoms.
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities o f  type 1 errors as a result o f  multiple comparisons the level o f  
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Table 67 shows that nightmare frequency has moderately sized significant 
correlations with neuroticism and total positive symptoms on the PDS. The 
correlation between nightmare frequency and neuroticism became insignificant when 
controlling for anxiety, depression and PDS measures. However, the correlation 
between total number of positive symptoms on the PDS and nightmare frequency 
remains when anxiety and depression are partialled out. Thus, the table suggests that 
total positive symptoms on the PDS seems to be the main correlate of nightmare 
frequency.
Factors predicting PTSD ‘caseness’
A regression analysis was also conducted to determine the extent to which nightmare 
frequency per year, neuroticism, anxiety, depression and sleep quality predicted 
caseness on the PDS scale.
The Omnibus tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness of fit’ was significant (x (4)= 
27.51; p <0.001) suggesting that this model is a better predictor than the statistical 
estimation using no predictors (75.4%). Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R square tests 
suggests that between 38% and 57% of the variance in PTSD are explained by these 
predictors. The model correctly classifies 93% of overall cases into either having or 
not having PTSD. The model had a negative predictive value of 100% and a positive 
predictive value of 71 %. This means that the model was able to correctly identify 
100% of the participants that did not have PTSD and 71.4% of those who did have 
PTSD. The table below demonstrates that anxiety is the only variable that 
significantly independently contributes to the predictive ability of the model. 
However, the Wald test for nightmare frequency as a predictor is relatively high.
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Table 68 - Wald test statistic and probability of predictors for the presence of PTSD
Predictors Wald test
Nightmare frequency 2.39(0.12)
Anxiety 5.54* (0.02)
Depression 0.05 (0.82)
Neuroticism 1.66 (0.20)
Sleep quality 0.21 (0.64)
* p<0.05
Regressions were also conducted where nightmare frequency was replaced as a 
predictor by repetitive nightmares and secondly by trauma nightmares, however, 
number of nightmares per year was able to account for more of the variance in PTSD 
‘caseness’.
Chapter 13 
Study 3: Nightmares in Fire-fighters
D iscussion
Rescue workers are exposed to both the stress of events and the stress of their 
role as help provider (Raphael, 1986). Due to the high level of exposure to traumatic 
incidents, it has been demonstrated that a range of professionals, including police, 
ambulance and fire personnel, can become secondary victims of trauma, exhibiting 
symptoms akin to direct victims (Genest, Levine, Ramsden & Swanson, 1990; 
Raphael & Meldrum, 1993). This study, therefore, aimed to assess the frequency and 
distress of nightmares and their correlates in a non-treatment seeking sample of fire­
fighters.
Depression and anxiety
In comparison to the means in the non-clinical adult sample of Crawford, 
Crombie and Taylor (2001), the mean anxiety and depression of the sample of fire­
fighters is not elevated compared to the general population. These results are in 
accordance with Mock et al (1999), who concluded that although the working 
environment of emergence medical service providers contains many stressors, this 
population is not on average more anxious than the general working public. However, 
12.1% of the sample had ‘probable’ clinical levels of anxiety and 10.3% had 
‘probable’ clinical levels of depression based on the HADS scores. Bennett et al 
(2004) found that 10% of their 617 sample of British Ambulance workers reported
‘probable’ levels of clinical depression and 22% reported probable levels of anxiety 
based on the HADS scores. Hence, both studies report similar prevalence rates for 
depression in emergency service workers, however, Bennett et al (2004) report a 
higher prevalence rate for anxiety. This may be because ambulance workers respond 
to more emergency calls than the police and fire service combined (James & Wright, 
1991), and therefore may suffer from greater psychological distress than these other 
groups (Mannar et al, 1996).
Post traumatic stress disorder: Prevalence
This study found that 24.6% (n=14) of the sample met the criteria for PTSD. 
Five participants were classified as having PTSD of mild severity; six had PTSD of 
moderate severity, and three of moderate to severe severity. General population 
studies demonstrate lifetime prevalence rates of at least 8 to 9% for PTSD (Breslau, 
Davis, Andreski & Peterson, 1992; Kessler, Sonnege, Bromet, Hughes & Nelon,
1995). Therefore, this study confirms the elevated levels of PTSD in this population.
These findings are in line with Wagner et al (1998), who investigated the 
prevalence of PTSD among 402 professional fire-fighters using the PSD symptom 
scale (Foa et al, 1993). They found a prevalence rate of PTSD symptoms of 18.2%.
McFarlane (1989) found prevalence rates of 32%, 27% and 30% in a sample 
of fire-fighters 4, 11 and 29 months after an Australian bush fire. These prevalence 
rates are higher than found in this study and also in Wagner et al (1998). This may be 
due to the fact that In the McFarlane (1989) study many of the fire-fighters were 
personally affected by the disaster in that they were victims, not only helpers. Hence, 
it can be argued that this study does not reflect prevalence rates of PTSD arising just 
from helping other people in an emergency.
PTSD and years in the service
The current study found no association between PTSD measures and number 
of years in the service. These findings are in line with Beaton, Murphy, Johnson, Pike 
and Comeil (1999) who found, in a sample of 220 fire-fighters, no relationship 
between number of years in the service, nor past half a years exposure to traumatic 
incidents, and self-reported post traumatic stress symptomatology. These findings 
contradict those of Hytten and Hasle (1989) who reported that ‘seasoned’ volunteer 
and professional fire-fighters with more years experience were evidently ‘better able 
to cope’ with a multicasualty, multifatality apartment fire, based on self-reported post 
trauma symptomatology. The latter investigators argued that years of service, training 
and exposure to previous traumatic incidents made it easier for these ‘seasoned’ 
volunteer fire-fighters to cope with this apartment fire. However, other authors have 
reported a positive relationship between number of years in the service and rates of 
PTSD (Comeil, 1995). Moran and Britton (1994) also reported that length of 
emergency service as a volunteer was positively related with both the chronicity of 
their adverse emotional reaction to their recollected ‘worst’ (duty-related) traumatic 
incident. However, both the aforementioned studies consisted partially and entirely of 
volunteers who probably possessed neither the degree of preparatory training nor the 
frequency of traumatic incidences as professional fire-fighters. Study three and the 
study of Beaton et al (1999) only used professional fire-fighters.
PTSD and well-being
A logistical regression analysis using PTSD as the dependent variable (i.e. 
those identified as ‘cases’ on the PDS; Foa, 1995) found that anxiety, depression,
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neuroticism, sleep quality and nightmare frequency accounted for 38% and 57% of 
the variance in PTSD. However, the regression found that anxiety was the only 
variable that significantly independently contributed to the predictive ability of the 
model.
The finding that neuroticism did not significantly contribute to PTSD 
‘caseness’ is not in line with the notion that this factor may place some individuals at 
greater risk for the development of PTSD following exposure to a traumatic event 
(Yehuda & McFarlane 1995). For example, McFarlane (1988) found elevated 
neuroticism was associated with PTSD in fire-fighters exposed to a natural disaster. 
Furthermore, neuroticism has been associated with PTSD in other groups of trauma 
victims such as Vietnam veterans with combat related PTSD (Talbert et al 1993), 
young urban adults (Breslau et al 1991), road traffic accident victims (Holeva & 
Tarrier, 2001) and in bum survivors (Fauerbach et al, 2000). In a nationally 
representative sample Cox et al (2004) also found that elevated levels of neuroticism 
were significantly associated with PTSD among men and women who had 
experienced one or more traumatic events. It is not clear why neuroticism was not 
related to PTSD ‘caseness’ in this sample. However, it may be that reducing PTSD 
scores to a dichotomous variable causes a loss of data.
Nightmare prevalence
It was hypothesised that nightmare prevalence would be elevated in this 
population compared to estimates from the general population. Participants reported a 
mean of 1.19 nightmares a month, and 39.7% participants report experiencing at least 
one nightmare per month. In contrast, the American Sleep Disorders Association
(1990) estimated that 5% of the adult population experience at least one nightmare per 
month, and Hublin et al (1999) found that 3% had nightmares weekly, whereas 10% 
had nightmares monthly. Thus, the prevalence of nightmares in this population is in 
excess of general population estimates, thus supporting the hypothesis.
The current study demonstrated that 25.9% of fire-fighters report the 
occurrence of repetitive nightmares. Of those reporting at least one nightmare a month 
57.1% reported the occurrence of repetitive nightmares. These findings are higher 
than in Feldman and Hersen (1967). They found for participants who seldom report 
nightmares the incidence of recurring nightmares was 3%, which increases to 37% in 
a group of participants reporting that they sometimes-experienced nightmares. This 
heightened prevalence of repetitive nightmares may reflect the elevated PTSD in the 
sample.
The question concerning nightmares on the PDS questionnaire was analysed 
separately. The question asked whether participants were’ having bad dreams or 
nightmares about the traumatic event’. 26.3% of participants reported that they were.
Nightmares and well-being
This study assessed correlations between the frequency of nightmares, 
repetitive nightmares and trauma nightmares. All types of nightmares were 
significantly positively related to the number of positive symptoms on the PDS scale 
and trauma nightmares were also significantly related to the severity of post traumatic 
symptoms. Both nightmares and repetitive nightmares had significant positive 
correlations with neuroticism. Anxiety and sleep efficiency were correlated with
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traumatic nightmares although theses both just missed statistical significance (p 
= 0.02).
Nightmare frequency had moderately sized significant correlations with 
neuroticism and total positive symptoms on the PDS. PDS total positive symptoms 
was the largest correlate and all other correlates became insignificant when it was 
partialled out.
A regression analysis in which trauma nightmares was the dependent variable 
found that anxiety, positive symptoms of PDS scale, PDS severity, neuroticism and 
sleep efficiency explained 22-33% of the variance. However, sleep efficiency was the 
only variable that significantly independently contributes to the predictive ability of 
the model.
A regression analysis with repetitive nightmares as the dependent variable 
found that anxiety, positive symptoms of PDS scale; PDS severity and neuroticism 
explained 26-39% of the variance. However, in contrast to traumatic nightmares, 
anxiety, neuroticism and the number of positive symptoms on the PDS scale all 
contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model.
Low sleep efficiency thus predicts trauma nightmares more than it predicts 
repetitive nightmares. This may be because these trauma nightmares, which are 
characteristic of PTSD, have been found to occur earlier in the night than idiopathic 
nightmares and are associated with gross body movements (van der Kolk et al, 1984; 
Hartmann, 1996) and nocturnal awakenings (Germain & Nielsen, 2003). Thus, it
could be that the repetitive nightmares found in this sample are more like the 
idiopathic nightmares assessed in study one.
Nightmare distress
One of the aims of this study was to assess the prevalence of nightmare 
distress in this non-treatment seeking group, and the correlates of nightmare distress. 
Nightmare distress was assessed by one question asking participants if nightmares 
were a problem for them (question taken from Wood & Bootzin, 1990). However, and 
surprisingly, only one participant (1.75% of the sample) reported that nightmares 
were a concern for them. This is in contrast to Wood and Bootzin (1990), where, in a 
sample of undergraduates, 19.5% reported having a current problem with nightmares. 
Klink and Quan (1987) asking the same question found that 7.1% of the general 
population reported such a problem. There may be several explanations for the low 
incidence of nightmare distress in this population.
The low nightmare distress could be due to the sample being almost entirely 
male. However, Wood and Bootzin (1990) found that 15.7% of men reported a 
current problem with nightmares. It could also be suggested that fire-fighters are less 
likely to admit to being distressed by their nightmares due to the image of the job and 
their role as ‘rescuer’. In fact the minimisation of reporting symptoms has been noted 
repeatedly in studies of emergency service personnel (Pole et al, 2001; Wagner, 
Heinrichs & Ehlert, 1998). However, this explanation is doubtful in that the fire­
fighters did report that they have nightmares and also reported symptoms of distress 
on well-being measures.
The low prevalence of nightmare distress may be due to the sample having 
low scores on neuroticism and anxiety, scores that are in fact lower than for the 
general population. It may also be that emergency workers are a self-selected resilient 
occupational group and may not be representative of the general population in terms 
of their personalities nor their coping styles (Mitchell & Bray, 1990). For example, 
some studies have found that experienced emergency service workers have better 
coping skills in term of dealing with trauma (Moran & Britton, 1994; Comeil, 1995). 
This hypothesis is in line with Picchioni et al (2002), who found that when daily 
stressors, life stressors, social support and coping where used to predict nightmare 
frequency in a multiple regression, coping did not contribute any unique variance to 
the overall model. However, when nightmare distress was used as the criterion 
variable, coping was found to contribute a significant amount of unique variance to 
the overall model. Hence, it may be that a population with more refined coping skills 
for dealing with trauma are less distressed by nightmares, even though their 
experience of traumas is causing more nightmares to occur. It may also be that fire­
fighters experience a good degree of social support from their colleagues, in fact 
many studies have commented on the strong degree of camaraderie between 
colleagues, and this may reduce how distressed they become to aversive stimuli 
(including nightmares). Similarly, Picchioni et al (2002) suggested that a high amount 
of social support could produce a reduction in nightmare distress.
Personality variables may also explain the low prevalence of nightmare 
distress. For example, there is evidence that emergency-service and military personnel 
often function with self-images characterised by high levels of perceived competence 
and self-efficacy (Solomon, 1989). Furthermore, Short (1979) suggests that helpers
are perceived and may perceive themselves as ‘strong and resourceful’. This is in 
contrast to the ‘vulnerable, open and sensitive’ frequent nightmare sufferers described 
by Hartmann (1984). It may also be, as concluded by Hartmann (1996), that patients 
with repetitive posttraumatic nightmares have different personalities characteristics 
from those who develop ordinary nightmares. He states that the patients in his study 
with PTSD ‘definitely did not have the very thin boundaries found in those with life 
long nightmares’ (Hartmann, 1996, p 112). It may thus be thick-boundariness that 
results in the very low level of nightmare distress.
This finding of low nightmare distress in a population with an elevated 
frequency of nightmares is intriguing. Krakow et al (2002) studied nightmare 
frequency and nightmare distress in sexual assault survivors with PTSD, and found a 
high association between nightmare distress and nightmare frequency. However, 
unlike the current study these participants were recruited specifically to treat their 
complaint of bad dreams, and Krakow et al suggest that their correlation between 
nightmare frequency and distress may not be generalisable to other types of chronic 
nightmare sufferers. Thus, it may be that correlations between nightmare distress and 
frequency differ according to the population studied.
Summary of novel findings
This study has found that PTSD score is related to nightmare frequency in a 
sample of emergency workers who have experienced various traumatic scenes over a 
long period of time. Possibly due to their self-selection as a group, and their social 
support, they do not report distress about their nightmares, which are more frequent
than in the general population. Sleep efficiency was related to the incidence of trauma 
nightmares.
Limitations of this study
1. This study relied on the use of retrospective reports in order to increase 
compliance. There may be a problem with this in that retrospective reports have been 
found to underestimate the frequency of nightmares (as reviewed in the Introduction, 
chapter 1). However, to mitigate this problem it can firstly be noted that Schreuder et 
al (1998) investigated PTSD patients and reported a strong correlation between 
retrospective nightmare frequency and serial reports of nightmares collected for 28 
days, and, secondly, that in a design using non-parametric correlations a linear 
reduction of scores does not affect the inferential results.
2. It would have been interesting to obtain some brief measure of dream 
content in order to fully appreciate the nature of the nightmare, as was done by Wood 
et al (1992) for the San Francisco earthquake.
3. The frequency of traumatic dreams rather than just their occurrence would 
have been a more sensitive measure.
Study 4 builds on this study by having a population that is also high in PTSD 
but that is far less self-selecting, in that they have had traumatic brain injury. It also 
reprises a theme from study 2, in that complete cessation of dreaming is investigated 
as an interfering factor in the production of nightmares.
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Chapter 14
Study 4: Nightmares and traumatic brain injury
Introduction
Study 3 involved the relationships between numerous traumas, of various 
intensities, sleep and dreams/nightmares. Study 4 involves the relationship of a single 
trauma, head injury, to sleep and dreams/nightmares. As in study 3 there are 
mediating variables between the trauma, sleep and dreams, such as anxiety and 
depression, as well as the memory of the trauma. There are novel factors for this 
study, in that there can have been amnesia from the trauma, and in that the brain 
injury might affect dream production.
Head and brain injury
Head injury can cause damage to the brain because of contusion, brain 
laceration, intracranial haematoma, or contrecoup injury. Diffuse closed head injury 
often results in the shearing of nerve fibres, often in the frontal and temporal lobes 
(Ommaya and Gennarelli, 1974). Secondary damage can also occur because of 
intracranial hypertension, hypoxia, anaemia, metabolic anomalies, hydrocephalus, and 
subarachnoid haemorrhage (Jennett and Teasdale, 1981).
Mild traumatic brain injury (TBI) involves a loss of consciousness for up to 30 
minutes and a posttraumatic amnesia (PTA) of less than 24 hours (American Congress 
of Rehabilitation Medicine, 1993) and /or a Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) of 13-15 on
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admission to hospital (Russell & Smith, 1961). Severe TBI involves a period of coma 
of at least 6 hours and/or a period of PTA of at least one day (McMillian and 
Greenwood, 2003).
Prevalence of TBI
Jennett and MacMillian (1981) have estimated that the annual number of 
hospital admissions in Britain involving head injury is between 250 and 300 per 
100,000 of the population. It is suggested that, of these, 75% are classified as mild 
head injury (MHI; Kraus & Nouijah, 1988), whereas only 8% are classified as severe 
(Artiola et al. 1980). Jennett and Frankowski (1990) have estimated that in 
industrialised countries the main cause of all head injuries are road traffic accidents 
(RTA; approx 45%), falls (approx 30%), occupational accidents (approx 10%), 
recreational accidents (10%) and assaults (approx 5%).
In the United States, more than 80,000 individuals sustain permanent disability 
from TBI each year. TBI affects people of all ages and is the leading cause of long­
term disability among young adults. The impact of TBI can be widespread, extending 
from cognitive, behavioural, and physical impairments to functional domains such as 
work, interpersonal relationships and leisure activities (Mailhan et al 2005).
Emotionality
Survivors of TBI are at risk of a range of neuropsychiatric and behavioural 
disorders; emotional disturbances such as anxiety and depression are particularly 
common. Following a TBI an individual is required to adjust to the new situation and
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to come to terms with losses and limitations. They may experience a sense of being 
out of control and feel insecure about the future.
Depression
Depression has been reported in 10% to 75% of TBI patients. A number of 
recent studies have reported rates between 30% and 60% (Busch, 1998; Hibbard et al 
1998; Satz et al 1998; Bowen et al, 1999; Douglas, 2000; Curran, 2000). Fleminger et 
al (2003) state that the prevalence of depression after TBI is in the order of 20-40% in 
the first year, and that about 50% of people suffer from depression at some point after 
their injury. Jorge et al (1993b) examined 66 consecutively admitted TBI patients to a 
trauma centre. These patients underwent psychiatric interview one month after injury 
and were reassessed at 3, 6 and 12 months. At one month 26% were diagnosed with 
major depression using the Hamilton Rating scales, and 3% were diagnosed with 
minor depression. It was found that at 3, 6 and 12 months the rate of depression 
remained relatively constant, being 22.2%, 23.2% and 18.6% respectively. Of those 
not diagnosed as depressed at 1 month, 10% developed depression at 3 months. New 
cases were further diagnosed at the rate of 15% at 6 months, and 12% at 12 months. 
Similar findings have been reported by Kersel et al (2001) and Bowen et al (1999). 
Thus, an important conclusion to be drawn from such studies is that depression is no 
more common in the acute phase than in the latter stages of recovery during the first
year after TBI. ------------  -----------
However, a higher prevalence of depression has been reported in studies that 
recruited TBI patients at varying times post injury. Kreutzer et al (2001) examined 
722 patients with mild to severe brain injuries. Average time post injury was 2.5 
years, with a rangeof 3 months to 9 years. The authors found that 42% met the DSM-
IV criteria for a major depressive episode. These findings are in line with Hibbard et 
al (1998) and Hoofien et al (2001). The former studies diagnosed 48% with major 
depression post-TBI. The sample consisted of 100 TBI patients of varying levels of 
severity averaging 7.6 years post injury. Hoofien et al (2001) found that 45% of their 
76 patients with severe TBI, and on average 14.1 years post-injury, were suffering 
from depression, as indicated by an elevated score on the Symptom Checklist 90- 
Revised. Generally such studies show that the prevalence of depression with TBI 
patients increases with time after the first year post injury.
Irritability and anger
Severe (Brooks et al. 1987) and mild (Haboubi et al. 2001; Debs et al. 1999) 
brain injury frequently lead to problems of anger and irritability. This may be the 
result of organic damage, abnormal electrical discharge or an emotional response to 
disabilities or indeed a learnt behavioural pattern for expressing needs (Alderman, 
2003).
Quality of life (OoL)
There is substantial evidence that severe and moderate TBI (and often even 
mild TBI) affects several statuses that are central to most people’s definition of 
quality of life. In a review article Dijkers (2004) stated that reduced QoL after TBI 
was common. In a fairly representative brain iry ured sample, Smithr Magil-Evans and 
Britnell (1998) reported QoL measures that were comparable to ratings of a different 
study consisting of spinal cord injured patients (Fuhrer et al, 1992); both had lower 
overall ratings than a study with non-injured adults (Wilier et al. 1994).
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Interestingly, Talbot and Giroux (2000) found that patients with minor head 
injuries tend to under-estimate their perceived QoL when compared to close relative’s 
ratings, whereas more severely injured people overestimate their rating. This finding 
may relate to the difference in levels of awareness often evident in the two groups, in 
that less severely injured people have a more accurate level of insight into their 
difficulties.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
The psychological impact of the actual trauma, as opposed to the brain injury, 
has received relatively little empirical attention. It is well accepted in the general 
literature that PTSD symptoms are most likely following the experience of intense 
fear and helplessness during a traumatic event, particularly where there is a threat of 
death or serious injury to self or others (Diagnostic Statistical Manual IV, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Some have argued that PTSD cannot develop after 
TBI because the coma and organic amnesia associated with TBI prevent the 
experience of the trauma and as a result anxiety based on re-experience cannot 
develop (Bontke et al, 1996; Sbordone, 1992). However, recently there has been 
mounting evidence that PTSD can occur in both minor and severe head injury, 
although their mechanisms may differ (Bryant, 2001; McMillian, 1996).
PTSD and Mild TBI  _____
Sbordone and Liter (1995) found no evidence of PTSD in a post-concussional 
symptom group. However, this study can be criticised on the grounds that it was 
retrospective and non-blind. Furthermore, no standardised measures of PTSD were 
used and there were a large proportion of males in their sample. Mayou et al. (1993)
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studied 188 RTA survivors and reported that none of the sample that displayed PTSD 
had sustained loss of consciousness. However, the generalisability of this study can be 
questioned because individuals who reported loss of consciousness for over 15 
minutes were excluded. Moreover, the study did not specify how TBI was 
operationalised, and reliance on medical notes may have resulted in a loose definition 
of TBI.
Several controlled studies, though, have demonstrated that PTSD can occur 
following mild TBI despite a loss of consciousness during the event (e.g., Black and 
Bryant, 2000; Bryant and Harvey, 1995, 1999; Harvey and Bryant, 1998). Reports of 
PTSD have also been demonstrated in more uncontrolled studies. For example, 
Grigsby and Kaye (1993) reported PTSD in one third of patients who had whiplash 
injury or an undefined range of severity of TBI. Hickling et al (1998) found that 36% 
of 107 RTA survivors with mild TBI developed PTSD; 16 of their sample had lost 
consciousness and 9 of these had PTSD symptoms. Various single case reports of 
PTSD following minor TBI have also been reported (Horton, 1993; Layton et al.
1995; McGrath, 1997; Silver et al. 1997).
PTSD and severe TBI
The possibility of PTSD developing following a severe TBI is particularly 
controversial because the injury involves an extended period of PTA. In many cases 
these indi viduals suffer very significant periods o f  retrograde and anterograde 
amnesia, such that they do not recall any episodes of the traumatic experience.
To date there have been no controlled studies assessing PTSD in individuals 
with severe brain injury although there has been a number of uncontrolled studies
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suggesting that it can occur (e.g., Hibbard et al, 1998; McMillian, 1996; Ohry et al,
1996; Williams et al, 2002). However, Warden et al (1997) report 47 military 
personnel with severe TBI, none of whom had PTSD according to DSM-III-R criteria, 
although 14% had avoidance and arousal symptoms. A number of single case studies 
of PTSD following severe TBI (with significant periods of amnesia) have been 
reported (Bryant, 1996; King, 1997; Layton et al, 1995; McNeil and Greenwood,
1996; Silver et al. 1997; Williams et al 2002). Many of these case studies reported 
intrusive imagery or flashbacks in which the content was thematically related to the 
trauma sustained.
Bryant et al (2000a) reported a 6-month follow up of 96 patients. They found 
that 27% fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for PTSD using an interview schedule based 
on DSM-III criteria, but intrusive memories were reported in only 19.2% of TBI 
patients with PTSD. This contrasts with the rate of intrusive memories in PTSD after 
assault (93%) (Fleiss et al. 1981), terrorist activity (85%) (Loughrey et al 1993) and 
RTAs (65%) (Blanchard et al. 1994). This suggests that the profile of PTSD in TBI is 
distinct from other PTSD populations. They found that the symptoms with the highest 
positive predictive power of PTSD in TBI patients were intrusive memories, 
nightmares and emotional reactivity. Again these findings contrast with those of 
previous reports in which the symptoms of trauma reexperiencing had only moderate 
positive predictive power (Foa et al, 1995). ........
Thus, it seems that PTSD can develop after minor or severe TBI, despite loss 
of consciousness and post traumatic amnesia.
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Diagnostic problems
There are a number of problems in diagnosing PTSD after TBI. There is 
considerable overlap between ASD/PTSD and TBI in terms of dissociative
I
I (Alexander, 1995; Grisby, 1986; Sivec and Lynn, 1995), reexperiencing, arousal and
|
' neurological (Bryant, 2001) and post-concussive (Bohnen and Jolles, 1992)
I
symptoms. The problem in differentiating these TBI symptoms and PTSD are 
exacerbated by the absence of reliable means to differentiate between organically and 
emotionally mediated symptoms. A further problem in diagnosing PTSD in TBI 
patients is the tendency of TBI patients to underestimate their symptoms (Prigitano et 
al 1990). Finally, it has been demonstrated that litigation is associated with higher 
levels of symptom reporting following TBI (Lees-Haley and Brown, 1993).
Mechanisms underlying PTSD after TBI
There are several proposed mechanisms by which people may develop PTSD 
following TBI. It could be that memory for events shortly before the traumatic event 
may become the source of memory intrusions, and islands of memory during post- 
traumatic amnesia may also form a substrate for intrusive experiences (McMillian,
1996). However, Williams et al (2002) found that having a memory for the event was 
not necessarily associated with PTSD, whereas Gil et al (2005) found that memory of 
a traumatic event was a strong predictor and potential risk factor for the subsequent 
development of PTSD. Theseuuthors state that the relative^isk-for PTSTX among the 
participants with memory of the trauma was almost five times higher than among 
those without memory of the traumatic event, although 6% of the patients without 
memory for the traumatic event had PTSD, suggesting that PTSD can develop in the 
absence of memory of the traumatic event. However, as the authors acknowledge, it
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may be that false memory of the traumatic event can increase the risk for PTSD, or 
alternatively, that a lack of confidence in one’s own memory can serve as a protective 
factor against PTSD.
Benefits of memory disruption
Gil et al (2005) cite findings from Lavie and Kaminer (2001) who found in a 
study of Holocaust survivors that decreased dream recall is correlated with better 
adjustment to the trauma, and hence may serve a defensive function. It has also been 
proposed that ‘deliberate’ disruption of memory of the traumatic event may prove 
therapeutically beneficial. The assertion was addressed in a double-blind study that 
examined the severity of acute PTSD symptoms among 18 subjects who were given 
40 mg of propranolol 6 hours after trauma in comparison to the severity of symptoms 
among 23 participants who received a placebo (Pitman et al 2002). The results 
demonstrated that participants in the experimental group tended to exhibit lower 
levels of PTSD symptoms 10 days after the traumatic event. Thus, these findings 
suggest that lack of memory of the traumatic event may protect against the 
development of PTSD but also that the pharmacologically induced disruption of the 
consolidation of traumatic memories can be therapeutically beneficial for trauma 
survivors.
Implicit memory - - --------- ------ -----
Brewin et al (1996) described a dual representational theory of PTSD, which 
recognises that memories may be encoded and stored at an implicit level. There is 
evidence that individuals with PTSD selectively respond to subliminal threat stimuli 
(Harvey, Bryant and Rapee, 1996). These patterns suggest that implicit encoding of
trauma related material occurs in PTSD. Brewin’s theory proposes that traumatic 
experiences can be encoded and stored as verbally accessible memories (VAMs) or as 
situationally accessible memories (SAMs). The latter may be experienced as 
flashbacks, or somatic sensations that are reminiscent of the traumatic experience. 
Thus, the theory suggests that during periods of impaired consciousness associated 
with TBI, individuals may encode features of their traumatic experience implicitly 
(for a review see Schacter, Chiu and Ochsner, 1993). Therefore, even when areas of 
the brain that store declarative memories are disrupted, implicit memories may be 
accessed during exposure to situations similar to those in which the original trauma 
occurred. There is evidence that the main reexperiencing symptoms that occur 
following severe TBI are psychological distress or physiological reactivity in response 
to reminders of the trauma (Bryant, Marosszeky, Crooks, Baguley and Gurka, 2001), 
rather than declarative memories of the traumatic events (Bryant et al. 2000). Thus, 
this theory can account for the development of PTSD following severe TBI.
Fear Conditioning
It has been argued that the physiological arousal of PTSD reflects extreme fear 
conditioning and that this ongoing arousal results in associations between trauma 
reminders and anxiety responses (Kolb, 1987), and is mediated in limbic structures 
(van der Kolk, 1996). Therefore, this view allows for the possibility that people who 
lose consciousness as a result of a TBI may still experience fear conditioning to the 
traumatic event. There is much evidence that PTSD subjects display marked 
physiological reactivity to trauma-specific stimuli (Orr and Kaloupek, 1997)..
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Memory reconstruction after TBI
PTSD patients may feel emotional pain and feel as though they need to create 
a memory for the event. Thus, reported memories may be consistent with the patient’s 
emotional state but consist of a reconstruction of events containing information given 
to them by others as well as their own imaginings (Bryant et al. 1998; Bryant et al 
2000; McMillian, 1996). For example, Harvey and Bryant (2001) found that 40% of 
mild TBI patients who suffered from significant memory loss in the first months after 
their trauma reported that they had full recall for the event when they were re-assessed 
2 years later. Bryant (1996) reported a series of case studies that illustrates the 
reconstructive nature of trauma memories following severe TBI. Other case reports 
describe severe TBI patients developing images of the event based on police reports, 
dreams and other secondary sources (Bryant, 1996; McMillian, 1991, 1996).
Summary of relationships between PTSD and TBI
Although it has been argued that the loss of memory may protect against the 
development of PTSD (Sbordone and Leiter, 1995), this assertion has not received 
much support, although some authors propose that intrusive re-experiencing may be 
less frequent, less vivid and less severe in individuals with a brain injury (McMillian, 
1996; Turnbull et al 2001). However, the literature (as briefly reviewed above) 
suggests that PTSD occurs in a wide range of severity of TBI and that no clear 
relationship has been demonstrated between severity of PTSD and severity o f  TBI 
(Feinstein et al, 2002). Severity of PTSD may instead be related to recall of the 
trauma, new learning, executive ability and coping strategies (McMillian et al, 2003) 
and insight (Evans et al, 2002), such that those with less insight report less intense 
symptoms.
377
i '
[
Excessive daytime time sleepiness following head injury 
| Daytime sleepiness is one of the most important symptoms of TBI (Beetar et
I al. 1996). Beetar et al (1996) reported that 17% of their 202 TBI group reported
| excessive daytime somnolence during outpatient’s appointments. Castriotta and Lai
i (2001) studied 10 patients with TBI who complained of excessive daytime sleepiness
and all but one were classified as having EDS. In contrast, the prevalence of excessive 
daytime sleepiness in the general population is generally considered to be 0.5% - 5% 
(Benbadis et al. 1999), although reports from questionnaires vary from 0.3% to 13.3% 
(D’Alessandro etal. 1995).
Guilleminault et al (2000) assessed 184 patients with a history of head trauma 
who were complaining of excessive daytime sleepiness. On the MSLT it was found 
that mean sleep onset time was less than 5 minutes in 28% of the subject and less than 
10 minutes in 82% of the subjects. A MSLT of less than 5 minutes is considered 
■ pathological and normal volunteers tend to score within the range of 10 to 20 minutes.
Sleep disorders after TBI
The prevalence of sleep disorders following TBI is between 50-73% 
(Castriotta et al. 2001; Cazalis et al. 2001 Clinchot et al. 1998). These include 
narcolepsy (Lankford et al, 1994), apnoea (Guilleminault et al, 1983, 2000; Masel et 
al, 2001) and periodic limb movement disorder (Masel et al, 2001), each occurring 
 with prevalencies well in excess of the general population.
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Sleep disturbances
Daytime sleepiness and sleep disturbance are among the most universal 
symptoms of TBI (Beetar et al. 996; Castriotta and Lai, 2001; Parsons and ver Beek, 
1982; Deb, Lyons and Koutzoukis, 1998). TBI may result in damage to sleep 
regulating centres, including the reticular activating system and/or its connections, 
and the suprachiasmatic nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus, which regulate sleep 
timing (Evans, 2002; Boivin et al. 2003; Quinto et al. 2000). Furthermore, the 
experience of trauma and/or having to adjust to ongoing disability may cause mood 
changes, which may themselves result in sleep problems (Thaxon et al. 2002). Such 
sleep disturbance may then affect recovery from a head injury, quality of life and 
general health (Rao et al. 2002).
The prevalence of sleep disturbances following recent traumatic brain injury 
has been reported to range from 36% (McLean et al. 1984) to as high as 70% 
(Keshavan et al. 1981). Several polysomnographic studies that have been carried out 
in patients after traumatic brain injury have indicated various sleep-wake pattern 
disturbances (Appenzeller and Fisher, 1968; Feinberg et al, 1969;Markland and 
Dyken, 1976).
Objective sleep changes
Leonard and Pennigstroff (1970) found an increase in stage 2 sleep, a decrease
in stages 3-4 and no change in the amount of REM sleep. Harada et al (1976), ____
however, found a decrease in REM activity and an increase in spindles and K 
complexes in stage 2 sleep. Other studies have demonstrated a decrease in the amount 
of both rapid eye movement (REM) sleep and slow wave sleep and an increase in the 
number of awakenings from sleep in patients with TBI (George et al, 1981; Prigatano
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et al, 1982; Ron et al, 1980). Recovery can occur but may be subject to psychosocial 
influences (Fichtenberg et al, 2000). For example, Cohen et al (1992) found disorders 
of initiating and maintaining sleep (DIMS) were common following recent TBI, but in 
a group of discharged patients 29.5 months after injury, 52% complained of excessive 
daytime somnolence whereas only 8% reported DIMS.
Dagan et al (1991) suggested that patients may suffer from insomnia at the 
acute phase, however, some may go on to develop obsessive thoughts about their 
sleep, leading them to continue believing they are suffering from a sleep disturbance, 
which may, in fact have objectively improved. However, Kauftnan et al (2000) 
highlight the difficulty in discriminating between the organic and psychological 
effects of a head injury. They argue that there data suggested insomniac pattern 
caused by mental stress rather than brain injury, and propose that the fear of going to 
sleep, fearful awakenings from sleep and frightening dreams, resemble findings 
observed in patients with PTSD. However, Perlis (1997) found that individuals with 
mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) and post-concussive syndrome reported 
significantly more problems with sleep compared to orthopaedic controls, particularly 
in relation to initiating and maintaining sleep. This suggests that factors other than the 
psychological trauma may play a role in this sleep disturbance.
Parcell et al (2006) assessed the incidence of self-reported sleep disturbances 
in a community based cohort of patients with blunt TBI relative to that of a group of 
age and sex-matched healthy controls. A community-based sample was used as 
patients in hospitals or institutionalised settings tend to have sleep times and daily 
routines imposed on them as well as factors such as noise, room sharing and
discomfort. 63 participants with TBI were consecutively recruited after discharge 
from rehabilitation and there were 63 controls from the general community. 
Participants were required to keep a sleep and wake diary for 1 week detailing bed 
times, sleep onset, frequency and duration of night time awakenings, time of morning 
awakening, number and duration of daytime naps, sleep efficiency, caffeine and 
alcohol consumption. They also completed the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) and a 
general sleep questionnaire noting whether their sleep had changed and the nature of 
the change since their TBI or in the past 3 months in the case of the control group. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scales were also administered. The TBI group 
had a mean GCS of 9.58 and mean PTA of 19.84 days, with a range of 0 to 112 days. 
According to the PTA duration, 13% (n = 8) of the TBI sample had mild injuries 
(PTA< 24hrs), 21% (n=13) had moderate injuries (PTA l-7days), 44% (n= 27) had 
severe injuries (PTA 8-28 days ), and 22% (n=14) had very severe injuries (PTA > 4 
weeks). Table 69 shows the comparisons of frequency of reported sleep changes for 
both groups using chi squared analysis.
Table 69 -  Data from Parcell et al (2006) showing for a community based cohort of 
patients with blunt TBI the changes to their sleep since the TBI, and, in the control 
group, changes over the past 3 months
Reported change to sleep TBI (%) 
N= 63
Control (%) 
(n=63)
X2 P
Sleep has changed 80 23 40.20 <0.01
More night-time awakenings 46 5 27.03 <0.01
Longer sleep onset latency 44 5 25.46 <0.01
Deeper sleep 21 10 3.01 0.08
Lighter sleep 25 3 11.82 <0.01
Bedtime earlier 34 5 16.81 <0.01
Bedtime later 18 3 6.97 <0.01
Bed wetting 2 0 1.01 0.32
Table 69 demonstrates that the TBI group were more likely to report changes 
in their sleep than controls, with the most frequently reported changes being increased 
nighttime awakenings and more difficulty falling asleep. 52% of the TBI patients 
reported a change in bedtime (earlier or later after the injury) compared with only 8% 
of controls. The TBI group reported poorer sleep quality and greater daytime 
sleepiness (as assessed by the ESS) than the control group, although these differences 
were'not statistically significant. Scores for anxiety were simiiar forthe TBIgroup 
and the control group. In the TBI group, higher levels of anxiety were associated with 
increased time post injury and milder injury according to GCS. This may be a result 
of increased insight as post injury time elapses and to the higher demands placed on 
TBI individuals as they attempt to return to pre-injury activities.
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The TBI group scored significantly higher for depression relative to the 
control group. In the control group 98% scored in the normative range for depression 
and 2% had mild depression, however, in the TBI group, 62% scored in the normative 
range, 27% had mild depression and 5% had severe depression. No association was 
found between depression and time post injury or depression and injury severity using 
the GCS. On the sleep diary weekday and weekends were analysed separately. The 
TBI group reported significantly longer daytime naps; longer sleep onset latencies, 
later wakeup times and poorer sleep efficiency. On weekends the TBI group reported 
significantly earlier bedtimes, longer sleep onset latencies and poorer sleep efficiency 
than controls. Further analysis revealed that these differences were not due to 
employment status. The authors found that increased time since injury was associated 
with higher self-reported dajdime sleepiness and an increase in reported number of 
night time awakenings. Higher scores for anxiety on the HADS were associated with 
increased daytime sleepiness, more reported night time awakenings, reports of sleep 
changes and poorer sleep quality. Higher scores for depression were also associated 
with reports of sleep change and worse sleep quality as well as an increase in 
nighttime awakenings and bedwetting.
Insomnia after TBI may be caused by depression. Fichtenberg et al. (2000) 
examined 91 consecutive post acute TBI patients. The Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 
(PSQI: Buysse et al, 1989) was used as a measure of sleep quality and the BDI as a 
measure of depression. They concluded that in the post acute phase, depression and 
milder brain injuries (as measured by the GCS) demonstrated the strongest 
relationships with insomnia. They found no relationship between the diagnosis of
I insomnia and age, gender and years of education, months post-injury or litigation
i
, status, and pain had only a small association with insomnia.
The above review, showing that TBI is associated with various stresses and 
deficiencies in well-being, combined with the review in chapter 1 showing 
associations between poor well-being and nightmares, leads to our first hypothesis for 
study 4:
There will be a higher incidence of nightmares in people who have had 
Traumatic Brain Injuries compared to the general population.
There is, however, a caveat to this hypothesis that will now be described. This 
is that some individuals with brain injury lose the ability to have, or to recall, dreams. 
A subset of our sample of TBI patients would thus be expected to have no nightmares 
because the injury had caused them to stop having dreams. This is similar to the 
second study of this thesis, involving apnoea, where the disorder was hypothesised to 
be stressful, and thus to cause nightmares, but was also hypothesised in some patients 
to decrease the production or recall of dreams, and hence to lead to a lack of 
nightmares. The changes that brain injury causes to dreaming will now be reviewed.
Changes in dreaming after neurological disease 
— Irr l 883Charcot published the first case demonstrating that dreaming couldbe 
altered by neurological disease. Charcot reported that his patient Monsieur X had lost 
the ability to conjure up any visual mental images although his abstract memory was 
completely preserved. Monsieur X claimed that he had ‘absolutely lost this power of 
mental vision’, furthermore, he also reported a corresponding deficit within his
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dreams, claiming that he dreamt only of speech (Charcot, 1883/1889, p. 158). Solms 
(1997) argues that the clinical evidence of Charcot’s case suggested a vascular 
process in the distribution of the posterior cerebral arteries. A similar case was later 
reported by Wilbrand (1887): Autopsy revealed that his patient Fraulein G had a 
bilateral infarction in the occipito-temporal region (Wilbrand, 1892). His patient 
reported that prior to her illness she had dreamt frequently, whereas now she hardly 
dreamed at all. Hence, this syndrome became known as the ‘Charcot-Wilbrand 
syndrome’. Critchley (1953) defined this syndrome as a condition ‘whereby a patient 
loses the power to conjure up visual images or memories, and furthermore, ceases to 
dream during his sleeping hours’ (p. 311). The fundamental symptom was thought to 
be deficient revisualization or ‘visual irreminiscence’ (Nielsen, 1946), accompanied 
by an alteration in the visual component of dreaming, prosopagnosia, and 
topographical agnosia or amnesia.
Charcot and Wilbrand’s cases: two variants of dream abnormality
Solms (1997) highlights important differences between Charcot and 
Wilbrand’s classic cases. He points out that on careful inspection of the original case 
reports it is evident that Wilbrand’s case suffered an abnormality of visual recognition 
rather than a defective visual imagery and, hence, lacked the cardinal symptom of the 
Charcot-Wilbrand syndrome - visual irreminiscence. Charcot’s case ceased to dream 
in visual images but continued, to dream in words, whereas Wilbrand’s patient hardly 
dreamt at all. Thus, the former patient appeared to lose the visual aspect of his 
dreams, whereas the latter lost the ability to dream at all for some period of time, or 
dreamt much less frequently. Solms argues that Charcot’s variant of the syndrome 
may be an incomplete form of Wilbrand’s variant. The latter assumption would imply
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that the lesion sites of the two variants of the Charcot-Wilbrand syndrome should 
overlap as should the clinical presentations of the patients.
Solms (1997): The neuropsychology of dreams
Mark Solms interviewed 361 consecutive neurological patients about changes 
in the nature and frequency of their dreaming since the onset of their illness. From 
I these clinco-anatomical studies and review of the previous literature Solms (1997)
| postulated that there were 4 major disorders of dreaming after head injury. These
I
being, cessation of visual dream imagery (reported by 1.1% of the effective sample),
! global cessation of dreaming (34.9%), confusion between dreams and reality (5.3%)
i[
| and recurring nightmares (7.9%). Solms also found that patients reported a number of
!
| other subtle changes in their dreams; some were qualitatively similar to the gross
|
I changes described above, however, these were not considered to be clinical disorders
i
of dreaming, although evidence suggested that some of these were sub-clinical forms 
of the major disorders. For instance, some patients reported reduced vivacity of visual 
dream imagery (a sub-clinical variant of cessation of visual dream imagery), reduced 
frequency of dreaming and reduced narrative complexity and emotional intensity of 
dreaming (possible sub-clinical variants of global cessation of dreaming), increased 
vivacity of dreaming and increased frequency of dreaming (possible sub-clinical 
variants of the confusion between dreams and reality) and, finally, some patients 
reported increased frequency of (nonrecurring) nightmares(a possible sub-climcal 
variant of recurring nightmares). Completely normal dreaming was only reported by 
8.6% of the cerebrally impaired patients.
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Solms found that all four of the major disorders of dreaming correlated with 
I specific sites or types of lesion, however, this was not the case for the sub-clinical
f
changes in dreaming, thus, he points out that these sub-clinical types are of scientific 
' interest but are of limited diagnostic value.
Solms used a control group of 29 non-head injured individuals who had 
undergone similar trauma and hospital procedures as the study group. None of the 
clinical disorders of dreaming were reported in the control group with the exception 
of global cessation of dreaming, which was reported by one of the control participants 
(a case of hysteria). Of the controls, 34.5% reported no changes in their dreams since 
the onset of their physical symptoms.
Anatomical correlates of global cessation of dreaming
In his review of all the previously published cases of global cessation of 
dreaming with focal damage, Solms (2002) states that the lesions fell into two 
anatomical subgroups. The majority of these had parietal lobe lesions, or space 
occupying lesions in close proximity to the parietal lobe. The critical area seems to be 
the inferior parietal lobule. It has been suggested that lesions to Brodmann’s areas 39 
and 40 are the most restricted damage sufficient to produce the syndrome (Hobson et 
al. 2003). There appears to be no lateral bias between the hemispheres.
The second group had deep bifrontal lesions, more specifically the lesion was 
situated in the white matter immediately anterior to the frontal horns of the lateral 
ventricles; in these cases the damage was invariably bilateral. This observation is 
supported by Frank (1946), who found that loss of dreaming was a common result of
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prefrontal leukotomy. Anatomical evidence has suggested that the white matter 
implicated in this syndrome is composed essentially of the fibre tracts connecting 
ventral midbrain nuclei with the limbic system (e.g. cingulated gyrus and nucleus 
accumbens) and frontal cortex. Bilateral damage to the white matter in the vicinity of 
the frontal horns of the lateral ventricles was found to be the most restricted site 
causing the syndrome.
This pattern of effects of the two types of lesions led Solms to his 
neurocognitive theory of dreaming, in which he proposed a ‘backward projection’ 
mechanism of dream formation, whereby abstract thinking in anterior areas of the 
brain is converted into concrete perceptions in posterior areas.
Imaging studies of REM sleep
Functional imaging studies have been remarkably complementary to the lesion 
data (Braun et al 1997, 1998; Heiss et al 1985; Madsen et al, 1991; Maquet et al,
1996; Nofzinger et al, 1997). Imaging studies have demonstrated specific activation 
of limbic and paralimbic regions of the forebrain in REM sleep compared to waking 
(Braun et al. 1997; 1998; Maquet et al. 1996; Nofzinger et al. 1997). Such findings, 
Hobson et al (2003) argue, imply that dream emotions may be the primary shaper of 
dream plots rather than following secondary to the dream plot. Nofzinger et al. (1997) 
concluded from their PET study that an important function of REM sleep is the
integration of neocoxticalfiinction with basal forebrain and hypothalamic_______
motivational and reward mechanisms. PET studies have also demonstrated significant 
deactivation of a large area of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in REM (Braun et al.
1997; Maquet et al. 1996). Single photon emission computer tomography (SPECT) 
and fMRI have demonstrated a similar decrease in cerebral blood flow to frontal areas
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during REM (Lovblad et al. 1999; Madsen et al. 1991a). However, these findings 
need to be replicated. The latter observations are of interest in terms of the cognitive
deficits in memory, orientation and self-reflective awareness during dreaming. These
f
| findings suggest that the forebrain activation and synthesis processes underlying
r
I waking and dreaming are very different. Thus, the combination of the preferential 
activation of subcortical and cortical limbic structures which mediate emotion and the 
relative inactivation of the lateral prefrontal cortex involved in directive thought 
paints an overall impression of REM sleep (and REM dreaming) as an emotion driven 
state with deficits in orientation, memory, volition and directive thought.
Global cessation of dreaming: Posterior variant
The finding that the parieto-temporal-occipital junction is involved in 
dreaming is not new (Doricchi & Violani, 1992; Greenberg & Farah, 1986). Murri et 
al (1985) assessed dream recall in 19 patients with unilateral hemispheric lesions of a 
vascular or neoplastic nature. Dream recall was investigated using both morning recall 
diaries and REM awakenings. They reported that the site of the lesion appeared to be 
the only factor significantly influencing dream recall. Patients unable to report 
dreaming on provoked awakenings often had lesions in the temporo-parieto-occipital 
region. Furthermore, Cathala et al (1983) using the REM awakening method in 
patients with unilateral or bilateral lesions in the frontal or parietal regions, also
 reported a  reduction in dream activity mainly in patients with parietal lobe lesions.
Of the 361 patients interviewed by Solms, 34.9% reported that they had 
stopped dreaming completely since the onset of their illness. Of the 132 patients who 
reported changes in their dreaming, Solms (1997) found 112 patients with forebrain
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lesions who lost dreaming for varying periods of time or permanently. Looking only 
at the non-dreaming patients with localized lesions he found that 47 of these patients 
had focal lesions in one or both parietal lobes. Solms found that 45 of the 47 non­
dreaming patients with definite parietal lesions had unilateral lesions, and the 
laterality of these lesions was equally distributed between the two hemispheres. Thus, 
this suggests that global cessation of dreaming arises with equal frequency with left 
and right posterior cortical lesions. Hence, this is in agreement with the assertions of 
Doricchi and Violani (1992) that simple right-dominant versus left-dominant theories 
of dreaming are ‘’too generic and potentially misleading’. Also, as Solms points out, 
findings on image generation have also suggested that ‘both hemispheres can generate 
images’ (Kosslyn, 1994, p.319). This finding led Solms (1997) to the hypothesis that 
the cortical network for spatial representations, located primarily in the parietal lobes 
(Roberston, 1998), is essential for dreaming.
Deficits following left parietal lobe lesion
The left parietal lobe lesion associated with loss of dreaming was also found to 
be associated with left - right confusion and finger agnosia (2 of the components 
believed to make up Gerstmann syndrome). Thus, it is reasoned that a disorder in the 
function of this part of the brain results in the inability to represent perceptual 
information symbolically. Primary perceptual abilities appear to remain intact but
patients lose-the-abilityTo extract higher-order abstraction from perceptual______
information in all modalities. Thus, they are not able to conceptualise concrete 
information and perform symbolic operations on it. Therefore, this suggests that 
abstraction, conceptualisation and symbolization are essential component functions in 
the process of dreaming. This ability to derive abstract concepts from spatially
organised heteromodal information was termed ‘quasi-spatial synthesis’ (Luria, 1973, 
1980). Solms (2002) details psychoanalytic observations of a patient with a focal 
lesion in the left parietal lobe (more specifically the lesion was localised to the 
supramarginal gyrus, but extending anteriorly to include the primary sensorimotor 
cortex). The patient, Mr. L, was found to demonstrate a real absence of constructive 
thoughts or even simply of active associations. He appeared to lack the capacity for 
elaboration or abstraction at any level. Although his ‘ego activities’ were judged to be 
rational and appropriate, they were extremely impoverished, restricted and concrete. 
He was ‘mentally blank, save for these fragmentary islands which he tried desperately 
to join together, usually without success’ (Solms, 2002, p. 123). Mr. L also reported 
global cessation of dreaming. When Mr. L began regaining explicit continuous 
memories of his life and showed evidence of spontaneous thought, so he too began to 
dream again. This was very important to Mr. L as he felt it was ‘a vital sign of inner 
life and of psychological recovery’ (Solms, 2002, p. 128). Luria’s (1972) famous case 
Comrade Zasetsky, who temporarily ceased to dream, also suffered a similar wound 
to the left parieto-occipital region.
Deficits following right parietal lobe lesion
Solms found that loss of dreaming caused by right inferior parietal lobe lesions 
was also accompanied by deficits of visuospatial short-term memory performance. 
Again, these patients do not present with primary perceptual difficulties, but rather 
they cannot hold perceptual information in consciousness, in simultaneous 
visuospatial patterns, and this applies to both externally and internally generated 
information. Solms concludes that ‘dreaming and visuospatial working memory share
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the same elementary component function that is contributed by this part of the brain’ 
(Solms, 2002, p.47)
II
These findings suggest that both symbolic quasi-spatial functions and concrete
I
i spatial functions are fundamental to the process of dreaming (Solms, 1997; 2000), 
which is also supported by evidence from a neuroimaging study that showed 
activation of the right inferior parietal cortex during REM sleep (Maquet et al. 1996)
Some patients with parietal damage continue to dream
Solms also found that a large number of his patients with parietal lobe damage 
continued to dream. It was found that the dreaming and non-dreaming patients with 
parietal damage could not be distinguished on the basis of pathology type. However, 
Solms noted that the mean number of weeks elapsed since the last neurological insult 
was somewhat lower for the non-dreaming patients than for the dreaming patients 
(non-dreaming group, mean tine since neurological insult = 30.8 weeks, dreaming 
group, mean time = 97.2 weeks). Hence, this suggests that some of the dreaming 
subjects with parietal lesions may have been non-dreamers at an earlier stage in their 
illness. In order to analysis the issue of recovery from cessation of dreaming Solms 
followed up 13 of these non-dreaming cases. 10 of these started to dream again within 
1 year of the last neurological insult. However, he states that there are at least some 
patients who do not recovery dreaming and that these tend to have extensive right 
hemisphere damage.
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j Cessation of dreaming: anterior variant
t[
| Of the patients with localising lesions reporting cessation of dreaming, Solms
(1997) reported that nine of these had bifrontal lesions in the white matter inferior to
the frontal homs of the lateral ventricles. This area provides a crucial link between 
limbic structures and frontal cortex. Solms found that in the bifrontal cases, global 
cessation of dreaming correlated significantly with adynamia (lack of spontaneous 
motivational impetus), disinhibition and perseveration (these symptoms are classically 
associated with frontal lobe dysfunction). Solms found that adynamia statistically 
discriminated between dreamers and non-dreamers, and argues that the frontal lobe 
syndrome in non-dreaming patients is thus of the mediobasal variety. Solms reasoned 
that the fundamental component factor which is disordered by damage to this part of 
the brain is spontaneous motivation, and thus dreaming is a meaningful psychological 
event. Interestingly, the precise lesion that causes this type of loss of dreaming was 
the same as that targeted in the modified prefrontal leukotomy procedure used as a 
treatment for severe mental illness (Panksepp, 1985), and loss of dreaming was one 
effect of that procedure (Frank, 1946, 1950; Jus et al. 1973). In contrast, Doricchi and 
Volani (1992) reported that the preservation of dreaming with frontal lobe lesions was 
their ‘most robust and consistent conclusion’ (Doricchi & Volani, 1992; pi 18). Solms 
explains this apparent contradiction, arguing that authors reporting a low incidence of 
loss of dreaming among frontal cases studied only patients with unilateral and/or 
convexity lesions, whereas those reporting a high incidence of loss of dreaming 
among frontal cases studied only patients with bilateral, white matter lesions. Indeed, 
Solms reported a number of patients with bifrontal lesions who reported preservation 
of dreaming, however, the majority of these patients had lesions in the cortical 
convexity of the frontal lobes.
Why is the ventromesial quadrant of the frontal lobes so important to
dreaming?
Solms (1997, 2003) argues that the ventromesial quadrant of the frontal lobes 
contains substantial numbers of fibres connecting frontal and limbic structures with 
dopaminergic cells in the ventral tegmentum area (VTA). These circuits arise from a 
group of cells in the VTA, where the source cells for the mesocortical and mesolimbic 
dopamine systems are situated. They ascend through the forebrain bundles of the 
lateral hypothalamus via basal forebrain areas and they terminate in the amygdala, 
anterior cingulated gyrus, and frontal cortex. It has been suggested that this circuit 
instigates goal seeking behaviours and appetitive interaction with the world 
(Panksepp, 1985; 1998b), and it is frequently described as the ‘seeking’ or ‘wanting’ 
command system of the brain (Panksepp, 1998a). It is considered to be the primary 
site of action of many stimulants (e.g. amphetamine and cocaine, see Role and Kelly, 
1991), with overactivity thought to result in the positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Bird, 1990) and also excessive, usually vivid, dreaming and nightmares (Nausieda et 
al. 1982; Scharf et al. 1978) in the absence of any effect on the intensity, frequency 
and duration of REM sleep (Hartmann et al. 1980). Furthermore, transaction or 
chemical inhibition of this circuit reduces the positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Breggin, 1980; Panksepp, 1985), some formal features of which have been equated 
with dreaming (Hobson, 1992,1988b). Indeed, drugs that block this circuit (e.g., 
haloperidol) inhibit excessive and usually vivid dreaming (Sacks, 1985,1990, 1991). 
Therefore, Solms argues that the mesocortical-mesolimbic dopamine system plays a 
causal role in the generation of dreams. This also accords with Braun et al’s (1997)
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neuroimaging study reporting increased activation of the caudal orbital frontal area 
during REM sleep in comparison to NREM sleep.
Is cessation or reduction of dreaming a memory disorder?
It is reasonable to ask whether patients reporting cessation of dreaming have 
actually stopped dreaming as a result of their neurological illness or whether they just 
cease to be able to remember their dreams. Hence, is cessation of dreaming a disorder 
of dreaming or a disorder of memory? In order to answer this question researchers 
have used two different methods. Firstly, the REM awakening technique has been 
used as it is generally accepted that most people experience dreams during REM 
sleep. It is argued that this technique minimises the potential for forgetting as even the 
most severe amnesiacs are able to recall what happened a few seconds ago. The 
second technique requires subjecting non-dreamers to formal neuropsychological tests 
in order to obtain objective scores of their current memory function, on the 
assumption that if these patients are forgetting their dreams they are also likely to 
forget other experiences.
Jus et al. (1973) awakened 9 amnesic patients who reported cessation of 
dreaming from REM defined sleep during two nights in a sleep laboratory. Of the 66 
REM awakenings only two elicited the report of a dream. This incidence of 3% is in 
sharp contrast to the 80% normally obtained. Murri et al. (1985) subjected 12 
participants who had been unable to recall any dreams over a 10-day observation 
period, together with seven patients who had been able to recall dreams over the 
observation period, to sleep laboratory investigation. (Note that the non-dreamers did 
not report global cessation of dreaming, they just had not recalled any dreams for 10
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days.) It was found that all seven of the dreamers frequently reported dreams on REM 
awakenings (75% of REM awakenings elicited dream reports), whereas only three of 
the 12 non-recallers reported dreams (17% of awakenings elicited dream reports). 
However, there were no differences between the groups in sleep profiles or in amount 
of REM sleep. Other studies have confirmed the subjective reports of dream cessation 
following neurological damage (Michel & Sieroff, 1981; Schanfald, Pearlman, and 
Greenberg, 1985). Thus, overall it seems that neurological patients’ reports of non­
dreaming can be confirmed by REM sleep awakenings: this suggests a disorder of 
dreaming and not a disorder of memory.
Studies assessing waking memory function of dreamers and non-dreamers 
have, however, been inconsistent. For example, Muri et al. (1984) found no 
relationship between dreaming and memory, yet Cathala et al. (1983) found strong 
positive correlations between tests of visual and verbal memory and frequency and 
informational richness of dream recall, and Arena et al (1984) found that the absence 
of dreaming was related to poor long-term verbal recall. Furthermore, Talland (1965) 
reported that 10 out of 20 patients with Korsakoff amnesia stated that they never 
dreamed and 8 reported that they only ever dreamed rarely. These assertions were also 
verified in a sleep laboratory. Greenberg et al. (1968) obtained only 1 dream report 
from 7 Korsakoff anmesics over several nights in a sleep laboratory with a total of 34 
REM awakening (3% recall rate). He states that most of the truly amnesic patients in 
his series stated that they were unsure of whether or not they were dreaming. Hence, 
these and other studies add support to the notion that global cessation of dreaming 
may be an artefact of general amnesia. However, Solms’ (1997) review of the 
previous literature found that in 79% of cases, global cessation of dreaming was not
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associated with general amnesia. Thus, it seems that many amnesiacs do not dream, 
but very few non-dreamers are actually amnesic. Bischof and Bassetti (2004) reported 
the case of a 73 old woman reporting a total dream loss after acute, bilateral occipital 
artery infarction (including the right inferior lingual gyrus), which lasted over three 
months. They found that a detailed neuropsychological assessment revealed normal 
results on tests of alertness and vigilance, verbal and non-verbal learning, and short­
term as well as long-term memory. The patient was also awakened five minutes after 
polysomnographic onset of the first REM period and 10, 15 and 20 minutes after the 
following REM periods. No dream was reported after these awakenings.
The literature can be summarised as supportive of Solms’ conclusions that 
‘although some cases with loss of dreaming may be dreaming but then forgetting their 
dream, in the majority of cases the dream disorder occurs independently of amnesia’ 
(p. 36), and that ‘subjective cessation of dreaming cannot be dismissed as an artefact 
of recent memory disorder as some authors have suggested’ (p 160).
In his own cohort of patients demonstrating cessation of dreaming, Solms 
showed that neither long-tenn memory disorder nor audioverbal short-term memory 
disorder were able to significantly discriminate between dreaming and non dreaming 
patients. Solms also noted that most of his truly amnesic patients were unsure as to 
whether they were still dreaming or not, as opposed to being sure they were not 
dreaming. (A note should be made, however, that Solms did in fact find that dreamers 
and non-dreamers were significantly different in relation to visuospatial short-term 
memory as measured by the immediate recall trial of the Complex Figure Test. 
However, when patients were separated according to lesion site it was found that this 
difference only applied to patients with parietal lesions and not to patients with 
bifrontal lesions.)
It will thus be important in study 4 to obtain various memory test scores for 
non-dreaming and dreaming TBI patients.
Is cessation of dreaming a language disorder?
Many authors have suggested that global cessation of dreaming may be the 
consequence of an aphasic disorder (Broughton, 1982; Doricchi & Violani, 1992; 
Epstein & Simmons, 1983; Foulkes, 1978; Jacobson, 1973). Some authors have 
claimed that the language disorder prevents patients from reporting their dreams, 
whereas others argued that the language disorder makes it impossible for these 
patients to generate dreams (Moss, 1972). The latter view means that the loss of 
ability to generate language necessarily results in the loss of ability to generate 
dreams. This idea is consistent with the idea that the dream-generation module is 
localized to the left hemisphere (Greenberg and Farah, 1986). However, the problem 
with such an argument is that only 52% of the non-dreamers reported in the literature 
were aphasic (Solms, 1997). Furthermore, in Solms’ own study he found the 
incidence of aphasia among his non-dreaming patients was 25%. Indeed, Schanfald et 
al (1985) investigated the relationship between aphasia and language and concluded 
that aphasiacs are able to generate dreams. Moreover, Solms showed that aphasia also 
occurred in 50% of cases of non-visual dreaming, hence, when postulating a 
relationship between dreaming and language, this latter association must also be 
explained.
Doricchi and Violani (1992) proposed possible linguistic-semantic disorders in 
patients who report cessation of dreaming. In this account they suggest that such 
disorders may not necessarily produce manifest aphasia but may nevertheless prevent 
dreaming. Muller (1992) states that this explanation is unsatisfactory as it can explain
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‘all disconfirmatory presentations by postulating ad hoc connections with language’. 
Finally, on this, Solms (1997) argues that if cessation of dreaming is caused by an 
aphasic disorder then it should never occur after right unilateral damage. Yet such 
cases of dream cessation with right unilateral damage have been reported (Humphrey
| & Zangwill, 1951; Gloning & Stembach, 1953; Johann et al. 1957), indicating that
i
| cessation of dreaming can occur for reasons unconnected with aphasia.
i
j
j Normal dreaming after brain injury
| Solms (1997) found that unchanged dreaming correlated significantly with
i
f
| lesions to the dorsolateral frontal lobes. Thus, he suggested that the dorsolateral
r
i\ frontal region did not play a significant role in the normal dream process. In line with
ti
| this, several H215 O PET studies have found significant deactivation of the dorsolateral
i
j frontal cortex during both REM (Braun et al. 1997; Maquet et al. 1997) and NREM 
(Anderson et al. 1998; Braun et al. 1997). Furthermore, a single photon emission
t
computed tomography (SPECT) study found decreased blood flow to the frontal areas 
during REM sleep (Madsen et al 1991). However, these accounts of decreased frontal 
area activity and dreaming are contradicted by Heiss et al’s (1984) finding of 
increased superior frontal activity during dreams, as compared to dreamless sleep, and 
Nofzinger et al’s (1997) finding of no significant decrease of glucose uptake in the 
dorsolateral convexity when comparing REM sleep and waking.
 So far the relationships between brain lesions and alterations or cessation of
dreaming have been addressed. However, a confound in this relationship will now be 
described, that of sleep quality, as this will have to be taken account of in study 4.
Sleep quality and dreaming
Solms (1997) conducted a preliminary assessment of sleep quality following 
head injury. He asked his 361 patients whether or not their sleep had been affected by 
their illness. Responses were classified under four heading; sleep was considered to 
be (a) better, (b) disrupted, (c) unaffected since the onset of illness, or patients were 
(d) unsure of whether or not there had been any change in the quality of sleep. The 
results are shown in Table 70.
Table 70 -  Data from Solms (1997) categorising dreams as either present or 
absent as a function of disruption of sleep since onset of illness
Dreams Sleep since onset of illness
Disrupted Not disrupteda
Absent 49 52
Present 59 127
ai.e. better or unaffected
Solms (1997) found that the non-dreaming patients experienced significantly 
more disturbed sleep than the dreaming patients. He interpreted this as providing 
support for the sleep-protection theory of dreaming. This thesis will not be following 
that line of argument, as there are alternative explanations of these data that do not 
impact on this or any other proposed function of sleep. But study 4 will be designed to 
take account of the sleep quality confound indicated by these data.
4UU
Aims of study 4
The first aim of this study is to assess the prevalence of idiopathic nightmares, 
repetitive nightmares and dream cessation in a population with traumatic brain injury.
As stated above, the first hypothesis is:
There will be a higher incidence of nightmares in people who have had 
Traumatic Brain Injuries compared to the general population.
The second hypothesis follows from the work of Solms reviewed above:
There will be a higher incidence of complete absence of dreaming in people 
who have had Traumatic Brain Injuries compared to the general population.
The second aim of this study is to investigate predictors of whether a TBI 
patient will have global cessation of dreaming, increased nightmares, repetitive 
nightmares, or dream normally. These predictors include measures of functional brain 
injury, anxiety, depression, pain and time since injury.
Methodological note on investigating hypothesis 3:
The work of Solms that has been reviewed above is highly important for the 
issue of what forebrain structures support dreaming, and hence what changes to 
dreaming may occur after head injury. However, it is evident that Solms’ (1997) 
methodology is problematic as it relied upon patients reporting whether or not their 
dreams have changed subsequent to neurological damage. This method is problematic 
as people’s beliefs about the content of their dreams are influenced by a number of 
factors apart from the actual dream content (Beaulieu-Prevost and Zadra, 2005a).
Furthermore, participants with neurological conditions may have difficulty recalling 
the frequency and nature of their dreams before the onset of their illness or injury. 
Indeed, Solms (1997) acknowledges that ‘many patients had great difficulty framing 
definite responses to some of the.. .questions, which pertained to the more elusive 
aspects of dreaming’ (pp. 84). For example, patients had difficultly assessing the 
narrative complexity, emotional intensity and frequency of their current dreams. 
Dream and nightmare frequency will thus be assessed with a short simple 
questionnaire, referring only to their current frequency of dreams and nightmares. 
Data from this questionnaire will be compared with normative data from other studies 
as opposed to patients’ own assessment of premorbid dreaming.
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Chapter 15
Study 4: Nightmares and traumatic brain injury
Method
Participants
51 participants who had suffered a head injury (M=35, F=16; mean age = 
39.69, SD = 13.7, range = 20-77) were recruited from referrals to a head trauma 
clinic at the University of Wales Swansea for neuropsychological examination. 78% 
(n=41) of participants had sustained head injuries in a road traffic collision, 5.8% (n = 
3) during an assault, 7.7% (n= 4) from a fall, and 7.6% (n=2) from a blow to the head. 
They were considered, by referring clinicians, to have suffered a moderate or severe 
head injury, based on levels of consciousness (recorded by Glasgow Come Scale, 
GCS). The mean GCS was 10.91 (SD = 4.24; range 3-15). The median length of 
posttraumatic amnesia (PTA) was category 4 (i.e., less than 2 weeks) and the inter­
quartile range was categories 2 -5  (less than one hour to more than 2 weeks). Mean 
time since injury was 49.35 months (SD=36.13, range = 9-177 months). CT brain 
scans were not available but the majority of participants were considered by referring 
clinicians to show neuropsychological signs of frontal dysfunction, against a 
background of diffuse cerebral injury.
Participants were given an information sheet regarding the study and its 
procedures. Informed consent was obtained from all participants (see appendix 24 for 
example of consent form). The study, its procedures and participant documents were
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approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Wales Swansea and, due to 
most participants being NHS patients, by the Local Research Ethics Committee 
(covering Neath, Port Talbot and Swansea) (appendix 25).
Materials
Injury Severity
The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) and duration of Post Traumatic Amnesia 
(PTA) were used as indices of injury severity. The GCS is a measure of depth of 
coma and is assessed during admission to hospital, lower scores indicate greater 
severity of injury. This information was obtained from patient’s medical notes.
The duration of PTA is the time from injury to the start of continuous 
memories. It is the sum of any time spent in coma or in confusion when behaviour 
superficially seems to be normal but when individuals lack the capacity to remember 
ongoing events (Greenwood, 1997). This information was also obtained from 
patient’s medical notes.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAPS: Zigmond & Snaith. 1983)
This scale was described fully in Chapter 11, in the Method for Study 3. In 
study 4 anxiety was assessed using the 7 items forming the anxiety scale of the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. A score of 8 or above is considered to be 
indicative of ‘possible’ clinical levels of anxiety, and a score of 11 or above is 
considered indicative of a ‘probable’ diagnosis anxiety. The anxiety scale of the 
HADS is particularly suited for this study as this scale tends to be less confounded by 
somatic symptoms, which are associated with medical conditions such as Traumatic 
Brain Injury.
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The Beck Depression Inventory for Primary Care fBDI-PC-7).
Depression was measured using the BDI-PC. This is a 7-item self-report 
instrument specifically designed for medical patients in order to minimise the overlap 
between symptoms of their medical illness and symptoms of depression. For example, 
the somatic symptoms of depression, that is, tiredness or fatigue, as found in the 13- 
item Beck Depression Inventory (Beck and Beck, 1972), may not be indicative of 
depression per se in patients with cardiovascular disease, but may be caused by a 
decreased circulation of oxygen. Also, some questions on the 21-item BDI-II, for 
example, loss of energy and difficulty concentrating, might overlap with the 
symptoms of a head injury. In order to overcome such problems Beck and colleagues 
derived a set of non-somatic items from the BDI-II (Beck-II; Beck, Steer and Brown, 
1996) in order to specifically screen for depression in primary care patients. Sadness 
and Loss of Pleasure (anhedonia) was included because one of these two symptoms 
must be present for the establishment of a DSM-IV major depression disorder 
(MDD). Suicidal thoughts or wishes were included as an important clinical indicator 
of suicidal risk in depressed patients. Pessimism, Past Failure, Self-Dislike, and Self- 
Criticalness were chosen because the symptoms loaded saliently on the Cognitive 
dimension of the BDI-II presented in the Manual for the Beck Depression Inventory II 
(Beck et al. 1996) for 500 psychiatric outpatients.
Weiss (1996) found that the BD-PC 7 items were indepehdeht ofThe cbntext 
of the other 14 BDI-II items and that it could function as a stand-alone instrument.
The 1-week test-retest reliability of the BDI-PC for the 26 psychiatric outpatients who 
were re-administered the BDI-II by Beck et al. (1996) was 0.82, p>0.001. However,
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as with other measures high BDI-PC scores only indicate that a detailed psychiatric 
evaluation may be warranted.
In this study the BDI-PC was used instead of the depression scale for the 
HADS as it has been found to be approximately twice as positively associated with 
the diagnosis of major depressive disorders as the HADS depression scale (Beck, 
Steer, Ball, Ciervo & Kabat, 1997). Good internal consistency has been demonstrated 
for the BDI-PC (0.86). Cicchetti (1994) described alpha coefficients within the mid 
.80s ashaving ‘good’ reliability for clinical purposes.
Steer, Thomas, Cavalieri, Leonard and Beck (1999) found that a BDI-PC cut 
off sccre of 4 and above had a 97% sensitivity and 99% specificity rates, respectively, 
for identifying internal medicine outpatients diagnosed with and with major 
depresive disorder. However, Beck et al (1997) found that a cut off score of 6 and 
above yielded maximum clinical efficiency with family practice outpatients of whom 
39% had no medical disorder. Thus, Steer et al suggest that if a physician wants to 
minindse the possibility of identifying a patient as depressed then the cut off score 
should be raised to 5 or 6 and above.
The BDI-PC 7 is scored by summing all of the highest ratings for each of its 
sevenitems. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale ranging fr6m 0 fo 3 .The maximum 
scoreis 21. In order to address the minimum DSM-IV requirements for the duration 
of mqor depression disorders symptoms, respondents are asked to describe 
themselves for the ‘past two weeks, including today’.
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Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buvsse et al, 1989)
The PSQI is an 18 item self-report questionnaire, which examines sleep 
quality and sleep disturbances for the previous month. Participants are required to 
provide information such as usual bed time, usual time of getting up, time taken to fall 
asleep and the hours of actual sleep per night. They are required to complete a 4-point 
scale for a variety of different sleep factors. The questionnaire yields seven 
component scores and one global sleep quality score. The seven components consist 
of subjective sleep quality, sleep onset latency, total amount of sleep, sleep efficiency, 
specific sleep disturbances, use of sleep medication and daytime dysfunction. An 
overall score of 21 on the PSQ indicates the worst sleep quality. The PSQI was 
developed to measure ‘sleep quality’ but has been shown to be particularly sensitive 
to the presence of insomnia and to effectively discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘poor’ 
sleepers (Buysse et al, 1989).
The PSQI has been demonstrated to be a valid screening tool for assessing 
sleep difficulties among patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI; Fichtenberg et al, 
2001). Fichtenberg et al (2001) demonstrated that when a sample of TBI patients were 
divided into insomnia and non-insomnia groups based on clinical interviews using 
DSM-IV criteria, those with insomnia had considerably higher PSQI scores than those 
without (mean PSQI was 13.9 (SD, 3.3) and 3.5 (SD, 2.3) respectively). The PSQI 
demonstrated impressive sensitivity and specificity to insomnia with the overlap 
betweenirisomniacsandnon-insomniac^consistingofonlyonevaluej aglobalscore 
of 8.
Insomnia was correctly classified in 96% of the total sample using a cutting 
score of 8 on the PSIQ and this increased to 98% using a cutting score of 9. Thus, the
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Global score alone seems to be an effective insomnia screen for a post acute TBI 
population.
Furthermore, PSQI derived calculations of sleep onset, latency and sleep 
duration were found to correlate relatively strongly for sleep onset and modestly for 
sleep duration and efficiency as measured by patient sleep diaries.
Pain and hypersomnia
The PSQI contains an item assessing the frequency with which pain disrupts 
sleep and two items assessing daytime sleepiness. Fichtenberg et al (2001) examined 
the concurrent validity of individual PSQI items relating to pain and hypersomnia 
with 47 TBI patients. In addition to the PSQI they administered the Multidimensional 
Pain Inventory (MPI), (Kerns, Turk & Rudy, 1985) and the Epworth Sleepiness Scale 
(ESS; Johns, 1992). It was found that the PSQI symptomatic scorers obtained 
significantly higher pain intensity scores on the MPI relative to asymptomatic scorers 
(mean = 34.3; SD =18.2 and mean =14.3; SD 10.1). On the PSQI measure of daytime 
somnolence symptomatic scorers obtained significantly higher levels of daytime 
sleepiness on the EES compared with asymptomatic scorers (M= 11.4 (SD= 5.8) and 
M= 4.7 (SD= 3.4) respectively; t=3.4; p<0.01).
On the basis of such research the PSQI was believed to be particularly 
appropriate for use in thisstudypopuratioh. FiMherffiore, this and the othermeasures 
were appropriate as they are relatively brief and understandable for individuals with 
cognitive impairments.
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Dream questionnaire.
Participants used a tick box format to comment on the frequency of dreams, 
nightmares and night terrors (appendix 26). Five responses were possible ranging 
from; at least once a week to never. The categories ‘less than once a year’ and ‘never’ 
were used in order to be sure that those reporting non-dreaming do not just dream 
very rarely. Participants used a ‘yes/no’ format to answer items on nightmare distress 
and repetitive nightmares. Nightmares were defined as ‘a vivid dream that is 
frightening or disturbing, the events of which you can remember clearly and in detail 
on awakening’. A night terror was defined as ‘a sudden awakening in fear, possibly 
accompanied by a scream, but where you do not remember any content’.
Neuropsychological tests
A battery of neuropsychological tests was administered to all participants. 
Patients were administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3rd edition) (WAIS 
III; Wechsler, 1997) and the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS III; Wechsler, 1997), the 
Hayling and Brixton Tests (Burgess & Shalice, 1997) and two tests (Zoo Map and 
Key Search) from the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome battery 
(BADS;Wilson et al, 1996). The reliability, validity and normative data for these 
batteries are reported in their technical manuals.
The following subtests of the WMS-III were used:
Logical Memory
Part I: Two short stories are presented orally. The second story is presented 
twice. The participant is then asked to recall the stories from memory.
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Part II: The participant is required to recall both the stories presented in logical 
memory part 1 after a delay of 25-35 minutes.
Faces:
Part I: A series of 24 faces is presented visually and the participant is told to 
remember each face. The participant is then presented with a series of 48 faces and 
asked to identify the faces they were asked to remember.
Part II: After 25-35 minutes the participant is again presented with 48 faces 
and asked to identify the faces they were initially shown.
Verbal Paired Associates:
Part I: This is an orally presented task which requires the participant to learn 
novel word associations. After eight word pairs are read, the first word of each pair is 
given, and the participant is required to provide the corresponding word. There are 
four trials in different orders.
Part II: After a delay of 25-35 minutes the participant is orally presented with 
the first word of each pair learned in the immediate condition and asked to provide the 
corresponding word.
Family pictures:
Part I: A family photograph and series of seenes are presented; The participant 
is then asked to recall information such as who was in each scene, what they were 
doing and where they were.
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Part II: The delayed condition is presented 25-35 minutes after the first; in this 
condition participants recall the same information as previously without the scenes 
being shown again.
Visual Reproduction
Part I: A series of 5 designs are shown; one at a time for 10 seconds each.
After each design is presented the participant is required to draw each one from 
memory.
Part II: 25-35 minutes after the initial condition participants are asked to draw 
the designs learned in part one in any order.
Spatial Span: A series of spatial patterns is visually presented on a three 
dimensional board. In the first task, the examiner points to a series of blocks at a rate 
of one block per second, and the participant then points to the same blocks in the 
same order. For the second task, the examiner points to a series of blocks, and the 
participant points to the same blocks but in the reverse order.
Letter - Number Sequencing: A string of alternating letters and numbers is 
presented, and the participant is asked to repeat the string by putting the numbers 
together in ascending order. The length of the string is gradually increased.
Subtests of the Wais-TII fUK> usedTn study 4 - ------------- -----------
Picture completion: The participant is presented with a series of pictures each 
of which has some important part that is missing and that the participant must 
identify.
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Vocabulary: Participants are presented with a series of words that they are 
asked to define.
Similarities: Participants are presented with pairs of words and the participant 
is required to explain the similarities between these words.
Digit-svmbol-Coding: The subject is shown a series of numbers, each of 
which is paired with its own corresponding test symbol. The subject is then shown the 
above series of numbers with empty boxes beneath them and they are required to use 
the key to copy the symbol corresponding to the number into the empty box.
Block design: Participants are required to reproduce a set of modelled or 
printed two-dimensional geometric patterns using two-colour cubes.
Arithmetic: Participants are orally presented with a series of arithmetic 
problems to solve.
Matrix Reasoning: A series of incomplete matrices of patterns that the 
participant completes by pointing to or saying the number of the correct response 
from five possible choices.
Digit span: The participant is orally presented with a series of number 
sequences and is asked to repeat them verbatim for Digits Forwards and in reverse for 
Digits Backwards.
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Information: Participants are asked a series of questions that tap into their 
general knowledge of common events, objects, places and people.
Picture Arrangement: A set of pictures is presented to the participant in a 
mixed-up order and they are required to rearrange the pictures so that they are in the 
correct sequence.
Comprehension: Participants are required to answer a series of questions that 
tap into their understanding of social rules and concepts or solutions to everyday 
problems.
Symbol search: Participants are presented with a series of paired groups, each 
pair consisting of a target group and a search group and they are required to mark the 
appropriate box to indicate whether the target symbol appears in the search group.
Tests of executive function
The Hayling and Brixton tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and the Zoo Map 
and Key Search sub tests from the BADS (Wilson et al. 1996) are all specialised tests 
of executive functioning. The Hayling test measures initiation speed and response 
suppression, while the Brixton test measures rule detection. Key search assesses 
ability to plan a strategy to solve a problem (finding a key in a field). The score is 
based on a number of criteria, including whether the rater believes the strategy to be 
systematic, efficient and likely to be effective. A penalty is imposed for lack of speed. 
The Zoo Map assesses ability to independently formulate and implement a plan (high 
demand condition) and to follow a pre-formulated plan (low demand condition). It
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involves plotting or following a route through a map that does not contravene a set of 
rules. The score is based on successful implementation of the plan. Penalties are 
imposed for rule breaks and lack of speed. Impaired performance on the Hayling and 
Brixton are determined by using a scaled score of 2 (abnormal), as recommended in 
the manual. A similar classification of patients based on the Zoo Map and key search 
tests is not possible as the manual only provides an overall profile score for the whole 
battery on a percentile basis.
Post traumatic Stress Disorder
A clinician using a semi-structured interview based on DSM-IV criterion 
assessed the presence of PTSD.
Procedure
Participants attending a head trauma clinic at the University of Wales Swansea 
were invited to take part in the research. It was emphasized to patients both verbally 
and in written information sheets that the research was entirely separate from their 
ongoing care at the head trauma clinic. The objectives of the study were explained to 
participants as well as what would be required of them. It was also stressed that any 
data collected about them would be entirely confidential and that the final analysis 
would not identify them.
Participants were administered the neuropsychological tests described above 
in addition to the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, the HADS and the dream 
questionnaire. The presence of PTSD was assessed during a clinical interview with a 
clinician.
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Design
This is a between groups design where assignment to groups is based upon 
whether individuals have ceased to dream, have frequent nightmares, or report dreams 
but do not have frequent nightmares. Analyses of variance are to be used to compare 
non-dreamers, dreamers without frequent nightmares and frequent nightmare sufferers 
on severity of injury, IQ measures, memory tests, mood measures and sleep quality. 
Regression analysis will be used to determine factors predicting nightmares and sleep 
quality.
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Chapter 16
Study 4: Nightmares and traumatic brain injury
Results
Descriptive statistics
Study four assessed brain injury in a sample of participants who had suffered a 
moderate to severe brain injury. The median length of post traumatic amnesia (PTA) 
was 4 (less than 2 weeks) and the inter-quartile range was 2-5 (less than one hour to 
more than 2 weeks). The following table presents the descriptive statistics for this 
sample.
Table 71 - Mean (standard deviation) and range of injury severity, time since injury,
sleep, mood, memory and IQ variables for all participants.
Mean (SD) Range
Glasgow Coma Scale 10.91 (4.24) 3-15
Time since injury (months) 49.35 (36.13) 9-177
Dream frequency categoiy 2.94(1 .62) 1-5
Nightmare frequency category 2.38(1 .55) 1-5
Night terrors category 2.04(1 .47) 1-5
Global Sleep quality Index 8.29(5.22) 2-21
Daytime sleepiness/arousal 1.67 (0.76) 0-3
Anxiety 10.46 (4.98) 0-21
Depression 7.15(4.73) 0-21
-Pain-------------------------  . _ LQ4(1.17X 0-3
Verbal IQ 90.39(14.16) 66-119
Performance IQ 89.38 (12.48) 65-122
Visual immediate memory 78.57(16.12) 53-109
Auditory immediate memory 87.53 (15.65) 50-120
Visual delayed memory 79.00 (16.12) 50-112
Auditory delayed memory 82.18(18.81) 46-117
The mean Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score reflects that most participants had 
suffered a severe brain injury. The mean time of assessment since injury was 49.35 
months. The mean dream frequency category for this sample suggests that on average 
participants reported one dream a year or less. On average participants reported one 
nightmare a year or less. The average frequency of night terrors reported was less than 
one a year. The Pittsburgh Global Sleep Quality Index (GSQI) score is the sum of the 
seven subscales assessing sleep (sleep quality and sleep efficiency being two of these 
subscales). A GSQI score of more than five indicates that a person is a poor sleeper 
(Buysse et al. 1989) and, thus, the mean score here of 8.29 indicates that the average 
sleep quality of the sample is poor. On average participants report feeling sleepy in 
the daytime once or twice each week.
Crombie and Taylor (2001) administered the HADS to a non-clinical sample, broadly 
representative of the general adult UK population, and found a mean Anxiety score of 
6.14 (3.76). Thus, the mean anxiety score for this sample of 10.46 (SD= 4.95, range 
0-21) is in excess of population norms. A score of 8 or above on the HADS anxiety 
scale is considered indicative of ‘possible’ clinical levels of anxiety and a score of 11 
or above is considered indicative of a ‘probable’ diagnosis of anxiety. The mean score 
is therefore in ‘possible’ range and thus, clearly anxiety is elevated in this population. 
Similarly, the mean score on the BDI-PC indicates that the level of depression is 
elevated in this population. A cut off score of 6 on this scalehas T>een suggested as a 
cautious cut off point to indicate probable depression on the BDI-PC (Steer et al, 
1999). On average participants report experiencing pain less than once a week. Mean 
scores for verbal IQ and performance IQ are in the low range of average. Memory 
scores are below average.
Injury severity
The Glasgow Coma Scale and length of posttraumatic amnesia were used as indices 
of injury severity.
3.8% (n=2) had no PTA
7.7% (n= 4) had less than one hour PTA
13.5% (n = 7) had a PTA of less than 24 hours
9.6% (n = 5) had a PTA of less than 1 week
23.1% (n=12) had a PTA of less than 2 weeks
38.5% (n=20) had a PTA of over 2 weeks
Length of PTA was not available for two participants.
Nightmare prevalence
The percentage of participants within each reporting category for nightmares were:
48.1% (n= 25) report ‘never’ having nightmares
9.6% (n=5) report having nightmares ‘less than once a year’
11.5% (n= 6) report having nightmares ‘once a year’.
17.3% (n = 9) report having nightmares ‘once a month’
13.5% (n = 7) report having nightmares ‘once a week’.
Thus, 30.8% (n =16) report experiencing at least one nightmare per month.
Repetitive nightmares fRNMs)
23.1% (n= 12) reported that they have recently had the same nightmare more than 
once, whereas 76.9% (n=40) did not. Of those reporting at least one nightmare a 
month (n =16), 68.8% (n = 11) reported the occurrence of repetitive nightmares.
Nightmare distress
19.2 (n= 10) of the whole sample report that ‘having nightmares is a problem’ for 
them, whereas, 80.8% (n= 42) report that nightmares are not a problem. Of those who 
report monthly nightmares (n =16), 50% state that ‘having nightmares is a problem’ 
for them.
Prevalence of night terrors
59.6% (n=31) report ‘never’ experiencing night terrors 
9.6% (n = 5) report night terrors ‘less than once a year’
13.5% (n = 7) report night terrors ‘once a year’
23.1% (n =12) report night terrors ‘once a month’
23.1% (n=12) report night terrors ‘once a week’.
Thus, 46.2% (n =24) report at least one night terror a month.
Dream frequency
34.6%Xn=18) report that they ‘never’ dream 
5.8% (n = 3) report dreaming ‘less than once a year’
13.5% (n=7) report dreaming ‘at least once a year’
23.1% (n=12) report dreaming ‘at least once a month’
23.1% (n=12) report dreaming ‘at least once a week’
Sleep quality
23.1% (n= 12) of participants rated their sleep quality as very good 
42.3% (n=22) rated their sleep as rather good 
25% (n=13) rated their sleep as fairly bad 
9.6% (n= 5) rated their sleep as very bad.
Thus, over half of the sample (65.4%) reported good sleep. However,
32.6% report less than satisfactory sleep quality.
Sleep efficiency
48.1% (n= 25) report a sleep efficiency of over 85%
28.8% (n= 15) report a sleep efficiency of between 75-84%
17.3% (n= 9) report a sleep efficiency of between 65-74%
17.3% (n=9) report a sleep efficiency of less than 65%.
Pittsburgh Global Sleep Quality Index (GSOI)
This is the sum of the seven subscales assessing sleep (sleep quality and sleep 
efficiency being two of these subscales). A GSQI score of more than five indicates 
that a person is a poor sleeper (Buysse et al. 1989). 65.4% (N = 34) had a GSQI of 
over 5und M.6% (n=18) had a score of 5 or less.
Insomnia
Insomnia is correctly classified in 96% and 98% of cases using cut off scores of 8 and 
9 respectively on the Pittsburgh Global Sleep Quality Index (Fichtenberg et al. 2001).
When a GPSQI score of above 9 was used as a cut off point for the presence of 
insomnia in this study, 34.6% (n=18) were classified as having insomnia. This 
suggests indicates sleep disturbance is fairly high in people with brain injury.
Depression
A cut off score of 6 and above was used to indicate probable depression on the BDI- 
PC (Steer et al, 1999). According to this conservative estimate, 61.5% (n = 32) of this 
sample reported ‘probable’ levels of depression.
Table 72 shows Shapiro-Wilk test statistics to check for normal distribution of
variables.
Shapiro-Wilk statistic (p)
Post traumatic amnesia 0.81*(0.01)
Glasgow Coma Scale 0.91 (0.18)
Time since injury (months) 0.88 (0.07)
Performance IQ 0.91 (0.20)
Verbal IQ 0.93 (0.37)
Auditory immediate memory 0.96 (0.70)
Auditory delayed memory 0.95 (0.56)
Visual immediate memory 0.96 (0.71)
Visual delayed memory 0.95 (0.54)
Global Sleep Quality Index 0.91 (0.21)
Anxiety 0.95 (0.59)
Depression 0.99(1.00)
Pain 0.78* (<0.001)
Hayling A 0.75* (<0.01)
Hayling B 0.66* (<0.01)
Hayling C 0.80* (0.01)
Zoo map 0.86* (0.04)
Nightmare frequency 0.67* (0 .0 0 1 )
Dream frequency__________ __ 0.79* (<0.01)
Repetitive nightmares 0.53* (0 0 .0 0 1 )
*p<0.05
Table 72 shows that the dream variables, measures of executive functioning, pain and 
PTA are non-normally distributed and so non-parametric statistics will be used with 
these variables.
421
Table 73 -  Table 73 shows means (standard deviation) of injury severity, time since 
injury, dream variables, memory, IQ, executive functioning, sleep quality, anxiety and 
depression of participants reporting no dreams, those reporting dreams but not 
frequent nightmares, and those reporting frequent nightmares (at least one a month). 
The table also shows tests of difference for each variable across the three groups.
Mean (standard deviation) Non-dreamers
(n=18)
Dreamers 
(n = 19)
Frequent 
Nightmares 
(n =15)
Test o f difference1
Post traumatic amnesia 4.41 (1.00) 4.00(1.18) 2.80 (0.94) x2(2)= 14.51 (p=0.01)*
Glasgow Coma Scale 8.06 (3.94) 10.67 (4.15) 14.43 (1.02) F (2,42)= 13.08* (p=0.001)
Time since injury (months) 52.89(49.61) 45.33 (21.73) 49.93 (32.61) F(2,48)= 1.93 (p=0.82)
Performance IQ 89.12(14.91) 88.31 (10.38) 91.14(12.59) F(2,47)=0.20 (p=0.81)
Verbal IQ 93.41 (17.27) 86.78 (12.42) 91.36(11.85) F(2,46)=1.00 (p=0.37)
Auditory immediate memory 86.35 (19.23) 87.31 (14.09) 89.38 (13.54) F(2,48)=0.14 (p=0.87)
Auditory delayed memory 79.12(19.89) 83.68(18.33) 84.00(19.08) F(2,48)=0.34 (p=0.72)
Visual immediate memory 74.70(15.24) 80.47(16.32) 80.85(17.26) F(2,48)= 0.74 (p=0.48)
Visual delayed memory 74.05 (14.87) 82.89(16.66) 79.77(17.19) F(2,48)= 1.35 (p=0.27)
Global Sleep Quality Index 6.22 (4.75) 7.95 (5.06) 11.20(4.92) F(2,48)= 4.27* (p =0.02)
Anxiety 7.94 (4.89) 10.42(4.62) 13.53 (3.94) F (2,49) = 6.20* (p=0.01)
Depression 5.89 (3.72) 7.42 (4.90) 8.33 (5.50) F (2,49)= 1.14 (p=0.33)
Pain 0.61 (0.98) 1.10(1.19) 1.47(1.24) x2 (2)=4.91 (p=0.09)
Hayling A 4.93(1.39) 4.92(1.24) 5.54 (0.93) x l  (2)= 2.89 (p=0.23)
Hayling B 5.13(1.35) 5.08(1.08) 6.00 (0.89) x*(2)=4.79 (p=0.09)
Hayling C ------------------ . 5.73 (2.05) 4.33 (2.57) 6.09(1.81) x2(2)=2.73 (p=0.25)
Zoo map 2.53 (1.30) 2.47(1.12) 3.36(0.92) x 2 (2)= 4.53 (p=0.10)
'Chi square tests were used for variables which were shown in table 72 to be non-normally distributed 
and one-way analysis o f variance was used where variables were normally distributed.
* p<0.05
Table 73 shows that length of PTA is significantly lower in the group reporting 
frequent nightmares compared to those reporting dreams. Subsequent Mann Whitney 
tests also shows that length of PTA is significantly lower in the nightmare group 
compared to non-dreamers (z = -3.59; pO.OOl). There is no significant difference 
between dreamers and non-dreamers in length of PTA (z = -1.21; p =0.23), however, 
the above table shows a trend for non-dreamers to have a longer length of PTA.
A similar pattern is found with GCS (where high scores indicate milder injury). Tukey 
HSD paired comparisons revealed that GCS is significantly higher in the nightmare 
group than in the non-dreaming group (z = -6.37, p<0.0001). The nightmare group 
also have a significantly higher GCS than dreamers (z = 3.76; p = 0.01). Again, 
although there is a trend for GCS to be lower in the non-dreaming group compared to 
the dreaming group, this is not statistically significant (z = -2.60; p = 0.10).
These findings, therefore, suggest that frequent nightmares are associated with milder 
head injuries compared to more severe head injury, and there is a trend for non­
dreaming to be associated with more severe injuries.
Table 73 shows that time since injury is not significantly different in the three groups. 
There is also no significant difference in verbal and performance IQ between the three 
groups. It was hypothesized that memory would not be significantly lower in non­
dreamers compared to dreamers, which is confirmed in the above table. Importantly in 
terms of dream recall there were no significant differences in delay visual or verbal 
memory between these groups. There were no significant differences in tests of 
frontal functioning (Hayling and Zoo map) between the three groups.
Table 73 also shows that participants in the frequent nightmare group report the worst 
sleep quality and non-dreamers report the best sleep quality. Tukey HSD paired 
comparisons revealed that sleep quality is rated as significantly poorer in the 
nightmare group compared to the non-dreaming group (z =4.98; p =0.01). However, 
sleep quality is not significantly different between the nightmare group and dreamers 
group (z = 3.25; p = 0.14), nor between the dreaming and non-dreaming groups (z =
I.72; p = 0.54).
Depression was not significantly different across the three groups. Tukey HSD paired 
comparisons revealed that anxiety is significantly higher in the nightmare group 
compared to non-dreamers (z = -5.59; p < 0.01). The table shows that there was a 
trend for anxiety to be higher in the nightmare group compared to the dreaming group 
(z = 3.11; p = 0.13). No significant difference was found between anxiety in the non­
dreaming group and the dreaming group (z = -2.48; p = 0.23)
PTSD
II.54% (n = 6) were considered to have PTSD in their clinical interview with a 
neuropsychologist. The following table (Table 3) shows the number of participants 
with PTSD in each group.
Table 74: Table 74 shows the number of participants in each of the three groups, 
categorised by presence/absence of PTSD
Non-dreaming group Dreaming group Nightmare group
Participants with PTSD 1 1 4
Participants without 17 18 11
PTSD
Table 74 shows that the frequency of PTSD is higher in the nightmare group. 
However, a chi squared analysis shows that this association is not significant (x = 
4.48; p = 0.11)
Insomnia
A chi squared analysis was also conducted to determine if the frequency of insomnia 
differed in the three groups. Table 75 shows the contingency table for this analysis.
Table 75 -  Number of participants in each of the three groups, categorised by 
presence/absence of insomnia
Non-dreaming group Dreaming group Nightmare group
Participants with 3 8 10
insomnia
■ • -  - ------------ -------------------
Participants without 
insomnia
15 11 5
Chi squared analysis showed a significant association (x (2) = 8.53; p = 0.01) 
suggesting that the incidence of insomnia is higher in the nightmare group compared 
to the non-dreaming group.
Logistical Regression
The above section reported that sleep quality and anxiety are worse in the nightmare 
group than the other groups, but that head injury is less severe.
A logistic regression was conducted to determine what percentage of the variance in 
nightmare frequency do these predictors (PTA, anxiety and sleep quality) account for. 
Depression was included as a predictor in order to control for the influence of this 
variable.
The regression was run firstly including subjects who report no dreams and then when 
excluding them from the analysis.
Predictors of monthly nightmares
The regression examines the extent to which anxiety, depression, PTA and sleep 
quality (GSQI) predict the presence or absence of monthly nightmares. The Omnibus 
tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness of fit’ was significant (x2 (4)= 25.62; p < 
0.001) suggesting that this model (with anxiety, depression, sleep quality and PTA as 
predictors) is a better predictor than the statistical estimation using no predictors 
(70%). Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R square tests suggests that between 40% and 
57% of the variance in the presence or absence of monthly nightmares are explained 
by these predictors. The model correctly classifies 78% of overall cases into either 
having or not having at least one nightmare per month. The model had a negative
predictive value of 85.7% and a positive predictive value of 64.28%. This suggests 
that the model was able to correctly identify 85.7% of the participants that did not 
have monthly nightmares and 64.28% of those who did have monthly nightmares. The 
table below demonstrates that PTA and anxiety contribute significantly to the 
predictive ability of the model, whereas depression does not. Sleep quality is close to 
significance (p =0.09).
Table 76 - Wald statistic (and probability value) for predictors of the 
presence/absence of monthly nightmares
Predictors Wald test
Post traumatic amnesia 5.72* (0.02)
Anxiety 4.99* (0.03)
Depression 1.87 (0.17)
Global sleep quality Index1 2.88 (0.09)
1 with the nightmare question omitted 
* p<0.05
This regression analysis was re-run with non-dreamers excluded in order to determine 
how this affected the findings.
The Omnibus tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness of fit’ was significant (x2 (4)= 
16.61; p < 0 .01) suggesting that this model (with anxiety, depression, sleep quality 
and PTA as predictors) is a better predictor than the statistical estimation using no 
predictors (54.5%). Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R square tests suggests that 
between 39% and 53% of the variance in the presence or absence of monthly
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nightmares are explained by these predictors. The model correctly classifies 73% of 
overall cases into either having or not having at least one nightmare per month. The 
model had a negative predictive value of 83.3% and a positive predictive value of 
75%. This suggests that the model was able to correctly identify 83.3% of the 
participants that did not have monthly nightmares and 75% of those who did have 
monthly nightmares. The table below demonstrates that PTA and anxiety continue to 
contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model, whereas depression and 
sleep quality do not.
Table 77 - Wald statistic and probability for prediction of monthly nightmares with 
non-dreamers excluded
Predictors Wald test
Post traumatic amnesia 5.30* (0.02)
Anxiety 4.05* (0.04)
Depression 1.58(0.21)
Global sleep quality Index1 0.94 (0.33)
1 with nightmare question omitted 
* p<0.05
These analyses show that when non-dreamers are excluded the model explains a little 
less of the variance in monthly nightmares but generally the differences between the 
two models is small. In both analyses anxiety and injury severity (PTA) are 
significant independent predictors of monthly nightmares.
Predictors of repetitive nightmares
A logistical regression was then conducted to determine the extent to which anxiety, 
depression, PTA and sleep quality (PGSQI) predict the presence or absence of 
repetitive nightmares. The Omnibus tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness of fit’ 
was significant (x2 (4)= 20.59; p < 0.001), meaning that this model (with anxiety, 
depression, sleep quality and PTA as predictors) is a better predictor than the 
statistical estimation using no predictors (76%). Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R 
squared tests show that between 34% and 50% of the variance in the presence or 
absence of repetitive nightmares are explained by these predictors. The model 
correctly classifies 82% of overall cases into either having or not having repetitive 
nightmares. The model had a negative predictive value 94.7% and a positive 
predictive value of 71.43%. This means that the model was able to correctly identify 
94.7% of the participants that did not have repetitive nightmares and 71.43% of those 
who did have repetitive nightmares. The table below demonstrates that PTA, 
depression and anxiety contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model. 
PTA is close to significance (p =0.06).
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Table 78 - Wald statistic and probability for predictors of repetitive nightmares
Predictors Wald test
Post traumatic amnesia 3.43 (0.06)
Anxiety 5.34* (0.02)
Depression 4.08* (0.04)
Global Sleep quality Index1 2.21 (0.14)
1 with nightmare question omitted 
*p<0.05
This regression analysis was re-run with non-dreamers excluded in order to determine 
how this affected the findings. The Omnibus tests of model coefficients or ‘goodness 
of fit’ was significant (x2 (4)= 14.17; p < 0.01), meaning that this model (with anxiety, 
depression, sleep quality and PTA as predictors) is a better predictor than the 
statistical estimation using no predictors (63.6%). Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R 
squared tests show that between 35% and 48% of the variance in the presence or 
absence of repetitive nightmares are explained by these predictors. The model 
correctly classifies 72.7% of overall cases into either having or not having repetitive 
nightmares. The model had a negative predictive value of 85.7% and a positive 
predictive value of 66.7%. This means that the model was able to correctly identify 
72.7% of the participants that did not have repetitive nightmares and 66.7% of those 
who did have repetitive nightmares. The table below demonstrates that anxiety 
contributes significantly to the predictive ability of the model, whereas PTA and 
depression are close to significance (both are p =0.058).
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Again these above two regressions are generally similar whether non-dreamers are 
excluded or included. However, the first model finds that depression is a significant 
single predictor of repetitive nightmares, which is not the case when non-dreamers are 
excluded.
Table 78 - Wald statistic and probability for predictors of repetitive nightmares with 
non-dreamers excluded
Predictors Wald test
Post traumatic amnesia 3.60 (0.06)
Anxiety 4.50* (0.03)
Depression 3.59 (0.06)
Global Sleep quality Index1 0.55 (0.46)
1 with nightmare question 
*p<0.05
Dream frequency and injury severity
Tests of difference found that length of PTA was shorter in the nightmare and 
dreaming groups compared to the non-dreaming group. This suggested that frequency 
of all dreams might be correlated with injury severity; with dream frequency 
becoming less as injury severity increases. Table 79 assesses the Kendall tau_b 
correlation between PTA and dream frequency and the magnitude of this correlation 
after controlling for memory indices, IQ, mood and sleep quality.
Table 79 - Kendall tau_b correlation between PTA and dream frequency, and the 
partial correlation when controlling for memory indices, IQ, mood and sleep quality.
Dream frequency and post traumatic amnesia -0.38 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for immediate auditory memory -0.38 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for delayed auditory memory -0.38 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for immediate visual memory -0.41 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for auditory delayed memory -0.41 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for verbal IQ -0.37 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for Performance IQ -0.40 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for depression -0.38 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for anxiety -0.35 *(p<0.01)
Controlling for Sleep quality -0.34 *(p<0.01)
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of
I significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
i
i|
i
j
; Table 79 shows that there is a significant correlation between PTA and retrospective
i
j
| dream recall frequency, suggesting that as injury severity increases dream frequency
decreases. Furthermore, this correlation remains significant after controlling for 
memory, IQ, mood and sleep quality, and so the decrease in dream frequency with 
increased severity of injury is not a result of deficits in memory, IQ, mood or sleep 
quality.
Sleep quality and memory in all participants
Tests of difference in table 73 showed that individuals with frequent nightmares 
reported worse sleep quality than those in the dreaming group without frequent 
nightmares and in the non-dreaming group. Thus, the following analysis, in Table 80, 
explored relationships of sleep quality with severity variables, IQ, memory and well 
being measures. In addition to sleep quality, this analysis also assessed relationship of 
daytime dysfunction.
Table 80 - Kendall tau_b correlations of sleep quality and daytime sleepiness with 
severity of injury, IQ, memory indices and mood.
Sleep quality (GSQI) Daytime Sleepiness
Post traumatic amnesia -0.28* (0.01) -0.14(0.28)
Glasgow coma scale 0.26 (0.02) 0.08 (0.52)
Time since injury -0.12(0.23) -0.09 (0.41)
Visual IQ 0.02 (0.90) -0.20 (0.07)
Performance IQ -0.05 (0.64) -0.21 (0.06)
Immediate auditory memory -0.20 (0.05) -0.34* (<0.01)
Immediate visual memory -0.13 (0.21) -0.34* (<0.01)
Delayed auditory memory -0.21 (0.04) -0.37* (<0.001)
Delayed visual memory -0.08 (0.43) -0.43* (<0.001)
Depression 0.34* (<0.001) 0.40* (<0.001)
Anxiety 0.22 (0.03) 0.30* (0.01)
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01 ). All values are two tailed.
Table 80 shows that poorer sleep quality is significantly related to milder head 
| injuries (as measured by PTA). Interestingly, this table shows that daytime
I|
j dysfunction (which is a subscale of the Pittsburgh sleep quality questionnaire
I measuring daytime arousal) is significantly negatively related to all memory indices,
j This suggests that daytime arousal significantly impairs memory. Furthermore, both
| sleep quality and daytime dysfunctions are positively correlated with depression. This
S
also suggests that poor sleep quality and reduced daytime arousal are related to
|
increased negative waking mood.
Partial correlations were conducted in order to determine if relationships with daytime 
sleepiness remained significantly related to memory variables after controlling for 
anxiety, depression. These are shown in Table 81.
Table 81 - Kendall partial tau_b correlations between daytime sleepiness and verbal 
immediate and delayed memory and visual immediate and delayed memory before 
and after controlling for performance IQ, verbal IQ, anxiety, depression and post 
traumatic amnesia.
Immediate
auditory
Delayed
auditory
Immediate
visual
Visual
delayed
D aytim e sleepiness w ith -0.34*
(p<0.001)
-0.37*
(pO.OOl)
-0.34*
(pO.OOl)
-0.43*
(pO.OOl)
Performance IQ controlled for -0.29*
(p<0.001)
-0.32*
(pO.OOl)
-0.30*
(pO.OOl)
-0.39*
(pO.OOl)
Verbal IQ controlled for -0.28*
(p<0.001)
-0.32*
(pO.OOl)
-0.30*
(pO.OOl)
-0.39*
(pO.OOl)
Anxiety controlled for -0.33*
(p<0.001)
-0.36*
(pO.OOl)
-0.35*
(pO.OOl)
-0.43*
(pO.OOl)
Depression controlled for -0.31*
(pO.OOl)
-0.34*
(pO.OOl)
-0.33*
(pO.OOl)
-0.42*
(pO.OOl)
Post traumatic amnesia controlled for -0.35*
(pO.OOl)
-0.39*
(pO.OOl)
-0.40*
(pO.OOl)
-0.49*
(pO.OOl)
* p = or < .01 (in order to reduce the probabilities of type 1 errors as a result of multiple comparisons the level of 
significance was set at p = <0.01). All values are two tailed.
Table 81 suggests that the negative relationships of daytime dysfunction with 
measures of immediate and delayed memory are very robust and remain relatively 
unchanged after controlling for IQ, injury severity and well-being measures.
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Chapter 17
Study 4: Nightmares and traumatic brain injury
Discussion
One of the hypotheses of this study was that there would be a higher incidence 
of nightmares in a population with brain injury compared to the general population. 
The hypothesis was based on the evidence reviewed concerning the waking stressors 
and deficiencies in well-being often found in this populations. This chapter will thus 
begin by discussing the findings regarding well-being deficiencies in the sample 
studied.
Prevalence of depression
This study found that at an average of 4 years and 11 months post injury, the 
prevalence of ‘probable’ depression reported in this study was 61.5% (n=32).
This is a high ‘probable’ prevalence, particularly as a stricter cut off point was 
adopted in this study following the advice of Steer et al (1999) to minimise the 
possibility of falsely identifying a patient as depressed. However, it is important to 
note that a high BDI-PC score only indicates that a detailed psychiatric evaluation 
may be warranted and so this prevalence rate is only a rough approximation.
High rates of depression have been reported in patients with traumatic brain 
injury. A number of recent studies have reported rates between 30% and 60% (Busch, 
1998; Hibbard et al, 1998; Satz et al, 1998; Bowen et al, 1999; Douglas, 2000;
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Curran, 2000). Kreutzer et al (2001) found a prevalence rate of 42% in patients with 
mild to severe brain injuries, an average of 2.5 years post injury. Hibbard et al (1998) 
assessed 100 patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) 7.6 years post injury and 
found a prevalence rate of 48% with major depression. Hoofien et al (2001) found a 
45% prevalence for depression (on the SCL-90-R) in their 76 patients with severe TBI 
at an average 14.1 years post-injury. The mean time since injury in this sample is 4 
years and 11 months. However, it is not uncommon for patients with a brain injury to 
report a high rate of depressive symptoms even though they may not be clinically 
depressed.
Prevalence of anxiety
73.1% (n =38) of the sample scored 8 or above on the HADS anxiety scale 
indicating ‘possible’ clinical anxiety and 53.8% score 11 or above, indicating 
‘probable’ clinical levels of anxiety.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: PTSD
Some researchers have argued that PTSD cannot develop after TBI because 
the coma and organic amnesia associated with TBI prevent the experience of the 
trauma, and as a result anxiety based on re-experience cannot develop (Bontke et al,
1996; Sbordone, 1992). However, based on interviews with a clinical
\
neuropsychologist, this study reports a prevalence rate of 11.54% (n = 6) for PTSD. It 
is worth noting that three of the patients diagnosed with PTSD had a PTA duration of 
less than 24 hours, one of less than a week, one more than two weeks, and one patient 
had no evidence of PTA. Therefore, this suggest that PTSD can develop after a 
traumatic head injury with extended periods of PTA.
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This prevalence rate is in line with the finding of Harvey and Bryant (1998). 
They recorded a 15% prevalence of acute stress disorder in 48 cases of mild TBI. 
Williams et al (2002) found a PTSD prevalence of 18% in a representative post-acute 
community sample of 66 patients with severe TBI. Hibbard et al (1998) examined 
general psychopathology in a retrospective study on 100 people with TBI (61% had a 
severe brain injury) and found that PTSD was reported in 19% (2% of these had 
received their diagnosis before their brain injury).
Of the 6 patients diagnosed with PTSD in the current sample, 4 reported that 
they had frequent nightmares, and Chi squared analysis revealed a trend for PTSD to 
occur more frequently in the nightmare group compared to the non-nightmare groups, 
and when compared specifically to the dreaming group. This offers some support for 
the findings of Bryant et al (2000a), suggesting that nightmares, emotional reactivity 
and intrusive memories had the highest positive predictive power of PTSD. This is in 
contrast to the findings of previous reports in which the symptoms of trauma re- 
experiencing had only moderate positive predictive power (Foa et al, 1995). However, 
their sample was not fully representative of severe TBI as participants were not 
selected at random and survivors with low GCS were excluded.
Sleep Quality
Global sleep quality
Buysse et al (1989) suggested that a score of over 5 on the global scale of the 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index indicates that a person is a poor sleeper. Of the sample 
in study four, 65.4% (N = 34) had a GPSQI of over 5. Fichtenberg et al (2001) found 
that insomnia was correctly classified in 96% and 98% of their sample using a cut of
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score of 8 and 9 respectively on the Pittsburgh Global Sleep Quality Index. Using this 
criterion 34.6% (n=18) of the sample in study four were classified as having 
insomnia. In contrast, in the United States, approximately 10% of the population 
suffer from insomnia (Hammond, 1984; Bixler et al,1979; Institute of Medicine,
1979; Karacan et al, 1983; Mellinger et al, 1985; Ford & Kamerow, 1989; Gallup 
Organisation, 1991). Therefore, the prevalence of ‘probable’ insomnia found in study 
four is well in excess of the general population.
As described in the introduction to this chapter the prevalence of sleep 
disturbances following recent traumatic brain injury has been reported to range from 
36% (McLean et al, 1984) to as high as 70% (Keshavan et al, 1981) and a number of 
studies have suggested that sleep disturbances are among the most universal 
symptoms of TBI (Beetar et al, 1996; Castriotta & Lai, 2001; Parsons & ver Beek, 
1982; Deb, Lyons & Koutzoukis, 1998). The 34.6% prevalence rate for insomnia 
found in this study is very similar to the 30% prevalence rate found by Mann, 
Fichtenberg and Putnam (1997) in a prospective study of 50 TBI patients. These 
findings are also in line with other research demonstrating that sleep complaints are 
common in patients who have suffered moderate or severe head injuries even years 
after the trauma (Prigatano et al, 1980; Guilleminault et al, 1983).
The current study also found that sleep quality was significantly related to 
injury severity (as measured by PTA). It was found that poorer sleep quality was 
found in those with milder injuries. These findings are in accordance with Clinchot et 
al (1998). These authors found that individuals with a GCS of less than or equal to 7 
(more severe injuries) were less likely to have sleep problems than those with a GCS
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of over 7 (p = 0.034). Poor sleep quality was significantly related to depression (and 
anxiety was very close to statistical significance (p = 0.03). This is in line with Parcell 
et al (2006), who also found that higher scores for anxiety and depression were 
associated with increased reporting of nighttime awakenings, reports of sleep changes 
and poorer sleep quality.
Daytime sleepiness/arousal subscale of the PSOI
Fichtenberg et al (2001) examined the concurrent validity of the PSQI item 
relating to hypersomnia with 47 TBI patients. It was found that the PSQI symptomatic 
scorers obtained significantly higher levels of daytime sleepiness on the Epworth 
Sleepiness Scale (ESS; Johns, 1992) compared with asymptomatic scorers (M= 11.4; 
SD, 5.8 and M= 4.7; SD, 3.4; t=3.4; p<0.01). This suggests that the PSQI scale of 
daytime sleepiness is a valid measure of daytime sleepiness.
57.7% of participants in study 4 reported problems with daytime 
sleepiness/arousal at least once or twice a week. Only 3.8% of this sample reported 
that daytime sleepiness/arousal was not a problem for them in the last month. In 
contrast, the prevalence of daytime sleepiness in the general population has been 
estimated at 0.5% and 5% (Benbadis et al, 1999), although reports from 
questionnaires vary from 0.3% to 13.3% (D’Alessandro et al, 1995). Thus, clearly the 
estimate of 57.7% from study four is well in excess of these population norms. Thfs 
finding is in accordance with the observation that daytime sleepiness is among the 
most universal symptom of TBI (Beetar et al, 1996).
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Daytime sleepiness/arousal and memory deficits
There were significant negative correlations between daytime sleepiness / 
arousal with immediate and delayed visual and verbal memory. These correlations 
were robust and remained relatively unchanged after controlling for length of PTA, 
verbal and performance IQ, anxiety and depression (these findings have important 
clinical implications as they suggest that improving daytime arousal may improve 
memory).
Prevalence of nightmares
The above findings are of generally increased rates of psychopathology in this 
population, which is the basis for the hypothesis that they would have a high 
incidence of nightmares.
Study four indeed found that 30.8% (n =16) of participants reported 
experiencing at least one nightmare per month, and 13.5% report at least one 
nightmare per week. In contrast, the American Sleep Disorders Association (1990) 
estimated that 5% of the adult population experience at least one nightmare per 
month. Hublin et al (1999) found that 3% had nightmares weekly, whereas 10% had 
nightmares monthly. Therefore, the prevalence of mghtmares m'this sample o f 
patients with a brain injury is well in excess of the general population, thus, 
confirming the hypothesis.
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In contrast to these findings, Solms (1997) found that only 14.9% of his 
effective sample reported an increased frequency of non-recurring nightmares. This 
may be a result of the different samples used. This sample here consisted primarily of 
patients who had sustained a traumatic brain injury in a road traffic accident, whereas, 
Solms assessed a large cross-section of the clinical neurological population 
representing a wide range of neurological conditions (e.g., benign cyst, 
cerebrovascular disease, idiopathic hydrocephalus, neoplasm, infection, idiopathic 
epilepsy). Thus, it is possible that the high percentage of nightmares found in study 
four is specific to a population who sustained a brain injury as a result of trauma.
Solms did, however, note that the prevalence of frequent nightmares was 
slightly higher in the cerebrally impaired group than in his control group and that it 
did correlate significantly with limbic system involvement. Solms argues that the 
clinical usefulness of non-recurring nightmares is questionable, especially in light of 
the fact that one control patient also reported it. However, although non-recurring 
nightmares may not be useful in terms of indicating underlying anatomical damage 
they may be clinically useful as indicators of mood disturbances.
The significance of frequent nightmares.
This study found that individuals with frequent nightmares (at least one a 
month) had higher levels of waking anxiety than those without frequent nightmares, 
and those who report non-dreaming. Furthermore, those with frequent nightmares also 
report lower sleep quality than those without nightmares, and non-dreamers. A 
regression analysis found that anxiety, sleep quality, post traumatic amnesia and 
depression accounted for 40-57% of the variance of monthly nightmares. Anxiety and
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posttraumatic amnesia were found to contribute significantly to the predictive ability 
of this model. These findings concerning the relationship with anxiety and nightmares 
are in line with research using other populations, as reviewed in the first chapter.
Interestingly, this study found that frequent nightmares were significantly 
associated with milder head injuries (as measured by GCS and duration of PTA). One 
explanation for this is that as the severity of the injury increases dream recall 
decreases and, hence, the frequency of nightmares decreases.
Cessation of dreaming
Study four found that 34.6% of patients report that they never dream. In 
contrast, a large representative survey found that 6.1% of the general population 
reported that they never dream (Borbely 1984), and Pagel (2003) found that, in a sleep 
laboratory population, 6.5% reported that they did not dream. Thus, the incidence of 
non-dreaming found in this study is far in excess of general population and sleep 
disordered populations.
The prevalence rate of non-dreaming found in this study is remarkably similar 
to the 34.9% reported by Solms (1997) in his sample of 391 neurological patients. 
Solms (1997) also assessed a control group referred to him for neuropsychological 
assessment in which cerebral illness was initially suspectediDut idtimately excluded. 
Only one patient in the control group reported cessation of dreaming, and this was a 
case of hysteria.
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Solms (1997) found that cessation of dreaming in his patients with focal 
lesions fell into two anatomical subgroups. The majority of these had parietal lobe 
lesions, or space occupying lesions in close proximity to the parietal lobe, and a much 
smaller group that had deep bifrontal lesions, more specifically the lesion was situated 
in the white matter immediately anterior to the frontal horns of the lateral ventricles; 
in these cases the damage was invariably bilateral. Functional imaging studies have 
been remarkably complementary to the lesion data (Braun et al, 1997, 1998; Heiss et 
al, 1985; Madsen et al, 1991; Maquet et al, 1996; Nofzinger et al, 1997).
However, the current study used a sample of patients typically with diffuse 
axonal injuries and, hence, anatomical correlates of non- dreaming cannot be 
determined. However, this study included clinical measures sensitive to partial lobe 
functioning (Block design) and frontal ‘executive functioning’ (Hayling and Zoo 
map). None of these measures were significantly different in the group reporting 
dreaming compared to non-dreamers. However, our group of non-dreamers would 
likely have consisted of both patients with parietal and deep bifrontal lesions and so it 
is perhaps not surprising that differences were not found on these clinical measures.
This study found that the cessation of dream recall was independent of IQ or 
memory. However, dreamers had significantly lower anxiety and higher sleep quality 
than dreamers. It could be speculated that non-dreamers have less anxiety because 
they have more severe injuries^and possibly less insight. For example, Talbot nnd 
Giroux (2000) found that patients with minor head injuries tend to under-estimate 
their perceived quality of life when compared to close relative’s ratings, whereas 
more severely injured people overestimate their rating. This finding may relate to the
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difference in levels of awareness often evident in the two groups. Less severely 
injured people have a more accurate level of insight into their difficulties.
Non-dreaming and sleep quality
This study found that sleep quality was significantly poorer in dreamers 
compared to those who report they never dream. This is in line with Partridge (1950) 
who suggested that cessation of dreaming in leukotomised patients was the result of 
the unusual depth of sleep that prefrontal leucotomy was supposed to produce. 
However, these finding contradict those of Solms (1997). He found that non-dreaming 
patients experienced significantly more disturbed sleep than the dreaming patients. He 
argued that his finding provided support for Freud’s (1900/1953) notion that dreams 
protect sleep. One possible reason for these differences between these studies is the 
different neurological populations (as described above) and secondly the different 
methods used. Solms methods were exclusively reliant upon clinical methods of 
investigation: He asked patients whether or not their sleep had been affected by their 
illness. Responses were classified under four heading: sleep was considered to be (a) 
better, (b) disrupted, (c) unaffected since the onset of illness, or patients were (d) 
unsure of whether or not there had been any change in the quality of sleep. However, 
the current study used a standardised measure of sleep quality that had been validated 
in a population with traumatic brain injury (Fichtenberg et al, 2001), and which did 
not require thinking back to before the trauma. ------  ----------  ---
Dream frequency and severity of injury
Dream recall frequency was generally low in this sample, but was significantly 
negatively correlated to severity of injury (as measured by PTA). Thus, as the injury
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becomes more severe patients report fewer dreams. This correlation remained 
significant after controlling for immediate and delayed memory, IQ, anxiety, 
depression and sleep quality. Therefore, it can only be speculated that perhaps more 
severe injuries cause damage to the lesion sites that Solms’ suggests and are necessary 
to support dreaming (e.g. deep bifrontal lesions).
Is cessation of dreaming a disorder of memory in this study?
It has been proposed that cessation of dreaming following neurological 
conditions may be a disorder of memory rather than dreaming. This study conducted 
neuropsychological tests to obtain objective scores of current memory functioning on 
the assumption that if patients forget their dreams they are also likely to forget other 
experiences. The results of this study demonstrate that there is no significant 
difference between immediate verbal and visual memory or delayed visual and visual 
memory between those reporting dreams and those reporting that they never dream.
These findings are in line with Murri et al (1984), and also with Solms (1997), 
who found that long-term memory disorder (both anterograde and retrograde) did not 
distinguish significantly between dreamers and non-dreamers. Also, Bischof and 
Bassetti’s (2004) case study of a 73 old woman reporting cessation of dreaming 
showed that she had scores on short-term and long-term memory that were in the 
normal range. The findings from this study are also in line with REM awakenings 
studies confirming the absenceofdreamsin those who report cessation of-dreaming—  
within the neurological populations (Jus et al, 1973; Michel & Sieroff, 1981;
Schanfald, Pearlman & Greenberg, 1985; Bischof & Bassetti 2004).
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However, the findings from study four are in contrast to Cathala et al (1983), 
who found strong positive correlations between tests of visual and verbal memory 
with the frequency and informational richness of dream recall. They also contradict 
the findings of Arena et al (1984), who reported that the absence of dreaming was 
related to poor long-term verbal recall (and also, in some cases, aphasia).
These discrepancies could be the result of methodological differences. Solms
(1997) highlights that in the clinical literature patients are described as non-dreamers 
if they themselves report a total cessation of dreaming (as in study 4), whereas, 
experimental studies (e.g. Arena et al, 1984, and Cathala et al, 1983) classify patients 
as non-dreamers if they do not report specific dreams during a time-limited 
experiment (morning recall diaries). Given the low mean rate of dream recall found in 
this study, experimental definitions of non-dreaming are likely to be inaccurate. When 
assessing dream frequency this study included the category of dreaming less than 
once in year in order to distinguish between those who never dreams from those who 
rarely dream.
This study, therefore, suggests that non-dreaming is a primary phenomenon in 
this sample, independent of any disturbance of memory, although it is acknowledged 
that individuals in some studies may have dream cessation due to a memory disorder.
Dreaming and Wais -10 scores
There are no differences in verbal or performance IQ scores between dreamers 
and non-dreamers, and so IQ differences cannot account for dream cessation in this 
study.
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Summary/ new findings
This sample of people with traumatic brain injury had a far higher prevalence 
of frequent nightmares, and reported absence of dreaming, in comparison with the 
normal population. This is the first study to systematically assess the prevalence of 
idiopathic nightmares and their relationships with mood and with a standardised 
measure of sleep quality. It was found that individuals with frequent nightmares had 
higher levels of waking anxiety and lower sleep quality than those without frequent 
nightmares. This was the first study to find that individuals with complete lack of 
dreaming had more severe injuries (as measured by PTA) than those who were 
reporting dreaming, but that the lack of dreaming was not associated with deficits in 
IQ scores. The finding that lack of dreaming was not associated with deficits in 
memory scores confirms previous research. It is therefore possible, as suggested in the 
work of Solms, that these individuals have had such a severe trauma that dream 
production has halted, which has the benefit that nightmares cannot occur. They also 
had the better sleep quality.
Limitations of study four
One of the main limitations of study four is that all patients had diffuse 
damage as a result of their injury, and therefore conclusions about what locations of 
the brain subserve dreaming could, not be made. This study also could have benefited 
from using objective measures of sleep quality and sleep architecture, to determine 
how accurate patients’ assessments of sleep quality was, and also to ensure that sleep 
architecture was normal. This was not feasible in this particular sample as most lived 
a considerable distance away.
Chapter 18 
A case study of the REM sleep of a patient 
with cessation of dreaming
Study four demonstrated the existence of a negative correlation between the severity 
of brain injury and frequency of dreaming. Furthermore, the study found a remarkably 
similar prevalence of non-dreaming to that of Solms (1997). As focal data in study 
four is lacking it is not possible to speculate about any focal damage that may have 
led to cessation of dreaming, and hence about the neuroanatomical structures 
underlying dreaming. However, there is the possibility that this cessation was the 
result of disruption of normal sleep architecture, as was investigated for sleep apnoea 
in study 2. The aim of this chapter is thus to present a case study showing the REM 
sleep profile of an individual who, following a traumatic brain injury reported 
cessation of dreaming. This will determine if sleep architecture is disrupted, or if the 
patient continues to show normal REM sleep, the latter possibility being an example 
of Solms’ (2000) contention that REM sleep and dreaming are dissociable states and, 
that the termination of dreaming can occur when the REM sleep cycle is spared 
(Benson and Greenberg, 1969; Brown, 1972; Efron, 1968; Jus et al. 1973; Kerr et al 
1978; Michel and Sieroff, 1981).
It should be noted that assessing the normality of sleep architecture, and specifically 
of REM sleep, does not mean that it is assumed here that dreaming is associated 
solely with REM sleep. It is acknowledged that complex mentation can be obtained 
from 43% to 50% of NREM awakenings (Foulkes, 1962; Nielsen, 1999; 2000),
although REM dreams are more frequent, longer, more bizarre, more visual, more 
animated and more emotional than NREM reports (Domhoff 1996; Merritt et al 1994; 
Hobson 1988b; Hobson & Stickgold, 1994a; LaBerge, 1990). Rather, the aim here is 
to see if the sleep architecture of this patient with cessation of dreaming is greatly 
different from normality, as this would provide a simpler explanation of the cessation 
of dreaming than having to invoke a Solms’ neurological explanation.
Method
This chapter focuses on a patient who reported a cessation of dreaming following a 
brain injury. The patient was referred to the researcher by a neuropsychologist who 
was aware of the researcher’s interests. The patient reported to the clinician, during a 
neuropsychological assessment that he had stopped dreaming following his head 
injury. The study was approved by the local ethical committee.
The patient (AJ) was a 43 year old male who suffered a small bifrontal contusion 
following an unprovoked assault. On admission to hospital the patient had a Glasgow 
Coma Score of 11/15 and duration of PTA was 2.5 weeks.
Measures
REMview. - The REMview (nightcap) was used to record two consecutive nights of 
sleep. The REMview is a reliable and compact bedside computerised unit that records 
eyelid and body movements and, based on an algorithmic combination of these two 
measures, can determine sleep latency and the architecture of REM and non-REM 
sleep stages (Stickgold et al. 1994). The REMview is worn on the head overnight, and 
stores raw data which is then downloaded to a PC for analysis. The algorithm
software program is in agreement with 85.6% of EEG-determined REM / NREM 
sleep states on a minute by minute basis, and sleep onset and REM sleep were both 
predicted within one minute of EEG determined onset (Mamelak and Hobson, 1989).
A dream diary was also kept each morning for 10 days. This consisted of only one 
question ‘did you dream last night?’
The WAIS and the faces (visual memory) and logical memory (verbal 
memory) subtests of the WMS-III were obtained from the patient’s 
neuropsychological assessment (these measured are described in detail in chapter 15). 
The neuropsychological assessment was carried out 5 months post injury and the 
patient’s REM sleep and dream recall was assessed 12 months post injury, hence, it is 
likely that the patients cognitive capacity had increased during this time.
Procedure
The patient was asked detailed questions to ensure that he had not experienced any 
dream mentation since his injury. AJ wore the REMview monitor for 2 nights whilst 
keeping the dream diary.
Results
Table 82 shows the neuropsychological test scores for verbal and performance IQ and 
verbal (indexed by the immediate and delayed conditions of the logical memory 
subtest) and visual memory (indexed using the immediate and delayed conditions of 
the faces subtest).
VIQ 67
PIQ 80
Logical memory: 
Immediate condition
4
Logical memory: 
Delayed condition
1
Faces
Immediate condition
7
Faces
Delayed condition
8
The above table shows that the patient’s verbal and performance IQ scores and verbal 
memory scores (as indexed by the logical memory story recall test) are in the 
impaired range.
However, AJ’s memory scores on the visual memory test (faces immediate and 
delayed) are in the average range (i.e. the average range = 7-8). Thus, it could be 
argued that visual memory was adequate to recall as least some dreams.
The following table shows the average percentage of REM and NREM sleep across 2 
nights’ REMview recordings.
Table 83 -  REMview assessed % REM, % NREM and total sleep time for AJ.
AJ
% REM 17.45 %
%NREM 82%
Total sleep time (mins) 456 mins
The table above demonstrates that AJ continues to show REM sleep despite the 
reported absence of dreaming. Pages 455 and 456 of this chapter show a summary of 
AJ’s REMview output for the two nights. The REM view uses the following 
algorithm; periods of head movements are classed as the person being awake, periods 
of head movements and no eye movements are classed as non-REM sleep and periods 
of eye movements without head movements as classed as REM sleep (as indexed by 
the black bars on the sleep state hypnogram).
Discussion
These results indicate that the cessation of dreaming is not due to the disruption of the 
REM sleep cycle. This suggests that the findings of study four that dream recall 
decreases as severity of injury increases is not a result of the disruption of the REM 
sleep cycle. This is in line with previous research demonstrating cessation of 
dreaming together with an intact REM cycle.
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Chapter 19 
General conclusions
Four main studies were conducted with samples having the following characteristics: 
people with frequent nightmares; b) people with sleep apnoea; c) fire-fighters and d) 
people with traumatic brain injury. For brevity, in this section, nightmare means 
waking criterion nightmares and non-waking criterion nightmares (i.e. unpleasant 
dreams, irrespective of whether they wake the sleeper).
Major Conclusions
• Nightmare frequency was significantly elevated in patients with sleep apnoea, 
traumatic brain injury and in fire fighters compared to the general population.
• Nightmare distress did not render nightmare frequency -  psychopathology 
correlations negligible in study 1. In study 3, only one fire-fighter reported having 
a problem with nightmares. Nightmare frequency is thus not an artifact of 
nightmare distress in these two studies. These findings support the intuitive 
hypothesis that poor waking well-being is associated with increased frequency of 
nightmares and that the is not solely a matter of how distressed one is by ones 
nightmares.
• Within subjects correlations of pre-sleep mood with the presence/absence of a 
nightmare that night were small in comparison to between subjects analyses.
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Nightmares are thus more likely to be caused by general trait or medium-term 
poor well being rather than by acute poor well-being.
• None of the individual difference variables assessed in this study predispose 
individuals to have nightmares under conditions of high anxiety or high 
depression. This was despite the individual difference variables in many cases 
having significant between subjects correlations with nightmare frequency.
• Ratings of PTSD correlated with nightmare frequency in emergency service 
workers who have undergone repeated exposure to trauma. PTSD was more 
common in patients with traumatic brain injury and frequent nightmares than 
those without nightmares.
• Despite sleep fragmentation there was no indication of cessation of dreaming in 
the patients with apnoea, but approximately one third of the participants with 
brain injury had complete cessation of dreaming. For the individuals with brain 
injury, cessation of dreaming was significantly associated with severity of injury 
and not with tests of memory, IQ or frontal functioning.
• Severity of apnoea was associated with more neutrally toned dreams rather than 
more negatively toned dreams. Hence, this study has shown that both head injury 
and apnoea can affect the process of dreaming.
Other conclusions
• Correlations between nightmare frequency and measures of psychopathology,
including anxiety and depression, were similar to those found in the more 
commonly used student samples.
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• Contrary to Beaulieu-Prevost & Zadra (in press), correlations of individual 
difference variables with prospective dream frequency were significantly higher 
than with retrospective dream frequency. However, correlations of individual 
differences with prospective nightmare frequency were smaller than with 
retrospective nightmare frequency. This may question the accuracy of some 
individual’s retrospective assessment of their nightmare frequency, in that 
individuals high on psychopathology and other individual difference variables 
appear to be overestimating their nightmare frequency retrospectively in 
comparison to low psychopathology individuals.
• In line with Zadra and Donderi (2000) and Blagrove et al (2004) it was found that 
logs produce a higher estimation of nightmare frequency compared to 
retrospective measures,
• Blagrove et al (2004) and Blagrove and Haywood (2006) had found that using the 
waking criterion in defining nightmares did not increase between subjects 
correlations between nightmare frequency and anxiety. The findings here confirm 
but also delineate the results of those papers as follows: Using a stricter definition 
of nightmares, by defining nightmares as having to wake up the sleeper, made 
little difference to the between subjects correlations with individual difference 
variables or well-being variables. However, using the criterion that the dream has 
to be very unpleasant as opposed to just moderately unpleasant to be classed as a 
nightmare, did cause an increase in between subjects correlations, in comparison 
to the criterion that the dream was at least moderately unpleasant. The former 
finding confirms the results of Blagrove et al in questioning the need for the
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waking criterion, but the latter finding delineates that conclusion by showing that 
the definition of nightmares in terms of intensity is important. Given that the 
current thesis results confirmed Zadra et al’s (2006) finding that nightmares that 
cause waking are more intense in terms of fear than bad dreams, which do not 
cause the sleeper to wake. It therefore follows that Zadra and Donderi’s (2000) 
results in favour of the use of the waking criterion may be due to a confound with 
nightmare intensity.
• Using either type of stricter definition of nightmares, either by defining
nightmares as having to wake up the sleeper, or as having an emotional tone of 
very unpleasant, made little difference to within-subjects correlations with state 
pre-sleep mood.
Applied implications of these results for the scientific study of dreaming and nightmares 
A higher frequency of nightmares than in the general population has here been 
found in people with apnoea, with snoring and excessive daytime sleepiness, and with 
traumatic brain injury. It was also found in fire-fighters. This thesis and previous research 
suggests that the presence of frequent nightmares can be indicative of underlying 
psychopathology and thus potentially beneficial to clinicians. Furthermore, these are 
important findings from the standpoint of advising members of such populations about 
their likelihood of having nightmares. As imagery rehearsal treatment for nightmares has 
been validated for traumatized populations (e.g’, Krakow et"al,T 995J, it should therefore 
be offered to people with traumatic brain injury and people in the emergency services. 
Work is needed, however, to find out if the therapy works for people with apnoea, given 
the obvious closeness between precipitating cause and effect in this case.
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Theoretical implications of these results for the scientific study of dreaming and 
nightmares, and suggestions for further studies
This thesis confirmed the results of Zadra et al (2006), that nightmares defined 
with the waking criterion have more negative emotions than bad dreams. There are two 
possible explanations for this association, a) Instances of negative emotion in a dream 
cause an immediate waking, or b) the general higher intensity of nightmares causes 
awakenings, which are not necessarily at times of high emotional intensity within the 
nightmare. This distinction is similar to that make in lucid dreaming research, of whether 
becoming lucid is due to a general brain activation during a dream, or due to specific 
events, such as seeing an incongruity. The results of Blagrove et al (2006) support 
explanation a), in that people ascribe their awakening to the events or emotions of the 
nightmare. But the following study is still required to confirm this:
a) The Fosse method of line-by-line rating of emotion s in dreams should be done 
for a sample of nightmares that caused awakening, so as to confirm that, just preceding 
the point of waking, a high rating was given to a negative emotion. The null hypothesis is 
that highy intense emotions are present, but not immediately prior to waking.
______ Two further experiments would then add to this detailed exploration of emotions
within nightmares:
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b) Just as Blagrove and Haywood (2006) asked participants to rate how sure they 
were that a dream /nightmare had awoken them, confidence in ratings of 
unpleasantness need to be assessed as a first step to assessing the validity of 
unpleasantness ratings.
c) Overall ratings from memory of pleasantness or unpleasantness waking events 
and experiences are highly dependent on the emotions present at the end of the 
experience and the highest rating of events during the experience. Such memory 
biases need to be assessed for dreams, as if present they would add to error 
variance in the overall rating of pleasantness/unpleasantness of a dream.
One of the major hopes of this thesis, that individual difference variables would 
be found that predisposed individuals to nightmares when state anxiety or depression was 
high, was not realised. Furthermore, although there was a wide range of within subjects 
correlations between mood and the presence of nightmares, the mean of these 
correlations was small. Two experiments are now proposed for the study of the 
interaction between predisposing traits and state anxiety and depression.
d) longer diary study, assessing with in-subject correlations over one month or more. 
This may produce a better estimate of the within subjects correlations, which may 
this have a higher between subjects correlation with the individual difference 
variables.
e) It may be that the latter suggestion will fail to find predisposing traits, and that the 
failure to find them in this thesis accurately reflects a real lack of such 
predisposing factors. An alternative more complicated longitudinal analysis is
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thus needed that allows for the mood on a day to affect not just the following 
night, but other nights as well.
Implications for theories of nightmare formation: The results here mirror many 
previous papers on the relationship between nightmares and waking life, in that the 
association is small but significant. That there is an association supports the notion of 
dreams being meaningful, and, given the review in chapter 1 on work concerning the 
memory consolidation function of REM sleep, this supports the notion that nightmares 
may be involved in the processing of emotionally traumatic information. These 
differences between patient / emergency service groups and the general population, and 
significant between subjects correlations, therefore support the proposal of Hartmann 
(1995, 1998) that nightmares are involved in a therapeutic connecting of emotional 
memories. However, for the between and within subjects correlations to be so moderately 
sized does mean that nightmares can occur with little obvious relationship with poor well 
being. There is thus still support from these findings for Revonsuo’s (2000) proposal that 
we are all predisposed to have nightmares, which would thus occur almost whatever our 
degree of waking life poor well being, or, in extremis, the view of Hobson et al (2000) 
that dreaming is greatly disconnected from waking life, in terms of its content, 
neurochemistry, and logic.
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Appendix 2: Life events scale used in study 1
Please tick in the appropriate column to indicate whether the following events have 
affected you during the last year.
YES NO
You have had a serious illness, injury or accident
You have cared for someone important to you who has had a serious 
illness, injury or accident
You have had a separation or divorce
You have had a serious problem in a relationship or with family 
members
You have moved house
You have had a serious problems at work
You have had minor problems at work
You have had serious financial problems
You have been the victim of a serious crime
You have been the victim of a minor crime
You have had legal difficulties
You have had a serious disappointment
You have had continuous worry or stress or major trouble lasting 
some months
There has been a death of a close family member or friend
Appendix 3: Childhood items
The following statements are concerned with childhood. Please circle the appropriate 
response according to your experiences.
As a  ch i ld  did  y o u  e v e r  feel un loved  or  u n w a n te d ? Not at all mildly sometimes Very much
As a ch i ld  w e re  yo u  ev e r  u n rea so n ab ly  p u n ish e d ? Not at all mildly sometimes Very much
Did yo u  e x p e r ie n c e  a n y  ty p e s  o f  abu se? Not at all mildly sometimes Very much
H o w  h a p p y  w a s  y o u r  ch i ld h o o d ? Very happy happy fair unhappy Very unhappy
Appendix 4: retrospective dream questionnaire used in study 1
What is your age?_________________
Are you male or female? M F
• How many dreams do you have each w eek?________________
• If you usually do not have one per week, how many do you have per 
month?________
• A night terror is a sudden awakening in fear, but where you do not remember a 
dream.
• How often, if at all, do you experience night terrors?_______
• A nightmare is a very disturbing dream that you can recall clearly.
• How many bad dreams/nightmares do you have a month?____________
• If you have nightmares less than once a month, how many do you have per 
year?___________
• Now, please think about whether you are ever woken up by the emotions or 
events in your nightmares.
Please state in what percentage of your nightmares does the emotion or the 
events of the nightmare wake you up? (Please circle one of the following).
0%  20%  4 0 %  60%  80%  100%
none of them all of them
• How long have you been experiencing nightmares?________
• Do you ever have the same nightmare being repeated? YES/NO
• How often do you have such a repetitive nightmare?____________
• Are you taking any prescribed medicines that affect or may affect your mood
or sleep?______________
• If so, please list them h e re_________________________________
• Have you been diagnosed as having any medical disorder of sleep?
• If so, please state any medical diagnosis here__________________
1
\ J
ll
e- 8
D E’« ^ IS.
o 53“ D-
sr. o'
ES o- « 9T3£L 2 c° £
£  2-
JD cr *<
I  “la  g  c
!•!.§> ST ° sr " 2 |
-O c« O C o to
S S-
S*w S3
8 3 O PJ
a 1*
f ?
I!
ft !* D M3< ■«
Eft? ®
- 8 I*
e- >*
IL 6
& &
2aC 2
o o n  o2 B3 *2 . 
S. aQ. f»
S. B-
n n
=P O
3
E
O-
o
e
qo
H |
*<
B
8
&
BO
c?
5*Bo3cv
§*
T3
o
p.D.
&O
Bog3Cl
s-
S'
'& 2.
fr-S*
Instructions to participants.
Each night and each morning for 14 days we would like you to quickly assess how depressed 
or happy and how anxious or calm you feel on the 2 scales provided and answer a few 
additional questions. For the rating scales you will be presented with a line running between 
relaxed and anxious and one between happy and depressed. You will be asked to put a cross 
on each line according to how you feel. For example, if you felt quite relaxed you would 
place the cross as shown below.
very quite neither quite very
RELAXED-------------------X ------------------------------------------------------ANXIOUS
We would also like you to record your dreams for 14 days. Please do not skip days at all and 
please complete the diary for 14 nights in a row. Thus, each day you will be asked to provide 
a written account in the dream diary provided of all the dreams you can recall from the 
previous night. This should take only about 5-10 mins each day.
When you are recalling each dream we would like you to indicate any emotions or moods that 
are present and rate on a scale of 1 to 3 how intensely the particular emotion or mood was 
experienced (where 1 is low, 2 is medium and 3 is high). Please write the content of the 
dream in the main box of the dream diary. In the right-hand column you will see listed 7 
emotions. Please put a number in the appropriate column (1,2 and 3) to indicate the 
appearance of this emotion and its intensity. If you wish to report the experience of any 
emotions that are not present in the list please indicate this in the column marked ‘other’ or in 
the space for comments below. Please report the experience of any emotion; regardless of its 
duration or how related it seems to the dream content.
For example,
“In my first dream I recall from last night 1 remember 1 was sleeping in my bedroom when H  
came in. I  was irritated because I couldn ’t sleep and considered getting up (IRRATATION,
1). Then I flew out the door on a cookie plate or something. I flew around near the house. O 
and H were watching and they envied me ’ (JOY/ELATION, 3). ”
After each dream report we would like you to answer the questions provided on the dream 
diary sheets.
N.B. We are interested in ALL your dreams not just your nightmares so please record as 
much information as possible regardless of how uneventful and unimportant it may seem.
Please try and provide as honest a report as possible and not just the dramatic dream elements. 
We understand that scenes of a personal or embarrassing nature are a common feature of 
everyone’s dreams. Therefore, all dream reports will be treated with the utmost 
confidentiality and sensitivity. Any information you provide will be available only to the two 
researchers undertaking this study.
After the two-week recording period please return the dream diaries to us in the return 
envelope.
If you have any problems or worries with the study please contact us at any time on the 
following details:-
Mark Blagrove 01792 295586 or 07976136193 
Samantha Fisher 01792 205678 ext 4616 or 01685 376980 
Email 160133 @s wan. ac. uk
Summary
Before bed, fill in the 2 scales indicating your mood that day by putting a cross on each line 
according to how you feel. The following morning record the date, then the dream content 
including any emotions/moods present and their intensities by giving them a rating of either 
1, 2 or 3. Finally, please answer the questions on the bottom of the diary page.
Appendix Table 7: Intercorrelations between variables well-being and individual 
difference variables.
APS CEQ STB EPQ-
N
EPQ-
L
GHQ-
12
BQ-
18
STA1
-S
STAI
-T
GSI PST PSD LE ChE
APS - 0.39* 0.42* 0.57* -0.07 0.24 0.40 0.37* 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.21 0.06
(0.01) (<.01) (<•01) (0.57) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) K O I) K O I) (0.01) (0.08) (0.62)
CEQ 0.39 - 0.43 0.17 -0.05 0.25 0.64 0.16 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.22 0.28 0.26
(<•01) (<•01) (0.16) (0.71) (0.04) K O I) (0.40) (0.02) K O I) K O I) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
STB 0.42 0.43 - 0.53 -0.23 0.51 0.51 0.64 0.66 0.53 0.54 0.43 0.34 0.07
(<•01) (<•01) (<•01) (0.06) (<.01) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.57)
EPQ- 0.57 0.17 0.53 - -0.07 0.39 0.28 0.72 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.55 0.29 0.08
N (<•01) (0.16) (<•01) (0.55) « o i ) (0.02) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.53)
EPQ- -0.07 -0.05 -0.23 -0.07 - -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.08
L (0.57) (0.71) (0.06) (0.55) (0.87) (0.89) (0.94) (0.73) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.02) (0.51)
GHQ 0.24 0.25 0.51 0.39 -0.02 - 0.40 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.46 0.25
•12 (0.47) (0.04) (<•01) « o i ) (0.86) K O I) (0.01) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.04)
B Q - 0.40 0.64 0.51 0.28 -0.02 0.40 - 0.43 0.40 0.54 0.54 0.44 0.40 0.22
18 (<-oi) (<•01) « 0 1 ) (0.02) (0.89) (<.01) (0.02) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.07)
■ST AI 0.37 0.16 0.64 0.72 -0.01 0.57 0.43 - 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.63 0.48 0.19
| s (0.05) (0.40) (<-oi) (<•01) (0.94) (<.01) (0.02) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.01) (0.33)
STA1 0.46 0.31 0.66 0.68 0.05 0.55 0.40 0.87 - 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.44 0.31
•T (<.01) (0.25) (<.01) (<•01) (0.73) « 0 1 ) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.03)
GSI 0.42 0.35 0.53 0.64 0.15 0.54 0.54 0.87 0.67 - 0.91 0.75 0.49 0.18
(0.01) (<•01) « 0 1 ) « o i ) (0.22) « 0 1 ) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) KOI) K O I) (1.15)
PST 0.37 0.36 0.54 0.60 0.15 0.53 0.54 0.86 0.62 0.91 - 0.64 0.51 0.16
(<■01) (0.03) (<-oi) (<.01) (0.21) (<.01) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.20)
PSDI 0.32 0.22 0.43 0.55 0.17 0.59 0.44 0.63 0.65 0.75 0.64 - 0.42 0.33
(0.01) (0.07) « 0 1 ) « o i ) (0.18) (<.01) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) K O I) (0.01)
LE 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.29 0.02 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.51 0.42 - 0.12
(0.08) (0.02) (<■01) (0.02) (0.90) (<.01) K O I) (0.01) K O I) K O I ) K O I ) K O I ) (0.34)
C h i l d 0.06 0.26 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.33 0.12 -
(0.62) (0.04) (0.57) (0.53) (0.51) (0.04) (0.07) (0.33) (0.03) (0.15) (0.20) (0.01) (0.34)
APS = Arousal predisposition scale; CEQ = creative experience questionnaire; STB; 
STA-borderline personality scale; EPQ-N =PQ-R Neuroticism scale; EPQ-L =EPQ-R 
Lie scale; GHQ-12 = General health questionnaire -12; BQ-18 = Boundary 
Questionnaire-18; STAI-S = state anxiety ; STAI-T =; trait anxiety; GSI =SCL-90-R, 
Global symptom index; PST = SCL-90-R, Positive symptom total; PSDI = SCL-90- 
R, Positive symptom distress index; LE =sum of life event items; Child = Sum of 
childhood items
* p <0.01
Appendix Table 8 - Spearman’s rho correlations between frequency estimates and
age.
Age and frequency o f dream types Spearman’s rho coefficient
Retrospective dream frequency r = -0.08 (0.52)
Retrospective unpleasant dream frequency r = -0.11 (0.37)
Retrospective nightmare frequency r = -0.07 (0.55)
Retrospective bad dream frequency r = -0.26 (0.03)
Log dream frequency r = 0.21 (0 . 11)
Log unpleasant dream frequency r = 0.10 (0.44)
Log nightmare frequency r = 0.21 (0 .12)
Log bad dream frequency r = -0.18 (0 .2 0 )
Log extreme nightmares r = 0.19 (0.16)
Log extreme unpleasant dreams r = 0.11 (0.41)
Log extreme bad dreams r = 0.29 (0.21)
Appendix Table 9 - means (standard deviations) and Wilcoxon test statistics for 
dream type frequencies between males and females.
Dream type estimations Mean (SD) per 
month -male
Mean (SD) per 
month -female
Mann Whitney test statistic
Retrospective dream 
frequency 32.41 (39.91) 31.89 (20.19)
z =-1.10 ;p = 0.28
Retrospective nightmare 
frequency 3.09 (3.70) 2.72 (3.17)
z = -0.58; p = 0.56
Retrospective unpleasant 
dream frequency 6 .50(7.13) 4.81 (4.72)
z =-0.08; p = 0.93
Log dream frequency 9.50 (4.85) 12.86 (4.62) z = -2.32; p = 0.02
Log nightmare frequency 2.42 (3.17) 2.54 (2.38) z = -0.58; p = 0.56
Log unpleasant dream 
frequency 3.33 (3.92) 4.02 (2.82)
z = -1.11; p = 0.26
Log extreme nightmare 
frequency 1.67 (0.58) 1.52(1.35)
z = -0.64; p = 0.52
Log extreme unpleasant 
dream frequency 2.08 (2.71)
2.07 (0.58)
z = -0.85; p = 0.39
Log extreme bad dream 
frequency 1.67 (0.58) 1.23 (0.57)
z = -1.46; p =  0.14
Appendix Table 10 -  Sex differences in personality and psychopathology/well-being 
measures
Group Statistics
g e n d e r N M e a n S t d .  D e v i a t i o n
S t d .  E r r o r  
M e a n
n i g h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s m a l e 1 3 3 3 . 6 1 5 4 1 1 . 8 3 5 9 5 3 . 2 8 2 7 0
f e m a l e 5 4 3 5 . 5 5 5 6 8 . 5 7 7 4 3 1 . 1 6 7 2 4
a r o u s a l  s c a l e m a l e 1 4 3 2 . 7 1 4 3 1 0 . 9 4 3 4 1 2 . 9 2 4 7 5
f e m a l e 5 4 3 7 . 3 1 4 8 9 . 1 2 3 5 2 1 . 2 4 1 5 5
c r e a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s m a l e 1 3 9 . 1 5 3 8 4 . 1 2 0 0 0 1 . 1 4 2 6 8
q u e s t f e m a l e 5 4 1 0 . 1 2 9 6 4 . 5 3 1 0 1 . 6 1 6 5 9
b o r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y m a l e 1 4 6 . 6 4 2 9 4 . 4 4 8 1 1 1 . 1 8 8 8 1
f e m a l e 5 4 8 . 4 4 4 4 4 . 1 4 2 1 3 . 5 6 3 6 7
E y s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m m a l e 1 4 6 . 7 1 4 3 4 . 1 9 5 7 6 1 . 1 2 1 3 6
S c a l e f e m a l e 5 4 7 . 9 0 7 4 2 . 9 6 6 9 2 . 4 0 3 7 5
E y s e n c k  L ie  S c a l e m a l e 1 4 4 . 2 1 4 3 2 . 9 6 5 9 2 . 7 9 2 6 8
f e m a l e 5 4 3 . 9 0 7 4 2 . 6 6 5 4 2 . 3 6 2 7 2
G e n e r a l  H e a l t h m a l e 1 4 5 . 0 7 1 4 4 . 8 1 1 2 7 1 . 2 8 5 8 7
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e f e m a l e 5 4 3 . 5 9 2 6 3 . 9 9 3 0 1 . 5 4 3 3 8
H a r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y m a l e 1 4 3 4 . 9 2 8 6 1 0 . 6 8 0 4 2 2 . 8 5 4 4 6
Q u e s t f e m a l e 5 3 3 4 . 6 0 3 8 1 0 . 0 9 0 6 3 1 . 3 8 6 0 5
S t a t e  A n x i e t y m a l e 8 4 9 . 5 0 0 0 1 6 . 1 4 2 2 3 5 . 7 0 7 1 4
f e m a l e 2 1 4 7 . 3 8 1 0 1 5 . 3 2 8 0 0 3 . 3 4 4 8 4
T r a i t  A n x i e t y m a l e 1 3 4 6 . 0 7 6 9 1 3 . 4 4 4 0 9 3 . 7 2 8 7 2
f e m a l e 3 9 5 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 3 . 3 1 0 0 7 2 . 1 3 1 3 2
S C L - D e p r e s s i o n m a l e 1 3 1 . 5 6 3 8 1 . 2 2 0 1 2 . 3 3 8 4 0
f e m a l e 5 4 1 . 4 0 6 3 . 9 2 2 8 5 . 1 2 5 5 8
S C L - A n x i e t y m a l e 1 3 1 . 1 6 1 5 . 9 5 7 0 3 . 2 6 5 4 3
f e m a l e 5 4 .9 6 1 1 . 9 4 5 7 8 . 1 2 8 7 0
G l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x m a l e 1 3 1 . 2 6 0 8 . 8 4 6 6 7 . 2 3 4 8 3
f e m a l e 5 4 1 . 1 6 8 0 . 7 4 8 8 1 . 1 0 1 9 0
P o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l m a l e 1 3 4 8 . 3 8 4 6 2 4 . 9 8 1 7 9 6 . 9 2 8 7 0
f e m a l e 5 4 4 8 . 6 6 6 7 2 0 . 5 2 7 0 2 2 . 7 9 3 3 7
P o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m m a l e 1 3 1 . 9 0 7 7 . 7 6 8 9 4 . 2 1 3 2 7
D i s t r e s s  I n d e x f e m a l e 5 4 1 . 9 0 7 8 . 5 7 4 8 8 . 0 7 8 2 3
I i f e e v e n t 1 4 m a l e 1 4 3 . 5 7 1 4 3 . 2 7 4 9 5 . 8 7 5 2 7
f e m a l e 5 4 3 .0 7 4 1 2 . 2 7 2 4 9 . 3 0 9 2 5
s u m  o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s m a l e 1 4 3 . 4 2 8 6 3 . 0 8 1 3 2 . 8 2 3 5 2
f e m a l e 5 4 4 . 1 2 9 6 3 . 3 3 6 7 4 . 4 5 4 0 7
\  V J  a  I • —V '  » V. ’ n  I '- 'M  V - /1  I w  >.
Ax^e^e^ces vK u)e\\-bean^.
Independent Samples Test
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
nightmare distress Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
4.250 .043 -.678
-.557
65
15.171
.500
.586
-1.94017
-1.94017
2.86250
3.48405
-7.65697
-9.35895
3.77663
5.47860
arousal scale Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.514 .476 -1.613
-1.448
66
17.964
.112
.165
-4.60053
-4.60053
2.85203
3.17736
0.29479
1.27687
1.09374
2.07581
creative experiences Equal variance 
quest assumed
Equal variance 
not assumed
.448 .506 -.709
-.752
65
19.629
.481
.461
-.97578
-.97578
1.37723
1.29842
3.72631
3.68754
1.77474
1.73597
borderline personality Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.555 .459 -1.429
-1.369
66
19.263
.158
.187
-1.80159
-1.80159
1.26088
1.31567
4.31901
4.55277
.71584
.94960
Eysenck Neuroticism Equal variance 
Scale assumed
Equal variance 
not assumed
5.322 .024 -1.226
-1.001
66
16.521
.225
.331
-1.19312
-1.19312
.97350
1.19183
•3.13678
•3.71324
.75054
1.32699
Eysenck Lie Scale Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.126 .724 .375
.352
66
18.812
.709
.729
.30688
.30688
.81793
.87172
■1.32617
■1.51890
1.93993
2.13265
General Health Equal variance 
Questionnaire assumed
Equal variance 
not assumed
1.957 .167 1.183
1.059
66
17.917
.241
.304
1.47884
1.47884
1.24970
1.39596
■1.01628
■1.45495
3.97395
4.41262
Hartmann Boundary Equal variance 
Quest assumed
Equal variance 
not assumed
.021 .885 .106
.102
65
19.581
.916
.920
.32480
.32480
3.06844
3.17319
-5.80329
-6.30344
6.45289
6.95304
State Anxiety Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.006 .938 .328
.320
27
12.134
.745
.754
2.11905
2.11905
6.45780
6.61509
1.13126
2.27640
5.36936
6.51449
Trait Anxiety Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.042 .839 -1.152
-1.146
50
20.433
.255
.265
•4.92308
-4.92308
4.27297
4.29486
3.50560
3.86984
3.65944
4.02369
SCL-Depression Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
3.199 .078 .518
.436
65
15.467
.606
.669
.15755
.15755
.30415
.36095
-.44988
-.60978
.76498
.92488
SCL-Arodety Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.109 .743 .684
.679
65
18.080
.496
.505
.20043
.20043
.29283
.29499
-.38439
-.41913
.78525
.81998
Global Severity Idex Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.563 .456 .391
.363
65
16.810
.697
.721
.09281
.09281
.23721
.25598
-.38093
-.44773
.56654
.63335
Positive Symptom T01 Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.723 .398 -.043
-.038
65
16.121
.966
.970
-.28205
-.28205
6.61719
7.47060
3.49750
6.10932
2.93340
5.54521
Positive Symptom Equal variance 
Distress Index assumed
Equal variance 
not assumed
3.226 .077 .000
.000
65
15.384
1.000
1.000
-.00009
-.00009
.19010
.22716
-.37974
-.48322
.37957
.48305
Iifeevent14 Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
6.867 .011 .663
.536
66
16.366
.510
.599
.49735
.49735
.75035
.92829
■1.00078
■1.46678
1.99548
2.46149
sum of 4 childhood ite Equal variance 
assumed 
Equal variance 
not assumed
.114 .737 -.711
-.745
66
21.616
.480
.464
-.70106
-.70106
.98611
.94040
-2.66989
■2.65335
1.26777
1.25123
Correlations
a g e
n i g h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 6
S ig .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 1 4
N 6 6
a r o u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 2 6
S ig .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 1
N 6 7
c r e a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 8
q u e s t S ig .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 6 5
N 6 6
b o r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 1 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 7 9
N 6 7
E y s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 5 9
S c a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 3 7
N 6 7
G e n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 2
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i i e d ) . 5 0 9
N 6 7
H a r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - .3 5 3 * *
Q u e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 0 4
N 6 6
S t a t e  A n x ie t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 5 4
N 2 9
T r a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 6 6
N 5 1
S C L - D e p r e s s i o n P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 6 6
N 6 6
S C L - A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 1 4
N 6 6
G l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 5
N 6 6
P o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 5 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 1 9
N 6 6
P o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 3 5
D i s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 8 0
N 6 6
I i f e e v e n t 1 4 P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - .3 2 0 * *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 0 8
N 6 7
s u m  o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 0 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 8 5
N 6 7
**• C o r r e l a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 .0 1  l e v e l  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) .
t'jppwcri/.
Correlations
1
.
F i s h e r ' s  r  o f  
w s  n i g h t s  o f  
u n p l d  a n d  
p r e s l e e p  
a n x i e t y F r R n p r e a n F r R u p o a F r R n p o a
l i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 8 - . 2 2 9 - . 1 5 1 - . 1 9 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 5 6 . 1 5 1 . 3 0 4 . 2 3 2
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 4 8 - . 1 5 8 - . 1 1 3 - . 1 1 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 5 . 3 2 5 . 4 4 2 . 4 7 4
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 9 - . 2 5 3 - . 2 9 7 * - . 3 2 3 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 9 8 . 1 1 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 9
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
j s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 1 5 . 0 0 3 . 0 3 1 - . 0 4 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 2 0 . 9 8 4 . 8 3 5 . 7 8 6
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
i t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 4 2 - . 0 1 4 - . 2 0 1 - . 2 6 6
St S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 7 7 . 9 3 3 . 1 7 0 . 0 9 2
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 2 4 - . 0 3 0 - . 0 4 6 - . 1 9 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 7 3 . 8 5 0 . 7 5 5 . 2 1 7
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 4 - . 1 0 9 - . 0 3 6 - . 2 1 2
l i e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 4 . 4 9 7 . 8 0 7 . 1 8 4
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 6 6 . 0 0 2 . 1 7 8 . 3 5 1 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 6 0 . 9 9 0 . 2 2 6 . 0 2 5
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
w a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 1 6 . 0 9 7 - . 0 7 0 - . 0 9 9
e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 4 1 . 5 4 5 . 6 3 4 . 5 3 7
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 5 - . 1 2 5 - . 1 6 8 - . 2 8 9
e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 1 7 . 4 4 2 . 2 5 8 . 0 7 1
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
i t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 3 9 - . 3 3 4 . 0 7 0 - . 1 1 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 6 2 . 1 6 2 . 7 5 6 . 6 4 5
N 2 2 1 9 2 2 1 9
si t A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 0 5 - . 1 0 8 - . 2 3 9 - . 2 5 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 9 . 5 4 3 . 1 3 8 . 1 4 9
N 4 0 3 4 4 0 3 4
l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 4 4 - . 1 2 8 - . 0 8 1 - . 1 1 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 7 0 . 4 3 2 . 5 9 0 . 4 9 2
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 2 0 - . 0 9 6 - . 1 1 0 - . 1 2 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 0 . 5 5 4 . 4 6 2 . 4 3 0
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 2 6 - . 1 6 7 - . 0 3 2 - . 0 4 9
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i ! e d ) . 8 6 1 . 3 0 2 . 8 3 1 . 7 6 4
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
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Correlations
F i s h e r ' s  r  o f  
w s  n i g h t s  o f  
u n p l d  a n d  
p r e s l e e p  
a n x i e t y F r R n p r e a n F r R u p o a F r R n p o a
1 l o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 2 6 - . 0 0 2 - . 1 9 3 - . 1 3 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 6 3 . 9 9 2 . 1 8 8 . 3 8 5
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
' e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 0 6 . 0 1 6 - . 0 2 6 - . 1 6 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 7 5 . 9 2 3 . 8 5 9 . 3 1 0
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
V /V 1 3
Correlations
F r R u p r e d e F r R n p r e d e F r R u p o d F r R n p o d
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 5 . 1 9 6 . 0 3 1 . 0 1 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 6 5 . 2 1 9 . 8 3 6 . 9 3 8
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
i N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 4 5 . 1 6 9 - . 0 3 2 . 1 3 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 0 . 2 9 1 . 8 3 2 . 3 9 5
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
f l m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 4 3 - . 0 5 2 - . 3 0 1 * - . 4 0 1 * *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 3 . 7 4 6 . 0 3 8 . 0 0 9
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 6 2 . 3 7 2 * . 2 0 3 . 1 7 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 7 2 . 0 1 7 . 1 6 7 . 2 7 7
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 8 9 . 2 4 4 - . 0 6 1 - . 0 0 9
5 t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 9 9 . 1 2 4 . 6 8 2 . 9 5 4
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
f d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 1 8 . 1 9 2 . 0 2 1 . 1 1 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 5 . 2 3 0 . 8 8 5 . 4 9 0
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 1 7 . 0 6 7 . 0 4 1 - . 0 8 3
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 0 6 . 6 7 8 . 7 8 3 . 6 0 7
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 3 6 - . 2 0 1 - . 0 3 7 - . 0 3 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 5 7 . 2 0 7 . 8 0 4 . 8 3 6
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
> n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 4 6 . 3 1 0 * - . 0 3 7 - . 0 8 4
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 9 2 . 0 4 8 . 8 0 1 . 6 0 0
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
a i t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 2 4 - . 0 3 3 - . 0 0 7 - . 0 6 1
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 7 3 . 8 3 9 . 9 6 4 . 7 0 8
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
' a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 5 - . 1 1 0 . 2 1 1 - . 1 6 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 4 1 . 6 5 4 . 3 4 6 . 5 1 0
N 2 2 1 9 2 2 1 9
a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 0 . 0 4 6 - . 0 4 1 - . 0 9 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 0 6 . 7 9 5 . 8 0 0 . 6 1 4
N 4 0 3 4 4 0 3 4
l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 9 8 . 1 1 3 . 0 2 0 - . 0 4 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 3 . 4 8 8 . 8 9 4 . 8 0 3
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
b s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 1 9 . 0 7 0 . 1 3 7 - . 0 0 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 6 . 6 7 0 . 3 5 9 . 9 6 6
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
t e i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 0 9 . 0 5 7 - . 1 2 0 - . 1 1 2
I s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 5 1 . 7 2 9 . 4 2 3 . 4 9 2
N 4 7 4 0 4 7 4 0
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C o r r e l a t i o n s
F r R u p r e d e F r R n p r e d e F r R u p o d F r R n p o d
; i o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 9 - . 1 0 4 - . 1 4 0 - . 1 4 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 9 0 . 5 1 8 . 3 4 2 . 3 5 6
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
e v e n t s  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 2 6 . 1 8 4 . 1 0 9 - . 0 9 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 3 . 2 5 0 . 4 6 2 . 5 5 2
N 4 8 4 1 4 8 4 1
Correlations
F r R u F p r e a n F r R n F p r e a n F r R u F p o a F r R n F p o a
u g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 4 9 - . 2 4 2 - . 1 8 5 - . 2 3 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 9 5 . 1 2 7 . 2 0 9 . 1 3 3
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
M m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 3 7 - . 1 8 1 - . 1 3 2 - . 1 4 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 1 3 . 2 5 7 . 3 7 0 . 3 5 1
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
m i a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 8 1 * * - . 3 2 3 * - . 3 2 8 * - . 3 3 5 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 0 9 . 0 3 9 . 0 2 3 . 0 3 2
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
i s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 4 - . 1 0 1 - . 0 1 3 - . 0 4 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 2 2 . 5 3 2 . 9 3 2 . 8 0 3
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
j j t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 5 0 - . 0 9 6 - . 2 2 6 - . 2 4 4
f S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 9 . 5 5 1 . 1 2 2 . 1 2 4
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
i i e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 2 9 - . 1 0 1 - . 1 1 2 - . 2 0 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 3 . 5 2 8 . 4 4 7 . 1 9 4
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
j s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 7 1 - . 1 6 8 - . 1 0 2 - . 2 1 5
l i e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 5 7 . 2 9 3 . 4 9 0 . 1 7 6
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 8 0 . 0 3 2 . 2 2 6 . 3 3 0 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 3 2 . 8 4 2 . 1 2 3 . 0 3 5
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
y i e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 4 8 . 0 3 7 . 0 2 5 - . 0 7 9
. e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 5 0 . 8 1 9 . 8 6 6 . 6 2 4
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
i t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 9 - . 1 9 2 - . 1 3 8 - . 2 4 9
e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 9 . 2 3 4 . 3 5 6 . 1 2 1
N 4 5 4 0 4 7 4 0
a l e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 4 6 - . 3 3 2 . 0 1 4 - . 1 4 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 8 3 . 1 6 5 . 9 5 0 . 5 4 5
N 2 1 1 9 2 2 1 9
i  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 4 9 * - . 1 9 3 - . 2 8 0 - . 2 8 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 3 2 . 2 7 5 . 0 8 0 . 1 0 8
N 3 8 3 4 4 0 3 4
o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d  e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 9 - . 1 0 8 - . 0 6 5 - . 0 9 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 3 6 . 5 0 7 . 6 6 4 . 5 6 9
N 4 5 4 0 4 7 4 0
s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 9 - . 1 4 5 - . 0 3 3 - . 1 0 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 0 4 . 3 7 2 . 8 2 5 . 5 1 1
N 4 5 4 0 4 7 4 0
s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 7 8 - . 1 6 1 - . 0 6 9 - . 0 1 7
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 4 1 . 3 2 2 . 6 4 4 . 9 1 8
N 4 5 4 0 4 7 4 0
Correlations
F r R u F p r e a n F r R n F p r e a n F r R u F p o a F r R n F p o a
’ o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 6 4 - . 0 2 4 - . 2 1 3 - . 1 4 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 7 7 . 8 8 1 . 1 4 6 . 3 5 3
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 1 4 . 0 0 1 . 0 6 0 - . 1 3 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 2 7 . 9 9 5 . 6 8 5 . 3 9 6
N 4 6 4 1 4 8 4 1
Correlations
■
F r R u F p r e d e F r R n F p r e d e F r R u F p o d F r R n F p o d
T u i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 9 5 . 2 0 4 - . 0 1 1 - . 0 5 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 2 4 . 2 0 2 . 9 4 0 . 7 1 4
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
i N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 1 . 2 2 4 - . 0 7 4 . 0 6 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 3 1 . 1 5 9 . 6 1 8 . 6 9 4
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
I t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 2 . 0 5 1 - . 2 5 1 - . 3 0 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 3 9 . 7 5 2 . 0 8 5 . 0 5 0
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
j j s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 0 6 . 2 1 7 . 2 7 2 . 1 9 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 7 7 . 1 7 4 . 0 6 1 . 2 3 4
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
■ a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 5 0 . 2 7 4 . 0 9 5 . 1 5 1
s s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 6 . 0 8 3 . 5 2 0 . 3 4 5
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
V d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 1 8 . 3 1 1 * . 0 2 1 . 1 1 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 3 1 . 0 4 8 . 8 8 5 . 4 6 1
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
i s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 0 9 . 1 5 8 . 0 6 3 - . 0 5 0
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 5 2 . 3 2 5 . 6 7 2 . 7 5 8
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 0 7 - . 2 4 4 - . 0 6 3 - . 0 4 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 7 2 . 1 2 4 . 6 7 1 . 7 7 0
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
i o e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 5 9 . 3 2 4 * . 0 0 9 - . 0 4 7
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 7 9 . 0 3 9 . 9 5 4 . 7 7 1
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
j i t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 4 7 . 0 9 4 . 1 0 4 . 0 5 9
y e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 5 5 . 5 6 4 . 4 8 7 . 7 1 9
N 4 6 4 0 4 7 4 0
a l e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 7 2 . 0 7 9 . 2 3 3 - . 0 7 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 4 3 . 7 4 8 . 2 9 6 . 7 5 0
N 2 2 1 9 2 2 1 9
t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 5 3 . 1 2 3 - . 0 6 0 - . 0 8 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 4 8 . 4 8 9 . 7 1 3 . 6 2 0
N 3 9 3 4 4 0 3 4
l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 0 4 . 2 9 7 . 0 5 8 . 0 0 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 7 3 . 0 6 3 . 7 0 0 . 9 6 3
N 4 6 4 0 4 7 4 0
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 5 3 . 1 9 6 . 1 4 6 . 0 5 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 2 . 2 2 6 . 3 2 8 . 7 5 3
N 4 6 4 0 4 7 4 0
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 2 2 . 2 4 5 - . 0 5 4 - . 0 5 4
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 1 . 1 2 8 . 7 2 0 . 7 3 9
N 4 6 4 0 4 7 4 0
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Correlations
— - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
F r R u F p r e d e F r R n F p r e d e F r R u F p o d F r R n F p o d
■ o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 0 2 - . 0 2 2 - . 0 6 8 - . 0 2 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 9 1 . 8 8 9 . 6 4 5 . 8 8 3
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
i v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 6 7 . 2 9 0 . 2 3 6 . 0 2 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 6 2 . 0 6 6 . 1 0 7 . 8 7 0
N 4 7 4 1 4 8 4 1
Correlations
F r X R u p r e a n F r X R n p r e a n F r R X u p o a F r R X n p o a
■ n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 9 0 - . 2 4 6 - . 2 4 4 - . 2 3 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 2 2 . 1 3 7 . 1 1 5 . 1 5 1
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 3 - . 2 6 0 - . 1 6 8 - . 1 7 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 5 1 . 1 1 4 . 2 8 0 . 3 0 5
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 4 2 - . 2 5 1 - . 3 5 5 * - . 3 3 8 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 6 4 . 1 2 8 . 0 1 9 . 0 3 8
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
w s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 1 - . 1 1 2 - . 1 0 4 - . 1 3 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 6 0 . 5 0 5 . 5 0 5 . 4 3 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 5 - . 0 2 3 - . 2 8 7 - . 2 5 4
s s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 2 3 . 8 9 2 . 0 6 2 . 1 2 4
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
f d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 9 - . 1 3 0 - . 2 6 5 - . 2 9 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 0 2 . 4 3 7 . 0 8 6 . 0 7 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 5 - . 2 8 2 - . 1 7 5 - . 2 7 6
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 9 0 . 0 8 6 . 2 6 2 . 0 9 3
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 6 7 . 0 6 8 . 3 0 1 . 3 8 8 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 6 7 . 6 8 5 . 0 5 0 . 0 1 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
a n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 9 5 . 1 9 1 - . 0 6 5 - . 0 7 1
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 4 5 . 2 5 2 . 6 8 1 . 6 7 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i f t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 4 - . 0 2 6 - . 2 6 8 - . 2 6 6
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 8 9 . 8 8 0 . 0 8 6 . 1 1 2
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
l a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 7 0 - . 5 1 2 * - . 0 1 7 - . 2 5 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 8 7 . 0 3 6 . 9 4 6 . 3 1 5
N 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 7
f art  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 8 - . 3 1 1 - . 2 8 5 - . 3 3 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 9 9 . 0 8 8 . 0 9 7 . 0 6 3
N 3 5 3 1 3 5 3 1
i o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 0 5 - . 0 8 9 - . 1 2 8 - . 1 4 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 7 7 . 6 0 0 . 4 1 8 . 4 0 7
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
P o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 7 - . 0 2 6 - . 1 3 4 - . 1 8 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 8 2 . 8 8 0 . 3 9 7 . 2 8 5
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
:o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 1 - . 1 3 5 - . 0 1 6 - . 0 0 9
/ s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 9 9 . 4 2 7 . 9 1 9 . 9 5 8
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
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Correlations
---------------------------
F r X R u p r e a n F r X R n p r e a n F r R X u p o a F r R X n p o a
i o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 1 6 . 1 1 1 - . 1 8 7 - . 1 1 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 5 9 . 5 0 8 . 2 3 0 . 4 8 7
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 4 2 . 0 6 2 . 0 4 7 - . 0 4 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 6 4 . 7 1 2 . 7 6 4 . 7 9 5
---------------------------- N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
Correlations
F r R X u p r e d e F r R X n p r e d e F r X R u F p r e a n F r X R n F p r e a n
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 6 7 . 1 1 5 - . 2 0 4 - . 2 6 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 6 8 . 4 9 2 . 1 9 0 . 1 0 8
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
l e N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 6 . 0 0 3 - . 2 5 9 - . 2 8 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 7 4 . 9 8 8 . 0 9 3 . 0 8 0
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 0 9 - . 1 1 4 - . 2 0 7 - . 3 4 8 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 8 8 . 4 9 4 . 1 8 4 . 0 3 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
j u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 5 2 . 1 7 9 - . 1 7 5 - . 2 2 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 0 . 2 8 1 . 2 6 1 . 1 7 5
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 3 4 . 2 0 1 - . 1 0 5 - . 1 3 4
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 1 . 2 2 6 . 5 0 1 . 4 2 1
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
: r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 3 4 . 1 9 4 - . 0 4 7 - . 2 2 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 0 . 2 4 4 . 7 6 4 . 1 8 4
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 4 8 - . 0 2 6 - . 1 1 5 - . 3 5 7 *
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 2 . 8 7 9 . 4 6 1 . 0 2 8
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
f s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 6 - . 2 2 8 . 0 8 4 . 1 2 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 4 6 . 1 6 9 . 5 9 2 . 4 6 5
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
e n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 9 7 . 1 6 4 . 0 6 4 . 1 1 1
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 3 7 . 3 2 5 . 6 8 3 . 5 0 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
a r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 5 . 0 1 9 - . 1 0 9 - . 1 4 1
n e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 7 5 . 9 1 1 . 4 9 1 . 4 0 6
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
l a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 6 - . 2 8 5 - . 2 0 0 - . 4 9 9 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 6 . 2 6 7 . 4 1 1 . 0 4 1
N 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 7
t a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 1 - . 1 7 9 - . 1 6 4 - . 3 8 6 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 0 5 . 3 3 4 . 3 4 8 . 0 3 2
N 3 5 3 1 3 5 3 1
l i o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 2 3 . 1 4 1 . 0 1 1 - . 1 1 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 3 7 . 4 0 5 . 9 4 5 . 4 9 5
. .  . N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
’o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 3 5 . 0 2 5 . 0 4 4 - . 0 8 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 2 6 . 8 8 2 . 7 8 3 . 6 1 2
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
:o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 6 4 . 0 8 5 - . 0 5 1 - . 1 7 8
l i s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 8 7 . 6 1 9 . 7 4 6 . 2 9 1
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
/  I
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Correlations
.
F r R X u p r e d e F r R X n p r e d e F r X R u F p r e a n F r X R n F p r e a n
l o t  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 6 - . 0 5 0 . 0 7 8 . 0 8 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 8 . 7 6 5 . 6 1 7 . 6 0 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
e v e n t s  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 9 7 . 1 6 3 . 1 2 3 . 0 2 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 3 6 . 3 2 9 . 4 3 3 . 9 0 4
N------------------------------------------------------------ 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
Correlations
■
F r R X u F p o a F r R X n F p o a F r R X u F p r e d e F r R X n F p r e d e
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 8 7 - . 2 7 7 . 0 6 5 . 1 4 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 6 2 . 0 9 2 . 6 7 8 . 3 8 0
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
? N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 1 8 - . 2 1 5 - . 0 7 1 . 0 9 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 6 1 . 1 9 5 . 6 5 1 . 5 5 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
f i t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 7 9 * - . 3 5 3 * - . 0 6 4 - . 0 9 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 1 2 . 0 3 0 . 6 8 3 . 5 8 4
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 5 - . 1 4 4 . 1 1 3 . 1 2 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 4 3 . 3 8 8 . 4 7 2 . 4 3 9
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 8 7 - . 2 4 9 . 1 1 1 . 1 6 9
i S t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 6 2 . 1 3 2 . 4 7 8 . 3 1 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 9 4 - . 3 4 0 * . 1 3 5 . 1 9 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 5 6 . 0 3 7 . 3 8 9 . 2 5 3
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 2 - . 3 3 2 * . 0 7 4 . 0 2 1
p i e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 9 4 . 0 4 2 . 6 3 9 . 8 9 9
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 6 9 . 4 0 1 * - . 1 7 5 - . 1 7 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 8 1 . 0 1 2 . 2 6 1 . 3 0 5
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 6 - . 0 6 3 . 0 8 5 . 2 0 5
e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 9 . 7 0 6 . 5 8 6 . 2 1 8
_ N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
p a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 0 - . 2 5 1 - . 0 0 1 . 0 5 5
e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 6 1 . 1 3 4 . 9 9 7 . 7 4 5
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
; e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 6 - . 2 9 9 - . 0 8 8 - . 1 1 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 2 8 . 2 4 4 . 7 2 1 . 6 5 5
N 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 7
.t A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 2 8 - . 3 7 5 * - . 0 8 1 - . 1 7 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 5 5 . 0 3 8 . 6 4 3 . 3 5 0
N 3 5 3 1 3 5 3 1
Dal S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 5 - . 1 3 4 . 1 9 5 . 2 2 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 6 8 . 4 3 0 . 2 1 7 . 1 8 6
_  . . . . N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
s t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 0 9 - . 1 5 1 . 0 6 3 . 0 7 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 9 2 . 3 7 2 . 6 9 2 . 6 5 4
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 0 3 - . 0 2 3 . 1 5 4 . 1 7 2
l e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 8 3 . 8 9 2 . 3 2 9 . 3 0 9
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
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Correlations
F r R X u F p o a F r R X n F p o a F r R X u F p r e d e F r R X n F p r e d e
t o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 9 9 - . 1 0 3 . 0 0 3 - . 0 4 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 0 2 . 5 3 7 . 9 8 4 . 7 9 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 0 2 - . 0 2 9 . 1 1 0 . 1 3 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 6 . 8 6 4 . 4 8 2 . 4 2 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
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Correlations
F r R X u p o d F r R X n p o d F r R X u F p o d F r R X n F p o d
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 8 - . 2 1 1 - . 2 2 1 - . 2 4 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 2 8 . 2 0 4 . 1 5 5 . 1 4 5
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 3 - . 1 8 6 - . 2 5 8 - . 1 2 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 9 3 . 2 6 5 . 0 9 4 . 4 6 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
t t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 5 9 * * - . 4 8 6 * * - . 3 7 3 * - . 3 8 6 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 1 4 . 0 1 7
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i i s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 0 1 - . 0 3 0 . 1 3 1 . 0 1 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 7 . 8 6 0 . 4 0 1 . 9 4 3
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 6 . 0 9 1 . 0 4 2 . 2 2 2
s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 2 9 . 5 8 9 . 7 8 8 . 1 8 0
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
' d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 6 . 0 4 2 - . 0 7 1 . 0 1 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 7 0 . 8 0 3 . 6 5 2 . 9 1 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 9 - . 2 5 0 - . 0 7 9 - . 1 9 4
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 1 2 . 1 3 1 . 6 1 3 . 2 4 2
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 1 . 0 3 6 - . 0 5 9 . 0 0 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 7 9 . 8 3 2 . 7 0 7 . 9 7 4
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
: s n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 5 2 . 0 5 1 - . 0 0 7 . 0 0 9
. e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 3 9 . 7 6 0 . 9 6 7 . 9 5 7
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
i r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 5 8 - . 0 6 8 - . 0 3 3 . 0 3 0
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 7 . 6 8 9 . 8 3 6 . 8 5 9
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 7 6 - . 3 5 7 - . 1 2 0 - . 3 1 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 7 2 . 1 6 0 . 6 2 5 . 2 1 3
N 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 7
a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 6 9 - . 1 6 7 - . 1 7 6 - . 2 1 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 1 . 3 7 0 . 3 1 2 . 2 3 9
N 3 5 3 1 3 5 3 1
I o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 4 - . 1 0 5 . 0 2 2 . 0 0 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 8 2 . 5 3 5 . 8 9 1 . 9 7 5
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
j s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 0 8 - . 0 5 1 . 0 8 4 . 0 2 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 5 8 . 7 6 4 . 5 9 6 . 8 7 4
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
a s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 0 2 - . 0 4 9 - . 0 4 0 - . 0 6 5
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 2 1 . 7 7 2 . 8 0 2 . 7 0 2
N 4 2 3 7 4 2 3 7
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Correlations
F r R X u p o d F r R X n p o d F r R X u F p o d F r R X n F p o d
T o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 6 3 . 0 4 4 - . 0 6 0 . 0 8 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 9 5 . 7 9 2 . 7 0 1 . 5 9 6
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
> v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 6 . 0 3 7 . 1 7 0 . 1 2 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 1 9 . 8 2 7 . 2 7 6 . 4 6 3
N 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 8
C o r r e l a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 . 0 5  l e v e l  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) .  
C o r r e l a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 . 0 1  l e v e l  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) .
relations
Correlations
F i s h e r ’ s  r  o f  
w s  n i g h t s  o f  
u n p l d  a n d  
p r e s l e e p  
a n x i e t y F r R n p r e a n F r R u p o a
p
F r R n p o a
l i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 2 2 * - . 4 2 1 * - . 3 4 5 - . 2 9 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 4 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 9 9 . 1 7 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 2 - . 1 7 5 - . 1 2 9 - . 1 1 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 0 5 . 4 1 3 . 5 4 8 . 5 9 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 3 5 - . 3 6 4 - . 4 0 3 - . 2 5 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 0 9 . 0 8 0 . 0 5 1 . 2 3 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 3 - . 0 1 9 - . 1 2 0 - . 0 9 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 4 3 . 9 3 1 . 5 7 7 . 6 6 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 4 5 . 0 9 8 - . 4 2 2 * - . 3 6 9
j $ t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 9 8 . 6 4 9 . 0 4 0 . 0 7 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
■ d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 4 . 0 2 3 - . 4 2 1 * - . 3 7 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 3 1 . 9 1 4 . 0 4 0 . 0 7 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 0 - . 1 1 6 - . 4 3 0 * - . 3 7 8
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 0 0 . 5 9 1 . 0 3 6 . 0 6 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 8 - . 1 5 9 . 5 2 1 * * . 5 8 6 * *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 6 1 . 4 5 8 . 0 0 9 . 0 0 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
■ n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 4 3 . 1 3 2 - . 1 2 8 - . 1 0 0
. e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 5 3 . 5 3 8 . 5 5 1 . 6 4 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i i t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 0 6 - . 0 2 3 - . 3 8 0 - . 3 4 4
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 2 1 . 9 1 4 . 0 6 7 . 1 0 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 1 - . 3 2 2 - . 2 7 0 - . 1 5 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 9 0 . 3 3 4 . 4 2 2 . 6 4 6
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
l i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 8 - . 0 1 6 - . 4 4 0 * - . 3 5 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 7 2 . 9 4 3 . 0 4 6 . 1 1 9
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
i o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 5 4 - . 0 9 0 - . 2 7 7 - . 2 0 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 0 0 . 6 7 7 . 1 9 0 . 3 4 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 2 1 - . 0 3 1 - . 4 0 1 - . 3 2 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 2 2 . 8 8 5 . 0 5 2 . 1 1 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 6 - . 1 1 4 - . 0 6 9 . 0 2 1
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 0 . 5 9 7 . 7 4 9 . 9 2 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Correlations
F i s h e r ' s  r  o f  
w s  n i g h t s  o f  
u n p l d  a n d  
p r e s l e e p  
a n x i e t y F r R n p r e a n F r R u p o a F r R n p o a
l i o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 5 . 0 4 9 - . 1 3 7 - . 0 5 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 2 7 . 8 2 1 . 5 2 4 . 7 8 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 7 0 . 1 9 4 - . 0 3 1 - . 0 6 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 8 . 3 6 4 . 8 8 5 . 7 5 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Correlations
F r R u p r e d e F r R n p r e d e F r R u p o d F r R n p o d
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 0 . 0 2 4 - . 1 1 8 - . 0 9 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 7 5 . 9 1 0 . 5 8 4 . 6 7 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j. N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 0 . 0 8 3 . 0 8 2 . 2 7 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 0 9 . 7 0 0 . 7 0 4 . 1 9 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j t i t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 4 0 - . 1 3 8 - . 4 7 5 * - . 3 2 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 5 8 . 5 2 1 . 0 1 9 . 1 2 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i i i s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 2 . 3 4 5 . 0 6 1 . 1 3 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 0 2 . 0 9 9 . 7 7 8 . 5 1 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
; a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 0 5 . 2 3 0 - . 0 3 4 . 1 2 5
e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 7 . 2 7 9 . 8 7 5 . 5 6 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
f d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 6 8 . 0 9 8 - . 0 3 6 . 1 2 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 3 3 . 6 4 9 . 8 6 8 . 5 7 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 7 - . 1 1 5 - . 3 4 6 - . 2 2 6
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 3 . 5 9 2 . 0 9 8 . 2 8 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 8 - . 2 3 5 - . 1 3 7 - . 1 7 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 8 4 . 2 6 9 . 5 2 3 . 4 2 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 3 1 2 . 3 3 8 - . 1 5 0 - . 0 9 3
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 3 8 . 1 0 7 . 4 8 4 . 6 6 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j f t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 4 - . 0 2 0 - . 1 6 6 - . 0 4 9
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 3 1 . 9 2 5 . 4 3 8 . 8 1 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 3 8 . 0 5 2 - . 2 9 4 - . 1 1 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 1 1 . 8 8 0 . 3 8 1 . 7 4 8
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 4 . 0 3 4 - . 3 3 4 - . 1 5 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 8 2 . 8 8 3 . 1 3 9 . 4 9 2
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
t o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 1 0 . 0 4 4 - . 2 6 6 - . 1 1 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 6 4 . 8 3 7 . 2 0 8 . 5 9 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 4 . 0 3 7 - . 3 2 5 - . 1 7 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 0 4 . 8 6 5 . 1 2 1 . 4 1 4
_ . . . .  __  . . . .
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 1 3 . 0 1 2 - . 2 1 2 - . 0 6 1
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 5 3 . 9 5 4 . 3 2 1 . 7 7 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Correlations
F r R u p r e d e F r R n p r e d e F r R u p o d F r R n p o d
n  o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 1 - . 0 0 7 - . 1 9 6 - . 0 2 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 8 4 . 9 7 4 . 3 5 8 . 9 1 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 5 4 . 2 7 3 . 2 0 9 . 1 5 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 3 0 . 1 9 6 . 3 2 7 . 4 5 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Correlations
F r R u F p r e a n F r R n F p r e a n F r R u F p o a F r R n F p o a
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 9 8 - . 3 2 9 - . 3 3 7 - . 2 8 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 6 8 . 1 1 6 . 1 0 7 . 1 8 0
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
i s N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 9 - . 1 1 0 - . 1 4 6 - . 1 2 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 2 2 . 6 0 9 . 4 9 7 . 5 5 6
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
i j h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 1 7 * - . 2 8 5 - . 4 0 2 - . 2 3 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 4 8 . 1 7 7 . 0 5 2 . 2 6 5
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
o u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 1 4 - . 0 4 6 - . 1 1 9 - . 0 8 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 2 6 . 8 3 1 . 5 8 0 . 6 9 3
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
f c a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 3 1 . 0 2 3 - . 4 0 0 - . 3 4 8
s s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 5 2 . 9 1 6 . 0 5 3 . 0 9 6
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
i r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 0 - . 0 0 4 - . 4 7 1 * - . 4 1 7 *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 8 4 . 9 8 6 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 3
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 4 - . 0 9 1 - . 4 6 2 * - . 4 0 3
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 0 3 . 6 7 2 . 0 2 3 . 0 5 1
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 9 - . 1 3 4 . 5 3 9 * * . 6 0 9 * *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 2 1 . 5 3 2 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 2
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
a n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 0 . 0 9 6 - . 1 2 8 - . 1 0 3
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 5 2 . 6 5 5 . 5 5 0 . 6 3 2
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
^ r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 7 - . 0 6 4 - . 3 4 1 - . 3 1 0
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 9 4 . 7 6 8 . 1 0 3 . 1 4 0
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
l a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 7 6 - . 0 9 2 - . 2 6 5 - . 1 6 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 8 4 . 7 8 7 . 4 3 0 . 6 3 9
N 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
' a r t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 3 8 - . 0 1 9 - . 4 5 1 * - . 3 6 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 2 . 9 3 6 . 0 4 0 . 1 0 7
N 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 1
* o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 5 1 . 0 0 8 - . 2 4 8 - . 1 7 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 9 1 . 9 7 2 . 2 4 3 . 4 0 8
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 9 9 - . 0 3 0 - . 3 7 0 - . 2 9 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 5 5 . 8 9 0 . 0 7 5 . 1 6 9
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
' o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 8 - . 0 3 3 - . 0 3 8 . 0 5 2
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 1 . 8 7 7 . 8 6 0 . 8 1 1
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
, \ t ------
Correlations
F r R u F p r e a n F r R n F p r e a n F r R u F p o a F r R n F p o a
01 o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 2 9 . 0 0 9 - . 1 5 9 - . 0 6 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 9 4 . 9 6 7 . 4 5 9 . 7 4 9
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
■ e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 6 6 . 2 9 0 . 0 3 5 - . 0 1 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 4 8 . 1 7 0 . 8 7 2 . 9 3 0
N 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
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Correlations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ..........
F r R u F p r e d e F r R n F p r e d e F r R u F p o d F r R n F p o d
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 4 . 0 9 8 - . 0 4 0 - . 0 6 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 0 2 . 6 4 7 . 8 5 1 . 7 6 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
. s N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 7 0 . 1 7 5 . 0 3 7 . 2 3 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 8 . 4 1 3 . 8 6 2 . 2 6 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
f c h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 6 - . 0 0 9 - . 4 5 5 * - . 3 2 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 6 1 . 9 6 7 . 0 2 6 . 1 2 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
D u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 3 . 1 1 1 . 1 9 2 . 1 7 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 0 5 . 6 0 6 . 3 6 9 . 4 2 4
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
n a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 3 . 1 5 7 . 0 0 9 . 1 7 7
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 3 4 . 4 6 5 . 9 6 8 . 4 0 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 7 0 . 2 1 0 - . 2 4 0 - . 0 2 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 2 7 . 3 2 5 . 2 6 0 . 9 1 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j y s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 0 7 - . 0 2 7 - . 3 7 2 - . 2 4 9
p a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 1 8 . 8 9 9 . 0 7 4 . 2 4 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 4 7 - . 2 4 3 - . 0 5 0 - . 1 3 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 9 4 . 2 5 3 . 8 1 7 . 5 2 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
G e n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 9 5 . 3 3 3 - . 1 5 6 -  1 8 0
l u e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 6 1 . 1 1 2 . 4 6 7 . 4 0 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
• a r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 7 . 1 0 9 - . 1 6 4 - . 0 4 6
b e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 8 7 . 6 1 2 . 4 4 3 . 8 3 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i t a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 3 0 7 . 3 5 4 - . 0 2 8 . 0 3 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 5 8 . 2 8 6 . 9 3 6 . 9 3 1
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 1 5 . 1 0 6 - . 3 5 9 - . 2 0 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 4 7 . 6 4 9 . 1 1 0 . 3 7 1
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
G l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 0 6 . 2 6 6 - . 2 1 7 - . 1 0 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 5 . 2 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 6 3 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
’ o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 5 9 . 1 9 0 - . 2 7 1 - . 1 3 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 5 7 . 3 7 4 . 2 0 0 . 5 3 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
’ o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 8 8 . 2 2 9 - . 1 6 6 - . 0 6 1
d i s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 7 8 . 2 8 1 . 4 3 8 . 7 7 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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Correlations
F r R u F p r e d e F r R n F p r e d e F r R u F p o d F r R n F p o d
" I n  o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s| P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 2 9 . 1 2 3 - . 2 9 9 - . 0 9 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 9 2 . 5 6 7 . 1 5 7 . 6 6 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
’e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 3 4 1 . 3 6 3 . 3 2 2 . 2 2 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 0 3 . 0 8 1 . 1 2 5 . 2 9 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Correlations
F r X R u p r e a n F r X R n p r e a n F r R X u p o a F r R X n p o a
l i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 3 3 * - . 4 3 8 * - . 3 7 4 - . 3 5 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 3 4 . 0 3 2 . 0 7 2 . 0 9 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 6 7 - . 2 0 8 - . 2 6 3 - . 2 3 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 0 7 . 3 2 9 . 2 1 4 . 2 7 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
I n n a  r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 0 - . 2 5 8 - . 3 9 8 - . 3 2 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 9 9 . 2 2 4 . 0 5 4 . 1 1 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 5 - . 0 6 2 - . 1 7 5 - . 1 3 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 8 7 . 7 7 2 . 4 1 5 . 5 4 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 3 7 . 0 6 4 •  - . 4 4 1 * - . 4 1 6 *
s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 6 2 . 7 6 5 . 0 3 1 . 0 4 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 1 6 - . 0 0 9 - . 4 5 1 * - . 4 0 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 4 0 . 9 6 8 . 0 2 7 . 0 5 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
> e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 7 - . 2 5 6 - . 4 1 6 * - . 3 9 0
l i e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 2 . 2 2 7 . 0 4 3 . 0 5 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 6 - . 1 2 6 . 6 0 1 * * . 5 6 8 * *
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 2 4 . 5 5 7 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 4
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
f i e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 9 9 . 1 6 2 - . 2 0 2 - . 1 5 9
e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 4 4 . 4 5 0 . 3 4 3 . 4 5 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 2 - . 0 6 5 - . 3 7 2 - . 3 6 2
e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 3 7 . 7 6 4 . 0 7 4 . 0 8 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 9 4 - . 6 1 3 * - . 3 5 3 - . 3 1 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 2 2 . 0 4 5 . 2 8 6 . 3 4 3
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
l i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 2 0 - . 1 9 3 - . 4 1 1 - . 3 7 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 0 3 . 4 0 2 . 0 6 4 . 0 9 3
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
e b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d  e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 8 9 - . 1 1 2 - . 2 9 8 - . 2 5 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 7 8 . 6 0 2 . 1 5 7 . 2 2 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 6 2 - . 0 9 7 - . 3 8 5 - . 3 5 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 7 3 . 6 5 1 . 0 6 3 . 0 8 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 3 - . 0 8 6 - . 0 6 5 - . 0 1 8
s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 4 2 . 6 8 8 . 7 6 2 . 9 3 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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Correlations
F r X R u p r e a n F r X R n p r e a n F r R X u p o a F r R X n p o a
n o t  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 1 8 . 1 9 9 - . 1 9 2 - . 1 1 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 0 7 . 3 5 1 . 3 6 8 . 6 0 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 7 4 . 1 7 9 - . 0 2 5 - . 0 4 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 1 7 . 4 0 3 . 9 0 9 . 8 5 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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Correlations
F r R X u p r e d e F r R X n p r e d e F r X R u F p r e a n F r X R n F p r e a n
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 5 5 - . 0 2 6 - . 3 2 8 - . 3 9 3
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 9 9 . 9 0 6 . 1 1 8 . 0 5 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
p N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 0 1 . 0 3 7 - . 2 5 7 - . 1 9 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 9 5 . 8 6 3 . 2 2 5 . 3 5 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 5 6 - . 0 9 6 - . 0 9 8 - . 2 3 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 9 4 . 6 5 5 . 6 4 8 . 2 7 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 9 . 1 1 0 - . 2 4 7 - . 1 1 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 8 6 . 6 0 7 . 2 4 5 . 6 0 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 9 2 . 1 5 9 - . 0 5 8 - . 0 4 9
l e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 7 0 . 4 5 8 . 7 8 8 . 8 2 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 7 5 . 1 2 2 . 0 5 0 - . 0 8 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 1 4 . 5 6 9 . 8 1 5 . 6 8 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 4 0 - . 2 8 3 - . 1 8 8 - . 2 8 7
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 5 9 . 1 8 0 . 3 7 9 . 1 7 4
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
/ s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 7 8 - . 3 0 6 - . 0 1 4 - . 0 6 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 8 9 . 1 4 6 . 9 4 8 . 7 6 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 5 2 . 1 9 2 . 0 8 9 . 0 9 7
y e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 7 8 . 3 6 8 . 6 7 8 . 6 5 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
b r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 0 2 - . 0 0 8 - . 0 8 1 - . 1 5 8
w e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 9 4 . 9 7 1 . 7 0 8 . 4 6 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
l a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 7 - . 2 0 1 - . 3 2 5 - . 5 4 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 4 1 . 5 5 4 . 3 3 0 ; 0 8 7
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
i r a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 2 0 - . 1 6 7 - . 1 1 0 - . 2 5 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 0 3 . 4 6 9 . 6 3 6 . 2 6 5
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
S l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 6 . 0 9 2 . 0 0 1 - . 0 9 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 9 0 . 6 7 0 . 9 9 6 . 6 6 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
’ o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 1 6 - . 0 4 0 - . 0 3 5 - . 1 4 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 4 1 . 8 5 1 . 8 7 0 . 4 8 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
’ o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 7 9 . 0 7 6 . 0 5 8 - . 0 5 3
) i s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 1 5 . 7 2 6 . 7 8 9 . 8 0 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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Correlations
F r R X u p r e d e F r R X n p r e d e F r X R u F p r e a n F r X R n F p r e a n
o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 3 7 . 1 4 8 . 1 6 7 . 1 6 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 2 2 . 4 9 1 . 4 3 5 . 4 5 3
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
w e n t s  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 3 6 8 . 3 5 0 . 2 3 6 . 1 9 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 7 7 . 0 9 4 . 2 6 6 . 3 6 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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C o r r e l a t i o n s
F r R X u F p o a F r R X n F p o a F r R X u F p r e d e F r R X n F p r e d e
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 7 8 - . 3 6 5 . 0 2 7 . 1 1 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 6 8 . 0 7 9 . 9 0 0 . 6 1 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 9 3 - . 2 5 6 . 0 4 3 . 2 6 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 6 5 . 2 2 7 . 8 4 0 . 2 0 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
t i t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 7 6 - . 3 1 3 . 0 6 4 - . 0 2 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 7 0 . 1 3 7 . 7 6 5 . 9 0 4
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 5 7 - . 1 1 1 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 4 6 4 . 6 0 5 . 9 6 2 . 7 7 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 2 7 * - . 4 0 4 . 0 8 6 . 0 3 6
e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 3 7 . 0 5 0 . 6 8 8 . 8 6 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
f d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 9 3 * - . 4 4 7 * . 1 6 3 . 0 9 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 1 4 . 0 2 8 . 4 4 6 . 6 5 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 5 3 * - . 4 2 3 * - . 1 8 1 - . 2 3 0
a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 2 6 . 0 3 9 . 3 9 7 . 2 8 0
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 6 2 3 * * . 5 8 4 * * - . 1 7 7 - . 2 3 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 0 1 . 0 0 3 . 4 0 8 . 2 7 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
; n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 1 3 - . 1 7 2 . 1 6 0 . 2 7 9
j e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 1 7 . 4 2 1 . 4 5 6 . 1 8 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
a r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 4 9 - . 3 4 4 . 0 4 1 . 0 2 0
y e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 9 5 . 1 0 0 . 8 5 1 . 9 2 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
‘a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 7 0 - . 3 7 1 . 0 3 2 . 0 8 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 6 2 . 2 6 1 . 9 2 5 . 8 0 6
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 4 2 8 - . 4 0 0 - . 0 7 9 - . 1 4 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 5 3 . 0 7 3 . 7 3 4 . 5 4 0
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
i l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 7 2 - . 2 3 9 . 2 4 2 . 2 2 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 9 9 . 2 6 0 . 2 5 5 . 2 8 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 5 3 - . 3 3 1 . 0 8 2 . 0 4 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 0 9 0 . 1 1 4 . 7 0 2 . 8 1 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
:o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 3 9 - . 0 0 4 . 2 4 7 . 2 1 1
D i s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 5 8 . 9 8 6 . 2 4 5 . 3 2 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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C o r r e l a t i o n s
F r R X u F p o a F r R X n F p o a F r R X u F p r e d e F r R X n F p r e d e
n o t  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 5 - . 1 2 0 . 1 7 7 . 1 2 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 3 7 . 5 7 8 . 4 0 8 . 5 4 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 1 0 - . 0 1 8 . 4 0 5 * . 3 1 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 6 2 . 9 3 4 . 0 5 0 . 1 3 1
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
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Correlations
F r R X u p o d F r R X n p o d F r R X u F p o d F r R X n F p o d
n i g h t m a r e s  e a c h  y e a r P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 1 - . 2 4 9 - . 0 5 8 - . 2 3 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 0 5 . 2 4 1 . 7 8 8 . 2 7 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e N m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 7 1 - . 1 9 0 - . 1 2 9 - . 0 3 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 7 4 0 . 3 7 3 . 5 4 8 . 8 8 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
j h t m a r e  d i s t r e s s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 3 2 4 - . 3 6 1 - . 3 1 3 - . 3 4 0
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 1 2 2 . 0 8 3 . 1 3 7 . 1 0 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i u s a l  s c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 1 2 8 . 1 0 6 . 1 9 8 . 1 7 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 5 1 . 6 2 1 . 3 5 4 . 4 0 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 5 0 . 1 8 2 . 0 6 8 . 2 0 6
j e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 1 6 . 3 9 4 . 7 5 3 . 3 3 5
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
i r d e r l i n e  p e r s o n a l i t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 0 8 6 . 1 9 1 - . 1 0 2 . 0 0 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 8 9 . 3 7 0 . 6 3 6 . 9 8 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  N e u r o t i c i s m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 7 0 - . 2 7 9 - . 3 2 0 - . 2 9 0
; a l e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 0 3 . 1 8 7 . 1 2 8 . 1 6 9
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
s e n c k  L i e  S c a l e P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 2 7 - . 0 3 8 . 0 6 5 - . 1 3 9
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 0 1 . 8 5 9 . 7 6 4 . 5 1 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
e n e r a l  H e a l t h P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 8 9 - . 0 0 8 - . 2 5 3 - . 2 4 6
u e s t i o n n a i r e S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 7 6 . 9 7 1 . 2 3 2 . 2 4 7
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
a r t m a n n  B o u n d a r y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 4 3 . 0 6 2 - . 0 4 7 . 0 2 2
u e s t S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 8 4 3 . 7 7 2 . 8 2 8 . 9 1 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
l a t e  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 0 9 - . 1 8 9 - . 0 5 2 - . 1 6 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 3 7 . 5 7 7 . 8 7 9 . 6 2 4
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f a i t  A n x i e t y P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 4 9 - . 0 4 4 - . 2 0 7 - . 2 1 8
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 1 9 . 8 5 1 . 3 6 9 . 3 4 3
N 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
l o b a l  S e v e r i t y  I d e x P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 3 0 - . 1 6 0 - . 0 8 2 - . 1 0 6
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 5 4 6 . 4 5 7 . 7 0 2 . 6 2 2
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m  T o t a l P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 2 1 0 - . 1 3 7 - . 1 4 6 - . 1 7 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 3 2 5 . 5 2 4 . 4 9 6 . 4 1 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
o s i t i v e  S y m p t o m P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 0 2 2 . 0 8 4 . 0 3 0 - . 0 3 3
i s t r e s s  I n d e x S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 9 1 9 . 6 9 5 . 8 9 0 . 8 7 8
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
I ' —  T
Correlations
F r R X u p o d F r R X n p o d F r R X u F p o d F r R X n F p o d
n  o f  4  c h i l d h o o d  i t e m s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n - . 1 1 0 . 1 5 2 - . 2 1 8 - . 0 0 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 6 1 0 . 4 7 8 . 3 0 7 . 9 9 6
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
‘e v e n t s P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n . 2 6 7 . 2 2 6 . 3 5 7 . 2 8 7
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) . 2 0 7 . 2 8 8 . 0 8 7 . 1 7 4
N 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
C o r r e l a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 . 0 5  l e v e l  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) .
’  C o r r e l a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 . 0 1  l e v e l  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) .
relations
Appendix Table 15 - Difference between nightmares and bad dreams in 
frequency and intensity of emotions
Difference between nightmares and 
bad dreams
Wilcoxon test statistic
Frequency of anxiety/fear z = -2.99* (0.03)
Frequency of anger z = -0.76 (0.44)
Frequency of shame z = 0.12 (0.91)
Frequency of sad z = -1.64 (0.10)
Frequency of joy z = -0.76 (0.44)
Frequency of love z = -1.25 (0.21)
Frequency of surprise z = -1.82 (0.07)
Intensity of anxiety/fear when present z = -3.75 (<.01)
Intensity of anger when present z = - 0.12 (0.99)
Intensity of shame when present
Intensity of sad when present z = -1.97 (0.05)
Intensity of joy when present z = -0.95 (0.34)
Intensity of love when present z = - 1.27 (0.20)
Intensity of surprise when present z = -0.97 (0.33)
Intensity of anxiety/fear per dream z = -1.75 (0.08)
Intensity of anger per dream z = -2.05 (0.04)
Intensity of shame per dream z = -0.38 (0.70)
Intensity of sad per dream z =  1.92 (0.05)
Intensity of joy per dream z = -2.23 (0.03)
Intensity of love per dream z = - 0.45 (0.65)
Intensity of surprise per dream z = -1.21 (0.22)
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PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET: DREAM RECALL AND SLEEP 
APNOEA
Dear Sir/Madam
We are researching quality and frequency of dreams in patients who may be suffering from 
obstructive sleep apnoea.
If  you are willing please could you take home the enclosed sheets and report any dreams for the 
next ten days. Please bring these sheets back with you when you attend for your sleep study. 
We would like to repeat these questionnaires again for ten days only when on treatment should 
you require CPAP.
All information is kept strictly confidential and no individuals can be identified in any final 
analysis. You are free to withdraw at any time and this will not affect your ongoing treatment in 
any way.
For more information, please contact either the above number or Samantha Fisher on 01792 
205678 Ext. 4616.
Thank you very much indeed for any help you can offer.
Yours sincerely
D r K e ir  L E W IS
S en ior L ectu rer  and
C on su ltan t in R esp ira tory  M ed ic in e
S am an th a  F IS H E R  
P o st-g ra d u a te  R esearch er  
S w an sea  U n iversity
v-Os. NHStargret  Price OBE, MA heaim WALES Paul M. Barnett
'hairman/Cadeirydd ‘ ' BRBrI Prom otion j  G T C i Chief Executive/Prif Weithredwr
W  wa,es
The Trust welcomes correspondence in Welsh or English Y moe'r Ymddiriedolaeth yn croesawu gohebioeth yn Gymraeg neu yn Soesneg
ii ju
j v  slu d j 2 .
Version Oi Patien t Consent Form
08/03/05
Title: Dream recail in patients with sleep apnoea before and after 
treatment with CPAP.
Centre number...........................
Study number.............................
Patient identification number for this trial..............................
Name of researchers: Ms Samantha Fisher, Dr Keir Lewis, Robin Ghosal &
Dr. MarkBlagrove.
Contact telephone number: University of Wales Swansea.
Ms. Samantha Fisher- 01792 205678 (ext 4616)
Dr. Mark Blagrove -  01792 295586 
Dr Keir Lewis -  01554 756567
Please initial Box
1.1 confirm that I have read and understood the information
sheet dated....................... (version number ) for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2 .1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my
medical care or legal rights being affected. ------------
3 .1 understand that the study is non therapeutic and for research 
purposes only.
4 .1 agree to take part in the above study.
Name of Patient Bate Signature
Name of Person taking consent Bate Signature
Researcher Bate Signature
Patient’s initials:   Hospital No.
Day 1
1. Did you dream  last night? Y es /  No
2. H ow  would you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 . 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. D id the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Y es / N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very
RELAXED___________
e.g. you may feel serene, calm 
untroubled, peaceful, composed
quite quite very
ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel tense, nervous 
jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite
HAPPY
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, 
playful, light-hearted, joyful
quite very
DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel sad, dejected, 
lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Day 2
1. Did you dream  last night? Yes /  No
2. H ow  w ould you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 . 6  7
3. Did the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Y es /  N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
RELAXED
very quite
e.g. you may feel serene, calm 
untroubled, peaceful, composed
quite very
ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel tense, nervous 
jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite
HAPPY
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, 
playful, light-hearted, joyful
quite very
DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel sad, dejected, 
lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Patient’s initials: Hospital No.
Day 3
1. D id you dream  last night? Y e s / N o
2. H ow  w ould  you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. D id the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  w ake you up? Y es / No
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite very
R ELAX ED ______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel serene, calm e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________ DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Day 4
1. D id you dream  last night? Y e s / N o
2. H ow  w ould you rate the overall m ood o f the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. D id the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Y es / N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite very
RELA XED______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel serene, calm e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________ DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Patient’s initials: Hospital No.
D a v 5
1. D id you dream  last night? Y es /  N o
2. H ow  w ould you ra te the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dreams?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Did the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Yes /  N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite very
RELAX ED ______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel serene, calm e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________ DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Day 6
1. Did you dream  last night? Yes /  N o
2. H ow  w ould you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. D id the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream wake you up? Y es /  N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of w'ords under each line; they are related to the
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite very
RELAXED______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel serene, calm e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________DEPRES SED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Patient’s initials: Hospital No.
Day 7
1. Did you dream  last night? Y e s / N o
2. H ow  w ould  you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Did the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Y es /  N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite
RELAXED
e.g. you may feel serene, calm 
untroubled, peaceful, composed
quite very
ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel tense, nervous 
jittery, shaky, uneasy
HAPPY
very quite
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, 
playful, light-hearted, joyful
quite very
DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel sad, dejected, 
lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Day 8
1. Did you dream  last night? Y es /  N o
2. H ow  w ould you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Did the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Y es / N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the tw'O sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite . very
RELAXED______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel serene, calm e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________ DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Patient’s initials: Hospital No.
Day 9
1. Did you dream  last night? Y e s / N o
2. H ow  w ould you rate the overall m ood o f  the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Did the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  wake you up? Y es / No
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite very
RELAXED______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may fee] serene, calm e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________ DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
Day 10
1. Did you dream  last night? Y es / N o
2. H ow  w ould you rate the overall m ood o f the dream  or dream s?
very moderately slightly neither or slightly moderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Did the unpleasant em otions or events in the dream  w ake you up? Y es / N o
Please could you indicate how depressed or happy you feel, and how anxious or relaxed you 
feel. It may help you to look at the two sets of words under each line; they are related to the 
four main emotions. Please put a cross on the line according to how you feel.
very quite never quite very
RELAXED______________________________________________________ ANXIOUS
e.g. you may feel serene, calm • e.g. you may feel tense, nervous
untroubled, peaceful, composed jittery, shaky, uneasy
very quite never quite very
HAPPY______________________________________________________ DEPRESSED
e.g. you may feel, cheerful, elated, e.g. you may feel sad, dejected,
playful, light-hearted, joyful lonely, downhearted, gloomy
8/3/05 
Version 1 
Follow up letter to be sent 3 months after CPAP has started,
Dear
Thank you for taking part in the research project assessing sleep and dreaming. As 
you may recall it is our intention to continue this research by assessing any changes in 
sleep following treatment with continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP). I have 
enclosed a questionnaire and would be very grateful if you could complete the 
questions again daily for 14 days. I have enclosed a stamped addressed envelop so 
that the questionnaire can be returned to us.
May I take this opportunity to thank you for all your help with the project. A copy of 
the findings will be available in due course. If you would like us to send you a copy 
please complete the details below and send the slip back to us.
Thank you,
Yours sincerely,
Samantha Fisher
.....x-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Yes I would like a summary of the research findings.
Name:
P R I F Y S G O L  C Y M R U  A B E R T A W E  t j g i l j  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  W A L E S  S W A N S E A
Yr Adran Seicoleg Departm ent of Psychology
Parc Singleton, A bertaw e SA2 8PP Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP
2 d - 0 < d .
Samantha Fisher
Department of Psychology 05/05/2004
Dear Samantha,
I am writing to inform you that the Departmental Ethics Committee has considered your 
application “Dream recall and sleep apnoea”, to be carried out in collaboration with Dr. 
Keir Lewis. I am happy to say that the application has been approved.
Good luck with the study.
Youps-sincerely,
Professor David Clark 
Chair of Ethics Committee
P en n a eth  yr A d ra n  • Professor Rodger LI. Wood • H ea d  o f D ep a rtm en t  
T el 0 1 7 9 2  2 9 5 2 7 8  F ax 0 1 7 9 2  2 9 5 6 7 9  E m a il  p s y c h o lo g y @ s w a n s e a .a c .u k
>ck 2 D :
Ethical Committee application
Title of the investigation: Dream recall and Sleep Apnoea
Names and statuses of investigators: Dr. Keir Lewis (Senior Lecturer and 
Consultant in Respiratory Medicine) Dr. Mark Blagrove and Samantha Fisher.
Category of application:
Practical class - program o f study - single experiment- grant application -other 
(please specify) routine - non-routine.
A ‘single experiment’ which is considered to be ‘routine’.
Brief description of purposes:
A study conducted by Gross and Lavie (1994) investigated the impact of 
successful treatment of apnoeas on dreaming. Although they found that there 
was no significant systematic incorporation of the apnoea stimulus into the 
dream reports they reported that dreams after apnoeas were significantly 
more negative than after healthy sleep. This significant difference in 
‘emotional colouring’ was found to be independent of dream length. Very little 
research has assessed the frequency of nightmares in sleep apnoea patients. 
We suggest that nightmare frequency may take a U shape function where 
patients with apnoea of ‘moderate’ severity are most at risk from nightmares. 
We suggest that patients with less severe apnoea may not experience 
sufficient distress for the occurrence of nightmares, whereas, the sleep of 
those with severe apnoea may be too fragmented to allow for the occurrence 
of REM nightmares. Furthermore, we are interested in the how levels of 
anxiety and depression are affected by CPAP treatment.
Methods:
Patients who attend Dr Lewis’ clinic at Prince Phillip Hospital, Llanelli will be 
asked if they are willing to complete a dream diary for 10 days before and 
after treatment with continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP). Each 
morning patients will be asked to state if they had a dream or nightmare (no 
content is required) and how anxious or depressed they feel on two visual 
analogue scales.
Ethical considerations; Does the study involve any o f the potentially 
controversial procedures listed below?
Administration of drugs - collection o f body fluids or tissue -  unpleasant 
stimulation or procedures-collection of confidential information -  deprivation -  
active deception -  withholding information -  payment
Are any other potentially controversial procedures involved? Please specify? 
Indicate how it is intended to minimise any risk o f harm or distress, which 
could arise from each identified procedure.
Patients will be informed that all information is kept strictly confidential and 
that no individual can be identified from the final analysis.
It will be made clear to patients that their names may be stored on a computer 
whilst the study is in progress but will be destroyed afterwards. Data will be 
registered under the data protection act. It will be emphasised to patients that 
they do not have to take part in the study and can refuse to do so if they wish 
without giving a reason. Patients will be informed of their right to withdraw 
from the study at any time and that this will not affect their ongoing treatment 
in any way.
Informed consent: Please state how informed consent will be obtained. Attach 
copies o f the consent form to be used plus any participant information sheets.
A consent form and patient information form will be issued to all participants, 
which must be signed before the study commences (see appendices). 
Participants will be told exactly what they are required to do and informed that 
they may withdraw from the study at any time. Again they will be assured full 
confidentiality.
fo/vw'AvVNee \
Canolfan Gwasanaethau Busnes 
Business Services Centre
Ms Sam antha Fisher 
Department of P sych ology  
University of W ales S w a n sea  
Singleton Park 
S w an sea
SA2 8PP 15 April 200 5
Dear Ms Fisher,
Full title of study: Dream frequency in patients with sleep apnoea before and after
treatment with CPAP
REC reference no: 05/WMW01/20
Thank you for your letter of 12 April 2005 , responding to the C om m ittee’s request for further 
information on the above research [and submitting revised documentation].
The further information h as been  considered on behalf of the C om m ittee by the Chairman.
Confirmation of ethical opinion
On behalf of the Com m ittee, I am p leased  to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
ab ove research on the b asis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
docum entation [as revised].
The favourable opinion ap p lies to the following research site:
Site: Carm arthenshire NHS Trust
Principal Investigator: Ms Sam antha Fisher, PhD Student
Conditions of approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you com ply with the conditions se t  out in the 
attached docum ent. You are advised  to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
The final list of docum ents reviewed and approved by the Com m ittee is a s  follows:
• Application form
• CV
• Protocol, version 1, 8 /3 /05
• Invitation letter to s leep y  control participants, version 2, 11 /4 /05
• Follow-up letter, version 1, 8 /3 /05
• Letter to GP, version 1, 8 /3/05
• Patient C onsent Form, version 2, 11/4/05
• Patient C onsent Form (control group 1), version 2, 11/4/05
• Patient C onsent Form (control group 2), version 2, 11/4/05
S O P s  v e r s i o n  1 . 0  d a t e d  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 4  C a n o l f a n  G w a s a n a e t h a u  B u s n e s  B u s i n e s s  S e r v i c e s  C e n t r e
S L 1 5  F a v o u r a b l e  o p i n i o n  f o l l o w i n g  d d s t s / t i e E M M Z i i r ^ H i u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  S t  D a v i d ' s  H o s p i t a l
G IG
NHS
CYMRU
WALES
C a e r f y r d d i n
Sir Gaerfyrddin, SA31 3YH 
Ffon: 01267 225225 WHTN: 1820 
Ffacs: 01267 225060  
DX QW3DYF 121550
C a r m a r t h e n
Carmarthenshire, SA31 3YH 
Telephone: 01267 225225 WHTN: 1820 
Fax: 01267 225060  
DX QW3DYF 12.1550
rhan o Bwrdd lechyd  Lleol P o w y s / part of P o w y s Local H ealth Board
• Patient Information S h eet, version 2, 11/4/05
• Patient Information S h eet (control group 1), version 2, 11/4/05
• Patient Information S h eet (control group 2), version 2, 11/4/05
• Q uestionnaire, version 2, 11/4/05
Management approval
The study may not com m en ce until final m anagem ent approval has been confirmed by the 
organisation hosting the research.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research m ust 
obtain m an agem en t approval from the relevant host organisation before com m encing any 
research procedures. W here a substantive contract is not held with the host organisation, it 
m ay be n ec e ssa r y  for an honorary contract to be issued  before approval for the research can  
be given.
Notification of other bodies
W e shall notify the research sponsor [the host organisation] that the study has a favourable  
ethical opinion.
Statement of compliance (from 1 May 2004)
The Com m ittee is constituted in accordance with the G overnance Arrangem ents for 
R esearch  Ethics C om m ittees (July 2001) and com plies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for R esearch  Ethics C om m ittees in the UK.
R E C  r e f e r e n c e  n u m b e r :  0 5 / W M W 0 1 / 2 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ P l e a s e  q u o t e  t h i s  n u m b e r  o n  a l l  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
Yours sincerely,
Dr Mark Turtle
Chairman
Enclosures Standard approval conditions [SL-AC1 or SL-AC2]
Copy: H ost organisation
S O P s  v e r s i o n  1 . 0  d a t e d  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 4
S L 1 5  F a v o u r a b l e  o p i n i o n  f o l l o w i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n
W e s t  W a l e s  G e n e r a l  H o sp i ta l
C arm arthen SA31 2AF
C a rm a rth e n sh ire  nhs trust Ysbyty Cyfiredinol ooHkwin cyn,™
YMDDIRIEDOLAETH G IG  S I ?  O o O r f y r t M i u  Coerfyrddin SA31 2AF
Telephone: 0 1 2 6 7  2351 5 1  
WHTN: 1827
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
D i r e c t o r :  D r  I m r o z  S a l a m
R & D  O f f i c e r :  I n g a r e t  E d e n ,  e x t  2 1 4 9  e m a i l :  i n q a r e t . e d e n @ c a r m a r t h e n . w a l e s . n h s . u k
S e c r e t a r y :  A l i s o n  M a y ,  e x t  2 1 4 9
24 August 2005
Samantha Fisher 
Postgraduate R esearcher  
Psychology Department 
Sw ansea University 
Singleton Park 
Singleton 
SWASEA
Dear Sam antha
Project title: Nightmare frequency in patients with Sleep Apnoea before and after
treatment with CPAP 
R&D Reference: 2005.010
We write to confirm that the above project has received approval from Carmarthenshire NHS Trust to 
proceed and w e en c lo se  your application form duly signed by Dr Imroz Salam , director of R&D. Trust 
approval is subject to the project receiving approval from the Local R esearch Ethics Committee, and we 
acknowledge receipt of their letter of favourable opinion dated 29 March 2005 reference 05AA/MW01/20.
Under R esearch G overnance, and a s  lead researcher, you are required to:
1. Adhere to the protocol approved by the LREC and inform the R&D Office of any ch an ges  
(including ch a n g es to the end date of the project) and any ch an ges you refer to the Local 
R esearch Ethics Committee
2. Inform the R&D Office of any adverse events that may occur, whilst a lso  reporting th ese  
through the proper channels in the Trust.
3. Com plete any interim and final reports requested by the R&D office. T h ese are required every 
six months, or at the end of the project if sooner.
4. Comply with the R esearch G overnance Framework and co-operate with any audit inspection of 
the project files. W e en close an audit checklist which you may find useful.
5. Ensure that your research com plies with the Data Protection Act 1998. The Trust Data 
Protection Officer and the Caldicott Guardian have approved the project.
Please note that R&D approval from this Trust does not give approval for the research to take 
place at any other Trust: if you wish to extend the project to another Trust, local R&D approval 
must be sought and the local research ethics committee contacted for advice.
We en close a summary of your responsibilities a s  lead researcher under the R esearch G overnance 
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A p p en d ix  22 - G rap h  sh o w in g  th e  q u ad ra tic  re g ress io n  cu rve  b e tw een  d ip  ra te  
m easu re  an d  n ig h tm are  freq u en cy  fo r all p a r tic ip an ts
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Appendix 23: Retrospective dream questionnaire used in study 3.
Gender Male / Female Age____________
Job title_______________________
Number of years in current p o s t_____________ years
The fo llo w in g  q u estio n s  ask  a b o u t y o u r  s leep  on an average  n ig h t (fo r  a rest d a y ), p lea se  
answer in th e sp a ce  p ro v id ed
• On average (on a rest day), what time do you usually turn the lights o ff  in order to go to
s 1 eep?_______________________________
• How long does it norm ally take you to fall asleep (on a rest day)?___________________
• What time do you norm ally wake up (on a rest day)?_____________________________
• Between falling asleep and waking up, how much time are you usually awake during the
n ig h t?___________ hours a n d ______________ minutes
• How is your sleep norm ally (on a rest day)? Please circle on o f the following responses.
1. very poor
2. rather poor
3. neither poor nor good
4. rather good
5. very good
• How many dreams do you have each week?________________________
• If you do not have one dream per week how many do you have a m o n th ____________________
• On average how would you rate the overall mood o f your dreams? Please circle on o f the 
following responces..
very moderately slightly neither or slightly m oderately very
unpleasant unpleasant unpleasant mixed pleasant pleasant pleasant 
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Version 03 Patient Consent Form
17/03/04
Centre n u m b er..................................
Study n u m b er...................................
Patient identification number for this trial.....................................
Name o f researchers: M s Samantha Fisher, Dr. Mark Blagrove and Professor Rodger Wood.
Contact telephone number: University o f W ales Swansea.
Ms. Samantha Fisher- 01792 205678 (ext 4616)
Dr. M ark Blagrove -  01792 295586
Professor Rodger W ood -  01792 295778
Please initial Box
1 .1 confirm that I have read and understood the information
sheet dated ............................(version num ber............. ) for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my 
medical care or legal rights being affected. --------------
3 . 1 understand that sections o f any o f my medical notes may be____________ _________
Looked at by the three names researchers; Professor Rodger
W ood, Dr. M ark Blagrove and Ms. Samantha Fisher. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to my records.
4 . 1 understand that the study is non therapeutic and for research 
purposes only.
5. I agree to take part in the above study.
Name of Patient Date Signature
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature
Researcher Date Signature
P en n a eth  yr A d ran  • Professor Rodger LI. Wood • H ea d  o f  D ep artm en t  
Tel 0 1 7 9 2  2 9 5 2 7 8  F ax 0 1 7 9 2  2 9 5 6 7 9  E m a il p s y c h o lo g y @ s w a n s e a .a c .u k
, -^----------J
Canolfan Gwasanaethau Busnes 
LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE Business Services Centre
Covering : BRIDGEND - NEATH PORT TALBOT &
Chairman :  M r  S c o t t  P e g l e r  -  Medicines Information & CITmcal Pharmacist 
Secretary :  M r s  N i c o l a  J o h n  -  C o n s u l t a n t  i n  P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  
Administrator :  M i s s  L a w m a r y  C h a m p i o n  
D i r e c t  T e l e p h o n e  :  0 1 7 9 2  -  6 0 7 4 1 6  
e-mail : lawmary.champion@ bscswansea.wales.nhs.uk
U:\ETHICS\CORRESPONDENCDi2004.CORRESPONDENCE  
\MARCH.MINUTE.LETTERS.04.wpd
Dr M Blagrove, Professor R Wood &Jy1s S
Fisher Miss Lawmary Champion
University o f W ales Swansea Protocol No.:
Department of Psychology Please always Quote
Singleton Park
SW ANSEA SA2 8PP (01792) 458066 Ext.7416
D i r e c t  L i n e  0 1 7 9 2  6 0 7 4 1 6
19 March 2004
Dear Dr Blagrove, Professor Wood and Ms Fisher 
2004. 021 : Sleep quality and dreaming after head injury
Thank you for your undated letter received on 25th February 2004, enclosing 
Amendments requested by the Committee. The following documents have now been 
approved and registered: Application Form Version 2 dated 4/03/04; Patient 
Information Form for the control group Version 3 dated 17/3/04; Patient Information 
Sheet for those who have suffered brain injury Version dated 17.3.04; Consent Form 
Control Group Version 3 dated 17.3.04 and Consent (Head Injury) Form Version 3 
dated 17.3.04. This Study has now been approved.
Please quote our Reference Number in all future correspondence.
Please also note:
1 The enclosed document is confidential and not for publication
2 Any publication resulting from the Protocol must define how subjects were 
chosen and to what extent they were volunteers.
3 That the form of consent must be read and signed by each subject or, if oral 
consent has been approved by the Committee, that the consent of each subject 
must be appropriately recorded. In either case, forms and records must be kept 
for subsequent examination, if required, by the Committee
4 That changes to the Protocol as approved must be referred to the Committee
5 Ethical approval does not imply acceptance of materials and drug costs by the 
Authorities or provider units
6 Any untoward incident which occurs in connection with this Protocol must be 
reported baqk to the Chairman of the Committee without delay.
Yours sincerely
v k j
NICOLA JOHN - CONSULTANT IN PHARMACEUTICAL PUBLIC HEATH 
NATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE & SECRETARY OF THE LOCAL 
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
cc Mr Dorian Edwards R & D  Support Office
Canolfan Gwasanaethau Busnes B u sin ess S erv ices Centre
41 Stryd Fawr 41 High Street
Abertawe, SA1 1LT S w a n sea , SA1 1LT
N H S  Ffon: 0 1 7 9 2  4 5 8 0 6 6  WHTN: 1780 Telephone: 0 1 7 9 2  4 5 8 0 6 6  WHTN: 1780
 ^ f | Lr  Ffacs: 0 1 7 9 2  6 0 7 5 3 3  Fax: 0 1 7 9 2  6 0 7 5 3 3
Y DX 121810, Abertawe 7 DX 121810 , S w a n sea  7
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Date_______________________________
Please read the following questions and put a tick in the appropriate box.
■ How often do you wake up and remember a dream?
at least once a least once at least once less than once never
a week month a year a year
□ □ □ □ □
A nightmare is a vivid dream that is frightening or disturbing, the events of which y o u  
can remember clearly and in detail on awakening.
■ How often do you have a nightmare?
at least once a least once at least once less than once never
a week month a year a year
□ □ □ □ □
■ Is having a nightmare a problem or concern for you?
yes no
□ □
■ Have you recently had the same nightmare more than once?
yes no
□ □
A night terror is a sudden awakening in fear, possible accompanied bv a scream, but 
where you do not remember any dream.
■ How often do you have night terrors?
at least once a least once at least once less than once never
a week month a year a year
□ □ □ □ □
■ Please could you state any medication you are taking below:
